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Being is said in many ways. --Aristotle, Met. 1003a33 1. To Be Being is one of the most important philosophical notions, and the behaviour of the verb to be has [...]

In his article in this issue, ''How do Madhyamikas Think?' Revisited,' Tom Tillemans reflects on his earlier article 'How do Madhyamikas Think?' (2009), itself a response to earlier work of [...]

In this issue, Constance Kassor describes Gorampa's attitude to contradictions as they occur in various contexts of Buddhist pursuit. We agree with much of what she says; with some things [...]

Introduction We thank Mark Siderits for his insightful and rigorous treatment of our heresy. He raises exactly the right problems for our view, and provides us with an opportunity to [...]

We thank Brook Ziporyn for a creative and imaginative treatment of our view in a context we had not considered, that of Tiantai theory. Ziporyn's main criticisms of our position [...]

Chinese (Sino-Japanese) Buddhism in general and Chan (Zen) in particular are very different kettles of fish from Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. The Daoist influence gives it a whole new flavor. Chan certainly [...]

The view that everything is empty (sunya) is a central metaphysical plank of Mahayana Buddhism. It has often been the focus of objections. Perhaps the most important of these is that it in effect entails a nihilism: nothing exists. This objection, in turn, is denied by Mahayana theorists, such as Nagarjuna. One of the things that makes the debate difficult is that the precise import of the view that everything is empty is unclear. The object of this essay is to put the debate in a new light. It does so by proposing a mathematical characterization of Emptiness--that is, the totality of empty things--showing that, whatever it is, it has a definite structure and is not, therefore, to be identified with nothingness., Introduction The view that everything is empty (sunya) is a central metaphysical plank of Mahayana Buddhism. This is understood in different ways in different Mahayana traditions. Our concern here will [...]

Introduction Anyone who is accustomed to the view that contradictions cannot be true and cannot be accepted, and who reads texts in the Buddhist traditions, will be struck by the [...]

'If you know the nature of one thing, you know the nature of all things.' Khensur Yeshe Thubten Whatever is dependently co-arisen, That is explained to be emptiness. That, being […]

Inconsistent models of arithmetic are one of the many mathematical structures paraconsistent logics make possible. These models can be seen as a sequence of nuclei that are either improper, proper with linear chromosomes, or proper with cyclical chromosomes.

Reasons for rejection of dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are true, are not found in any of six major accounts of truth. These include the deflationist theory of truth, the semantic theory of truth, the teleological theory, the pragmatist theory, the coherence theory and the correspondence theory of truth.

Philosophical humor is presented in a supplement to Mind. Pieces range from poetry to a lonely hearts column, a quiz, book reviews and a jobs section. The articles include a description of an auction of philosophical objects; the story of A Prime, a variable employed in philosophical examples; correspondence concerning a book proposal by Dr. Wannaby; a discussion of BOB palindromes; a proposal concerning traffic lights; and a useful list of rhetorical devices and other maneuvers.

Nicholas J.J. Smith argues that the Principle of Uniform Solution is valid only relative to a particular level of abstraction, but his argument is flawed because he assumes that all levels are equal. On the contrary, the level of the relevant cause is the appropriate level of abstraction. For paradoxes of self-reference, the level of the Inclosure Schema is the correct level of abstraction.

1. Introduction The standard paradoxes of self-reference, such as Burali-Forti's Paradox, the Liar Paradox, Berry's Paradox, have a common underlying structure. This is established in Priest (1994)--hereafter, SPSR. That paper [...]

The rationality of belief in some contradictions is discussed. Problems include the objection that contradictions entail everything, that they cannot be true, that they cannot be believed rationally, that acceptance of contradictions would make rational criticism impossible, and that nothing could be denied if contradictions were accepted.

Fuzzy logic can help account for vagueness. In the context of many-valued logic, validity is established by 'acceptable' sentences, but in a fuzzy logic, acceptability is determined by a sentence that is 'true enough.' This position creates valid arguments that has conclusions as true as their premises, and creates 'local validity.'

In this issue, Takashi Yagisawa maintains the following position. Just as there are physically impossible worlds, where the laws of physics are different from those of the actual world, so [...]

1. Introduction In three recent papers, Everett (1993, 1994 and 1996), Anthony Everett has produced a number of interesting and interrelated arguments against a dialetheic solution to the semantic paradoxes. [...]

1. Introduction In 'Is Arithmetic Consistent?' (1994a - hereafter, IAC) I drew attention to the fact that there are inconsistent but non-trivial theories that contain all the sentences true in [...]

Etchemendy provides a needed reminder in his book 'The Concept of Logical Consequence' that the orthodox view of validity is problematic and will make valid inferences invalid and intuitively invalid inferences valid. Etchemendy's argument is described in detail, with both its strengths and weaknesses highlighted. At the very least, it raises doubts about deductive validity and the over-reliance on this approach in addressing the notion of logical consequence over the past 50 years.

Two commonly used approaches to solving the problem of semantic paradoxes, the gap and glut solutions, are compared. The semantic gap theory, as espoused by Terry Parsons, treats paradoxical sentences as neither true nor false. Paradoxical statements are both true and false, under the semantic glut solution. While similarities exist between these two approaches, Parsons' gap solution is shown to be inferior at some critical points.

Introduction Let L be the language of first order arithmetic; and let N be the set of sentences of L true in the standard interpretation. It is well-known that N [...]

Until the early 1970s there was really only one fully articulated technical solution to the semantic paradoxes: Tarski's. Most logicians--and philosophers who were interested--subscribed to it, faute de mieux. Since [...]

Introduction When one meets the paradoxes of self-reference for the first time, one is struck by the fact that they all appear to be members of a single family, generated [...]

BOGHOSSIAN, Paul. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. x + 139 pp. Cloth, $24.95--Boghossian's book concerns a view that he dubs Equal Validity: 'There are [...]

'What is philosophy?' is a question that every professional philosopher must ask themselves sometimes. In a sense, of course, they know: they spend much time doing it. But in another [...]