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I INTRODUCTION In the early 2000s the Australian Law Reform Commission ('ALRC') and the Australian Health Ethics Committee ('AHEC') of the National Health and Medical Research Council ('NHMRC') embarked on [...], This article analyses the ethical and legal aspects of data-sharing and genomic research. It begins in Part II with an overview of the nature of genomic information, and whether it is exceptional when compared to other forms of health information. Part III considers the role of data-sharing in genomic research, with the importance of public trust in supporting genomic research considered in Part IV. The Australian regulatory framework for data-sharing in genomic research is considered in Parts V and VI, with reform options discussed in Part VII. The article concludes that advances in genomic research and the complexity of the current regulatory framework make it timely to review Australian laws to ensure that they maintain their relevance for this rapidly developing field of research.

INTRODUCTION 1518 I. BACKGROUND 1521 A. The Development of Article III Standing and 1522 Data Breach Litigation B. Private Rights of Action and Standing 1527 II. ANALYSIS 1531 A. The [...], Data breaches are not going away. Yet victims still face uncertainty when deciding whether and where to file cases against companies or other institutions that may have mishandled their information. This is especially true if the victims have not yet experienced a financial harm, like identity theft, as a result of a data breach. Much of the uncertainty revolves around the standing doctrine and the Supreme Court's guidance (or lack thereof) on what constitutes a substantial risk of harm sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Federal circuit courts have come to divergent results in data breach cases based on the Supreme Court's guidance. This Note analyzes these divergent results and shows that the circuits are not as far apart as some commentators have suggested. This Note then proposes two possible clarifying measures--one judicial and one legislative. The judicial solution is a test the Supreme Court should adopt for evaluating standing in data breach litigation. The test would have courts assess three factors and would allow plaintiffs who have not yet had their data misused to establish standing. Under the test, courts would examine (1) whether the breach was targeted; (2) whether the thief attained information that could lead to financial harm; and (3) whether any portion of the compromised data has been misused. For the legislative solution, this Note proposes language for a private right of action that could be inserted into federal legislation, either as part of comprehensive privacy legislation or in sector-specific privacy legislation.

INTRODUCTION Introduction 1477 I. Understanding Carpenter and Evolving Police Surveillance Laws 1479 A. Carpenter: Phone Thief Nabbed after His Own Cell Phone's Location Was Warrantlessly Searched 1479 i. RadioShack Robbery: [...]

I. INTRODUCTION In July 2015, Siouxland Anesthesiology, Ltd., suffered a data breach of 13,000 patient records due to a "hacking/IT incident" later determined to be a criminal malware attack.' The [...], Reading about major data breaches in the news is a disturbing, but all too common, occurrence these days, and South Dakota companies are no exception. In fact, since South Dakota's data breach notification law. Senate Bill 62, became effective on July 1, 2018, fifty-five data breaches have been reported to the South Dakota Attorney General. While some of these breaches are known to have occurred in the healthcare sector due to HIPAA breach reporting requirements, identifying other industries is not possible because the information is not available to the public. While the act strengthens post-breach reporting on some organizations not subject to federal legislation, others, like "covered entities " and "business associates "falling under HIPAA's purview, are only required to meet HIPAA's Privacy and Security Rules. In the absence of a comprehensive, industry-neutral federal data security regulatory scheme, South Dakota needs to adopt a proactive statutory measure to strengthen protections for South Dakota residents' Personally Identifiable Information ("PII") and Protected Health Information ("PHI"). This comment will highlight healthcare data breaches in South Dakota, as they are readily identifiable and a significant source of data breaches within the state, while also providing an overview of data breach trends. Additionally, this comment will explore the legal landscape of health information data security in South Dakota and how other states, like Nebraska, are taking action to protect the data and privacy of their residents. Finally, this comment will argue for proactive legislation beyond data breach notification laws.

I. INTRODUCTION "There's an app for that!", the known past response for any one person looking to digitize just one piece of their life with their mobile device. Now, we [...], Mapping data gathered by governments, corporations, and private individuals can be published freely across the web for use in diverse application sets. Upon its collection, other data, private data, may become subject to the public eye. Evolving from multiple acquisitions in its almost twenty-year history, Google's Street View application offers the public historical and 360-degree views of the globe from across the world. With users serving as the target of marketing techniques, which often create a game of chess between developers, the privacy practices of other companies often come to light. In this paper, we consider these issues and suggest some mitigations that public, private, and partnership entities may take in this shared effort. Keywords-Cyber Security, Data Privacy, Google, Street View.

I. INTRODUCTION One of the more effective ways that the United States collects intelligence on terrorism is also one of its most controversial. (1) In 2016, the Federal Bureau of [...], In 2008, Congress passed the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. Included in this hill was Section 702, which authorized government agencies to collect data of foreign targets, with the stated goal being to protect the national security of the United States. Section 702 has proven to be instrumental in stopping potential terrorist attacks, both in the United States and abroad. However, data of United States citizens may be collected as well, and the process used to collect data on foreign targets by intelligence agencies can be exploited. This raises constitutional concerns with Section 702, most notably, United States citizens' Fourth Amendment rights to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. In examining Section 702, this comment will show how Section 702 has been abused by intelligence agencies. It will also examine constitutional challenges and offer solutions regarding how to curtail these abuses without hindering Section 702's primary goal of protecting the United States National Security.

I. INTRODUCTION On September 28, 2018, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law California Senate Bill 1001, the so-called Bolstering Online Transparency Act (the "CA Bot Act"). (1) Bots (short for [...], Bots are software applications that complete tasks automatically. A bot's communication is disembodied, so humans can mistake it for a real person, and their misbelief can be exploited by the bot owner to deploy malware or phish personal data. Bots also pose as consumers posting online product reviews or spread (often fake) news, and a bot owner can coordinate multiple social-network accounts to trick a network's "trending" algorithms, boosting the visibility of specific content, sowing and exacerbating controversy, or fabricating an impression of mass individual consensus. California's 2019 Bolstering Online Transparency Act (the "CA Bot Act") imposes conspicuous disclosure requirements on bots when they communicate or interact with humans in California. Call it Isaac Asimov's fourth Rule of Robotics: A robot may not pretend to be a human being. By requiring bots to "self-identify" as such, the CA Bot Act is a pioneer in laws regulating artificial intelligence. Most of its criticism points to the act's lack of an enforcement mechanism to incentivize compliance. Accordingly, this Article lays out a map to sanction violations of the act with civil actions under California's Unfair Competition Law and statutory tort law of fraudulent deceit. It outlines what is prohibited, who can be sued, and who has standing to sue, then addresses First Amendment limits on unmasking John Doe defendants via subpoena. For many reasons, attempts to hold CA Bot Act violators liable are most likely to prevail in the commercial arena. But a willful use of bots to undermine a political election or prevent voting might also be a worthy target. Ultimately, the law could be strengthened with an articulated enforcement provision. But if the CA Bot Act aims a first salvo against malicious online bots, this Article hopes to spark the powder. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 841 II. Which Bots Have to Disclose (and How)? 845 A. Interpreting the CA Bot Act's Statutory Language 846 B. What Constitutes a Bot Under the CA Bot Act? 847 C. Which Bot Behavior Triggers the CA Bot Act's Disclosure Requirement? 848 1. The CA Bot Act Regulates Bots that Talk to People 848 a. Bots that Talk to Computers: Spiders, Crawlers, and Web Scrapers 849 b. Bots that Talk Directly to People: Chatbots 850 c. Bots that Talk Indirectly to People: Social Bots 852 2. The CA Bot Act Regulates Bots that Pose as Humans 854 a. Chatbots 854 b. Social Bots 856 3. The CA Bot Act Regulates Bots that Try to Influence People 857 a. The Commercial Prong 858 b. The Political Prong 858 D. Adequate Disclosure Under the CA Bot Act 858 1. Disclosure Must Be Proven in a UCL or Concealment Action 859 2. What Constitutes Adequate Disclosure? 859 III. Suing to Sanction a CA Bot Act Violation 860 A. Enforcing the CA Bot Act Requires Showing Causation and Harm 860 B. Two Legal Frameworks for Sanctioning CA Bot Act Violations 861 1. California's Unfair Competition Law 861 a. The UCL Permits "Borrowing" Laws to Define 861 "Unlawful" Business Practices b. The UCL's Borrowing Doctrine and the CA Bot Act 862 2. Fraudulent Deceit 863 a. Violations of Disclosure Statutes Can Constitute Fraudulent Concealment 863 b. Violations of the CA Bot Act's Political Prong Can 863 Be Concealment C. Public Prosecution for CA Bot Act Violations via the UCL 864 1. Standing to Sue in California 864 2. Compelling Government Action to Enforce the UCL Against CA Bot Act Violators 865 D. Reliance on the Mistaken Belief that a Bot Is a Person 866 1. Reliance Under the UCL 867 a. Purchasers Relying on a Product's Mislabeling Have Standing Under the UCL 867 b. Online Bots Seek to Induce Commercial Transactions by Posing as People 868 c. Online Users Could Show Injury Was as a Result of Deceptive Bot Speech 871 2. Reliance Under the Law of Fraudulent Deceit 871 a. Misrepresentation Need Only Enter into the Decision-Making 872 b. Plaintiffs Are Not Expected to Guess Who Is a Bot 872 c. Reliance Should Be Clearly Articulated in Detail 873 E. How Does a CA Bot Act Violation Cause Harm? 873 1. Economic Harm 874 a. Harm Under the UCL 874 b. Harm Under Fraudulent Deceit 877 2. Noneconomic Harm 878 a. Physical Pain, Mental Suffering, and Emotional Distress 878 b. Harm to a Plaintiff's Right to Vote in an Election 882 3. Remedies 884 a. Remedies at Law 884 b. Equitable Remedies 885 IV. Unmasking Anonymous Online Speech 886 A. Subpoenaing ISPs and Online Social Networks' Immunity 886 B. The CA Bot Act Would Likely Survive Judicial Review Under the First Amendment 887 1. Constitutional Analysis of the Commercial Prong 888 2. Constitutional Analysis of the Political Prong 889 C. Enforcement of a Doe Subpoena in California 890 V. Conclusion 892

Abstract Many aspects of social and commercial life depend on our ability to confide secrets in others. The law, responsive to societal needs, developed the action for breach of confidence, [...]

Contents I. Data Protection as a Fundamental Right II. Exploring Blockchain Technologies A. Basics of Blockchain Terminology B. Classification of Blockchain Technologies C. Applications of Blockchain D. Limits of Blockchain [...], Blockchain has come to revolutionize commerce, driving faster and more efficient transactions. This new technology was born to work in a trustless environment, without any need for trusted intermediaries or supervision by state agencies, leaving a digital print that is mostly public and permanent. Nonetheless, the main problem it presents is that the use of blockchain can interfere with an individual's privacy rights. This article explores the challenges posed by blockchain to data protection. Looking into the characteristics of blockchain will be necessary to explore its advantages and limits, especially from a privacy point of view. Blockchain is a kind of technology that is currently disruptive, but its applications can be modulated and configured in different ways depending on the needs. This article examines the territorial and material scope of the General Data Protection Regulation in order to clarify whether it is applicable to blockchain technologies. The issue of identifiers on a blockchain, the allocation of responsibility to participants, the tension with data subjects ' rights and, in particular, the right to erasure are discussed. Some recommendations for reconciling data protection and blockchain technologies are proposed, in particular, projecting the privacy by design principle to blockchain applications. Technological developments should not suppose a deterioration of the rights of individuals. However, some technical solutions entail significant trade-offs, as the case on anonymity in cryptocurrencies illustrates.

Abstract: The idea that privacy makes you safer is unjustly neglected: public officials emphasize the dangers of privacy while contemporary privacy theorists acknowledge that privacy may have safety implications but [...]

INTRODUCTION The Economics of the Baby Shortage, (1) by Elisabeth Landes and Richard Posner, described a suboptimal landscape of child adoption in the United States. Many children went unadopted, raised [...], In 1978, Dr. Elisabeth Landes and then-Professor, later-Judge Richard Posner, published The Economics of the Baby Shortage. The article openly discussed how economic analysis can address the allocation of babies available for adoption. The ideas expressed in the article were widely denounced as an inhumane commodification of children, something tolerable only in the twisted minds of academic authors. Despite the backlash, an odd thing happened in the more than four decades since Landes and Posner wrote on this topic: their ideas began to take hold. Today, almost all states in the United States permit, in some form, the contractual assignment of parental rights; that is, almost all states now permit the sale of babies. We suggest, an ironic reason for the change: the modern technology of in vitro fertilization has quieted or overcome complaints about the commodification of children by moiling surrogacy contracts into a long-accepted, though euphemistically labeled, realm of parental property rights in children.

INTRODUCTION I. The law of theft A. What is "Theft?" B. Theft of Intangibles C. Cyber Theft II. The Law of Torts A. Cyber Remedies in Tort B. Bailment as [...], Theft of personal property is easy to consider, but theft of information poses unique problems. Courts and legislatures dealing with victims of data breaches grapple with whether the victim has been harmed--in a manner that the law can redress. In most cases, the thief is gone, and the victims--the individual whose data was taken and the company it was entrusted to--are engaged in a lawsuit. This article engages in a discussion on the nature of such "cyberdamage," and whether a mere showing of damage to privacy is enough, or if a showing of financial harm is required.

INTRODUCTION The late Judge Reinhardt posited the following: As a society, we must remain solicitous of the constitutional liberties of public employees, as of any citizens, to the greatest degree [...]

Abstract: When an Amazon Echo is activated, the device is constantly recording and sending those recordings to Amazon's cloud. For an always recording device such as the Echo, getting consent [...]

INTRODUCTION I. THE CONCEPT OF DATA PORTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES A. Emergence of Data Portability B. Laws Including an Access or Portability Right C. Why Conditions are Right for [...]

INTRODUCTION Are our privacy interests implicated when police keep records of each and every time our cars are spotted by automated license plate readers? For many years, police have used [...]

INTRODUCTION 1674 I. THE STUDENT SURVEILLANCE REGIME 1677 A. Surveillance: What Is It? 1678 B. Typology 1679 1. Technologies for Watching 1680 a. Digital Learning and Data Capture 1680 b. [...], New technologies are expanding schools' ability to keep students under surveillance--inside and outside the classroom--during the school year and after it ends. Schools have moved quickly to adopt a dizzying array of new tools. These include digital learning products that capture and store student data; anonymous tip lines encouraging students to report on each other; and software that monitors students' emails and social media posts, even when they are written from home. Steadily growing numbers of police officers stationed in schools can access this information, compounding the technologies 'power. Advocates of these tools argue that they improve student safety and learning outcomes, but this Article reveals that the evidence for this argument is in fact quite thin. Moreover, policymakers have failed to consider important countervailing considerations--most notably, student privacy and its significance for child development; unequal impact, particularly for poor, Black, and LGBTQ youth; and potential liability for school administrators. Using North Carolina's public schools as a case study, this Article makes three contributions to the burgeoning literature on the surveillance state. First, it provides a comprehensive typology that shows the full range of student surveillance. Second, it identifies key procedural and substantive objections to student surveillance that shoidd be--but are not--taken into account by policymakers. Third, it proposes principles to guide the selection, implementation, and oversight of student surveillance.

Online education has a reputation for being insular and isolating, with low levels of participation, disconnected from the creative, discursive, and tumultuous world of social media. (1) Bringing social media [...]

ABSTRACT This Article contends that the Privacy Act of 1974, a law intended to engender trust in government records, can be implemented in a way that inverts its intent. Specifically, [...]

One of the most significant challenges confronting courts and legal scholars in the twenty-first century is the application of Fourth Amendment doctrine to new technology. The circuit split over the [...]

I. INTRODUCTION There are approximately 22 million Bitcoin wallets set up across the globe. (1) However, the number of users has been predominantly left to guesswork because many users own [...]

AbstractTwo cases currently before the High Court of Australia--Clubb v Edwards and Preston v Avery--raise the validity of state laws that seek to prohibit certain communication and protest outside abortion [...]

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. BACKGROUND 1186 A. Anthropomorphism and Attributions of Agency 1187 1. Promiscuous Agency Account 1189 2. Selective Agency Account 1191 3. Transition Model 1193 B. Legal Doctrines [...], This Note offers a solution to the unique privacy issues posed by the increasingly humanlike interactions users have with virtual assistants, such as Amazon's Alexa, which accompany smart-home technology. These interactions almost certainly result in the users engaging in the cognitive phenomenon of anthropomorphism--more specifically, an assignment of agency. This is a phenomenon that has heretofore been ignored in the legal context, but both the rapidity of technological advancement and inadequacy of current applicable legal doctrine necessitate its consideration now. Since users view these anthropomorphized virtual assistants as persons rather than machines, the law should treat them as such. To accommodate this reality, either the courts or Congress should grant them legal personhood. This can be accomplished through the application of an objective test that is satisfied by the establishment of social and moral connections with these virtual assistants. Further, due to the paramount privacy concerns resulting from this technology's use within the home, courts should establish a new privilege that protects the communications between users and their virtual assistants.

Abstract: The Cloud has changed how individuals record, store, and aggregate their personal information. As technology's capacity for holding an individual's most intimate details and recording day-to-day experiences increases, Fourth [...]

Introduction 700 I. LinkNYC: Narrowing the Digital Divide While Widening Digital Surveillance Concerns 701 A. Closing New York City's Digital Divide as Mobile Broadband Usage Increases 701 B. The Smart [...]

Abstract: When the European Court of Justice in effect accepted a Right to Be Forgotten in 2014, ruling that a man had a right to privacy in his past economic [...]

Abstract: Alexa, Amazon's digital voice assistant, and devices like it, are increasingly common. With this trend comes growing problems, as illustrated by a murder investigation in Bentonville, Arkansas. Police wanted [...]

AUTHOR. Cyber Initiative Fellow, Stanford University; Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University (effective March 2018); J.D., Stanford Law School; Ph.D. candidate, Stanford University Department of Computer [...], TheUnited States government hacks computer systems for law enforcement purposes. As encryption and anonymization tools become more prevalent, the government will fore-seeably increase its resort to malware. Law enforcement hacking poses novel puzzles for criminal procedure. Courts are just beginning to piece through the doctrine, and scholarship is scant. This Article provides the first comprehensive examination of how federal law regulates government malware. Part I of the Article considers whether the Fourth Amendment regulates law enforcement hacking. This issue has sharply divided district courts because, unlike a conventional computer search, hacking usually does not involve physical contact with a suspect's property. The Article provides a technical framework for analyzing government malware, then argues that a faithful application of Fourth Amendment principles compels the conclusion that government hacking is inherently a search. Part II analyzes the positive law that governs law enforcement hacking, answering fundamental criminal procedure questions about initiating a search, establishing probable cause and particularity, venue, search duration, and notice. A review of unsealed court filings demonstrates that the government has a spotty compliance record with these procedural requirements. The Article also argues for reinvigorating super-warrant procedures and applying them to law enforcement hacking. Finally, Part III uses government malware to illuminate longstanding scholarly debates about Fourth Amendment law and the structure of surveillance regulation. Law enforcement hacking sheds new light on the interbranch dynamics of surveillance, equilibrium adjustment theories for calibrating Fourth Amendment law, and the interplay between statutory and constitutional privacy protections.

ABSTRACT When the government seeks electronic documents held in the cloud, what legal standard should apply? This simple question raises fundamental questions about the future of our civil liberties in [...]