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Demographic research shows that, in Europe, fertility takes place later and is lower in cities than in rural areas. One might expect fertility to be delayed in urban areas because of longer periods in education and enhanced career opportunities. We, therefore, examine how prevalent later fertility (35+ and 40+) is along the urban-rural axis, and whether differences can be explained by economic, cultural and compositional factors. We estimate multilevel random coefficient models, employing aggregated Eurostat data of 1328 Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques (NUTS) 3 and 270 NUTS 2 regions from 28 European countries. The urban-rural gradient in later fertility considerably diminishes once factors describing the economic environment, family and gender norms as well as population composition are accounted for. The higher prevalence of later fertility in cities is particularly associated with higher female education, greater wealth and a higher share of employment in high-technology sectors., Competing Interests: Conflict Of Interest Statement The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Death of a parent during childhood has become rare in developed countries but remains an important life course event that may have consequences for family formation. This paper describes the link between parental death before age 18 and fertility outcomes in adulthood. Using the large national 2011 French Family Survey (INSEE-INED), we focus on the 1946-66 birth cohorts, for whom we observe entire fertility histories. The sample includes 11,854 respondents who have lost at least one parent before age 18. We find a strong polarization of fertility behaviours among orphaned males, more pronounced for those coming from a disadvantaged background. More often childless, particularly when parental death occurred in adolescence, some seem to retreat from parenthood. But orphaned men and women who do become parents seem to embrace family life, by beginning childbearing earlier and having more children, especially when the deceased parent is of the same sex.

Childbearing takes place at increasingly older ages, and fertility is continuing to decrease across female birth cohorts. This study investigated whether the proportion of women who unintentionally forwent childbearing increased over time, and linked this to the age profile of fertility intentions and realization among men and women. This study was based on the Austrian Micro-Censuses (1986-2016) and on the Austrian Generations and Gender Surveys (panel data 2008/09 and 2012/13). Across the birth cohorts 1950-1979, an increasing proportion of women wanted to have children after 40 years of age, but more women failed to meet their fertility intentions expressed at 34-36 years of age. At the individual level, from 30 years of age, more than one-third of women and men with a strong fertility intention were found to persist with this intention within four years even at less fertile ages. In addition, women and men with a strong fertility intention became less likely to have a child with age: <10% of women and approximately 20% of men who had expressed a certain and short-term intention to have a child at 39-41 years of age in 2008/09 had a child by 2012/13. In particular, childless women and men, and those with only one child, persisted in certain and short-term positive intentions from 30 years of age, but parity was not a significant factor in their realization. The sharp increase in 'unrealized fertility' over time draws attention to the importance that personal circumstances and context encountered at older ages may have for fertility, and augurs a continued increase in the use of assisted reproduction., (© 2021 The Author(s).)

In this study, we investigate through microsimulation the link between cohabiting parenthood and family instability. We identify mechanisms through which increases in cohabiting parenthood may contribute to overall increases in separation among parents, linking micro-level processes to macro-level outcomes. Analyses are based on representative surveys in Italy, Great Britain, and Scandinavia (represented by Norway and Sweden), with full histories of women's unions and births. We first generate parameters for the risk of first and higher-order birth and union events by woman's birth cohort and country. The estimated parameters are used to generate country- and cohort-specific populations of women with stochastically predicted family life courses. We use the hypothetical populations to decompose changes in the percentage of mothers who separate/divorce across maternal birth cohorts (1940s to 1950s, 1950s to 1960s, 1960s to 1970s), identifying how much of the change can be attributed to shifts in union status at first birth and how much is due to change in separation rates for each union type. We find that when cohabiting births were uncommon, increases in parents' separation were driven primarily by increases in divorce among married parents. When cohabiting parenthood became more visible, it also became a larger component, but continued increases in parents' divorce also contributed to increasing parental separation. When cohabiting births became quite common, the higher separation rates of cohabiting parents began to play a greater role than married parents' divorce. When most couples had their first birth in cohabitation, those having children in marriage were increasingly selected from the most stable relationships, and their decreasing divorce rates offset the fact that increasing proportions of children were born in somewhat less stable cohabiting unions.

Study Question: What is the likelihood of having a child within 4 years for men and women with strong short-term reproductive intentions, and how is it affected by age?, Summary Answer: For women, the likelihood of realising reproductive intentions decreased steeply from age 35: the effect of age was weak and not significant for men., What Is Known Already: Men and women are postponing childbearing until later ages. For women, this trend is associated with a higher risk that childbearing plans will not be realised due to increased levels of infertility and pregnancy complications., Study Design, Size, Duration: This study analyses two waves of the nationally representative Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The analytical sample interviewed in 2011 included 447 men aged 18-45 and 528 women aged 18-41. These respondents expressed a strong intention to have a child in the next 3 years. We followed them up in 2015 to track whether their reproductive intention was achieved or revised., Participants/materials, Settings, Methods: Multinomial logistic regression is used to account for the three possible outcomes: (i) having a child, (ii) not having a child but still intending to have one in the future and (iii) not having a child and no longer intending to have one. We analyse how age, parity, partnership status, education, perceived ability to conceive, self-rated health, BMI and smoking status are related to realising or changing reproductive intentions., Main Results and the Role of Chance: Almost two-thirds of men and women realised their strong short-term fertility plans within 4 years. There was a steep age-related decline in realising reproductive intentions for women in their mid- and late-30s, whereas men maintained a relatively high probability of having the child they intended until age 45. Women aged 38-41 who planned to have a child were the most likely to change their plan within 4 years. The probability of realising reproductive intention was highest for married and highly educated men and women and for those with one child., Limitations, Reasons for Caution: Our study cannot separate biological, social and cultural reasons for not realising reproductive intentions. Men and women adjust their intentions in response to their actual circumstances, but also in line with their perceived ability to have a child or under the influence of broader social norms on reproductive age., Wider Implications of the Findings: Our results give a new perspective on the ability of men and women to realise their reproductive plans in the context of childbearing postponement. They confirm the inequality in the individual consequences of delayed reproduction between men and women. They inform medical practitioners and counsellors about the complex biological, social and normative barriers to reproduction among women at higher childbearing ages., Study Funding/competing Interest(s): This research was partly supported by a Research School of Social Sciences Visiting Fellowship at the Australian National University and an Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP150104248). Éva Beaujouan's work was partly funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project 'Later Fertility in Europe' (Grant agreement no. P31171-G29). This paper uses unit record data from the HILDA Survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS) and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to either DSS or the Melbourne Institute. The authors have no conflicts of interest., (© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permission@oup.com.)

The frequency of union dissolutions increased sharply over the past 40 years in Western Europe and North America, resulting in a rapid growth in the number of persons living with a second partner. In studies of the 1980s, primarily conducted within the context of marriage, second partnerships were generally found to be less stable than first unions, but more recent studies provide more conflicting evidence. Taking the example of France, we study whether the relationship between first and second union stability indeed reversed between the 1970s and the 2000s, and how union and individual characteristics contributed to changes over time. The analysis presented here is based on the French Generations and Gender Survey (2005). The article first provides an overview of the differences in marriage, childbearing and breakup behaviours in first and second unions. Second, a piecewise linear model for repeated events is used to compare women's dissolution risks in first and second unions. The results show that over time, the higher instability of second compared to first unions disappeared. Further, women in second unions adopted unmarried cohabitation as a living arrangement more often across the whole period and were more likely to have stepchildren, which was associated with less stable unions. Taking into account this diversity of family situations, i.e. controlling for family form and children, second unions were more stable than first unions, even during the past. At both union orders, marriage breakup risks tended to stabilise despite a continuing increase in the prevalence of separation, which suggests that cohabitation increasingly acts as a filter for marriage.

Cohabitation is sometimes thought of as being inversely associated with education, but in Britain a more complex picture emerges. Educational group differences in cohabitation vary by age, time period, cohort, and indicator used. Well-educated women pioneered cohabitation in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. In the most recent cohorts, however, the less educated have exceeded the best educated in the proportions ever having cohabited at young ages. But the main difference by education currently seems largely a matter of timing-that is, the less educated start cohabiting earlier than the best educated. In Britain, educational differentials in cohabitation appear to be reinstating longstanding social patterns in the level and timing of marriage. Taking partnerships as a whole, social differentials have been fairly stable. Following a period of innovation and diffusion, there is much continuity with the past.

A recent investigation of the British General Household Survey (GHS) found substantial over-reporting of childlessness in recent years, particularly at older ages. We examine the phenomenon in further detail and find that the principal cause was change in survey procedures. To some extent the bias can be corrected for by using information on own children in the household. Revised fertility histories give period estimates of total fertility that are in close agreement with national vital registration statistics, unlike those based on original fertility histories of recent years. Misreporting in fertility histories dates primarily from administrative changes in the GHS in the years 1998-2000, and particularly from 2003, when the option of laptop self-completion (CASI) was introduced for reporting demographic histories.