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AN obscure film (perhaps a Fellini or a David Lynch), a bizarre piece of modern art, or a complex poem frequently evoke from my students the question, 'What does it [...]

This essay is a brief attempt to summarize and evaluate the contributions that Democracy and Tradition makes to the field of comparative ethics. It is argued that the potential impact of these contributions would be strengthened by engagement with the common morality already imbedded in international human rights norms. KEY WORDS: comparative ethics, common morality, human rights, moral epistemology, justification

Foundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect--all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls 'Infinitism'--the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.

In this paper I make some critical comments on John McDowell's Mind and World and offer suggestions as to how it might be possible to solve John McDowell's problem of finding a safe passage between the Scylla of the 'Myth of the Given' (Sellars) and the Charybdis of a Davidsonian linguistic coherentism. McDowell's defense of a minimal empiricism depends on the largely unargued and ultimately untenable assumption that epistemic justification can only operate at the level of conceptual or prepositional entities. Drawing on contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and continental philosophy of subjectivity, I try to show that epistemic normativity already comes into play at two levels of experience--sensory observation and self-knowledge--that are more basic than the conceptual. What McDowell needs is a philosophy of subjectivity that would allow him to identify primary sources of epistemic normativity that are both subject-centered and pre-conceptual.

Might epistemic justification be, to some substantive extent, a function of epistemic responsibility--a belief's being formed, or its being maintained, in an epistemically responsible way? (1) I will call any [...]

The first horn of the Responsibilism Dilemma turns on the fact that the concept of responsibility is neutral between positive appraisal and negative appraisal. To say that someone is responsible [...]

Testimonial justification based on parity between one's own beliefs and those of others is discussed. Topics include the parity argument, the trustworthiness of one's own beliefs, and the trustworthiness of others' beliefs.

The empirical basis for trust in testimony in the sciences is discussed in relation to a possible a priori principle of entitlement to trust. Topics include the indispensability of trust, the limits of testimony, and the basis of entitlement.

Richard Fumerton's 'Principle of Inferential Justification' holds that, in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must be justified in believing that E makes P probable. I argue that the plausibility of this principle rests upon two kinds of mistakes: first, a level confusion; and second, a fallacy of misconditionalisation. Furthermore, Fumerton's principle leads to skepticism about inferential justification, for which reason it should be rejected. Instead, the examples Fumerton uses to motivate his principle can be accounted for using a different principle: in order for S to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, it must be true that E makes P probable. The latter principle can be independently motivated and does not lead to skepticism.

Train Case 1. You're at Back Bay Station in Boston preparing to take the commuter rail to Providence. You're going to see friends. It will be a relaxing vacation. You've [...]

Byline: Mechtild Jager (1) Keywords: constructivism; epistemology; interests; norms; priority of pragmatics to semantics; reductive andnon-reductive justification; starting point of foundation Abstract: `What is justification?'-Constructivism of Erlangen/Constanceschool as an example for problems resulting from priority ofpragmatics to semantics.-R. Brandom's `Making it explicit' is an attempt to work out how semantics is rooted in pragmatics:meaning in use and conceptual content in social functionalroles. A philosophy that also focuses on reconstructing thosenorms that are implicit in pragmatics and constitutive to semanticsis developed by Constructivism of Erlangen/Constance school. Thisenquiry tries to work out that a discussion of constructivismmight be useful for a comprehension of Brandom's `theory ofexpression', because both philosophical positions meetthemselves in a pragmatic way of justification that makes itimpossible to justify claims to all rational beings but only tomembers of those communities that share the same interests andinstitutions. Author Affiliation: (1) Ewaldsweg 7, D-20537, Hamburg Article History: Registration Date: 16/10/2004

In order to defend the regress argument for foundationalism against Post's objection that relevant forms of inferential justification are not transitive, Lydia McGrew and Timothy McGrew define a relation E of positive evidence, which, they contend, has the following features: It is a necessary condition for any inferential justification; it is transitive and irreflexive; and it enables both a strengthened regress argument proof against Post's objection and an argument that nothing can ever appear in its own justificational ancestry. In reply, we construct in their own terms both a counter-example to the would-be transitivity of E, and a related objection to their never-in-its-own-ancestry argument. We also rebut their rejection of certain counterexamples to the would-be transitivity of some forms of inferential justification. By doing so, and by questioning their transitivity claim for E, we aim to further the project of undermining the circularity arguments advanced by a zoo of skeptics, relativists, antirealists and internalists against realism and externalism.

John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that 'justifies' is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by Watkins and Salmon as well as to Post's, arguing that none of these counterexamples apply to the relation they are describing. Given the revived transitivity assumption using this relation, the regress argument does indeed demonstrate the need for foundational stopping points in inferential justification.

Kung's book, 'Justification,' is the occasion for Rahner to clarify the relationship of faith and love, to banish the notion of meriting grace by faith, and to show how christology conserves a graced creation after the fall.

Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.

It has been claimed that justification, conceived traditionally in an internalist fashion, is not an epistemologically important property. I argue for the importance of a conception of justification that is completely dependent on the subject's experience, using an analogy to advice. The epistemological importance of a property depends on two desiderata: the extent to which it guarantees the epistemic goal of attaining truth and avoiding falsehood, and the extent to which it depends only on the information available to the believer. The traditional intermalist notion of justification completely satisfies the second desideratum and largely satisfies the first.

The way in which emotional responses to fiction can be aesthetically warranted is discussed, with a focus on fiction films. Topics include the real-life principle, the correspondence model, and a functional model.

The notion of a self-presenting state is discussed, in response to a paper by Keith Lehrer. Lehrer's account of exemplarization is also examined.

Author Laurence BonJour replies to participants in a symposium on his book 'In Defense of Pure Reason.' Responses are directed to Paul Boghossian, Tamar Gendler, Georges Rey, Gilbert Harman, and Albert Casullo.

The book 'In Defense of Pure Reason' by Laurence BonJour is discussed, with a focus on the role of experience. There are problems with BonJour's conception of experience, and his rejection of indefeasibility by experience as a component of a priori justification is unconvincing.

The book 'In Defense of Pure Reason' by Laurence BonJour is discussed. Topics include three frameworks for epistemological justification, general foundationalism, skepticism in relation to general foundationalism, a priori justification, rational insight into necessity, the alleged need for rational insight, 'intuitive examples,' red-green incompatibility, the transitivity of 'taller than,' and failures of insight into necessity.

The book 'In Defense of Pure Reason' by Laurence BonJour is discussed. Topics include BonJour's challenge and the empiricist's reply, the holistic hypothetico-deductive approach, the justification of beliefs, the justification of reasoning, and deeper difficulties in the debate between empiricism and rationalism.

The book 'In Defense of Pure Reason' by Laurence BonJour is discussed. BonJour attempts to provide a cognitive/perceptual account of a priori justification, but many problems remain unresolved.

The book 'In Defense of Pure Reason' defends a moderate rationalist account of a priori justification and knowledge. A priori justification is held to genuinely exist, but such knowledge is fallible and corrigible.

Justification as event consists in making faith, hope, and love real in the world by contributing to its development. Though the proper object of these virtues is God, world development is a legitimate Christian activity since immediacy to God is always mediated through human action in the world.