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We evaluate the actions of other individuals based upon a variety of movements that reveal critical information to guide decision making and behavioural responses. These signals convey a range of information about the actor, including their goals, intentions and internal mental states. Although progress has been made to identify cortical regions involved in action processing, the organising principles underlying our representation of actions still remains unclear. In this paper we investigated the conceptual space that underlies action perception by assessing which qualities are fundamental to the perception of human actions. We recorded 240 different actions using motion-capture and used these data to animate a volumetric avatar that performed the different actions. 230 participants then viewed these actions and rated the extent to which each action demonstrated 23 different action characteristics (e.g., avoiding-approaching, pulling-pushing, weak-powerful). We analysed these data using Exploratory Factor Analysis to examine the latent factors underlying visual action perception. The best fitting model was a four-dimensional model with oblique rotation. We named the factors: friendly-unfriendly, formidable-feeble, planned-unplanned, and abduction-adduction. The first two factors of friendliness and formidableness explained approximately 22% of the variance each, compared to planned and abduction, which explained approximately 7-8% of the variance each; as such we interpret this representation of action space as having 2 + 2 dimensions. A closer examination of the first two factors suggests a similarity to the principal factors underlying our evaluation of facial traits and emotions, whilst the last two factors of planning and abduction appear unique to actions., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

When encountering social scenes, there appears to be rapid and automatic detection of social interactions. Representations of interacting people appear to be bound together via a mechanism of joint attention, which results in enhanced memory, even when participants are unaware that memory is required. However, even though access is facilitated for socially bound representations, we predicted that the individual features of these representations are less efficiently encoded, and features can therefore migrate between the constituent interacting individuals. This was confirmed in Experiment 1, where overall memory for interacting compared with non-interacting dyads was facilitated but binding of features within an individual was weak, resulting in feature migration errors. Experiment 2 demonstrated the role of conscious strategic processing, where participants were aware that memory would be tested. With such awareness, attention can be focused on individual objects allowing the binding of features. The results support an account of two forms of processing: an initial automatic social binding process where interacting individuals are represented as one episode in memory facilitating access and a further stage where attention can be focused on each individual enabling the binding of features within individual objects.

Using visual search displays of interacting and non-interacting pairs, it has been demonstrated that detection of social interactions is facilitated. For example, two people facing each other are found faster than two people with their backs turned: an effect that may reflect social binding. However, recent work has shown the same effects with non-social arrow stimuli, where towards facing arrows are detected faster than away facing arrows. This latter work suggests a primary mechanism is an attention orienting process driven by basic low-level direction cues. However, evidence for lower level attentional processes does not preclude a potential additional role of higher-level social processes. Therefore, in this series of experiments we test this idea further by directly comparing basic visual features that orient attention with representations of socially interacting individuals. Results confirm the potency of orienting of attention via low-level visual features in the detection of interacting objects. In contrast, there is little evidence for the representation of social interactions influencing initial search performance., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Psychological models can only help improve intergroup relations if they accurately characterise the mechanisms underlying social biases. The claim that outgroups suffer dehumanization is near ubiquitous in the social sciences. We challenge the most prominent psychological model of dehumanization - infrahumanization theory - which holds outgroup members are subtly dehumanized by being denied human emotions. We examine the theory across seven intergroup contexts in thirteen pre-registered and highly powered experiments (N = 1690). We find outgroup members are not denied uniquely human emotions relative to ingroup members. Rather, they are ascribed prosocial emotions to a lesser extent but antisocial emotions to a greater extent. Apparent evidence for infrahumanization is better explained by ingroup preference, outgroup derogation and stereotyping. Infrahumanization theory may obscure more than it reveals about intergroup bias., (Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

There is growing interest in the visual and attentional processes recruited when human observers view social scenes containing multiple people. Findings from visual search paradigms have helped shape this emerging literature. Previous research has established that, when hidden amongst pairs of individuals facing in the same direction (leftwards or rightwards), pairs of individuals arranged front-to-front are found faster than pairs of individuals arranged back-to-back. Here, we describe a second, closely-related effect with important theoretical implications. When searching for a pair of individuals facing in the same direction (leftwards or rightwards), target dyads are found faster when hidden amongst distractor pairs arranged front-to-front, than when hidden amongst distractor pairs arranged back-to-back. This distractor arrangement effect was also obtained with target and distractor pairs constructed from arrows and types of common objects that cue visuospatial attention. These findings argue against the view that pairs of people arranged front-to-front capture exogenous attention due to a domain-specific orienting mechanism. Rather, it appears that salient direction cues (e.g., gaze direction, body orientation, arrows) hamper systematic search and impede efficient interpretation, when distractor pairs are arranged back-to-back., (Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Previous research suggests that patterns of ongoing thought are heterogeneous, varying across situations and individuals. The current study investigated the influence of multiple tasks and affective style on ongoing patterns of thought. We used 9 different tasks and measured ongoing thought using multidimensional experience sampling. A Principal Component Analysis of the experience sampling data revealed four patterns of ongoing thought: episodic social cognition, unpleasant intrusive, concentration and self focus. Linear Mixed Modelling was used to conduct a series of exploratory analyses aimed at examining contextual distributions of these thought patterns. We found that different task contexts reliably evoke different thought patterns. Moreover, intrusive and negative thought pattern expression were influenced by individual affective style (depression level). The data establish the influence of task context and intrinsic features on ongoing thought, highlighting the importance of documenting how thought patterns emerge in cognitive tasks with different requirements., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

People have a strong and reliable tendency to infer the character traits of strangers based solely on facial appearance. In five highly powered and pre-registered experiments, we investigate the relative merits of learning and nativist accounts of the origins of these first impressions. First, we test whether brief periods of training can establish consistent first impressions de novo. Using a novel paradigm with Greebles-a class of synthetic object with inter-exemplar variation that approximates that seen between individual faces-we show that participants quickly learn to associate appearance cues with trustworthiness (Experiments 1 and 2). In a further experiment, we show that participants easily learn a two-dimensional structure in which individuals are presented as simultaneously varying in both trustworthiness and competence (Experiment 3). Crucially, in the final two experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) we show that, once learned, these first impressions occur following very brief exposure (100 ms). These results demonstrate that first impressions can be rapidly learned and, once learned, take on features previously thought to hold only for innate first impressions (rapid availability). Taken together, these results highlight the plausibility of learning accounts of first impressions., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

Previous research has demonstrated that the tendency to form first impressions from facial appearance emerges early in development. We examined whether social referencing is one route through which these consistent first impressions are acquired. In Study 1, we show that 5- to 7-year-old children are more likely to choose a target face previously associated with positive non-verbal signals as more trustworthy than a face previously associated with negative non-verbal signals. In Study 2, we show that children generalise this learning to novel faces who resemble those who have previously been the recipients of positive non-verbal behaviour. Taken together, these data show one means through which individuals within a community could acquire consistent, and potentially inaccurate, first impressions of others faces. In doing so, they highlight a route through which cultural transmission of first impressions can occur., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

According to the dual model, outgroup members can be dehumanized by being thought to possess uniquely and characteristically human traits to a lesser extent than ingroup members. However, previous research on this topic has tended to investigate the attribution of human traits that are socially desirable in nature such as warmth, civility and rationality. As a result, it has not yet been possible to determine whether this form of dehumanization is distinct from intergroup preference and stereotyping. We first establish that participants associate undesirable (e.g., corrupt, jealous) as well as desirable (e.g., open-minded, generous) traits with humans. We then go on to show that participants tend to attribute desirable human traits more strongly to ingroup members but undesirable human traits more strongly to outgroup members. This pattern holds across three different intergroup contexts for which dehumanization effects have previously been reported: political opponents, immigrants and criminals. Taken together, these studies cast doubt on the claim that a trait-based account of representing others as 'less human' holds value in the study of intergroup bias., (Copyright © 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Previous research indicates that first impressions from faces are the products of automatic and rapid processing and emerge early in development. These features have been taken as evidence that first impressions have a phylogenetic origin. We examine whether first impressions acquired through learning can also possess these features. First, we confirm that adults rate a person as more intelligent when they are wearing glasses (Study 1). Next, we show this inference persists when participants are instructed to ignore the glasses (Study 2) and when viewing time is restricted to 100 ms (Study 3). Finally, we show that 6-year-old, but not 4-year-old, children perceive individuals wearing glasses to be more intelligent, indicating that the effect is seen relatively early in development (Study 4). These data indicate that automaticity, rapid access and early emergence are not evidence that first impressions have an innate origin. Rather, these features are equally compatible with a learning model., (© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Using an established paradigm, we tested whether people derive motoric predictions about an actor's forthcoming actions from prior knowledge about them and the context in which they are seen. In two experiments, participants identified famous tennis and soccer players using either hand or foot responses. Athletes were shown either carrying out or not carrying out their associated actions (swinging, kicking), either in the context where these actions are typically seen (tennis court, soccer Pitch) or outside these contexts (beach, awards ceremony). Replicating prior work, identifying non-acting athletes revealed the negative compatibility effects: viewing tennis players led to faster responses with a foot than a hand, and vice versa for viewing soccer players. Consistent with the idea that negative compatibility effects result from the absence of a predicted action, these effects were eliminated (or reversed) when the athletes were seen carrying out actions typically associated with them. Strikingly, however, these motoric biases were not limited to In-Context trials but were, if anything, more robust in the Out-of-Context trials. This pattern held even when attention was drawn specifically to the context (Experiment 2). These results confirm that people hold motoric knowledge about the actions that others typically carry out and that these actions are part of perceptual representations that are accessed when those others are re-encountered, possibly in order to resolve uncertainty in person perception.

Perceptual fluency and response inhibition are well-established techniques to unobtrusively manipulate preference: objects are devalued following association with disfluency or inhibition. These approaches to preference change are extensively studied individually, but there is less research examining the impact of combining the two techniques in a single intervention. In short (3 min) game-like tasks, we examine the preference and memory effects of perceptual fluency and inhibition individually, and then the cumulative effects of combining the two techniques. The first experiment confirmed that perceptual fluency and inhibition techniques influence immediate preference judgements but, somewhat surprisingly, combining these techniques did not lead to greater effects than either technique alone. The second experiment replicated the first but with changes to much more closely imitate a real-world application: measuring preference after 20 min of unrelated intervening tasks, modifying the retrieval context via room change, and generalization from computer images of objects to real-world versions of those objects. Here, the individual effects of perceptual fluency and inhibition were no longer detected, whereas combining these techniques resulted in preference change. These results demonstrate the potential of short video games as a means of influencing behaviour, such as food choices to improve health and well-being., Competing Interests: We declare we have no competing interests., (© 2020 The Authors.)

People make inferences about the trustworthiness of others based on their observed gaze behavior. Faces that consistently look toward a target location are rated as more trustworthy than those that look away from the target. Representations of trust are important for future interactions; yet little is known about how they are consolidated in long-term memory. Sleep facilitates memory consolidation for incidentally learned information and may therefore support the retention of trust representations. We investigated the consolidation of trust inferences across periods of sleep or wakefulness. In addition, we employed a memory cueing procedure (targeted memory reactivation [TMR]) in a bid to strengthen certain trust memories over others. We observed no difference in the retention of trust inferences following delays of sleep or wakefulness, and there was no effect of TMR in either condition. Interestingly, trust inferences remained stable 1 week after learning, irrespective of the initial postlearning delay. A second experiment showed that this implicit learning occurs despite participants' being unable to explicitly recall the gaze behavior of specific faces immediately after encoding. Together, these results suggest that gist-like, social inferences are formed at the time of learning without retaining the original episodic memory and thus do not benefit from offline consolidation through replay. We discuss our findings in the context of a novel framework whereby trust judgments reflect an efficient, powerful, and adaptable storage device for social information. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Human perceptual processes are highly efficient and rapidly extract information to enable fast and accurate responses. The fluency of these processes is reinforcing, meaning that easy-to-perceive objects are liked more as a result of misattribution of the reinforcement affect to the object identity. However, some critical processes are disfluent, yet their completion can be reinforcing leading to object preference through a different route. One such example is identification of objects from camouflage. In a series of 5 experiments, we manipulated object contrast and camouflage to explore the relationship between object preference to perceptual fluency and ambiguity solution. We found that perceptual fluency dominated the process of preference assessment when objects are assessed for "liking". That is, easier-to-perceive objects (high-contrast and noncamouflaged) were preferred over harder-to-perceive objects (low-contrast and camouflaged). However, when objects are assessed for "interest", the disfluent yet reinforcing ambiguity solution process overrode the effect of perceptual fluency, resulting in preference for the harder-to-perceive camouflaged objects over the easier-to-perceive noncamouflaged objects. The results have implications for preference and choice in a wide range of contexts by demonstrating the competition between perceptual fluency and ambiguity solution on preference, and by highlighting the critical factor of the form of preference decision. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

In 8 experiments, we investigated motion fluency effects on object preference. In each experiment, distinct objects were repeatedly seen moving either fluently (with a smooth and predictable motion) or disfluently (with sudden and unpredictable direction changes) in a task where participants were required to respond to occasional brief changes in object appearance. Results show that (a) fluent objects are preferred over disfluent objects when ratings follow a moving presentation, (b) there is some evidence that object-motion associations can be learned with repeated exposures, (c) sufficiently potent motions can yield preference for fluent objects after a single viewing, and (d) learned associations do not transfer to situations where ratings follow a stationary presentation, even after deep levels of encoding. Episodic accounts of memory retrieval predict that emotional states experienced at encoding might be retrieved along with the stimulus properties. Though object-emotion associations were repeatedly paired, there was no evidence for emotional reinstatement when objects were seen stationary. This indicates that the retrieval process is a critical limiting factor when considering visuomotor fluency effects on behavior. Such findings have real-world consequences. For example, a product advertised with high perceptual fluency might be preferred at the time, but this preference might not transfer to seeing the object on a shelf. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The binding of features into perceptual wholes is a well-established phenomenon, which has previously only been studied in the context of early vision and low-level features, such as color or proximity. We hypothesized that a similar binding process, based on higher level information, could bind people into interacting groups, facilitating faster processing and enhanced memory of social situations. To investigate this possibility we used 3 experimental approaches to explore grouping effects in displays involving interacting people. First, using a visual search task we demonstrate more rapid processing for interacting (vs. noninteracting) pairs in an odd-quadrant paradigm (Experiments 1a and 1b). Second, using a spatial judgment task, we show that interacting individuals are remembered as physically closer than are noninteracting individuals (Experiments 2a and 2b). Finally, we show that memory retention of group-relevant and irrelevant features are enhanced when recalling interacting partners in a surprise memory task (Experiments 3a and 3b). Each of these results is consistent with the social binding hypothesis, and alternative explanations based on low level perceptual features and attentional effects are ruled out. We conclude that automatic midlevel grouping processes bind individuals into groups on the basis of their perceived interaction. Such social binding could provide the basis for more sophisticated social processing. Identifying the automatic encoding of social interactions in visual search, distortions of spatial working memory, and facilitated retrieval of object properties from longer-term memory, opens new approaches to studying social cognition with possible practical applications. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

It has previously been reported that individuals prefer figures from which they can extract shapes via illusory contours (Kanisza figures) over figures in which this is not possible. However, based on the past research in this area, it is not possible to distinguish the influence of illusory contour perception from other factors such as the symmetry, familiarity, prototypicality, and nameability of the perceived shape. Here, we investigate the influence of illusory contours in the absence of these confounding variables by measuring participants' aesthetic/liking ratings for symmetric Kanisza figures and for unfamiliar and asymmetric Kanisza figures. Results show that illusory contours do indeed influence preference above and beyond any effects of these other factors. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

We investigated when young children first dehumanize outgroups. Across two studies, 5- and 6-year-olds were asked to rate how human they thought a set of ambiguous doll-human face morphs were. We manipulated whether these faces belonged to their gender in- or gender outgroup (Study 1) and to a geographically based in- or outgroup (Study 2). In both studies, the tendency to perceive outgroup faces as less human relative to ingroup faces increased with age. Explicit ingroup preference, in contrast, was present even in the youngest children and remained stable across age. These results demonstrate that children dehumanize outgroup members from relatively early in development and suggest that the tendency to do so may be partially distinguishable from intergroup preference. This research has important implications for our understanding of children's perception of humanness and the origins of intergroup bias., (© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

In everyday interactions we find our attention follows the eye gaze of faces around us. As this cueing is so powerful and difficult to inhibit, gaze can therefore be used to facilitate or disrupt visual processing of the environment, and when we experience this we infer information about the trustworthiness of the cueing face. However, to date no studies have investigated how long these impressions last. To explore this we used a gaze-cueing paradigm where faces consistently demonstrated either valid or invalid cueing behaviours. Previous experiments show that valid faces are subsequently rated as more trustworthy than invalid faces. We replicate this effect (Experiment 1) and then include a brief interference task in Experiment 2 between gaze cueing and trustworthiness rating, which weakens but does not completely eliminate the effect. In Experiment 3, we explore whether greater familiarity with the faces improves the durability of trust learning and find that the effect is more resilient with familiar faces. Finally, in Experiment 4, we push this further and show that evidence of trust learning can be seen up to an hour after cueing has ended. Taken together, our results suggest that incidentally learned trust can be durable, especially for faces that deceive.

Major depressive disorder (MDD) is associated with disrupted relationships with partners, family, and peers. These problems can precipitate the onset of clinical illness, influence severity and the prospects for recovery. Here, we investigated whether individuals who have recovered from depression use interpersonal signals to form favourable appraisals of others as social partners. Twenty recovered-depressed adults (with >1 adult episode of MDD but euthymic and medication-free for six months) and 23 healthy, never-depressed adults completed a task in which the gaze direction of some faces reliably cued the location a target (valid faces), whereas other faces cued the opposite location (invalid faces). No participants reported awareness of this contingency, and both groups were significantly faster to categorise targets following valid compared with invalid gaze cueing faces. Following this task, participants judged the trustworthiness of the faces. Whereas the healthy never-depressed participants judged the valid faces to be significantly more trustworthy than the invalid faces; this implicit social appraisal was absent in the recovered-depressed participants. Individuals who have recovered from MDD are able to respond appropriately to joint attention with other people but appear to not use joint attention to form implicit trust appraisals of others as potential social partners.

When observing emotional expressions, similar sensorimotor states are activated in the observer, often resulting in physical mimicry. For example, when observing a smile, the zygomaticus muscles associated with smiling are activated in the observer, and when observing a frown, the corrugator brow muscles. We show that the consistency of an individual's facial emotion, whether they always frown or smile, can be encoded into memory. When the individuals are viewed at a later time expressing no emotion, muscle mimicry of the prior state can be detected, even when the emotion itself is task irrelevant. The results support simulation accounts of memory, where prior embodiments of other's states during encoding are reactivated when re-encountering a person.

Dynamic face cues can be very salient, as when observing sudden shifts of gaze to a new location, or a change of expression from happy to angry. These highly salient social cues influence judgments of another person during the course of an interaction. However, other dynamic cues, such as pupil dilation, are much more subtle, affecting judgments of another person even without awareness. We asked whether such subtle, incidentally perceived, dynamic cues could be encoded in to memory and retrieved at a later time. The current study demonstrates that in some circumstances changes in pupil size in another person are indeed encoded into memory and influence judgments of that individual at a later time. Furthermore, these judgments interact with the perceived trustworthiness of the individual and the nature of the social context. The effect is somewhat variable, however, possibly reflecting individual differences and the inherent ambiguity of pupil dilation/constriction., (© 2016 The British Psychological Society.)

Eye gaze is a powerful directional cue that automatically evokes joint attention states. Even when faces are ignored, there is incidental learning of the reliability of the gaze cueing of another person, such that people who look away from targets are judged less trustworthy. In a series of experiments, we demonstrated further properties of the incidental learning of trust from gaze direction. First, the emotion of the face, whether neutral or smiling, influenced the pattern of trust learning. Second, the effect was specific to judgments of trust; reliability of gaze direction did not influence other emotional judgments of a person, such as liking. And third, visuomotor fluency was not sufficient for learning of trust, whether or not the face served as a target or as a distractor. Taken together, incidental learning of trust is influenced by facial emotion, it is a specific effect that does not generalize to other emotional assessments, and it is not determined solely by processing fluency. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

When engaging in joint activities, humans tend to sacrifice some of their own sensorimotor comfort and efficiency to facilitate a partner's performance. In the two experiments reported here, we investigated whether ownership-a socioculturally based nonphysical feature ascribed to objects-influenced facilitatory motor behavior in joint action. Participants passed mugs that differed in ownership status across a table to a partner. We found that participants oriented handles less toward their partners when passing their own mugs than when passing mugs owned by their partners (Experiment 1) and mugs owned by the experimenter (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that individuals plan and execute actions that assist their partners but do so to a smaller degree if it is the individuals' own property that the partners intend to manipulate. We discuss these findings in terms of underlying variables associated with ownership and conclude that a self-other distinction can be found in the human sensorimotor system.

In this article, three generations of authors describe the background to the original article; the subsequent emergence of vigorous debates concerning what negative priming actually reflects, where radically different accounts based on memory retrieval were proposed; and a re-casting of the conceptual issues underlying studies of negative priming. What started as a simple observation (slowed reaction times) and mechanism (distractor inhibition) appears now to be best explained by a multiple mechanism account involving both episodic binding and retrieval processes as well as an inhibitory process. Emerging evidence from converging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and especially electroencephalography (EEG), is beginning to identify these different processes. The past 30 years of negative priming experiments has revealed the dynamic and complex cognitive processes that mediate what appear to be apparently simple behavioural effects.

Gaze direction can be used to rapidly and reflexively lead or mislead others' attention as to the location of important stimuli. When perception of gaze direction is congruent with the location of a target, responses are faster compared to when incongruent. Faces that consistently gaze congruently are also judged more trustworthy than faces that consistently gaze incongruently. However, it's unclear how gaze-cues elicit changes in trust. We measured facial electromyography (EMG) during an identity-contingent gaze-cueing task to examine whether embodied emotional reactions to gaze-cues mediate trust learning. Gaze-cueing effects were found to be equivalent regardless of whether participants showed learning of trust in the expected direction or did not. In contrast, we found distinctly different patterns of EMG activity in these two populations. In a further experiment we showed the learning effects were specific to viewing faces, as no changes in liking were detected when viewing arrows that evoked similar attentional orienting responses. These findings implicate embodied emotion in learning trust from identity-contingent gaze-cueing, possibly due to the social value of shared attention or deception rather than domain-general attentional orienting.

This study investigates whether mimicry of facial emotions is a stable response or can instead be modulated and influenced by memory of the context in which the emotion was initially observed, and therefore the meaning of the expression. The study manipulated emotion consistency implicitly, where a face expressing smiles or frowns was irrelevant and to be ignored while participants categorised target scenes. Some face identities always expressed emotions consistent with the scene (e.g., smiling with a positive scene), whilst others were always inconsistent (e.g., frowning with a positive scene). During this implicit learning of face identity and emotion consistency there was evidence for encoding of face-scene emotion consistency, with slower RTs, a reduction in trust, and inhibited facial EMG for faces expressing incompatible emotions. However, in a later task where the faces were subsequently viewed expressing emotions with no additional context, there was no evidence for retrieval of prior emotion consistency, as mimicry of emotion was similar for consistent and inconsistent individuals. We conclude that facial mimicry can be influenced by current emotion context, but there is little evidence of learning, as subsequent mimicry of emotionally consistent and inconsistent faces is similar.

The purpose of the present study was to test whether we see evidence for body compatibility effects when viewing both familiar and unusual body postures. Specifically, in a task where colour targets have to be discriminated, we tested whether spatial orienting to a body site is sufficient for effects of body compatibility to emerge when viewing a task-irrelevant body or whether effects are dependent on whether or not we are able to adopt the viewed body posture. The results suggest that spatial orienting to a body site is insufficient; rather we argue that it is only postures that are familiar and we are easily able to adopt that can be processed fluently and influence target discrimination. This points to a key contribution of motor representations to body compatibility effects.

When observing actions, motor simulation processes aid the prediction and understanding of future events. A central issue concerns whether such action simulation serves social functions of interpreting other people, where performance is predicted to be better when third-person perspective (3PP) actions are viewed, or whether it is most beneficial to guide self actions, whereby the first-person perspective (1PP) would be advantageous. We show that in a spatiotemporal judgment task there is an advantage for the prediction of 1PP. However, this is only detected after motor priming whereby participants perform the observed actions prior to making spatiotemporal judgments. The results, first, confirm that people draw on their motor experience for the accurate simulation and prediction of action. Second, the results suggest that such experience facilitates more accurate state estimation for actions perceived in the 1PP, which map more closely onto visual input of self-generated action. More forward prediction error is retained for 3PP viewed actions, which may, however, have the benefit of compensating for the uncertainty involved in interacting with others., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

In spatial compatibility tasks, when the spatial location of a stimulus is irrelevant it nevertheless interferes when a response is required in a different spatial location. For example, response with a left key-press is slowed when the stimulus is presented to the right as compared to the left side of a computer screen. However, in some conditions this interference effect is not detected in reaction time (RT) measures. It is typically assumed that the lack of effect means the irrelevant spatial code was not analysed or that the information rapidly decayed before response. However, we show that even in conditions where there appears to be no spatial interference when measuring RTs, effects can nevertheless be detected after response when recording facial electromyography responses. This dissociation between two measures highlights the importance of diverging methods to investigate visuomotor processes as conclusions based on only one measure can be misleading.

Gaze direction perception triggers rapid visuospatial orienting to the location observed by others. When this is congruent with the location of a target, reaction times are faster than when incongruent. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies suggest that the non-joint attention induced by incongruent cues are experienced as more emotionally negative and this could relate to less favorable trust judgments of the faces when gaze-cues are contingent with identity. Here, we provide further support for these findings using time-resolved event-related potentials. In addition to replicating the effects of identity-contingent gaze-cues on reaction times and trust judgments, we discovered that the emotion-related late positive potential increased across blocks to incongruent compared to congruent faces before, during and after the gaze-cue, suggesting both learning and retrieval of emotion states associated with the face. We also discovered that the face-recognition-related N250 component appeared to localize to sources in anterior temporal areas. Our findings provide unique electrophysiological evidence for the role of emotion in learning trust from gaze-cues, suggesting that the retrieval of face evaluations during interaction may take around 1000 ms and that the N250 originates from anterior temporal face patches.

Detecting subtle indicators of trustworthiness is highly adaptive for moving effectively amongst social partners. One powerful signal is gaze direction, which individuals can use to inform (or deceive) by looking toward (or away from) important objects or events in the environment. Here, across 5 experiments, we investigate whether implicit learning about gaze cues can influence subsequent economic transactions; we also examine some of the underlying mechanisms. In the 1st experiment, we demonstrate that people invest more money with individuals whose gaze information has previously been helpful, possibly reflecting enhanced trust appraisals. However, in 2 further experiments, we show that other mechanisms driving this behavior include obligations to fairness or (painful) altruism, since people also make more generous offers and allocations of money to individuals with reliable gaze cues in adapted 1-shot ultimatum games and 1-shot dictator games. In 2 final experiments, we show that the introduction of perceptual noise while following gaze can disrupt these effects, but only when the social partners are unfamiliar. Nonconscious detection of reliable gaze cues can prompt altruism toward others, probably reflecting the interplay of systems that encode identity and control gaze-evoked attention, integrating the reinforcement value of gaze cues.

Previous studies have shown that viewing others in pain activates cortical somatosensory processing areas and facilitates the detection of tactile targets. It has been suggested that such shared representations have evolved to enable us to better understand the actions and intentions of others. If this is the case, the effects of observing others in pain should be obtained from a range of viewing perspectives. Therefore, the current study examined the behavioral effects of observed grasps of painful and nonpainful objects from both a first- and third-person perspective. In the first-person perspective, a participant was faster to detect a tactile target delivered to their own hand when viewing painful grasping actions, compared with all nonpainful actions. However, this effect was not revealed in the third-person perspective. The combination of action and object information to predict the painful consequences of another person's actions when viewed from the first-person perspective, but not the third-person perspective, argues against a mechanism ostensibly evolved to understand the actions of others.

The notion of a frontoparietal human mirror neuron system (HMNS) has been used to explain a range of social phenomena. However, most human neuroimaging studies of this system do not address critical 'mirror' properties: neural representations should be action specific and should generalise across visual and motor modalities. Studies using repetition suppression (RS) and, particularly, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) highlight the contribution to action perception of anterior parietal regions. Further, these studies add to mounting evidence that suggests the lateral occipitotemporal cortex plays a role in the HMNS, but they offer less support for the involvement of the premotor cortex. Neuroimaging, particularly through application of MVPA, has the potential to reveal the properties of the HMNS in further detail, which could challenge prevailing views about its neuroanatomical organisation., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

People tend to prefer fluently processed over harder to process information. In this study we examine two issues concerning fluency and preference. First, previous research has pre-selected fluent and non-fluent materials. We did not take this approach yet show that the fluency of individuals' idiosyncratic on-line interactions with a given stimulus can influence preference formation. Second, while processing fluency influences preference, the opposite also may be true: preferred stimuli could be processed more fluently than non-preferred. Participants performed a visual search task either before or after indicating their preferred images from an array of either paintings by Kandinsky or decorated coffee mugs. Preferred stimuli were associated with fluent processing, reflected in facilitated search times. Critically, this was only the case for participants who gave their preferences after completing the visual search task, not for those stating preferences prior to the visual search task. Our results suggest that the spontaneous and idiosyncratic experience of processing fluency plays a role in forming preference judgments and conversely that our first impressions of preference do not drive response fluency., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The observation of someone else's action facilitates similar actions in the observer. Such priming effects can be driven by alignment between the observer and the observed in body-centred or spatial coordinates (or both). The separate and joint contributions of these sources of priming remain to be fully characterised. Here, we compare spatial and body priming effects across the whole body "space", by using hand and foot responses. This allows a clearer separation of body priming from spatial priming than available from previous studies. In addition, we demonstrate two further features of these action priming effects. First, there are general interference and facilitation effects when the layout of viewed displays matches the participant's body (e.g. hand above the foot). These effects have not been considered in previous studies. Second, by taking these layout effects into account, we identify the facilitation and interference components of spatial and body priming effects. Both types of priming effect are observed, and facilitation and interference effects are only observed when both body and spatial frames of reference are working in the same direction. These findings show that in action perception, the behaviours of others are processed simultaneously in multiple frames of reference that have complex, interacting effects--both facilitating and interfering--on the motor system of the observer.

An important human capacity is the ability to imagine performing an action, and its consequences, without actually executing it. Here we seek neural representations of specific manual actions that are common across visuo-motor performance and imagery. Participants were scanned with fMRI while they performed and observed themselves performing two different manual actions during some trials, and imagined performing and observing themselves performing the same actions during other trials. We used multi-variate pattern analysis to identify areas where representations of specific actions generalize across imagined and performed actions. The left anterior parietal cortex showed this property. In this region, we also found that activity patterns for imagined actions generalize better to performed actions than vice versa, and we provide simulation results that can explain this asymmetry. The present results are the first demonstration of action-specific representations that are similar irrespective of whether actions are actively performed or covertly imagined. Further, they demonstrate concretely how the apparent cross-modal visuo-motor coding of actions identified in studies of a human "mirror neuron system" could, at least partially, reflect imagery., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The discovery of mirror neurons-neurons that code specific actions both when executed and observed-in area F5 of the macaque provides a potential neural mechanism underlying action understanding. To date, neuroimaging evidence for similar coding of specific actions across the visual and motor modalities in human ventral premotor cortex (PMv)-the putative homologue of macaque F5-is limited to the case of actions observed from a first-person perspective. However, it is the third-person perspective that figures centrally in our understanding of the actions and intentions of others. To address this gap in the literature, we scanned participants with fMRI while they viewed two actions from either a first- or third-person perspective during some trials and executed the same actions during other trials. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we found action-specific cross-modal visual-motor representations in PMv for the first-person but not for the third-person perspective. Additional analyses showed no evidence for spatial or attentional differences across the two perspective conditions. In contrast, more posterior areas in the parietal and occipitotemporal cortex did show cross-modal coding regardless of perspective. These findings point to a stronger role for these latter regions, relative to PMv, in supporting the understanding of others' actions with reference to one's own actions.

It has been proposed that one means of understanding a person's current behaviour and predicting future actions is by simulating their actions. That is, when another person's actions are observed, similar motor processes are activated in the observer. For example, after observing a reach over an obstacle, a person's subsequent reach trajectory is more curved, reflecting motor priming. Importantly, such motor states are only activated if the observed action is in near (peripersonal) space. However, we demonstrate that when individuals share action environments, simulation of another person's obstacle avoiding reach path takes place even when the action is in far (extrapersonal) space. We propose that action simulation is influenced by factors such as ownership. When an "owned" object is a potential future obstacle, even when it is viewed beyond current action space, simulations are evoked, and these leave a more stable memory capable of influencing future behaviour.

It has been proposed that common codes for vision and action emerge from associations between an individual's production and simultaneous observation of actions. This typically first-person view of one's own action subsequently transfers to the third-person view when observing another individual. We tested vision-action associations and the transfer from first-person to third-person perspective by comparing novel hand-action sequences that were learned under three conditions: first, by being performed and simultaneously viewed from a first-person perspective; second, by being performed but not seen; and third, by being seen from a first-person view without being executed. We then used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the response to these three types of learned action sequences when they were presented from a third-person perspective. Visuomotor areas responded most strongly to sequences that were learned by simultaneously producing and observing the action sequences. We also note an important asymmetry between vision and action: Action sequences learned by performance alone, in the absence of vision, facilitated the emergence of visuomotor responses, whereas action sequences learned by viewing alone had comparably little effect. This dominance of action over vision supports the notion of forward/predictive models of visuomotor systems.

Movement in Parkinson's disease (PD) is strongly influenced by sensory stimuli. Here, we investigated two features of visual stimuli known to affect response times in healthy individuals; the spatial location of an object (the spatial effect) and its action-relevance (the 'affordance' effect). Poliakoff et al. (2007) found that while PD patients show normal spatial effects, they do not show an additional affordance effect. Here we investigated whether these effects are driven by facilitation or inhibition, and whether the affordance effect emerges over a longer time-course in PD. Participants (24 PD and 24 controls) viewed either a lateralised door handle (affordance condition), a lateralised abstract stimulus (spatial condition), or a centrally presented baseline stimulus (baseline condition), and responded to a colour change in the stimulus occurring after 0 msec, 500 msec or 1000 msec. The colour change indicated whether to respond with the left or right hand, which were either spatially compatible or incompatible with the lateralised stimulus orientation in the affordance and spatial conditions. The baseline condition allowed us to assess whether compatibility effects were driven by facilitation of the compatible response or inhibition of the incompatible response. The results indicate that stimulus orientation elicited faster responses from the nearest hand. For controls, the affordance effect was stronger and driven by facilitation, whilst the spatial condition was driven by inhibition. In contrast, the affordance and spatial-compatibility effects did not differ between conditions in the PD group and both were driven by facilitation. This suggests that the PD group responded as if all stimuli were action-relevant, and may have implications for understanding the cueing of movement in PD., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Srl. All rights reserved.)

An important question for the study of social interactions is how the motor actions of others are represented. Research has demonstrated that simply watching someone perform an action activates a similar motor representation in oneself. Key issues include (1) the automaticity of such processes, and (2) the role object affordances play in establishing motor representations of others' actions. Participants were asked to move a lever to the left or right to respond to the grip width of a hand moving across a workspace. Stimulus-response compatibility effects were modulated by two task-irrelevant aspects of the visual stimulus: the observed reach direction and the match between hand-grasp and the affordance evoked by an incidentally presented visual object. These findings demonstrate that the observation of another person's actions automatically evokes sophisticated motor representations that reflect the relationship between actions and objects even when an action is not directed towards an object.

Observing other people's actions activates a network of brain regions that is also activated during the execution of these actions. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to test whether these "mirror" regions in frontal and parietal cortices primarily encode the spatiomotor aspects or the functional goal-related aspects of observed tool actions. Participants viewed static depictions of actions consisting of a tool object (e.g., key) and a target object (e.g., keyhole). They judged the actions either with regard to whether the objects were oriented correctly for the action to succeed (spatiomotor task) or whether an action goal could be achieved with the objects (function task). Compared with a control condition, both tasks activated regions in left frontoparietal cortex previously implicated in action observation and execution. Of these regions, the premotor cortex and supramarginal gyrus were primarily activated during the spatiomotor task, whereas the middle frontal gyrus was primarily activated during the function task. Regions along the intraparietal sulcus were more strongly activated during the spatiomotor task but only when the spatiomotor properties of the tool object were unknown in advance. These results suggest a division of labor within the action observation network that maps onto a similar division previously proposed for action execution.

Across cultures, speakers produce iconic gestures, which add - through the movement of the speakers' hands - a pictorial dimension to the speakers' message. These gestures capture not only the motor content but also the visuospatial content of the message. Here, we provide first evidence for a direct link between the representation of perceptual information and the motor system that can account for these observations. Across four experiments, participants' hand movements captured both shapes that were directly perceived, and shapes that were only implicitly activated by unrelated semantic judgments of object words. These results were obtained even though the objects were not associated with any motor behaviors that would match the gestures the participants had to produce. Moreover, implied shape affected not only gesture selection processes but also their actual execution - as measured by the shape of hand motion through space - revealing intimate links between implied shape representation and motor output. The results are discussed in terms of ideomotor theories of action and perception, and provide one avenue for explaining the ubiquitous phenomenon of iconic gestures.

This paper reviews recent aspects of my research. It focuses, first, on the idea that during the perception of objects and people, action-based representations are automatically activated and, second, that such action representations can feed back and influence the perception of people and objects. For example, when one is merely viewing an object such as a coffee cup, the action it affords, such as a reach to grasp, is activated even though there is no intention to act on the object. Similarly, when one is observing a person's behaviour, their actions are automatically simulated, and such action simulation can influence our perception of the person and the object with which they interacted. The experiments to be described investigate the role of attention in such vision-to-action processes, the effects of such processes on emotion, and the role of a perceiver's body state in their interpretation of visual stimuli.

We investigated whether young and older adults differ on measures of interference (INT), negative priming (NP), and inhibition of return (IOR) on a spatial selective attention task that gradually increased in cognitive demand, from simple perceptual matching to letter identification. For both groups, INT increased and IOR decreased with task demand; while NP remained stable. We found age-related increases in INT, NP, and IOR, independent of task demand. However, only between-groups differences in IOR remained after correcting for age-related slowing in response times. Finally, we found no association between our measures of attention across groups, suggesting negligible overlap between INT, NP, and IOR. Our results indicate that attention is selectively and independently influenced by age and task demands, with both effects dependent on how attention is measured. These findings shed light on the "frontal hypothesis of aging.", (Copyright 2010 APA, all rights reserved.)

When we observe someone shift their gaze to a peripheral event or object, a corresponding shift in our own attention often follows. This social orienting response, joint attention, has been studied in the laboratory using the gaze cueing paradigm. Here, we investigate the combined influence of the emotional content displayed in two critical components of a joint attention episode: The facial expression of the cue face, and the affective nature of the to-be-localized target object. Hence, we presented participants with happy and disgusted faces as cueing stimuli, and neutral (Experiment 1), pleasant and unpleasant (Experiment 2) pictures as target stimuli. The findings demonstrate an effect of 'emotional context' confined to participants viewing pleasant pictures. Specifically, gaze cueing was boosted when the emotion of the gazing face (i.e., happy) matched that of the targets (pleasant). Demonstrating modulation by emotional context highlights the vital flexibility that a successful joint attention system requires in order to assist our navigation of the social world.

Many lines of evidence point to a tight linkage between the perceptual and motoric representations of actions. Numerous demonstrations show how the visual perception of an action engages compatible activity in the observer's motor system. This is seen for both intransitive actions (e.g., in the case of unconscious postural imitation) and transitive actions (e.g., grasping an object). Although the discovery of "mirror neurons" in macaques has inspired explanations of these processes in human action behaviors, the evidence for areas in the human brain that similarly form a crossmodal visual/motor representation of actions remains incomplete. To address this, in the present study, participants performed and observed hand actions while being scanned with functional MRI. We took a data-driven approach by applying whole-brain information mapping using a multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) classifier, performed on reconstructed representations of the cortical surface. The aim was to identify regions in which local voxelwise patterns of activity can distinguish among different actions, across the visual and motor domains. Experiment 1 tested intransitive, meaningless hand movements, whereas experiment 2 tested object-directed actions (all right-handed). Our analyses of both experiments revealed crossmodal action regions in the lateral occipitotemporal cortex (bilaterally) and in the left postcentral gyrus/anterior parietal cortex. Furthermore, in experiment 2 we identified a gradient of bias in the patterns of information in the left hemisphere postcentral/parietal region. The postcentral gyrus carried more information about the effectors used to carry out the action (fingers vs. whole hand), whereas anterior parietal regions carried more information about the goal of the action (lift vs. punch). Taken together, these results provide evidence for common neural coding in these areas of the visual and motor aspects of actions, and demonstrate further how MVPA can contribute to our understanding of the nature of distributed neural representations.

Perceiving another individual's actions activates the human motor system. We investigated whether this effect is stronger when the observed action is relevant to the observer's task. The mu rhythm (oscillatory activity in the 8- to 13-Hz band over sensorimotor cortex) was measured while participants watched videos of grasping movements. In one of two conditions, the participants had to later report how many times they had seen a certain kind of grasp. In the other condition, they viewed the identical videos but had to later report how many times they had seen a certain colour change. The colour change and the grasp always occurred simultaneously. Results show mu rhythm attenuation when watching the videos relative to baseline. This attenuation was stronger when participants later reported the grasp rather than the colour, suggesting that the motor system is more strongly activated when the observed grasping actions were relevant to the observer's task. Moreover, when the graspable object disappeared after the offset of the video, there was subsequent mu rhythm enhancement, reflecting a post-stimulus inhibitory rebound. This enhancement was again stronger when making judgments about the grasp than the colour, suggesting that the stronger activation is followed by a stronger inhibitory rebound.