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This paper examines the ability of the Indian Army to conduct the operational art of war. India's size, geographical location, and increasing world economic importance will make her a more influential member of the world order in the next several years. This may necessitate that her military power be used, either defensively or offensively to achieve a strategic aim(s). An understanding of her Army's ability to conduct the operational art of war is important in the event that the U.S. becomes involved, either as an ally or an adversary, in any future conflict that may result from India's use of military power. The paper reviews the theory of operational art and then looks for historical and current evidence of the Indian Army's ability to conduct the operational art of war. Particular attention is paid the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict in the historical section. The current perspective section consists of the characteristics, organization, armament, equipment, and training of the Indian Army. The historical and current evidence will be analyzed and evaluated using the following four criteria: 1) the ability of the Indian Army to employ more than one army or equivalent, 2) the ability of the Indian Army to synchronize simultaneous and successive operations, 3) the logistical ability to support distributed operations, and 4) the ability of the Indian Army to conduct joint operations. An examination of the 1971 India-Pakistan War shows that the Indian Army exhibited a good ability to conduct the operational art of war in three of the four criteria areas. The current perspective reveals that the Indian Army is organized, equipped and trained in a manner that would support her ability to conduct the operational art of war in all of the criteria areas. All this does not imply that the Indian Army is without problems. What it does imply is that her army should be respected and understood in order to benefit the U.S. in any future alliance or adversarial relationship we migh