To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.010 Byline: Xi (Jason) Kuang (a), Roberto A. Weber (b), Jason Dana (c) Keywords: Coordination games; Advice; Equilibrium selection Abstract: This study investigates whether the effectiveness of non-binding advice in coordination is influenced by knowledge of the adviser's motive. Using pure coordination games in which a non-playing adviser makes a recommendation of which strategy to play, we find that if the advice appears to be 'self-interested' (i.e., the adviser has a monetary stake in the advice being followed), it is less effective than if the same advice is given by a neutral independent party with no economic interest in the game. The implications of our results for the effectiveness of advice in real-world economic and organizational situations are discussed. Author Affiliation: (a) College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree St. NW, Atlanta, GA 30308-0520, United States (b) Department of Decision and Social Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburg, PA 15213, United States (c) Psychology Department, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820, United States Article History: Received 27 September 2004; Accepted 30 March 2005