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This paper examines the economic and trade relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It analizes the current role of China in the world economy and the outlook for growth in the Chinese economy and its impact on global trade. Based on this, the article presents the main data of the growing presence of China in the international trade map of LAC and the evolution of Chinese FDI in the region. The article concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at improving the quality of economic and commercial links between China and LAC. Particular emphasis is given to the LAC's exports diversification oriented to China and Chinese investment's attraction oriented to manufactures, services and infrastructure.

Earlier this year China released a new defence White Paper. Like its predecessor two years ago, the paper leaves much unsaid - especially about China's maritime aspirations beyond its immediate waters. In contrast, the equivalent American document sets out a consistent picture of American aspirations, strategy and capability. By comparing the Chinese military budget with those of the US and its allies, it is clear that China is unlikely to be a peer competitor on the wider stage any time soon.

Benjamin Franklin describes how large sheets of paper are made in Europe. He also describes papermaking in China by way of contrast. This description was "communicated by Dr. Franklin to the American Philosophical Society, in which it was read, June 20, 1788."

China's increased presence in Latin America has raised alarm bells in the halls of government, the private sector and the mass media. In the span of one decade Chinese trade to the region has increased exponentially from $29 million in 2003 to $270 billion in 2012. Chinese sales of weapons, military training and cultural centers are steadily increasing in the region. This is causing many pundits to believe China's engagement in Latin America is part of a broader geopolitical strategy to counterbalance the U.S. pivot to Asia policy by challenging the U.S. in its strategic backyard. The paper will examine this concern by first exploring how self-image, history, and current economic motivations affect U.S. and Chinese policies in Latin America. The second part of the paper will provide an in-depth look at Chinese and U.S. policies in Latin America. The final section will assess the impact of those polices on cooperation between China and the United States. Despite concerns, China currently is not eclipsing U.S. influence in Latin America. China's presence in the region bears watching. Conflict with China in Latin America could distract the United States from engagement in the Asia Pacific region.

This scroll of an eagle in a pine tree is believed to represent a wish for strength in old age.

A colorful miniature model of a Chinese dragon head dance mask. The appearance of the dragon head is both fearsome and bold but it has a benevolent disposition, and it was an emblem to represent imperial authority.

The Chinese Southern style of the lion mask displayed here has a distinctive head with large eyes (of an eagle), a mirror on the forehead (demons are supposed to be scared of their own reflection), and a single horn at the center of the head (the source of his life) that was once removed from the head of the lion by the Jade Emperor because the lion was disrespectful. The costumed lion dancers perform appear at funerals, birthdays, the opening of new businesses, special events, and holidays.

"For decades, the United States has had massive and uncontested nuclear superiority over China. That may slowly be changing. Although it is unlikely that China will seek to sprint to parity in the near term, the United States progressively is reducing its nuclear forces while China slowly is expanding its own. The price of engaging China in multilateral nuclear arms control in the future may be formal acknowledgment that China has a right to parity. Even if multilateral arms control does not transpire, China may change its policy. This paper places the issue of nuclear parity in context by briefly examining what it has meant to the United States in the past relative to Russia and what it may mean, in a different context, to a distinctly different Chinese challenge."--Executive summary.

The United States is the world's preeminent military power due in large part to its technological superiority. This lead in innovative technology supporting national security also includes advances in new and green energy applications. A common ingredient enabling the production of many of these applications is a group of minerals known as rare earth elements (REEs). Two REEs in particular, the refined metals neodymium and samarium, are key components in the manufacture of miniature high-temperature resistant permanent magnets. These magnets are essential to scores of high-technology devices such as wind turbines, hybrid car engines, and computer hard drives. Moreover, they are critical for military applications including precision-guided munitions, tank navigation systems, and electronic countermeasures equipment. The world's demand for REEs is steadily increasing. Simultaneously, the supply of REEs is shrinking, or rather China, which annually produces 97% of the world market's rare earth minerals and controls some 37% of the planet's known reserves, is steadily reducing its output. China dramatically restricted its exports by 72% in the last 6 months of 2010 to satisfy its rapidly expanding national appetite for REEs. China also is progressively acquiring the industrial base to manufacture permanent magnets and their end-products at the expense of American businesses. The entire supply chain of REE permanent magnets is now in China. As the American military and industrial sectors continue their move toward increased reliance on miniaturized high-performance electronics and strive to adopt more energy-efficient technologies, there are concerns that the United States may trade its reliance on Middle East oil for dependence on REEs from China. This paper will illustrate how REEs have become a deeply ingrained need throughout the American economy and, in particular, how rare-earth magnets are now indispensible to the defense industry.

China's expanding influence into the LAC region along with growing Asia-Pacific and LAC relationships present challenges to the U.S. The complexity of the relationships between LAC and Asia-Pacific governments, to include China, suggest the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy is inadequate to address the cross-regional impacts. This paper explains political, economic, and military impacts and proposes a broader Pacific solution that links LAC into the U.S.' Asia rebalancing strategy. The political relationships between LAC and Chinese governments can undermine U.S. values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and international norms. China's soft power through economic statecraft increases their influence by providing trade and investment alternatives other than U.S. options. Increased cross-regional trade flows are also creating integrated supply chains. Last, Chinese arms sales, training exercises, and military education exchanges provide revenue and support their military modernization in Asia. These factors create one integrated problem, not two separate ones. Without a broader Pacific strategic option, the U.S. regional approach to the Asia-Pacific will result in reduced access to markets and future strategic risk to U.S. influence in both regions.

China has cautioned that the military components of the United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region complicates the region's security environment and believes U.S. actions are aimed directly at constraining China, ultimately harming its strategic interests. This paper examines the roots of this distrust and why U.S.-China military-to-military confidence building measures will be insufficient to overcome this distrust to improve the relationship between two militaries. Military-to-military relationship building efforts should instead focus more on developing crisis management and escalation control measures.