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There's something strange about Freud's Civilization and its Discontents (1930). Biologically, Freud was a Neo-Lamarckian, who believed in both the modification of organisms through need and the inheritance of acquired characteristics. However, in Civilization, Freud argued that because human nature is immutable, society has dim odds of improving substantially. Lamarckians, of course, rejected that any species-nature is immutable, as species can always be transformed via the inheritance of acquired characteristics. In fact, many of Freud's Viennese contemporaries-such as Wilhelm Reich, Julius Tandler, and Paul Kammerer-took their Lamarckism to license precisely the sorts of radical social projects Freud deemed impossible. Thus the Freud of Civilization helped himself to a rigid view of human nature which, given his associated biological views, he seemingly ought to have rejected. In this paper, I explain this apparent inconsistency, and suggest Freud resolved it in the following way: Freud was not merely a Lamarckian, but also a strong and peculiar kind of recapitulationist, who believed stages of psychological development both recapitulate phylogeny, and "remain with us" throughout both individual lives and future species-history. I suggest Freud's recapitulationism supposed a certain inertia: what occurred in phylogenetic history cannot un-occur, and therefore there are aspects of our nature which we cannot un-acquire. In this way, Freud reached a rigid conception of human nature despite his Lamarckism., (© 2024. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.)

Although random mutation is central to models of evolutionary change, a lack of clarity remains regarding the conceptual possibilities for thinking about the nature and role of mutation in evolution. We distinguish several claims at the intersection of mutation, evolution, and directionality and then characterize a previously unrecognized category: complex conditioned mutation. Empirical evidence in support of this category suggests that the historically famous fluctuation test should be revisited, and new experiments should be undertaken with emerging experimental techniques to facilitate detecting mutation rates within specific loci at an ultra-high, individual base pair resolution., (© 2024 The Authors. BioEssays published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

The aim of this article is to put the growing interest in epigenetics in the field of evolutionary theory into a historical context. First, I assess the view that epigenetic inheritance could be seen as vindicating a revival of (neo)Lamarckism. Drawing on Jablonka's and Lamb's considerable output, I identify several differences between modern epigenetics and what Lamarckism was in the history of science. Even if Lamarckism is not back, epigenetic inheritance might be appealing for evolutionary biologists because it could potentiate two neglected mechanisms: the Baldwin effect and genetic assimilation. Second, I go back to the first ideas about the Baldwin effect developed in the late nineteenth century to show that the efficiency of this mechanism was already linked with a form of non-genetic inheritance. The opposition to all forms of non-genetic inheritance that prevailed at the time of the rise of the Modern Synthesis helps to explain why the Baldwin effect was understood as an insignificant mechanism during the second half of the twentieth century. Based on this historical reconstruction, in §4, I examine what modern epigenetics can bring to the picture and under what conditions epigenetic inheritance might be seen as strengthening the causal relationship between adaptability and adaptation. Throughout I support the view that the Baldwin effect and genetic assimilation, even if they are quite close, should not be conflated, and that drawing a line between these concepts is helpful in order to better understand where epigenetic inheritance might endorse a new causal role. This article is part of the theme issue 'How does epigenetics influence the course of evolution?'

In the nineteenth century, farmers, doctors, and the wider public shared a family of questions and anxieties concerning heredity. Questions over whether injuries, mutilations, and bad habits could be transmitted to offspring had existed for centuries, but found renewed urgency in the popular and practical scientific press from the 1820s onwards. Sometimes referred to as "Lamarckism" or "the inheritance of acquired characteristics," the potential for transmitting both desirable and disastrous traits to offspring was one of the most pressing scientific questions of the nineteenth century. As I argue in this paper, Carpenter's religious commitments to abolition and the temperance movement shaped his understanding of heredity. But this also committed him to a body of evidence for the inheritance of acquired characteristics that was coming under criticism for being untrustworthy. Carpenter used his popular treatises on physiology to promote these older, familiar ideas about heredity because they provided vital means of arguing for the unity of mankind and the hereditary dangers of intemperance. While early nineteenth century physiology has been seen by some historians as a challenge to religious authority, given its potentially materialist accounts of the body and the actions of the soul, this paper demonstrates how the missionary and institutional activities of the Unitarian church were ideologically supported by Carpenter's publications.

This essay examines the reception of Ivan Pavlov's work on conditioned reflexes in early to mid-twentieth century Britain. Recent work on the political interpretation of biology has shown that the nineteenth-century strategy of "making socialists" was undermined by August Weismann's attacks on the inheritance of acquired characters. I argue that Pavlov's research reinvigorated socialist hopes of transforming society and the people in it. I highlight the work of Pavlov's interpreters, notably the scientific journalist J. G. Crowther, the biologist Lancelot Hogben, and the science writer H. G. Wells, who made Pavlov's work accessible to a British audience and embraced the socialist implications of his research - especially the idea that people could be persuaded to become socialists through science writing for a nonspecialist audience and through use of a simplified language such as Basic English. They saw, in the followers of National Socialism, how Pavlovian conditioning could create a national movement, and believed that this could be used for their own more democratic form of socialism. In the final part of the essay, I suggest that this broad socio-cultural movement to reshape humanity proved controversial, especially in the post-war period and in light of Soviet use of brainwashing. The likes of Aldous Huxley and F. A. Hayek feared that conditioning could only lead to totalitarianism, while the historian E. P. Thompson put forward a socialist humanism that left room for human agency.

Butler's idea of evolution was developed over the publication of four books, several articles and essays between 1863 and 1890. These publications, although never achieving the success expected by Butler, proposed a psychological elaboration of evolution (robustly enforced by Lamarck's philosophy), called 'unconscious memory'. This was strongly in contrast with the materialistic approach suggested by Darwin's natural selection. Starting with a historical introduction, this paper aspires to ascertain the logic, meaning and significance of Butler's idea of 'unconscious memory' in the post-Darwinian physiological and psychological Pan-European discussion. Particular attention is devoted to demonstrating that Butler was not only a populariser of science but also an active protagonist in the late Victorian psychological debate.

This paper discusses the "non-reception" of Darwin's works and concepts in French palaeontology and palaeoanthropology between 1859 and 1914. Indeed, this integration was difficult, biased and belated, for ideological, intellectual and epistemological reasons: Clémence Royer's biased 1862 translation of Darwin's Origin of Species pulled its ideas toward "social darwinism", making them less attractive to the natural sciences. - French nationalism and the authority of religion, which imposed Cuvier's thinking until late into the century - the dominance of Lamarckian and neo-Lamarckian transformism in France, both in biology and in paleontology, which proposed the notion of orthogenetic laws and environmental determinations, and refused darwinian evolutionary mechanisms - obstacles inherent to the application of Darwin's concepts to palaeontology, namely the impossibility to identify evolutionary mechanisms through the fossil record, which was stressed by Darwin himself and underlined in turn by 19th century French palaeontologists. However, as I argue, in the course of the examined period, French palaeontology grew from refusal to a better understanding and evaluation of Darwin's thinking. The quest for intermediary forms, the construction of branching evolutionary trees and the attempts to reconstruct human biological and cultural evolution were important efforts toward an integration of some aspects of Darwinian views and practices into French palaeontology and plaeoanthropology. The 1947 Paris conference which brought together American Neo-darwinists and French paleontologists made Darwinian concepts better understood and triggered a revival of French palaeontology from the 1960s., (Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

This article shows how Lamarckism was essential in the birth of the French school of molecular biology. We argue that the concept of inheritance of acquired characters positively shaped debates surrounding bacteriophagy and lysogeny in the Pasteurian tradition during the interwar period. During this period the typical Lamarckian account of heredity treated it as the continuation of protoplasmic physiology in daughter cells. Félix d'Hérelle applied this conception to argue that there was only one species of bacteriophage and Jules Bordet applied it to develop an account of bacteriophagy as a transmissible form of autolysis and to analyze the new phenomenon of lysogeny. In a long-standing controversy with Bordet, Eugène Wollman deployed a more morphological understanding of the inheritance of acquired characters, yielding a particulate, but still Lamarckian, account of lysogeny. We then turn to André Lwoff who, with several colleagues, completed Wollman's research program from 1949 to 1953. We examine how he gradually set aside the Lamarckian background, finally removing inheritance of acquired characters from the resulting account of bacteriophagy and lysogeny. In the conclusion, we emphasize the complex dual role of Lamarckism as it moved from an assumed explanatory framework to a challenge that the nascent molecular biology had to overcome.

Until recently the British zoologist Lancelot Hogben (1895-1975) has usually appeared as a campaigning socialist, an anti-eugenicist or a popularizer of science in the literature. The focus has mainly been on Hogben after he became a professor of social biology at the London School of Economics in 1930. This paper focuses on Hogben's life in the 1920s. Early in the decade, while based in London, he focused on cytology, but in 1922, after moving to Edinburgh, he turned his focus on experimental zoology, first concentrating on vertebrate endocrinology and later moving over to the comparative physiology of invertebrate muscle. In the early 1920s Hogben played an active role in the development of experimental zoology in Britain. As such he was a fearless critic of evolutionary and metaphysical speculations. But in this period Hogben's career prospects were seriously hampered by his confrontational nature and serious depression. As a result he was forced to leave Britain in 1925. He first accepted a position in Canada and in the period 1927-1930 he was a professor of zoology in South Africa. This paper will also add crucial new material to James Tabery's recent discussion of the history behind Hogben's ideas about the interaction of heredity and environment in individual development. In addition a previously unknown Lamarckian controversy will be discussed.

In recent years the term 'Lamarckian evolution' has become a household name for processes that do not follow classical Mendelian pattern of inheritance, and it is seen as a relevant complement to Darwinism. In this article I argue that bringing back Lamarck is unjustified and misleading., (Copyright © 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

The inheritance of characteristics induced by the environment has often been opposed to the theory of evolution by natural selection. However, although evolution by natural selection requires new heritable traits to be produced and transmitted, it does not prescribe, per se, the mechanisms by which this is operated. The mechanisms of inheritance are not, however, unconstrained, because they are themselves subject to natural selection. We introduce a schematic, analytically solvable mathematical model to compare the adaptive value of different schemes of inheritance. Our model allows for variations to be inherited, randomly produced, or environmentally induced, and, irrespectively, to be either transmitted or not during reproduction. The adaptation of the different schemes for processing variations is quantified for a range of fluctuating environments, following an approach that links quantitative genetics with stochastic control theory.