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INTRODUCTION Dans son dernier essai, Retrotopia (2017), Zygmunt Bauman esquissait un tableau socioculturel sombre, qu'un anti-utopiste comme Leszek Koiakowski aurait descrit, probablement, dans les termes d'une << inertie sans espoir [...], Less than a decade after the proclamation of 'the end of history', the anxieties about 'the end of utopia' are gaining ground in the intellectual field all over the world, in the context of both 'the crisis of the future' and the haunting of the present by the painful pasts. The latter two are the main consequences of the fracture in the contemporary temporal order--occurred in the '70s and deepened after the fall of the Iron Curtain--which defines the 'presentist regime of historicity'. These dynamics are counterbalanced, in the same period, by a 'global epidemic of nostalgia', including the commodified forms of 'retromania', that reveals the presentist 'faces of utopianism', from the non-instrumental 'retrospective utopias'--as poles of 'existential' types of reflective nostalgic practices--to the instrumental 'retrotopias' based on the 'restorative nostalgia', which were mobillized in the contemporary memory wars, starting from the '80s. Reflecting the tensions between the fixation on the traumatic legacy of the 'age of extremes' and the apprehensions about 'the future of nostalgia', the presentist dynamics of multidirectional memory discloses conflictual landscapes (social, cultural, and political), from the mnemonic turn of the '70s and the '80s--which has arisen against the background of the decline of both welfare state and the nation-states, and of the global economic crisis--to the post-Cold War contests around 'the divised memories' of 'Europe's Europes', coexisting with the clashes of contradictory 'faces' of nostalgia and utopia. Keywords: presentism, multidirectional memory, nostalgia, retrospective utopia, retrotopia

Keywords: vaccine; Cold War; Covid-19; vaccine nationalism; vaccine propaganda; health data surveillance; civil liberties Abstract Surveying the early responses to the Covid-19 pandemic among nation states, one finds a veritable babel of responses, some predictable and some not. Would these results have been different half a century or more ago, when smallpox was eradicated and hopes were high that international cooperation would yield similar results for other infectious diseases? Is this a story about the stability provided by the bipolar postwar world, juxtaposed with the complex geopolitical repositioning that finally followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, or is that too rich an irony? A multipolar world may indeed be less prepared to cope with an international health crisis than a bipolar one. In any case, the patterns of global response are not only reminiscent of the Cold War era itself but also suggestive of a new vaccination cold war. Byline: Jonathan D. Moreno, Judit Sándor, Ulf Schmidt

On 3 October 2015, the U.S. Navy met an odd milestone when it decommissioned USS Simpson--the last modern ship in its fleet to have sunk an enemy warship. Simpson had [...]

The UN General Assembly's 1975 "Zionism is Racism" resolution culminated a decades-long shift in global power dynamics. The Israeli Foreign Ministry's internal debates about how forcefully to oppose the resolution shows to what extent Soviet propagandists had stirred Holocaust-related fears by infusing anti-Zionism with allegations of racism. The diplomatic dustup, especially among African countries, reveals the multi-dimensionality of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In boosting the New Anti-Semitism, the UN fell in American esteem. This illuminating episode demonstrates the power of going public: how the General Assembly could cause disproportionate harm and two individuals could do much good., INTRODUCTION ON JULY 1, 1982, RONALD REAGAN SENT HIS UN AMBASSADOR JEANE Kirkpatrick to Bujumbura to celebrate Burundi's twentieth anniversary of independence. In the six-hour-long parade, revelers carried a six-foot-wide […]

THE COLD WAR IS CONVENTIONALLY THOUGHT TO BE LONG OVER. Whatever legacies of it remain in East Asia, such as the continued division of the Korean Peninsula and strained relations [...]

Abstract In 1966, a new hospital was being built in western Kenya with Soviet aid. Designed by Soviet architects and planners, with equipment transported from the USSR, it was to [...]

ABSTRACT: In much of the English-language scholarship on the post-1945 Allied occupation of Germany, French officials appear as little more than late arrivals to the victors' table, in need of [...]

This article explores the literary criticism of the South African writer Es'kia Mphahlele by placing it within the context of the cultural Cold War. As the author of The African Image (1962; revised edition, 1974), one of the landmark works in midcentury Afrocentric criticism, Mphahlele helped to usher in a new era for African literary criticism, pushing it away from negritude's politicized judgments and toward a more self-consciously academic format. This article examines how Mphahlele constructed this newly academicized form of literary criticism by borrowing liberally from aesthetic discourses normally associated with US and Soviet cultural diplomacy programs. In particular, it describes how Mphahlele adapted a modernist language of 'character,' taken from the writings of Lionel Trilling and E. M. Forster, only to apply this language to its ideological opposite: a social theory rooted in Marxian notions of class division. By doing so, Mpahahlele managed to find a way to generalize his own relationship to his South African audience-remote, uncertain, and riddled by class divisions--into a model for how literary criticism could represent an increasingly fragmented social sphere., It is a well-known fact that African decolonization took place during the same years as the global Cold War. But when we look back on these years, it is hard [...]

When we contemplate ruins, we contemplate our own future. Christopher Woodward, In Ruins: A Journey Through History, Art and Literature Ayoung Mozambican woman sits in a hospital examination room speaking [...]

Developed in the context of a bipolar world order, Julius Nyerere's political philosophy of Ujamaa expressed an African socialist vision predicated on the principles of non-alignment, anti-imperialism, and the aspiration to Pan-Africanism. Government promotion of formal Swahili poetry as a medium for the dissemination of Ujamaa prompted students and faculty at the University of Dar es Salaam to begin experimenting with free verse in the early 1970s. In response, a fierce public debate would emerge about appropriate forms for poetry written in Swahili. Ostensibly an aesthetic disagreement, the debate would reflect contradictions in Ujamaa philosophy and tensions inherent to Cold War political culture. Looking beyond prevailing descriptions of the debate as a dispute between traditionalism and modernism, this article traces the emergence of poetic voices responding to and questioning both the form and content of dominant political discourse and beginning to imagine new social and political formations outside the framework of Ujamaa., On June 6, 1968, a year and a half after the release of the Arusha Declaration, which ushered in Julius Nyerere's form of African socialism--known in Swahili as Ujamaa, or [...]

'One of the inherited traditions of Western education in the last four hundred years is that of putting things in compartments, resulting in an incapacity to see the links that [...]

The discovery of a tenth-century AD high-status burial at Prague Castle in 1928 led to multiple identifications in the context of two world wars and the Cold War. Recognised variously as both a Viking and Slavonic warrior according to Nazi and Soviet ideologies, interpretation of the interred individual and associated material culture were also entangled with the story of the burial's excavator, the remains and commemorative monuments of two Czech Unknown Soldiers and the creation of the Czechoslovak state. This epic narrative reflects the circumstances of Czechoslovakia and Central Europe across the twentieth century. Keywords: Prague, Slavic, Viking, Nazi, ideology, identity, Introduction Sometimes archaeology can be confusing, and, on closer inspection, can prove even more complicated. The conflicting interpretations of a putative Viking/warrior grave discovered at Prague Castle in 1928 well [...]

The training and advising of foreign air forces is not a new mission for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) (*), but it probably deserves greater attention than it has received. [...]

This article analyzes the proceedings of the First Congress of Black Writers within the context of the global Cold War, teasing out the contradictory political agendas that subtended this foundational event for black writing and African literature. It treats the First Congress as a spectacle designed by Alioune Diop, founder and editor of Presence Africaine, in order to create before the Cold War world an image of a unified black collectivity: a (geo) political impact that Diop envisioned for his conference ostensibly limited to discussions of culture. The article explores the rhetorical strategies by which Diop maintained an image of consensus among a caucus of delegates who were in fact deeply divided politically. It discusses Diop's invocation of the 1955 Bandung Conference, his deliberately broad definition of culture, and his deployment of liberal human rights discourse as consensual strategies that cohere to project an image of a transatlantic black civic culture already independent and sovereign in all but name., The First International Congress of Black Writers and Artists took place in Paris from the 19th through the 22nd of September of 1956 at the Sorbonne, the same site where, [...]

IN 1954 SECURITY OFFICIALS FOR the US Civil Service Commission questioned Ruth Windham, a former employee of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), who had recently resigned due to an undisclosed [...]

Americanists working in East Central European countries, such as Croatia, often find themselves caught in an older geopolitical imaginary that envisions this geography as the continental fault line of the [...]

Out of the smoldering ashes of socialist Eastern Europe ... On November 9, 2014, eight thousand illuminated balloons took to the Berlin night sky. The city was celebrating the twenty-fifth [...]

This article considers the opportunities that emerged during the 1950s for American interests in Africa through consideration of a unique story, that of Congresswoman Frances Bolton and her trip to Africa in 1955. Frances Payne Bolton (b. 1885, d. 1977) heiress to the Payne family Standard Oil fortune, and one of United States' longest serving Congresswomen, made a significant though largely unrecognized contribution to shaping America's cold war perspectives and policies on Africa. Following the United States' development with Congolese uranium of the atomic bomb in the early 1940s, Americans intensified their commercial and political interests in Africa. They did so in the context of rising African nationalism and continent-wide struggles for liberation from European colonial powers. American leaders then found themselves in a deeply ambiguous position vis-a-vis Africa and Africans, caught as they were between paying deference to European paternalist interests in the continent and largely unfulfilled aspirations to deal with the looming civil rights movement on the domestic front. The principal focus of the article is a consideration of Bolton's remarkable and unprecedented three month tour of the African continent in 1955. During a critical period in African states' struggles to gain independence, Bolton was deeply engaged in cultivating America's growing interest in economic and political opportunities in postcolonial Africa As chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, her 'Special Study Mission to Africa, South and East of the Sahara' included stops in twenty-four countries and, meetings with African political leaders as well as colonial officials. Upon her return over the next year or so, Bolton penned a report of mission for Congress, and made a fascinating film chronicle - Africa: Giant with a Future, 1955. The article seeks to highlight significant facets of Bolton's trip, and its influence on how Americans in and outside of government perceived Africa., Introduction Frances Payne Bolton (b. 1885, d. 1977), heiress to the Payne family Standard Oil fortune and one of the United States' longest serving congresswomen (1939-1960), made a significant, though [...]

This article examines the life story of Muhammad Kkansu (Chong Suil), a once distinguished foreign professor of Arabic history and culture at Dankook University and a prolific scholar on the Silk Road, who was indicted in 1996 on charges of espionage and use of a false identity as an Arab of Filipino-Lebanese descent to enter South Korea. It considers the complex circumstances that shaped his life choices as a diasporic Korean living in China and South Korea's blind and willful ignorance of the North, which ironically enabled a diasporic Korean from China, to pass as an "Arab" right under its nose. In contrast to accounts of North Korean spies, it humanizes the experiences of Kkansu, illustrating how a diasporic Korean learned to dissimulate by adopting an ambiguous identity and navigate the social and political realities of national division and anxieties caused by global and internecine hostilities during the Cold War. His imprisonment did not foreclose the possibility of becoming an academic again; in fact, he reemerged after a presidential pardon in 2003 and authored more than a dozen important monographs and encyclopedias on the Silk Road. While there are many contradictions and gaps about his personal life, Kkansu's life story challenges the master narratives of national culture, homogeneity, belongingness, and identity. Keywords: Anti-communism, cold-war, diaspora, dissimulation, identity, nationalism, postwar North and South Korea, race, "Exile is predicated on the existence of, love for, and bond with, one's native place; what is true of all exile is not that home and love of home are [...]

Fueled by the Iranian oil revenues, Tehran, under both the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) and since 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran, has intervened in the affairs of sub-Saharan Africa. The Shah's policy was motivated by a 'defensive anti-communist/anti-radicalism containment posture. Conversely, the Islamic Republic of Iran adopted an 'offensive or disruptive policy to alter a political status quo deemed hostile to the survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To understand Iran's scramble to secure its interests in sub-Saharan Africa, four periods will be examined in this analysis: i) the Shah and containment, 1953-1979; ii) the Islamic Republic of Iran's diplomatic offensive,' 1980-2001; Hi) the Islamic Republic of Iran seeking to escape international isolation, 2002-2010; and iv) the Saudi-Iranian Cold War, 2011-2018., Introduction Tehran's attempt to extend Iranian influence in sub-Saharan Africa dates back more than forty years. (1) Iran's capacity to influence events in the region to pursue Iranian political, strategic, [...]

This commentary proposes to connect Russia's present activities in Africa to the history of Soviet involvement on the continent during the Cold War. While post-Soviet Russia pursues very difficult foreign policy objectives in its relations with African states, in doing so it often draws on the relationships, partnerships, and formal and informal networks forged during the Cold War. An enduring continuity can be observed in Russia's ongoing efforts to present itself as an alternative to the West. In the past, the Soviet model of development tended to emphasize socialist modernization. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has abandoned its promotion of socialism to pursue crude economic interests via its business elite, based on values that appear to be in stark contrast to the conventions of Western liberalism., Introduction (1) In the summer of 2018, three Russian journalists were ambushed and murdered in the Central African Republic (CAR). The three had traveled to the CAR in pursuit of [...]

This article reads Ngugi wa Thiong'o's Wizard of the Crow as both a dictator-novel and a critical use of the genre to analyze the larger-scale global political transformations (so-called 'transitions') that followed the end of the Cold War. Beyond its critique of dictators and dictatorship on the African continent, Wizard of the Crow turns attention to nascent networks of opposition to neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization. This constitutes the emergent Global South consciousness of Ngugi's dictator-novel, which requires a reexamination of the contours of the genre in and for the twenty-first century., INTRODUCTION At the start of Ngugi wa Thiong'o's Murogi wa Kagogo (2004-07) [Wizard of the Crow] (2006) the government of the fictional country of Aburiria unveils plans to build a [...]

Master trilogist, essayist, and Somalia's most staunch critic, Nuruddin Farah has the honor of having kept Somalia alive in the global imagination. His output of thirteen novels engage various dimensions of Somali history and politics. In this interview, Farah is asked about the ideological and personal influence of the Cold War on Somalia. He reveals that the Cold War indeed impacted not only the journeys he embarked on, but that several characters in his novels attempt to resist and cope with the political framework generated by the long arm of the superpowers in Somalia., INTRODUCTION In a writing career that will span fifty years in 2020, Nuruddin Farah has had an impressive output of thirteen novels that include three full trilogies as well as [...]

In 1969, at the height of the Cold War, the Puerto Rican singer Lucecita Benitez won the First Festival of Latin Song in the World with her performance of "Genesis": [...]

THIS YEAR MARKS THE CENTENARY OF the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Toppling the provisional government that had overthrown the Romanov dynasty in February, Lenin and the Bolsheviks did more [...]

[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] Declassified documents from Russian archives and official Vietnamese and Albanian materials and memoirs permit consideration of the under-studied topic of relations between the Soviet Union [...]

The events of the Cuban missile crisis, during which the Cold War between the American and Soviet superpowers nearly went hot, were, according to Jeffrey D. Sachs, "the most perilous [...]

INTRODUCTION The Korean War has never officially ended. Yet the 70th anniversary of the first 'hot' conflict in a rapidly-developing Cold War is an occasion to reflect upon how deep [...]

Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine have been momentous in their consequences for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moscow has instilled new life in the almost seventy-year-old alliance. Doubts [...]

On April 8,1950, the Soviets removed the shroud of secrecy surrounding the U.S. strategic aerial reconnaissance program. Soviet fighters shot down an unarmed Navy PB4Y Privateer patrol plane with a [...]

ABSTRACT In both popular media and in mainstream academic scholarship, the Jackson-Vanik amendment--which linked Soviet-American trade relations to the question of Soviet Jewish emigration--is portrayed as a largely successful effort [...]

The Incident. (1) You only need say that phrase to anyone who worked in the Air Force nuclear enterprise and they know exactly what you mean. The Incident refers to the infamous weapons transfer sortie from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB in August 2007, where instead of an inert Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the plane flew with a real ALCM. The resulting fallout from these events sent shockwaves throughout the Air Force. While only a small portion of the Air Force had direct involvement with The Incident, any command, any base, any Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) that could claim the remotest involvement with the nuclear mission found itself in the midst of internal and external reviews of how it supported the nuclear mission in the past and how it could improve that support in the future. For the Air Force Intelligence Community (AFIC), The Incident did see some changes, but not to the degree seen in other AFSCs. At its core, the AFIC serves the primary purpose of bringing the adversary to the planning table. This purpose requires taking intelligence and tailoring that product to fit the spectrum of Air Force missions, from counterinsurgency operations, to mobility support for a Non-Combatant Evacuation to supporting the Air Force's nuclear deterrence mission. Yet, to understand how AFIC currently supports the Air Force nuclear enterprise, it is key to establish how the AFIC supported the nuclear enterprise in the past and how that support evolved over time. To that end, this article will educate the reader on how the AFIC supported nuclear operations by offering a baseline definition for intelligence and using that definition to explain how the AFIC fulfilled that role from the start of the Cold War, through the Post-Cold War/"Pre-Incident" years and how the AFIC continues its support to the nuclear enterprise in the "Post-Incident" Air Force. Baseline Definition Joint Publication 1-02 defines intelligence as "the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations." (2) This updated definition of intelligence still holds the same general meaning as this definition from the 1954 Clark Task Force: "[that which] deals with all the things that should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." (3) The shared meaning of both definitions: making an adversary known and bringing that information to help the Air Force fulfill its mission. Within the definition of intelligence, there exist key subsets (referred to in modern doctrine as functional competencies). As with the definition of intelligence, the names evolved over time, but four functional competencies categorize Air Force intelligence support, to include how the AFIC supported nuclear operations: Analysis, Collection, Targeting, Integration. (4) Cold War The requirement that Air Force intelligence had to support the nuclear mission goes all the way to the very foundations of the U.S. Air Force as a separate military branch. Shortly after its creation, the Air Force assumed control of Strategic Air Command (SAC), which encapsulated the assets and manpower involved with America's airborne strategic forces (primarily the B-29 bomber). (5) SAC's mission gained further impetus as events in Europe required the U.S. to be ready to use its nuclear arsenal at moment's notice, as the U.S. sought to counter the ambitions of the Soviet Union in Europe and the Middle East. (6) By the end of the 1949, SAC not only needed to respond to USSR actions overseas, but also had to be ready to defend the U.S. mainland, as the Soviet Union became the second nuclear power. As the Soviet Union emerged as the primary adversary, the USIC, to include the Air Force, focused much of its intelligence analysis capability towards understanding and countering the USSR. As one of the four functional competencies, analysis calls for: "the conversion of processed information into finished intelligence through the integration, evaluation...and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements." (7) All levels of intelligence professionals perform intelligence analysis. For the Air Force Intelligence professionals supporting the nuclear mission, detailed analysis of adversary capabilities and assessments of intentions reigned paramount for effective nuclear deterrence and operations. However, while intelligence analysis supporting SAC and the nuclear mission appeared to have a clear mission focus in nuclear deterrence/operations and a primary adversary in the USSR, it did not make the job any easier. The establishment of the modern USIC in 1947 did not resolve the long-standing bureaucratic infighting over intelligence. (8) Post 1947, continued infighting hindered intelligence efforts, as the Air Force refused to work with analysts from the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on intelligence estimates for national leadership, as each organization felt that their facts and assessments trumped the other organizations. (9) [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Yet, the challenges facing AFIC did not end with internal struggles, The Soviet Union, a close ally only a few years prior, remained a major mystery. (10) The Soviet enigma proved especially problematic regarding its nuclear program. The U.S. knew that it would not hold its nuclear monopoly for long, but the question was "when would the Soviets get the bomb?" After the U.S. tested the bomb in 1945, many analysts figured that the Soviets would get the bomb eventually, meaning "within 5 years or so." (11) However, the "5-year" refrain appeared to be a common trait among the USIC, much to the consternation of several government officials. (12) For the most part, the USIC, even in 1948, still held that the Soviets would not get the bomb until the early to mid-1950s at the earliest. The Air Force didn't share that assessment, figuring that the USSR could obtain nuclear status earlier, but even they expressed shock when a SAC reconnaissance plane detected the first radioactive particles coming from the USSR in 1949, signaling an end to the U.S. nuclear monopoly. (13) In the 1950s, the Air Force led the charge, stating that the Soviet build-up of nuclear weapons at a massive level, putting the U.S. in danger of falling far behind in the nuclear arms race. (14) With the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the Air Force claimed to have its proof of a certifiable "missile gap." (15) Yet, the Air Force assessment conflicted with other intelligence organizations. In particular, the CIA took umbrage with the Air Force as it came to the opposite conclusion that while the Soviet Union might have been the first to launch rockets into space, there was hardly a "missile gap" in favor of the Russians. (16) Despite this, the Air Force assessments still held sway over a number of powerful political leaders in Washington, D.C., thus helping it in the all-important budget wars. Even when President Kennedy debunked the "missile gap" assessment, he still held firm to strengthening the American nuclear deterrent, which remained a goal of SAC and the Air Force. The Air Force IC, along with their counterparts, continued to score various successes and failures in analysis of Soviet actions during the Cold War. Air Force analysts worked with their IC counterparts to provide President Kennedy an accurate picture of the situation in Cuba in 1962, giving him the key intelligence needed to help thwart the ambitions of the USSR and prevent a nuclear war at the same time. (17) By the same token, Air Force intelligence experienced the same intelligence malaise that nearly led to a potentially dangerous misreading of the Soviet Union during ABLE ARCHER 83, which proved problematic due to the confidence that the USIC had in assessing Soviet NC2 capabilities and intentions. (18) Still, Air Force intelligence could measure its overall success by noting that even when caught off-guard or surprised, the U.S. and the USSR did not go to nuclear war. However, for effective analysis, the analysts needed information to analyze. Thus, the requirement to collect that intelligence leads to the second functional competency for intelligence, collections. In modern doctrine, collections (more often referred to as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)) "...synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of sensors, assets, processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) in direct support of current and future operations" (19) In the late 1940s, SAC, in addition to overseeing the nuclear capable bombers, also maintained airborne reconnaissance to enhance their nuclear operations. When the Air Force assumed control of SAC, it possessed two strategic reconnaissance groups to provide that required intelligence. Converted World War II airframes such as the RB-17 and RB-29 served as the first Air Force Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) platforms. (20) Later on, more converted bombers, the RB-36 and RB-47, added to the reconnaissance fleet of SAC. These planes flew along the border of, or in some cases, directly into the Soviet Union to collect intelligence. (21) It would be a SAC aircraft (converted B-29) flying along the Eastern border of the Soviet Union in 1949 that would collect the first radioactive particles that told the world that the U.S. was no longer the sole nuclear power. (22) Eventually, newer aircraft specially designed for intelligence collection entered the SAC fleet. The U-2, an IMINT aircraft which could overfly all known Soviet fighter and surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage to provide key intelligence on Soviet nuclear capabilities, joined the SAC fleet in 1957. (23) In contrast to the relationship between CIA and Air Force analysts, the CIA and the Air Force collaborative efforts enabled a successful run of U-2 missions overflying the Soviet Union. While direct overflight of the Soviet Union ended in 1960, the U-2 continued to provide critical intelligence on this key adversary. Its collections proved invaluable in Cuba, where U-2 imagery showed the definitive proof of Soviet nuclear-capable missiles on the island, thus setting the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Eventually, other aircraft, such as the RC--135 (SIG-INT) and the SR-71 (IMINT) joined SAC's arsenal. While SAC reconnaissance aircraft did not carry armaments, they often found themselves in the cross-hairs of many nations' guns. More than seventy personnel lost their lives supporting reconnaissance missions tied in to nuclear deterrence missions. (24) In many cases, the nature of those missions could not be revealed to the next of kin, with some missions remaining classified today. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In addition to "air-breathing" assets, the Air Force also played a major role in the development and use of reconnaissance satellites. With the dawn of the Space Race, the U.S. military quickly moved in to make sure of the new medium. With the development and deployment of reconnaissance satellites, the U.S. could collect on the USSR mainland with a degree of persistence and safety that manned aircraft could not provide. Through the use of space-based reconnaissance the USIC came to see that in the 1960s, the Soviets were not quite the superior juggernaut that some had previously assessed. (25) In the later part of the Cold War, Air Force intelligence professionals serving at a ground listening post in the Pacific collected vital SIGINT that implicated Soviet aircraft in the shootdown of KAL 007 in September 1983, giving U.S. leadership a key talking point in future negotiations with Soviet leaders. (26) In addition to providing key intelligence to decision makers, collections enabled Air Force intelligence professionals to support the nuclear mission through the third competency, targeting. A long-standing mantra in the Air Force is "Air Power is Targeting and Targeting is Intelligence." (27) The concept of targeting related to aerial bombing goes back to the earliest days of the military heavier-than-air flight. However, the advent of nuclear weapons provided a new variable. One bomb from one plane could destroy an entire city in one single detonation. Yet, the requirement for accurate targeting did not simply disappear with the creation of nuclear weapons. As the world's largest country, the USSR presented formidable targeting obstacles. Where were the key locations for leadership and military forces? What of the locations of newer weapons, to include the locations after 1949 of their nuclear weapons? Even when the U.S. knew production and logistical facilities that were known, how could the U.S. effectively impact them in the event of a conflict? However, nuclear weapons and their effects did alter how many viewed the overall process of targeting. Given the weapons effects and the highly centralized control of nuclear operations, some took the mantra of "close counts" to mean that if we destroy whole cities, why bother with precise targeting? Service specific targeting and detailed training, a significant requirement for conventional operations, did not seem to have a place in nuclear operations. (28) As the Cold War evolved, much of the guidance would evolve, as the targets set grew to include ICBM, submarine bases and airfields, along with strategic target sets of leadership and industrial centers. However, the centralized nature of nuclear targeting meant that the vast majority of the targeting intelligence process occurred at levels far above the scope of most Air Force intelligence airmen. Yet, the Air Force IC provided major contributions to the nuclear enterprise. SAC intelligence personnel, particularly dedicated targeteers, supplied materials such as imagery and target analysis from higher levels for the mission folders that made up the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). However, intelligence/targeteer involvement in the overall nuclear targeting process did not have as robust a level of involvement as it did in the conventional targeting process (especially in the modern day). Operational planners needed to be involved to accurately reflect the platform requirements, but intelligence, at least at the Air Force nuclear operations realm, played a far lesser role. Up to this point, the discussions about intelligence support to Air Force nuclear operations span the entire spectrum from the highest levels of command to the airman at a bomb wing. However, the analysis, collections and targeting information can mean little without the integration functional competency. Integration is currently defined as "the application of all-source intelligence information to sustain operations..." which is also known as will also refer to as unit (Wing, Group, Squadron) support. (29) During World War II, it became clear to Army Air Corps commanders that the service lacked effective combat intelligence support to air operations. (30) Post-World War II, Air Force leadership sought to improve the quality and capability of intelligence support, establishing the first technical training school dedicated to intelligence in 1947, which in turn would allow more effective intelligence integration/support. (31) The majority of airmen working nuclear integration served at bomber or reconnaissance wings. To support these airframes, unit-level intelligence personnel had to have an understanding of not only the platform they supported but also, they required an understanding of adversary threats and tactics and had to offer their crews the ability to counter those threats. Another major role they played was to translate the myriad of intelligence information into a concise, reasonable form that gave context for the operators (aircrew and missilers) and their respective missions. The targeting aspect for bombers was already pre-determined and much of the work that intelligence personnel did with the nuclear targeting centered on combat mission folder construction as part of the SIOP requirements for the tasked SAC units. While a key point of integration/unit support focuses on direct intelligence airmen interaction with operators (aircrew/missilers), those working integration did not work in a vacuum, and there existed a structure for relaying intelligence from higher levels down to the units. Intelligence derived from Air Force personnel working at national intelligence agencies and production centers all found their way into the litany of intelligence data used and tailored by SAC intelligence airmen. Within the SAC span of control, there existed an Intelligence Directorate, led by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, oversaw all intelligence activity within the command. This individual led the 544th Intelligence Wing, based out of SAC Headquarters (Offutt AFB, Neb.). At this level, the directorate had three primary sections: Operations (INO), which provided current intelligence updates for SAC leadership as well as key information for the subordinate units, which included key products such as Order of Battle; Collections (INC), which provided intelligence collection to fulfill those requirements levied on SAC by subordinate units and higher commands; Targets (INT), which had responsibility for producing the targeting materials and gathering the required information for the Combat Mission Folders that supported the nuclear enterprise. (32) At the respective wings for SAC, the intelligence support was ultimately tailored to the wing requirements. However, most possessed the following functions: Plans and Programs supporting the wing with reports, programs, briefings; Mission Planning, which supported the mission planning requirements for the wing, to include mission studies, route analysis and briefing/debriefing requirements; Special Security Office (SSO), who conducted oversight on Sensitive Compartmentalized Information, including billets, investigations and indoctrination/debriefing; Combat Intelligence, which oversaw direct support to aircrew members with intelligence documents and also Evasion and Escape support; Order of Battle (OB) management, with a primary focus on electronic order of battle (this took information derived from higher levels, but once at the unit level, it fell to the intelligence Airmen to keep that information updated for their units); Target processing/intelligence, which oversaw CMF construction and EWO material study, computer programming, which involved system/photographic support. (33) All of these elements worked to provide SAC crews with the best possible intelligence picture. In the late 1950s/early 1960s, the ICBM wing entered the Air Force structure. The mission requirements of the ICBM differed from the aircraft world in several respects, especially given that the operators and support personnel would never actually cross into adversary airspace. In the event of a nuclear exchange, ICBM bases ranked high on the targeting priority lists, but the furthest that ICBM airmen deployed from home station were the most remote missile sites (a three to six hour drive). Thus, some of the threat information provided by intelligence personnel differed from the flying units. ICBM targeting processes did not call for much unit-level intelligence integration, thus, no targeting intelligence presence at the ICBM wings. ICBM crews primarily relied on intelligence support for providing the perspective for their mission, attempting to answer the "Why?" and "What's going on?" questions. Additionally, protection of the physical missile sites (Force Protection) required dedicated intelligence support, especially to account for any international security threats/attacks on the missile complexes. (34) With the mission requirements, intelligence support at the missile wings consisted of far fewer personnel then at the flying units, and thus, organizational structures could significantly deviate from their intelligence counterparts at flying wings. Yet, it is tough to fully document the actions of those individuals working integration during the Cold War, given that most of the history focuses on the higher level military/government actions and those documented operations. While the reconnaissance personnel collected the raw intelligence and passed up analyzed products, the majority of those at the unit were consumers of intelligence and did not necessarily provide any new, grand information that would change the course of the Cold War. Still, the tailoring of intelligence, providing that perspective to the crews that put some context into why they either had to fly alert sorties or sitting alert away from their families, awaiting a call to launch, which fortunately, did not happen outside of exercises. Post Cold War/Pre-Inicident By 1991, the world changed. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union disintegrated. The United States looked victorious as former target areas in Eastern Europe integrated with the Western world. That apparent victory portended massive military changes within the U.S. military. Even as the USAF prepared for the nightmare scenario of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, its conventional capabilities did not remain idle. Based on the lessons learned from those conventional conflicts, more money, training, emphasis and leadership went into shoring up the USAF's conventional aspect. The "Bomber Mafia" generals of the '40s, '50s and '60s gave way to the "Fighter Mafia" generals of the '70s and '80s, as a new mind set permeated the Air Force. (35) The change in mindset and strategic outlook posed significant consequences for the nuclear enterprise. In 1992, SAC dissolved, and the entire Air Force reorganized to reflect the new reality. As for the nuclear enterprise, it did not disappear, but it found itself relegated to a less prominent position in the discussion of national security issues. United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) assumed SAC's mantle of operational control of nuclear weapons, but the Air Force spread out the assets over the different commands. The nuclear bombers (B-52s, B-2s, B-1s) fell under Air Combat Command (ACC), ICBMs fell under USAF Space Command (AFSPC) and nuclear weapon storage/maintenance fell under Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC). (36) With the continuous alert requirement from the SAC days rescinded, bomber crews found themselves spending more flying and training time supporting conventional missions such as conventional strategic attack, interdiction and even close air support (CAS). For the ICBM units, the constant alert status did not change, but the future for AFSPC did not rest in the ICBM world, as those who started out in the ICBM world (especially the officers) immediately moved on to space mission assignments, further weakening the resident nuclear expertise. (37) While there remained those old "SAC Warriors" who looked back on the Cold War days with some nostalgia, the climate seemed to indicate that the conventional operations would dominate the Air Force agenda. (38) For intelligence professionals, it was possible to enter the Air Force in the 1990s and not once ever deal with the nuclear enterprise. Ironically, the requirement for nuclear deterrence actually increased in the post-Cold War era. The fall of the Soviet Union did not end the threat of nuclear weapons. North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Syria all actively pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, with Pakistan and North Korea successfully testing nuclear weapons. The last decades of the Soviet Union saw a massive degree of degradation within the national military structure, and this included oversight of its nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, the IC faced a dilemma of how to monitor Russia and its former republics as well as other known and potentially rising nuclear powers. For the AFIC, the changes and requirements required adaptation, taking the functional competencies and applying them to meet the new reality. In conventional missions, more of the planning and execution requirements fell to the lower levels, increasing requirements on intelligence airmen. National production and collection centers still provided the overall adversary picture (capabilities and limitations, assessments, order of battle), but the end of the Cold War saw a drastic reduction in manpower, thus reducing the overall effectiveness of those centers to provide intelligence to subordinate units. (39) Additionally, while the focus of operations was never really as simple as it appeared during the Cold War, there was no obvious Post-Cold War adversarial focus. A seemingly unstable Russia still had its nuclear weapons. DESERT STORM brought the Middle East into even greater focus for the USAF, as the no-fly zones over Iraq in the 1990s dominated missions and intelligence requirements. The counterinsurgency wars of the post-9/11 era only added to the emphasis on the Middle East. Concurrently, the Pacific also saw an increase in Air Force operations, as bombers made their return to Guam to monitor potential threats in East Asia. The AFIC did not lack for areas of focus in the Post-Cold War era. All of this happened in the midst of a technological explosion and expansion of mission requirements for the collections world. (40) The U-2 and RC-135, veterans of SAC's strategic collections missions against the USSR, now found themselves at the forefront of the USAF's conventional, tactical requirements. (41) The rise of space-based communication technology allowed for the creation of the Distributed Command Ground System (DCGS), which allowed for the processing, analysis and dissemination of an immeasurable amount of intelligence data, all from home-station and in near-real time (whereas PED during the Cold War could be measured in hours to days). The rise of Remote Piloted Aircraft (RPA) only added to the collections requirements levied against the AFIC. In some cases, the AFIC experienced new opportunities for advancement and excellence, and the importance of collections became more evident, especially in the counterinsurgency wars of the 2000s. However, this new collections focus did not encapsulate the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Concerns about adversary strategic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities remained a priority for collection, but the strategic collection requirements did not have the same primacy seen in the Cold War, and collection managers had the unenviable job of balancing the tactical and strategic level collection requirements. Concurrently, Air Force targeting requirements also grew. The advent of the Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), especially for stand-off and Global Positioning System-aided munitions, required exact intelligence on target areas, to include precision coordinates and very detailed target system analyses, to include an increase in concern for collateral damage. All of this emerged at a time when the Air Force, seeking to streamline its manning in the post-Cold War world, eliminated the targeting career field and lumped targeting under general intelligence. (42) Air Force intelligence personnel still performed the mission and met the requirements, but it was not an ideal solution. However, increased requirements did not translate into increased guidance on how to incorporate these challenges in supporting the nuclear enterprise, especially for those airmen charged with the critical integration competency. Key intelligence regulations, such as AF 14-105, Unit Level Intelligence, in the Post-Cold War era hardly mention the word "nuclear" or "deterrence." (43) Weapons of Mass Destruction was a focus area at least mentioned in the AFIs, but the intelligence professional, unless specifically assigned to nuclear units, knew practically nothing about American capabilities. Other doctrinal documents followed the same vein, providing general recommendations but little in the way of specific guidance on post-Cold War intelligence support to nuclear operations. The structure for how wing-level intelligence supported specific nuclear airframes did not vary much from the SAC days (the breakout of an intelligence flight into an analysis section, targeting, security, etc.). For the ICBMs, the intelligence support of the Cold War eventually withered, and by the mid-2000s, none of the Missile Wings possessed full-time intelligence support. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Post-Incident Everything changed after The Incident. The USAF made reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise a top priority. (44) The bombers and ICBM communities (operators and staff support) dug into historical archives to find old SAC regulations and nuclear guidance. The Air Force suddenly found itself having to relearn how to spell nuclear. Technical training schools, the USAF Weapons School, Air Force Professional Military Education, all now found themselves providing academics on the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Yet, the post "Incident" Air Force did not just completely revert to the SAC days. New organizations and ideas emerged in the scramble to regain confidence and surety. The Headquarters Staff created a whole new directorate (A10) to deal specifically with nuclear operations. (45) Most significantly, the Air Force decided that the nuclear assets needed to fall under a single command, to avoid many of the failings documented in the various DoD nuclear enterprise reviews, like the Schlesinger Report. (46) In August 2009, USAF Global Strike Command stood up as the newest Air Force major command (AFGSC). (47) For the IC, there was a combination of relearning the past, while building future requirements in a very different strategic landscape. All intelligence personnel within AFGSC were now required to attend an AFGSC Intelligence Formal Training Unit (IFTU) which emphasized educating analysts on the nuclear enterprise. (48) Analytical focus for AFGSC intelligence sought to incorporate a more strategic look at the world, emphasizing analysis of a nation's nuclear strike capability. Collections experts who developed infrastructures to support the overwhelming demand for conventional operations support (RPAs and the DCGS architecture) now sought ways to apply these advancements in nuclear operations/planning. For targeting support, the conventional mind set had to readapt to a top-down approach including strategic nuclear targeting, while, not losing the tactical skills required for conventional missions. Regarding integration, bombers did not undergo a dramatic change per se, although intelligence AFIs started to specifically reference nuclear operations (the AFGSC supplements account for this far more than the ACC supplements that directed guidance for the bombers). (49) Recommendations to reinstate direct intelligence support to the ICBM wings saw all three wings receive assigned intelligence personnel between 2010-2012. The new missile wing intelligence officer provided strategic context, force protection support, targeting analysis and education to the missile crews on what new threats could strike ICBM silos and the U.S. mainland. These changes signaled to the Air Force, and the Air Force IC especially, that nuclear operations, previously considered an obsolete mission, was back at the forefront, and that more intelligence personnel could expect increased participation in the Air Force Nuclear enterprise. Conclusion While the past does not always exactly predict the future, analysis of past actions can provide insight on how the future might evolve. For the AFIC, its core mission of focusing on the adversary and bringing that knowledge to planners and operators in a manner that allows for effective air operations will not change. The requirement for obtaining that intelligence to answer the unknowns and applying that knowledge for targeting and integration will not change. The general structure of the intelligence flight at the wing-level has not changed much from the SAC days and will probably remain set up in the same general structure for the foreseeable future. Yet, the recent emphasis on the nuclear mission has impacted the AFIC. With more enlisted personnel and officers receiving a baseline knowledge of the nuclear enterprise, it can only improve the AFIC overall ability to support the nuclear mission. For integration, it is critical to have a solid working knowledge of American nuclear capabilities so that the airmen working with those units can more effectively tailor their analysis and mission planning products to meet the requirements of the nuclear enterprise. For targeting, the creation of Special Experience Identifiers (SEIs) for intelligence personnel (general intelligence analysts and the new targeteers) will rebuild a new cadre of targeting experience to produce effective combat mission folders. However, this is not to say that the Post-Incident AFIC has all the answers and solved all the problems associated with supporting the nuclear enterprise. There are still challenges in trying to integrate nuclear mission requirements into the current collections architecture. Analysis of the adversary is never easy, as seen in the Cold War and seen now. At USSTRATCOM, the Joint Intelligence and Operations Center (JIOC) seeks to evolve to meet the challenge of tailoring analysis to support the strategic operations, but the manning is nowhere near that of its 544th Intelligence Wing predecessor. (50) Additionally, AFIC personnel must maintain a balance of providing support for the nuclear mission while not losing the ability to effectively support the current tactical, conventional missions. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In the near future, the AFIC will continue to evolve so that it can effectively support the nuclear mission. By reviewing how the AFIC supported the nuclear enterprise in the past, the current and future leaders of the AFIC can use the effective practices and try to avoid the errors their predecessors faced. As technology and capabilities evolve, the AFIC can integrate those advances and improve how it supports the nuclear mission. The past does not always foretell the future, but it can help steer it, and the AFIC will need to continue maintain that balancing, learning from the past and improving the future. NOTES (1.) The term The Incident does not have a doctrinal or official beginning. However, from the author's time at Headquarters Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and at the 5th Bomb Wing (5 BW) (20102013), most in leadership and in key operational positions reference the events of August 30, 2007, and the subsequent fallout as such. (2.) Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary or Military and Associated Terms, June 15, 2013, p. 139. (3.) Michael Warner & J. Kenneth McDonald, U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947 (Washington D.C.: Strategic Management Issues Office, Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 2005), p. 16. (4.) The four functional competencies as defined in this article are based on recent definitions of intelligence core areas by Headquarters Air Force Intelligence Directorate (HAF/A2). Briefing, HAF/A2DF, Subject: 14N Career Field Management Update, Feb 2013, slide 33. (5.) SAC initially stood up in 1946 as part of the Army Air Forces and officially became part of the USAF when it was created in 1947. J.C. Hopkins and Sheldon A. Goldberg. The Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1986: The Fortieth Anniversary History, (Offutt Air Force Base, Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1986), p. 2. (6.) Stephen Budiansky, Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Iraq (New York, Penguin Books, 2004), p. 349. (7.) JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary or Military Associated Terms, p. 15. (8.) During World War II, the Army Air Corps required intelligence analysis to contain facts and detailed assessments, whereas the Navy only asked for straight facts, allowing for leaders to make up their own minds about what it meant. Matthew Connelly, et al, "General, I Have Fought Just as Many Nuclear Wars as You Have": Forecasts, Future Scenarios, and the Politics of Armageddon" in American Historical Review (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, December 2012), p. 1434. (9.) Ibid, p. 1436. (10.) Ibid, p. 1437. (11.) Ibid. (12.) Ibid. (13.) Ibid, p. 1438. (14.) Michael Herman, "What Difference Did It Make?" Intelligence and National Security (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, vol 26, December 2011) p. 889. (15.) Ibid, p. 890. (16.) Ibid. (17.) Ibid, p. 896. (18.) ABLE ARCHER, the NATO Command and Control Exercise, always concerned Soviet leadership. However, the 1983 exercise generated more extra concern. Between the revelation that NATO planned to make the scenario and exercise more realistic than normal, the deployment of nuclear-capable PERSHING II missiles to Western Europe and heightened international tensions after the Soviet shootdown of KL007 in September 1983, Moscow's aging leadership was not certain that they would see 1984. As it turned out, nothing would happen and a potential conflict never materialized. Len Scott, "Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited" in Intelligence and National Security (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, vol 26, No 6, December 2011), p. 769. (19.) Air Force Doctrine Annex 2-0 Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations, Jan. 6, 2012, p. 2. (20.) Also included in the first airborne reconnaissance/ ISR assets were converted transports like the C-47. Chris Adams, Inside the Cold War: A Cold Warrior's Reflections (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, September, 1999), p. 64. (21.) Ibid, p. 65. (22.) Budiansky, Air Power: The Man, Machine & Ideas that Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Iraq, p. 353. (23.) The U--2 was designed to operate above 60,000 ft based on assessments of the Soviet Union's most capable fighter interceptor at the time (the MiG-17 was assessed to have a ceiling of only 45,000 ft). Eventually, the Soviets did develop a SAM (SA-2) that could reach the U-2, but prior to that time, the U-2 was able to directly overfly Soviet air defense capabilities. Maj Robert Stanley, "Attacking the Mobile Ballistic Missile Threat in the Post-Cold War Environment: New Rules to an Old Game" (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, May, 2006), p. 23. (24.) Adams, Inside the Cold War: A Cold Warrior's Reflections, p. 64. (25.) Herman, "What Difference Did It Make?", p. 890. (26.) David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand (New York, Doubleday, 2009), p. 21. (27.) Buster C. Glosson,, "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations," Airpower Journal (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, No. 2, Summer 1993), p. 8. (28.) Robert Frank Futrell, "U.S. Army Air Force Intelligence in the Second World War," in Horst Boog, ed., The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 548. (29.) AF Doctrine, Annex 2, Global iSR Operations, p. 33. (30.) Capt John R. Glock. "The Evolution of Air Force Targeting" Air & Space Power Journal (Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air University Press, November-December 2012), p. 154. (31.) The first dedicated school for intelligence training started in 1947, at Keesler AFB. Eventually, the training moved from Keesler to Sheppard AFB. In 1962, the Air Force consolidated its intelligence training at Lowry AFB, where it remained until the 1990s, when it moved to its current location at Goodfellow AFB, Tex. Thomas Manning, et al. History of Air Education and Training Command 1942-2002. (Randolph Air Force Base, TX, Office of History and Research, Headquarters Air Education and Training Command, 2005), p. 51. (32.) Strategic Air Command Regulation (SACR) 23-10, September 1, 1989, p. 10. (33.) SACR 23-9, August 18, 1987, pp. 12-27. (34.) Interview with Maj Douglas Pietersma, Sep. 3, 2013. Maj Peitersma was an intelligence officer at the 341 MW from 2002-2005 and later the 20 AF/A2 from 2010-2012. His insight into intelligence at the missile wings is invaluable, especially as the wings try to reintegrate intelligence back into their operations after a near decade long hiatus. (35.) Colin S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Feb 2012), p. 206 (36.) The B-1 became a conventional-only bomber in 1995 and executed its first conventional-only mission in 1998. Dennis R. Jenkins. B-1 Lancer: The Most Complicated Warplane Ever Developed (New York, McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 141. (37.) James R. Schlesinger (Chairman), Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: Review of the Air Force Nuclear Mission, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, December 2008), p. 2. (38.) Lt. Col. Robert Spalding, "Culture Clash: Bomber Nuclear Operations in a Post-Cold War World", in Air and Space Power Journal (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Winter 2009), p. 102. (39.) James R. Schlesinger (Chairman), Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, December 2008),p. 54. (40.) The term ISR (Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance) came into doctrine in the post-Cold War era. This encompassed the fact that collection assets had a more dynamic role in Air Force operations. (41.) Maj. Tyler Morton, "Manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Strategic, Tactical...Both?" Air and Space Power Journal (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, November-December 2012), p. 35. (42.) Capt John R. Glock. "The Evolution of Air Force Targeting", p. 168. (43.) In review of the AFI14-105 Air Combat Command (ACC) Supplement (ACCSUP): Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, the word nuclear appears a couple of times, but only in context of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, with no discussion whatsoever on any intelligence requirements specific to the nuclear mission. The supplement dictated integration/unit-level support in relatively general terms. AFI 14-105, ACCSUP, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, Jan. 28, 2003, (Certified Current Oct. 15, 2009). (44.) Fred W. Baker III. "Air Force Officials to Establish New Nuclear Major Command,* Armed Forces Press Service, Oct. 27, 2008. (45.) Maj. Gen. Donald C. Alston, Director, Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear enterprise (Washington D.C.: HQ USAF, Oct. 24, 2008), p. 71. (46.) Schlesinger, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: Review of the Air Force Nuclear Mission, p. 5. (47.) The command achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in August 2009. By November 2009, the ICBM wings fell under AFGSC, with the nuclear capable bomber wings joining in February 2010. The command achieved its full operational capability (FOC) in October 2010. US Air Force Fact Sheet: Air Force Global Strike Command. (48.) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-202 vol 1, Air Force Global Strike Command Supplement (AFGSCSUP), Intelligence Training, Aug. 1, 2010, p. 2. (49.) As previously noted, AFI 14-105 offered no specifics on nuclear operations/targeting. AFI 14-105 ACCSUP did not mention anything about support to the nuclear enterprise. The AFI 14-202(volumes 1, 2, 3) series superseded AFI 14-105, offering more specific, tailored guidance to intelligence personnel supporting a weapons system/airframe. The AFGSC supplements do account for nuclear operations and targeting (At least as much as can be said at the unclassified level). The AFGSC Supplement for targeting (AFI 14-117) also incorporates more provisions for nuclear targeting support within the MAJCOM. For unit-level operations for nuclear assets, reference AFI 14-202 vol 3, Air Force Global Strike Command Supplement (AFGSCSUP), General Intelligence Rules, Jul.1, 2010, pp. 4-5. (50.) Schlesinger, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, December 2008), p. 55. Maj. Scott Martin graduated in 2001 from Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. Following Intelligence Officer training at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, Major Martin worked at multiple assignments across the intelligence spectrum from flying units, Air Operations Centers and National-level Intelligence facilities, deploying multiple times in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Major Martin completed a staff tour in the Intelligence Directorate at Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale AFB, La. Previously, Maj Martin was the Senior Intelligence Officer at the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot AFB, N. Dak. He is currently the Director of Operations for the 424th Air Base Squadron at Chievres Air Base, Belgium. Major Martin has been published in Cryptologic Quarterly and Air and Space Power Journal.

Between October 1948 and July 1957, General Curtis E. LeMay served as the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the United States' airborne nuclear force. As commander of this force, LeMay was responsible for deterring any potential Soviet attack on the United States. If deterrence failed and the Soviets attacked, LeMay and SAC were charged to respond with a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. This scheme served as the basis of deterrence and retaliation, the essential military policy of the United States for the duration of the Cold War. LeMay, however, had no desire in waiting to respond; he wanted to attack first if he believed a Soviet assault was imminent. LeMay argued for the adoption of such a policy, carrying this argument across many years and multiple venues, despite a national policy of deterrence and retaliation. Evidence of this desire can be found in LeMay's statements during his command of SAC. Ranging from public and classified speaking appearances to written correspondence, LeMay left little doubt as to his belief that attacking first in a war, specifically a nuclear war, was warranted and necessary. Though cast as a warmonger in the years following his time at SAC, the historical record reveals a more complex man. His statements also render a seemingly honest concern for national survival and self-defense in the nuclear age. Today it may be hard to fathom the fear of a surprise nuclear assault that pervaded military thinking of the early Cold War, but at the time LeMay was making these proclamations, this fear was real and legitimate. Few, if any, effective defenses against a nuclear attack existed; this left preemptive attack--military action taken under a belief that an enemy attack is shortly pending, and preventive war--war predicated upon a belief that enemy action could occur at a future but yet undefined date, as perhaps the only effective options available. In his book, Counsels of War, Cold War historian Gregg Herken noted that, "the topic of preventive war--meaning an unprovoked attack by the United States on the Soviet Union--had been discreetly discussed in some government and military circles since the advent of the atomic bomb." (1) According to Herken, the possibility of undertaking a preventive war had been considered by members of Congress, the Truman Administration, and Paul Nitze. (2) These considerations, however, did not proceed past the discussion stage. Herken reported that, "in every case, the alternative of preventive war was finally rejected by civilian and military leaders alike as inimical to the nation's principles, and contrary to the popular will." (3) Similarly, by 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had made clear that the execution of a preventive war against the Soviet Union was "'not politically feasible under our system to do so or to state that we will do so.'" (4) This decision was further clarified by President Truman, who removed Secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, following Matthews' urging "that the United States become the first 'aggressors for peace.'" (5) Herken stated that Truman believed "the American people would never tolerate the use of the bomb for 'aggressive purposes.'" (6) In historian Peter J. Roman's article "Curtis LeMay and the Origins of NATO Atomic Targeting," appearing in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Roman argued that during "SAC's formative period (1948-1952)" ..."LeMay's effective bureaucratic politicking enabled his doctrinal vision to become reality." (7) Roman went on to explain that, "LeMay's conception of SAC rested firmly on an unflinching commitment to the decisiveness of strategic airpower as evidenced by World War II." (8) Roman pointed out that, in the Cold War, "given SAC's mission, the Soviet threat, and American reliance on atomic weapons, LeMay quickly decided to build an organization which could execute its war plans immediately, massively, and under the direction of one central command." (9) LeMay, however, also needed a modus operandi by which he could best prepare his command for war. While preventive war had been specifically removed by Truman and the military from the range of possible courses of action available to the American defense establishment, preemptive war had not been ruled out. Though no documentation is available to definitelt prove that political policymakers in Washington had specifically approved the possibility of a preemptive strike, the issue would be taken up by LeMay prior to and following the edicts of the Truman administration and the JCS. No Surprises--Except His Own As early as 1946, prior to his command of SAC, elements of LeMay's philosophical approach to preemption were evident in his public statements--thinking which held at its core the principle of surprise. In a New York Times article published on July 19, 1946, LeMay noted that, "the long-range bomber, flying over the polar region, made the industrial heart of any country in the world vulnerable to complete surprise and destruction." (10) The Times article would go on to quote LeMay stating that, "These bombers ... might carry atomic bombs, or the atomic bomb itself as a guided missile might effect the destruction before any declaration of war." (11) LeMay's proposition that an attack could arrive before a formal war declaration, and amid surprise, leaves one with little room but to see the hypothetical attack as one of preemptive or, at worst, preventive war. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Upon his arrival at SAC in the Fall of 1948, LeMay continued to stress the value of surprise in association with strategic bombing, a function of the United States military that LeMay held squarely in his control as commander of SAC. In a speech to Omaha Post Number One* on December 14, 1948, LeMay laid out what he saw as the future of strategic bombing. LeMay informed his audience that, "In order to crush any nation's will to fight--we must reach and destroy its political and economic centers--including its industrial areas--ports--railways and other means of transportation. That has always been the purpose of both strategy and tactics. And that purpose remains." (12) LeMay went on to point out what he saw as the principles of war influencing his thinking, concluded his remarks with the statement: "As ex-service people you are all familiar with the principles of war. Strategic bombardment enables us to exploit these principles to the full--particularly the principles of mass and surprise--by attacks on selected targets (emphasis added)." (13) The question that naturally comes is why was LeMay so fascinated with the concept of surprise? The answer to this question becomes clear in his correspondence and statements that followed. No Ambiguity A 1949 letter from LeMay to Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg leaves little room for ambiguity as to why LeMay was so enamored with the concept of surprise, and also directly exposes LeMay's opinion on preemptive and preventive war. Now declassified, LeMay's formerly Top Secret letter specifically addresses the issues of preemptive and preventive war as a response to a potential threat posed by the Soviet Union to SAC's ability to respond when required. The letter shows that there was discussion among some of the most senior leaders in the Air Force of a first strike against the Soviet Union, even in the period following the test of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Sent to Vandenberg on December 12th, LeMay's letter was a response to one sent by Vandenberg the preceding October. LeMay wrote that Vandenberg had, in his October letter, "stressed the importance of accelerating our readiness to conduct effective atomic warfare." (14) In his December reply, LeMay noted that "our readiness in this regard will depend materially upon our ability to avoid or absorb the effects of enemy attempts to immobilize our atomic striking force before it can be committed to combat." (15) LeMay continued: (16) I further realize that the magnitude of the problem of improving our means of coping with such attempts is so great, considering the limited resources available to meet all USAF commitments, that the possibilities of achieving an adequate overall solution in the near future are extremely limited. What LeMay referred to was the dilemma that SAC and United States faced in countering the Soviet threat, in being prevented or impeded in launching a nuclear strike against the Soviets. Specifically, LeMay worried that "the information available to us indicates that the U.S.S.R. has the capability of penetrating all Strategic Air Command stations to the extent required to immobilize through sabotage the combat units based thereon." (17) Such a chilling assessment, coming from a respected commander of one of the Air Force's Major Commands (MAJCOM)--let alone the nation's primary nuclear command--would likely have had an impact upon the decision making process, and this may very well have been LeMay's intent in phrasing the letter as he did. But this danger also left LeMay an opening to propose his solution to the problem. LeMay offered to Vandenberg "to leave one further thought with you that applies to the overall defense problem" (18) because "No matter how much active defense we provide for ourselves, it is unlikely that we can prevent the Soviets from attaining a measure of success in any attacks against our striking force." (19) LeMay continued: 20 The size of our striking force is so closely tailored to fit the task with which it is charged that we have little or no margin of safety within which we can absorb the effects of a successful enemy attack. Under these circumstances, it would appear economical and logical to adopt the objective of completely avoiding enemy attack against our strategic force by destroying his atomic force before it can attack ours (emphasis added). [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] As this record shows, LeMay advocated some form of first-strike to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Whether he is suggesting it be either preemptive or preventive is a distinction addressed by LeMay in the lines that followed. Expanding upon his statement about launching a first strike, LeMay wrote: (21) Assuming that as a democracy we are not prepared to wage a preventive war, this course of action poses two most difficult requirements: An intelligence system which can locate the vulnerable elements of the Soviet striking force and forewarn us when attack by that force is imminent, and Agreement at top governmental level that when such information is received the Strategic Air Command will be directed to attack. 1950 Commanders Conference The concerns raised about preemptive strikes against the Soviet Union that LeMay argued before Vandenberg in his December 12th letter were again aired by LeMay in 1950, this time in a forum officially known as a "Commanders Conference," a periodic meeting of the Air Force's senior staff and MAJ-COM leaders. The conferences served as a coordinating meeting, whereby policy guidance could be given by senior military and civilian officials within the Air Force to those commanders whose responsibility it would be to carry that policy out. Commanders Conferences also served as a roundtable for airing grievances and proposing new ideas about Air Force doctrine, strategy, and operations. That spring LeMay would take full advantage of the opportunity afforded him. On April 26, 1950, LeMay took center stage and prepared to make his point. Turning over the initial presentation to one of his subordinates, Brigadier General Montgomery, an explanation of SAC's role in a nuclear war followed. (22) What trailed Montgomery's presentation would serve to further illuminate the issues raised by LeMay in his December 12, 1949, letter to Vandenberg concerning a preemptive strategy. Offering thoughts on SAC's nuclear role and some of the weaknesses he saw in the ability of the command to perform its mission, LeMay turned to "the future." (23) He began by indicating that "Vandenberg has raised the point that our loss of monopoly in atomic weapons has serious implications on our plans for national security. I would like to tell you how severely it affects the Strategic Air Command mission." (24) Clearly, the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons would have a significant impact upon SAC's plans, and that reality would be a driver in the shaping of future operations and plans at SAC; LeMay would exploit the issue, using it as an opportunity to further his advocacy of a preemptive strike policy. But as he had done in his December 12th letter to Vandenberg, LeMay first needed to appropriately set the stage for making his argument about the necessity of a preemptive policy. Doing so, LeMay noted that, (25) As the Soviet stockpile grows and their capability to deliver that stockpile grows, there comes a time when the entire picture changes radically. It is about this period and what we must do about it that I would like to say a few words. LeMay then argued that, once the Soviets had amassed the number of weapons needed to launch a sufficiently large enough nuclear strike against the United States, the United States (26) will no longer have military superiority as we know it today. The enemy, even though possessing fewer bombs than we may have, will have enough either to destroy our striking force or the major cities of this country or both. Building upon this argument, LeMay pointed out that the Air Force's plans for the air defense of the nation against such an attack would be limited in utility, and that "the proposed air defense can only reduce the damage inflicted upon us. It certainly cannot eliminate all of the damage to us by a long shot." (27) But LeMay had a plan in mind. LeMay then turned to a report released by the Joint Chiefs, citing an argument which held that, once relative nuclear parity had been reached, the nation that initiated a nuclear strike, under conditions of surprise, would likely benefit greatly in a war. (28) This was the logic behind LeMay's belief in the necessity for preemptive action in the case of an impending Soviet attack upon the United States. In citing the Joint Chiefs' report, LeMay had established the logical imperative for preemption before the group of officials whose support he would need for the strategy he desired. LeMay continued: "In other words, unless we take steps now that are not presently programmed, we are pretty apt to lose the next war. In my mind, we now face a basic change in our concept." (29) The change that LeMay would propose, in this Top Secret forum of peers and superiors, mirrored the sentiments he had shared with Vandenberg in his December 12th, 1949, letter. Now with Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg, Secretary of the Air Force Finletter and others assembled before him, LeMay again made his beliefs about preemption known. Summing up, LeMay argued that the changes he sought required that, "We must not only plan to destroy the enemy industrial power but we must be capable at the same time of destroying his force before it destroys us." (30) Interestingly, LeMay went on to willingly expose critical problems in pursuing preemption as a possible solution to the Soviet threat. He eventually stated that: "We are a long way from possessing the capability of destroying the Soviet striking force." (31) From there LeMay continued, pointing out that, "As General Cabell stated, there is so little intelligence available on that force today as to its size and location that it is not possible to estimate what we can do about it." (32) Having just undercut his own argument for preemption, LeMay anticipated a resolution, telling those assembled that, "However, from our experience in building an atomic striking force, we know that sensitive spots do exist which, if attacked, would drastically reduce the striking power." (33) According to LeMay, "As a matter of fact, we believe that a well-planned attack based on sound intelligence might well eliminate that threat. Not only am I thinking of aircraft, but I am thinking of sites like Able, Baker, and Charlie." (34) LeMay then brought up the next problem, stating that, "In addition to our intelligence shortcomings today, too small a portion of our striking force has sufficient range to enable us to strike promptly from this country without deploying to forward bases." (35) Though LeMay had introduced some curious and acute issues that related to the question of preemption, he was undeterred. LeMay offered that regardless of "weaknesses on our part, I am convinced that we have no alternative. We must achieve the capability of destroying the enemy's long-range striking force." (36) In his conclusion LeMay stated, "I believe that our national leaders must be impressed with the need for taking the following specific steps:" (37) arguing in the final item for these leaders to "reexamine present policies which imply that we must absorb the first atomic blow." (38) In LeMay's mind, there was no sense in waiting to be the recipient of a nuclear attack. LeMay's advocacy for a policy of preemptive attack in his comments during the April 1950 Commanders Conference is certain in its meaning. Having expressed similar thoughts to Vandenberg in his December 1949 letter, it is highly likely that LeMay's recounting of comparable ideas at the Commanders Conference implies some degree of acceptance by Vandenberg of the concepts proposed by LeMay. If Vandenberg had any concerns about LeMay's ability to appropriately carry out set national policy objectives in light of his comments at the Commanders Conference--namely deterrence and retaliation--he surely would have relieved him of his command. Instead, LeMay's subsequent continued command of SAC and Vandenberg's seeming continued confidence in him indicates a degree of de facto consent to his ideas. LeMay Returns To College In early 1954, LeMay returned to the topic of preemption, this time addressing a group at the National War College (NWC) in Washington, DC. A prestigious institution within the military, the NWC was also known for hosting speakers of great reputation to offer remarks on topics at the strategic and conceptual level. During a lecture on January 28th, LeMay proceeded to explain how SAC planned to carry out a nuclear war in a contemporary context, "as opposed to future trends and requirements." (39) As LeMay saw it, "too many people are dealing with the future without having an accurate understanding or appreciation of the present forces and the problems that face us today." (40) LeMay noted that, "Obviously we won't have the time to build a bombing force to fight the next war." (41) Instead, (42) We will have to fight with what we have the day the war starts. And we cannot expect Russia will leave our aircraft factories unmolested to build something after the war begins. I certainly don't intend to leave the Russian industry undisturbed. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] LeMay's point meant that the planes and weapons that were prepared to fight on the first day of the war would be the only force the United States would be able to field. There would be no time to mobilize the rest of the military or civilian industry to support the attack. LeMay's subsequent statements also make it clear that he had no intention of allowing a Soviet attack upon the United States. Instead, as LeMay would reveal, the Joint Chiefs had placed an emphasis on the ability to carry out a strike that could save the United States from a Soviet nuclear attack. LeMay explained that SAC's mission (43) embraces three principal tasks: the blunting or Bravo task, which is to destroy the Soviet atomic forces on the ground (emphasis added); the retardation task, to prevent the massing and launching of Soviet military forces; and the destruction task, to systematically destroy the Soviet war-sustaining resources. LeMay observed that, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have assigned the blunting task the highest priority," (44) meaning that preemption of the Soviet nuclear forces was LeMay and SAC's primary mission. This was an important distinction. Moreover, LeMay admitted that the blunting, or preemptive mission, was not the only task assigned to SAC, but was SAC's "most difficult task." (45) At the prompting of a questioner following his speech, LeMay offered some details on the blunting mission and why it was regarded as particularly difficult: "You said your first task was to destroy the enemy's atomic capabilities on the ground. Can you discuss a little more in detail your possible success in that line?",46 the questioner asked. LeMay responded by reminding the questioner that, "I also said that was our most difficult task," (47) adding: "We think the best chance of preventing attacks on this country is to get those airplanes on the ground before they take off." (48) LeMay proceeded in his answer with great candor, explaining that "A specific answer to your question is impossible. I don't know how we are going to do it." (49) Yet, in response to a further question, LeMay explained that he did not believe (50) the Russians can destroy our Air Force on the ground. We have given it a lot of thought. We have run tests continually over the weekends or in the middle of the night, at awkward times, to see how we can disperse. We think we are going to have some time. I just cannot visualize a complete surprise. Perhaps the reason LeMay could not envision being completely surprised is because he intended a surprise of his own. The issue would be further addressed the following year. The Quantico Conference The most demonstrative example of LeMay's advocacy for a policy of preemptive attack against the Soviet Union took place in July 1955, at a gathering of senior political, defense and military officials in Virginia. The meeting was the Joint Secretaries' Conference, and it took place at the Marine Corps Base at Quantico. The conference was convened on July 14. On the third day of the conference LeMay was the opening speaker. According to a document from the conference, attendees scheduled to be present included, in addition to some of the most senior officers of each of the military services and the various service secretaries: Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles; Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey; Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson; AEC Chairman, Lewis Strauss; Assistant to the President, Fred Seaton; Special Assistant to the President, Nelson Rockefeller; and the Vice President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon. (51) The Quantico Conference had implications for resolving some key questions about potential dissonance between American declared policy and actual policy toward nuclear war, and certainly about LeMay's stance on preemption. Anything LeMay said in his speech would be directly known to some of the most senior figures in government; if there was disapproval of the things LeMay said concerning preemption, he could have, and likely would have been disciplined and removed from his position as commander of SAC, essentially ending his military career. None of these things happened. LeMay began his address by assuring the audience that SAC was "fully capable of inflicting decisive damage to an aggressor nation during the present time period if its force is properly utilized." (52) LeMay continued, (53) SAC has the potential to launch a predominately intercontinental attack of 180 atomic and thermonuclear strike aircraft within 12 hours of alert and to launch additional strikes each 12 hours until at the end of 48 hours a total of 880 strike aircraft will have been dispatched. The most salient aspect of LeMay's remarks was not the details of the concept, but the conditions under which he preferred to carry it out. He told the audience that, "I cannot over-emphasize the importance of striking enemy air battle objectives at the earliest possible time," (54) meaning that his "principal concern" (55) was "to deny promptly and decisively the ability of [of] the enemy to conduct nuclear war against the U.S." (56) In effect, this was a call for the preemptive destruction of Soviet assets capable of attacking the United States. Going further, LeMay sought to make clear his views on preemption, and in support offered a new definition of the concept of aggression. LeMay cited "a thought introduced by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on a visit to my headquarters last January," (57) where Lodge had "suggested that the word "aggression" be redefined and accepted by the United Nations." (58) LeMay continued: "The new definition should, in my opinion, recognize that we are now living in an age when it can no longer be an issue of morality that a nation must receive the first physical blow before it can respond with force; (emphasis added)" (59)..."In fact, the first blow can now signal the end of a conflict rather than the beginning." (60) LeMay's next statement would leave no doubt as to whom he thought should strike the first blow: (61) Therefore certain enemy actions short of war should constitute sufficient threat to the non-aggressor nation that it would be justified in launching direct attack at least on enemy strategic air power to forestall its own disaster. Citing an article from the publication, "The Review of Politics," LeMay concluded with (62) I share the philosophy contained in an article entitled 'Courage or Perdition?'...'Only one thing is worse than nuclear war-defeat in nuclear war, ...We are forced to look hard at the 14th fact of the atomic age, which, perhaps, is the most ominous of all: That in an atomic conflict the force which plans to strike second may never strike at all (emphasis added).' The Quantico Joint Secretaries Conference provides some of the most clear and compelling evidence as to LeMay's belief in and advocacy of a policy of preemptive nuclear war. That LeMay made these statements before the audience he did also indicates his confidence in such a policy, and a belief that those in senior government leadership positions would have found his ideas at least palatable. To a certain degree, history has shown LeMay to be correct, given his continued command of SAC and subsequent positional promotion to Air Force Vice Chief of Staff two years later. On Departure Though the Joint Secretaries Conference provided some of the most compelling evidence concerning LeMay's beliefs about a policy of nuclear preemption, they were not his final strong and clear remarks on the issue. In 1956 and 1957 LeMay spoke at two events that afforded him the opportunity to further elaborate on the topic, and he did so with sharp, muscular language. LeMay's statements in these forums created bookends to his remarks on the topic of preemption while in command of SAC. In January 1956 LeMay attended a conference at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. As had been the case at the National War College and the Quantico conference, LeMay used the forum to advocate for a nuclear strategy of preemption. A now declassified document from the meeting reveals that LeMay told those assembled that, "another situation has developed that should cause us some concern. It is that the Russians will continue to talk peace, and there are too many people that believe them." (63) It seems certain LeMay did not, and he wanted to be able to assuage his fears. Going further, LeMay recounted "Nine Basic Points On Which We All Agree"..."The Prevention of Aggression"..."The Air Power Battle"..."The Destruction of the Enemy Offensive"..."The Offensive Force"..."Defense after Offense"..."Intercontinental Capability"..."Centralized Control"..."The Principle of Security," and..."The Principle of Economy of Force." (64) According to LeMay, "The Air Power Battle" (65) held that "The first requirement of our Air Force is to win both phases of the Air Power Battle--the deterrent phase and the combat phase.There can be no doubt--at such time as Russian forces have the ascendancy over our forces, and it is to her advantage to attack us, she will attack." (66) Accordingly, LeMay believed that, "We must have such a force in being that for Russia to attack the United States would mean committing national suicide." (67) In the next item, "The Destruction of the Enemy Offensive," LeMay argued "We all know that the best way to destroy an enemy air offensive force is to attack it in its most vulnerable situation--on the ground before it is launched." (68) Put another way, the best way to defeat the Soviet threat was through preemptive attack, not deterrence and retaliation. LeMay went on to point out that, "we should provide as good a defense as can be afforded after the requirements of the offensive force are satisfied," (69) and that this "offensive force should have a predominantly intercontinental capability." (70) LeMay wanted to be ready for the worst. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Similarly, on May 21, 1957, a little more than a month before his departure as commander of SAC, LeMay paid a visit to Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, just outside Cocoa Beach on the Atlantic coast. There LeMay delivered what was to be one of his last major addresses as the chief of SAC, and his audience on that day was the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. LeMay noted that he had been requested "to discuss the Operational Side of Air Offense," (71) also the title of his talk. LeMay argued that the "objective of our national defense policy is deterrence," (72) yet, to this LeMay offered a caveat: "In the public mind--both ours and the Soviets--deterrence is rooted in fear of nuclear devastation of population centers." (73) LeMay went on to note that, "However, in the professional military mind--again, both ours and the Soviets," (74) "deterrence is measured in terms of ability to destroy the enemy's means of long-range delivery of nuclear weapons." (75) Put differently, deterrence was actually grounded in the ability to preempt an enemy's nuclear force. LeMay then informed the conference-goers that, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed SAC to destroy, as a matter of first priority, 'the Soviet capability to launch weapons of mass destruction against areas or forces vital to the United States and allied war effort'"..."In my view, our deterrent strength resides primarily in our recognized capability to win the Air Power Battle"..."Unless and until the Air Power Battle is won, there is no hope of successful operation by major surfaces forces. This requires, of course, a successful strategic air offensive" (76) For LeMay, this meant destroying the Soviet's ability to attack the United States, and that meant attacking the Soviets first, an enduring theme during his time at SAC. Fear Himself LeMay's remarks concerning preemptive war provide evidence that he disagreed with declared American nuclear policy, namely reliance upon deterrence and retaliation for holding the Soviet Union at bay across a spectrum of potential scenarios and levels of tension. While LeMay did argue for a policy of first-strike, he only did so in the context of one being threatened against the United States, a distinction that calls into question at least some of the argument that LeMay was interested in blindly launching an unprovoked preventive nuclear war against the Soviet Union. His statements also bring to light the sense of fear that must have pervaded his thinking, a fear that the United States could be devastatingly attacked, all the while possessing some wherewithal to preclude such from happening. Having been witness to the destruction of many of Japan's major cities by American bombers during World War II--destruction LeMay himself had leveled as commander of American strategic air forces in the Pacific, he was all too aware of the power of strategic bombing. It was almost as though LeMay had come to fear himself--and what a strategic air force was capable of doing. NOTES (1.) Gregg Herken, Counsels of War: The Revealing Story of the Experts and Advisors-Scientists, Academics, Think-Tank Strategists-Who Have Influenced and Helped Determine American Nuclear Arms Policy Since Hiroshima, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 94. (2.) Ibid., 94-95. (3.) Ibid., 95. (4.) Ibid. (5.) Ibid. (6.) Ibid. (7.) Peter J. Roman, Curtis LeMay and the Origins of NATO Atomic Targeting, Journal of Strategic Studies, (March, 1993), 46. (8.) Roman, 48. (9.) Roman, 49. (10.) John Stuart, "Army, Navy Differ on Future Defense," New York Times, July 19, 1946, via New York Times Website, www.nytimes.com (11.) Ibid. (12.) Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room, The Papers of Curtis E. LeMay, Box B-95 (or simply Box 95), "Speech by Lt. Gen. LeMay, Omaha, Nebraska, December Meeting of Omaha Post Number One, December 14, 1948". (13.) Ibid. Italics added by this author. (14.) Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room, Papers of Curtis E. LeMay, Box B-195 (B-3111), Letter from LeMay to Vandenberg, dated December 12, 1949. (15.) Ibid. (16.) Ibid. (17.) Ibid. (18.) Ibid. (19.) Ibid. (20.) Ibid. Italicization added by this author. (21.) Ibid. (22.) "Commanders Conference", 25-27 April, 1950, page 203. Record stored at: NARA, Record Group 341, RG 341, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Office of the Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff Executive Service Division, General Files 1950-1953, box 1. This record was accessed through George Washington University's National Security Archive online document site. The web address for this document, at the time of access in September, 2008, was: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/special/doc03b.pdf (23.) Ibid., page 224. (24.) Ibid. (25.) Ibid., page 225. (26.) Ibid. (27.) Ibid., page 225-226. (28.) Ibid., page 226-227. (29.) Ibid., page 227. (30.) Ibid. (31.) Ibid. (32.) Ibid. (33.) Ibid. (34.) Ibid., pages 227-228. With regard to LeMay's reference to sites "Able, Baker, and Charlie", although the source document does not make clear to exactly what sites LeMay was referring, it is likely that he was referring to US nuclear weapons storage sites as a comparison to similar such sites in the Soviet Union. (35.) Ibid., page 228. (36.) Ibid. (37.) Ibid, p. 230. (38.) Ibid, p. 231. (39.) Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room, Papers of Curtis E. LeMay, Box B-204, Speech by General LeMay Presented at the National War College, January 28, 1954, p. 1. (40.) Ibid. (41.) Ibid, p. 4. (42.) Ibid. (43.) Ibid, p. 5. (44.) Ibid. (45.) Ibid. (46.) Ibid, p. 1 of Question Period. (47.) Ibid. (48.) Ibid. (49.) Ibid, pp. 1-2 of Question Period. (50.) Ibid, p. 3 of Question Period. (51.) Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Papers of Chester R. Davis-Assistant Secretary of Army-1955 to 1956, Box 3, materials from the 1955 Secretaries' Conference. The materials referenced for this citation were the "Agenda, Saturday 16 July" and the Program for the conference, which included a directory of attendees, their lodging location, and phone extension. The directory of names was used to determine who was in attendance at the conference. (52.) Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room, Papers of Curtis E. LeMay, Box B-205, Remarks by General Curtis E. LeMay at Quantico, July 15, 1955, page 1 of speech. (53.) Ibid, pp. 4-5. (54.) Ibid, p. 19. (55.) Ibid. (56.) Ibid, pp. 19-20. The word "of' was mistakenly typed twice into LeMay's script. (57.) Ibid, p. 22. (58.) Ibid, p. 22. (59.) Ibid. (60.) Ibid, pp. 22-23. (61.) Ibid, p. 23. (62.) Ibid, pp. 23-24. (63.) Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room, Papers of Curtis E. LeMay, Box B-205, Remarks, General Curtis E. LeMay at Commander's Conference, Wright Patterson AFB, January 1956, page 2. (64.) Ibid, pp. 2-4. (65.) Ibid, p. 3. (66.) Ibid. (67.) Ibid. (68.) Ibid. (69.) Ibid, p. 4. (70.) Ibid. (71.) Library of Congress, Manuscript Reading Room, Papers of Curtis E. LeMay, Box B-206 (Box apparently contains items for boxes B-206 and B-207, but is here listed as box B-206. This particular document also bears the marking B-60725 in the upper right-hand corner of the cover), Remarks by General Curtis E. LeMay to The USAF Scientific Advisory Board, Patrick AFB, Fla., May 21, 1957, page 1 (page number not listed on first page). (72.) Ibid, p. 2. (73.) Ibid. (74.) Ibid. (75.) Ibid. (76.) Ibid, p. 3. * The record is unclear as to exactly what organization this was. In all likelihood, based upon the name of the organization and the nature of LeMay's remarks that day, it was likely a veterans' organization, perhaps the American Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars. Trevor D. Albertson served on the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy, on the staff of a member of the United States Congress and as an appointee in California state government. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of California, Merced, his MA. from the Catholic University of America and is a graduate of Norwich University. He was a 2008-2009 University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Dissertation Fellow. Trevor and his family reside in the Sierra Nevada foothills of Northern California and he serves in the Air Force Reserve.

***** No abstract is available for this article. ***** Byline: Bryn Nelson, David B. Kaminsky

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