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Processes of evolutionary transition (ET), becoming part of a new reproducing collective while losing the capacity of independent reproduction, seem difficult to track without circularity, since their features-units of selection, individuality, inheritance at multiple levels (MLS1, MLS2)-are products of one process. We describe ET in a non-circular way, noting kinds of interactions among community members necessary for such major transitions that are not instances of those same interactions within community members. Reproducing 'systems' tend to hybridize with environmental components, employing eco-devo scaffolding interactions forming communities. Communities are developmentally scaffolded systems of diverse members engaged in heterogeneous interactions. They may become individuals in their own right with the potential to evolve an inheritance system at the emergent community level. We argue for the explanatory benefits of treating 'individuality' as a special case of 'collectivity'. We characterize an idealized sequence of collective processes-coordination, cooperation and collaboration (3Cs)-which scaffolds transitions to new forms of collective individuality: communities. Hominid evolution and learning draw attention to developmental interactions driving both dimensions of ET: new 'levels of individuality' and inherited 'information systems'. Here, we outline a theoretical perspective that we suggest applies across a wide range of cases and scenarios. This article is part of the theme issue 'Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions'.

We track and analyze the re-situation of scientific knowledge in the field of human population genomics ancestry studies. We understand re-situation as a process of accommodating the direct or indirect transfer of objects of knowledge from one site/situation to (one or many) other sites/situations. Our take on the concept borrows from Mary S. Morgan's work on facts traveling while expanding it to include other objects of knowledge such as models, data, software, findings, and visualizations. We structure a specific case study by tracking the re-situation of these objects between three research projects studying human population diversity reported in three articles in Science, Genome Research and PLoS Genetics between 2002 and 2005. We characterize these three engagements as a unit of analysis, a "skirmish," in order to compare: (a) the divergence of interests in how life-scientists answer similar research questions and (b) to track the challenging transformation of workflows in research laboratories as these scientific objects are re-situated individually or in bundles. Our analysis of the case study shows that an accurate understanding of re-situation requires tracking the whole bundle of objects in a project because they interact in particular key ways. The absence or dismissal of these interactions opens the door to unforeseen trade-offs, misunderstandings and misrepresentations about research design(s) and workflow(s) and what these say about the questions asked and the findings produced., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the biologist Joseph Grinnell made a distinction between science and sentiment for producing fact-based generalizations on how to conserve biodiversity. We are inspired by Grinnellian science, which successfully produced a century-long impact on studying and conserving biodiversity that runs orthogonal to some familiar philosophical distinctions such as fact versus value, emotion versus reason and basic versus applied science. According to Grinnell, unlike sentiment-based generalizations, a fact-based generalization traces its diverse commitments and thus becomes tractable for its audience. We argue that foregrounding tractability better explains Grinnell's practice in the context of his time as well as in the context of current discourse among scientists over the political "biases" of biodiversity research and its problem of "reproducibility."

Gánti's chemoton model of the minimal chemical organization of living systems and life criteria for the living state and a living world are characterized. It is argued that these are better interpreted as part of a heuristic pursuit of an exact theoretical biology than as a "definition of life." Several problems with efforts to define life are discussed. Clarifying the proper use of Gánti's ideas to serve constructive engineering idealizations helps to show their enduring value., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

What gets integrated in integrative scientific practices has been a topic of much discussion. Traditional views focus on theories and explanations, with ideas of reduction and unification dominating the conversation. More recent ideas focus on disciplines, fields, or specialties; models, mechanisms, or methods; phenomena, problems. How integration works looks different on each of these views since the objects of integration are ontologically and epistemically various: statements, boundary conditions, practices, protocols, methods, variables, parameters, domains, laboratories, and questions all have their own structures, functions and logics. I focus on one particular kind of scientific practice, integration of "approaches" in the context of a research system operating on a special kind of "platform." Rather than trace a network of interactions among people, practices, and theoretical entities to be integrated, in this essay I focus on the work of a single investigator, David Wake. I describe Wake's practice of integrative evolutionary biology and how his integration of approaches among biological specialties worked in tandem with his development of the salamanders as a model taxon, which he used as a platform to solve, re-work and update problems that would not have been solved so well by non-integrative approaches. The larger goal of the project to which this paper contributes is a counter-narrative to the story of 20th century life sciences as the rise and march of the model organisms and decline of natural history., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

What counts as epigenetic depends on what counts as genetic. It is argued that Weismannism, the doctrine of genetic continuity and somatic discontinuity, is the basis for an overly inclusive concept of epigenetics as every inherited resource << beyond the genes >>. An alternative theoretical perspective, the << reproducer >> concept, facilitates analysis of multiple inheritance systems without labeling all non-genetic inheritance << epigenetic >>.

What counts as epigenetic depends on what counts as genetic. It is argued that Weismannism, the doctrine of genetic continuity and somatic discontinuity, is the basis for an overly inclusive concept of epigenetics as every inherited resource "beyond the genes." An alternative theoretical perspective, the "reproducer" concept, is introduced to facilitate analysis of multiple inheritance systems without labeling all nongenetic inheritance "epigenetic."