Search

When a federal statute faces constitutional challenges, the Department of Justice traditionally almost always has defended the constitutionality of that statute. Even if attorneys in the Department think the statute [...]

INTRODUCTION Government power is divided between the states and federal government. States have general government authority within their borders, while the federal government has only limited powers but jurisdiction over [...]

Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering. Although this deference captures the institutional advantages of agencies in interpreting statutes, critics--most notably Justices Thomas and Gorsuch--have raised serious challenges to its legality. They have argued that Chevron violates Article III by constraining the interpretive power of the federal courts; rests on the unjustifiable assumption that Congress has delegated primary interpretive authority to agencies; and is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, which directs federal courts to review statutes de novo. These challenges threaten to unravel Chevron deference, thereby losing the functional, institutional benefits of that deference and casting doubt on countless agency regulations and adjudications.To meet these concerns, this Article proposes restructuring Chevron as a limitation on the remedial power of the courts instead of a doctrine of interpretation. Under this approach, courts would not defer to agency interpretations. Instead, Remedial Chevron would limit the circumstances under which courts could vacate agency actions as inconsistent with statutes. Courts could vacate agency actions on that ground only if the agency's interpretation was unreasonable. This approach would avoid the legal objections to Chevron while largely preserving the functional benefits of judicial deference to agency interpretations., INTRODUCTIONJudicial deference to agency interpretations is a central feature of administrative law. The chief form of deference derives from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1) in [...]

Article III confers the judicial power on the federal courts, and it provides the judges of those courts with life tenure and salary guarantees to ensure that they decide disputes according to law instead of popular pressure. Despite this careful arrangement, the Supreme Court has not restricted the judicial power to the Article III courts. Instead, it has held that Article I tribunals--whose judges do not enjoy the salary and tenure guarantees provided by Article III--may adjudicate disputes if the parties consent to the tribunals' jurisdiction. This consent exception provides the basis for thousands of adjudications by Article I judges each year. This Article challenges the consent exception. It argues that the consent of the parties should not be a basis for adjudication before an Article I tribunal. As it explains, permitting Article I tribunals to adjudicate based on the parties' consent is inconsistent with the text of the Constitution and historical practice, and it undermines both the separation of powers and federalism., INTRODUCTION 716 I. THE ARTICLE III JUDICIAL POWER 719 A. Defining the Article III Judicial Power 719 B. The Article III Courts 722 II. THE CONSENT EXCEPTION 725 A. The [...]

Under current law, a party must establish Article III standing to bring suit in federal court. According to the Supreme Court, this standing requirement is necessary to protect the separation [...]

ABSTRACT In determining which constitutional procedural rights apply at sentencing, courts have distinguished between mandatory and discretionary sentencing systems. For mandatory systems--systems that limit sentencing factors and specify particular punishments [...]

ABSTRACT In United States v. Booker, the Court remedied a constitutional defect in the federal sentencing scheme by rendering advisory the then-binding sentencing guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. [...]

III. THE NON-REDELEGATION DOCTRINE In Booker, the Court redelegated sentencing authority to the district courts in an effort to achieve Congress's substantive sentencing goal of reducing unwarranted disparities in sentencing. [...]

One of the judiciary 's self-imposed limits on the power o f judicial review is the presumption of constitutionality. Under that presumption, courts supply any conceivable facts necessary to satisfy [...]