1. PROTECTION OF SMALL INVESTORS AND FIRM VALUE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SPLIT SHARE STRUCTURE REFORM IN CHINA
- Author
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Shi, Yanping, Lechner, Thomas A., Yang, Wentao, and Zhang, Yu
- Subjects
Stock markets ,Corporate governance ,Investor relations ,Stock market ,Business ,Economics ,Business, international ,Regional focus/area studies - Abstract
In a firm with concentrated ownership, minority shareholders risk expropriation by controlling shareholders. This expropriation risk reduces firm value. The split-share structural reform of China in 2005 provides an opportunity to exam the relationship between the protection of minority shareholders and firm value. Two previous attempts to make all shares tradeable in the stock market failed. The third attempt in 2005 added terms to protect the interests of minority shareholders. The key changes were the terms of compensation paid to the public shareholders and requiring a two-thirds vote of public shareholders necessary for the reform to occur. 237 firms completed the reform by the end of 2005. 32 firms that used compensation other than transferring dividend shares to tradeable shareholders as the only compensation method were excluded from the sample for the ease of comparison. Firms that have B shares or are cross-listed were excluded to avoid price impact from outside the domestic Chinese market. Four initial pilot firms that had an extraordinary increase in price after reform were excluded to avoid influential data. Firms with a re-list date after our examination window were also removed. Finally, 188 out of 237 firms were in our data sample. Firm values before and after reform were calculated based on Tobin's Q model. Multivariable linear regressions were used to examine whether better investor protection offered to the tradeable shareholders leads to a higher increase in firm value after reform. We find a higher voting approval rate is associated with a greater increase in firm value after reform. However, consideration payment does not show such a positive relationship with firm value. This may be because other factors can influence consideration payment. For example, some studies find a lower compensation ratio in firms with a better corporate governance environment. We also do not find positive association with respect to the non-binding complementary commitments made by the controlling shareholders. Our results indicate protection of small investors is important in a concentrated ownership structure, especially when corporate governance is still weak. JEL Classifications: G14, G32, O16, P31 Keywords: Ownership Structure and Firm Value, Minority Shareholder Protection, Split Share Structure Reform in China, INTRODUCTION Classical law and finance theories state that better investor protection is associated with better development of financial markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000b). Shleifer and [...]
- Published
- 2021