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There is growing recognition of the need for pupils to have the opportunity to engage with both religious and non-religious worldviews in religious education (RE). This recognition is bound up with issues of social justice and equality, underpinned by a desire to ensure that all young people should have the opportunity 'to understand the worldviews of others and reflect on their own' (Commission on Religious Education 2018: 26). In thinking about how best to provide non-religious pupils with opportunities to reflect on their own worldviews, beliefs, and moral commitments, we should take into account their current experiences in RE. This article therefore offers original insight into the experiences and perspectives of non-religious primary school children in relation to RE. We draw on data from a qualitative study exploring what it means to be 'non-religious' for primary school children in three different areas of England. Through presenting how these children reflect on RE, we see that they care about social justice but also that their own experiences of RE can be seen as perpetuating a 'hermeneutic injustice' (Fricker, 2007) as they are not being given interpretive resources to make sense of their own experiences and worldviews. We argue that giving children the opportunity to explore the kind of 'emerging worldview' (Beaman, 2017) that they themselves express might be one way to overcome this inequality and provide them with a language to reflect on their beliefs and values and enter into meaningful conversation with others.

This article explores the influence of Émile Durkheim on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in order both to open up the political significance of Levinas's thought and to develop more expansive meanings of moral and political community within education. Education was a central preoccupation for both thinkers: Durkheim saw secular education as the site for promoting the values of organic solidarity, while Levinas was throughout his professional life engaged in debates on Jewish education and conceptualized ethical subjectivity as a condition of being taught. Durkheim has been accused of dissolving the moral into the social, and his view of education as a means of imparting a sense of civic republican values is sometimes seen as conservative, while Levinas's argument for an "unfounded foundation" for morality is sometimes seen as paralyzing the impetus for concrete political action. Against these interpretations, I argue that their approaches present provocative challenges for conceptualizing the nature of the social, offering theoretical resources to deepen understanding of education as the site of an everyday ethics and a prophetic politics opening onto more compelling ideals for education than those dominant within standard educational discourses.

This paper considers the questions that Badiou's theory poses to the culture of economic managerialism within education. His argument that radical change is possible, for people and the situations they inhabit, provides a stark challenge to the stifling nature of much current educational debate. In "Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism", Badiou describes the current universalism of capitalism, monetary homogeneity and the rule of the count. Badiou argues that the politics of identity are all too easily subsumed by the prerogatives of the marketplace and unable to present, therefore, a critique of the status quo. These processes are, he argues, without the potential for truth. What are the implications of Badiou's claim that education is the arranging of "the forms of knowledge in such a way that truth may come to pierce a hole in them" (Badiou, 2005, p. 9)? I will argue that Badiou's theory opens up space for a kind of thinking about education that resists its colonisation by the cultures of management and marketisation and leads educationalists to consider the emancipatory potential of education in a refreshing new light.

This paper explores the relationship between language, subjectivity and teaching in Emmanuel Levinas's "Totality and Infinity". It aims to elucidate Levinas's presentation of language as always already predicated on a relationship of responsibility towards that which is beyond the self and the idea that it is only in this condition of being responsible that we are subjects. Levinas suggests that the relation with the Other through which I am a subject as one uniquely responsible is also the scene of teaching. Through examining these ethical conditions of subjectivity, I suggest that this notion of the self as oriented towards the Other in a relation of passivity presents a challenge to many of the standard "topoi" of teaching and learning and invites us to consider the nature of teaching in a provocative new manner.