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This research aims to indicate the roots of public law in the Constitutionalism in which the prerequisites for the citizens of the country to participate in public affairs as well as the basis for developing the concept of political participation were provided. This study examines the topic in the works of one of the famous jurists of this era. The concept of political participation should be developed by restricting both claims and obstacles. First, it had to constitutionalize the independent monarchy that it considered the whole country as its absolute property, and then recognized an authority for the public in public affairs, which was previously under the authority of the jurists. Both of these obstacles were removed through the concept of political equality. It was for years that concepts were being prepared in the workshop of Constitutionalism to create equality of humankind. Even a concept like representation was the result and implication of the concept of political equality. Within concepts such as "common house", "thirty crores" and "public affairs", the notion of political equality of the people of the country was developed and with the help of such foundation, thinking about such concepts was made possible. The present paper indicates that the emergence of these concepts was a sign of a fundamental change in the basis of sovereignty and its transfer from the king to the people on the one hand and the establishment of a kind of the public authority on the other hand.

One of the important discussions in the political thought is the equality or inequality of human beings. Any image about equality can have a variety of effects in people’s political life. Investigating and explaining the view of Islamic thinkers on this subject can be useful, both theoretically and practically, in strategies of the states and Islamic societies. The main questions here are posed as follows: “What is the view presented by Allameh Tabatabaʾi as the Islamic philosopher and commentator of the Quran about the political equality?” and “Are the society members equal from the angel of the nature and from the theoretical viewpoint in political participation, administering the society and political power?” The hypothesis of this article is that the political equality has not been used directly as a topic in Allameh Tabatabaʾi’s works; but considering his system of thoughts and posing the social and political issues, we can extract his views on political thought. Accordingly, the principles of political equality such as the equal basic rights in relation to others and in the relationship between the state and the individuals and equality before law have been accepted. This study has used the descriptive-analytical method and content analysis to extract Allameh Tabatabaʾi’s views. In the light of citizen rights, people can – considering their equal role in social administration – choose the ruler and the form of ruling through consultation, and can have the right to policy-making and supervising in making legislation and decision-making related to administering the society. People enjoy equal right and equal votes in ruling and administering the society.

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, I aim to provide an introductory overview of limitarianism – a novel philosophical view advanced by Ingrid Robeyns, which maintains that individuals should not be excessively wealthy – and its main conceptual features to the Romanian landscape. Second, I argue that one way of conceptualizing limitarianism, as a merely moral (non-political) view is problematic, since the presumed duty to avoid being excessively wealthy is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for satisfying the underlying moral duties upon which limitarianism is predicated. The implication is that limitarianism makes sense as a self-standing view only in its political interpretation.

Almost two decades after the advent of the Revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic, the model of “Religious Democracy” was introduced. It resulted in various scientific issues and dialogues about the concept of “religious democracy,” its potentials, limitations, pillars, and institutions. Therefore, in the present article, the discourse formation of religious democracy is presented with a brief look at its concept. In accordance with the author, religious democracy is a conception of democracy that recognizes the collective power and people’s participation as the essence of democracy, and also justifies, analyzes, and explains that referring to religion and its principles. According to a methodological study of discursive analysis, in religious democracy, “religion” and according to its Iranian discourse, “Islam” is regarded as nodal points. The main floating signifiers of Religious Democracy in the Iranian discourse are ”People”, “Law”, “Political Equality”, “Freedom”, “Independence”. The meaning of these signifiers will be understood by referring to Islam as the nodal point of the Religious Democracy. Nowadays in Iran, this kind of Democracy is exercised, and it seems that the most important “strategic and political necessity” for Islamic countries is exercising the “Religious Democracy” of their own.

Deliberative minipublics often seek to recruit participants who are representative and diverse. This raises theoretical and practical challenges, because representativeness and diversity can be interpreted in multiple ways and can conflict with one another. We address this issue by proposing a purposive design approach, according to which the appropriate conceptualisations of representativeness and diversity, and thereby recruitment strategies, depend on the deliberative mini-public’s aims. We argue that deliberative minipublics frequently have mixed aims, which can justify hybrid recruitment strategies that reflect distinct senses of representativeness or diversity.

This paper investigates the limitations of the ideal of political equality under non-ideal circumstances and focuses specifically on the way in which structurally unjust social contexts endanger individuals’ perception of their own worth. Starting from Rawls’ definition of the social bases of self-respect as a primary good to be fairly distributed, the paper main goal is to provide normative arguments in favor of a power sensitive theory of political agency. A power sensitive theory, in fact, proves to be necessary as it sheds a light over the way in which power relationships affect the very possibility, for some members of the constituency, of fully enjoying the status of political reflexive agents. Against this background, in the paper I defend two main theses. First, I argue that the contemporary debate concerning the implementation of the ideal of equality within liberal democracies has been overlooking the epistemic dimension of the basis of political equality. Second, I claim that specifying the epistemic dimension of political equality has at least two important effects. a. It is important from the perspective of conceptual analysis, as it allows to properly distinguish between the normative job played by moral arguments on the one hand, and the epistemic aspects of political equality on the other hand. b. The specification of the epistemic aspects of political equality has at least on important normative upshot, namely the possibility to show that epistemic forms of injustice are detrimental to the very ideal of political equality as an essential feature of liberal conceptions of democracy.

Neste artigo procuro responder a uma questão específica: é possível recuperar o valor e papel determinante do conceito de soberania popular, na condição das democracias contemporâneas? Presumindo de que é ainda possível (e também desejável) recuperar este ideal e princípio regulador, quero explorar que condições temos à nossa disposição hoje que nos permitam fazê-lo. Isso implica, antes de mais, expor criticamente os perigos eminentes trazidos pela globalização e pelo novo imperialismo neoliberal, que põem em cheque as aspirações democráticas fundamentais de liberdade, igualdade e justiça social. Neste sentido, questionar sobre as condições de possibilidade da soberania popular significa questionar as condições de possibilidade para a própria democracia. Só conseguiremos recuperar a democracia se redefinirmos: a) a relação entre indivíduo e comunidade; b) a relação entre nações democráticas e organizações globais não-democráticas; c) o espaço onde a democracia deve acontecer (da nação-estado para comunidades locais). Assim, este artigo tem quatro momentos. Primeiro, ofereço uma leitura do conceito de soberania popular na modernidade, tendo como ponto de referência a obra de Rousseau. No segundo momento caracterizo a constelação democrática contemporânea, a partir das leituras oferecidas por Bernard Manin (1997) e Nadia Urbinati (2006). No terceiro momento concentro-me na tensão entre ideais democráticos e hegemonia neoliberal. Por fim, questiono as condições de possibilidade para recuperar a democracia, e com ela, o conceito de soberania popular.

In this article an attempt is made to clarify the concept of political equality and how it relates to democratic government. The authors relate that with the general discussion on constitutional change in Iceland. An attempt is made to assess whether a formal, numerical equality of voting power in Iceland does indeed enhance or constitute political equality. The inequality of voting power between the centre and the periphery, or between the capital area and the countryside, is analysed and redefined. The question is then posed if – at the end of the day ˗ the nature of the unequal voting power between the countryside and the capital area calls for radical changes in the constitutional framework of the electoral system? It is pointed out that any change in the voting power and the geographical political balance needs to take into account different points of view and that alongside such political changes countermeasures need to be taken as to secure other interests of the periphery. Such measures need to be substantial and proportional to the changes they are supposed to counter.

Neste artigo sustenta-se que a democraticidade é o fundamento da legitimidade da representação. Assim, debater normativamente o problema da representação passa pela elucidação e defesa prévias de um modelo de democracia. Defende-se a democracia como o ideal (processual) da igualdade política (isocracia). Analisam-se e rejeitam-se as objecções às concepções processuais de democracia e expõem-se as debilidades das concepções substantivas rivais. Finalmente, à luz do ideal da isocracia, demonstra-se a superioridade democrática da democracia directa e sustenta-se que os sistemas eleitorais proporcionais são os que melhor se coadunam com a representação fidedigna das preferências dos cidadãos, isto é, a representação democrática.In this article, democracy is conceived as the source of legitimacy of political representation. Thus, in order to debate representation, one must previously clarify and uphold a specific model of democracy. Democracy here is understood as the procedural ideal of political equality (isocracy). Arguments contrary to procedural concepts of democracy are analyzed and rejected, and the weaknesses of rival substantive concepts are explored. Finally, in accordance with isocracy’s ideal, direct democracy is considered democratically superior, and proportional electoral systems are held to be those most compatible with a democratic sort of representation: the accurate representation of citizens’ preferences.

El presente trabajo tiene el propósitode reforzar la comprensión de la democraciasegún sus principios fundamentales, paraentonces elaborar un marco teórico en torno ala relación existente entre democracia yderechos humanos, demostrando, por fin, lanecesidad de repensarse las concepcionesoccidentales respecto de ambos temas y laposible solución, conferida en ambiente local,para la viabilidad de un discurso cosmopolita.The present work has the purposeto straighten the democracy understandingby its fundamental principles, in order toelaborate a theory framework concerningthe relationship between democracy andhuman rights, confirming, finally, thenecessity of rethinking occidentalconception for each one and the possiblesolution, found in the local sphere, to theuniversal discourse.

Growing economic inequality fosters inequality in the political processes of American democracy. Since the 1970’s inequalities in earnings and wealth have increased dramatically in the United States creating a higher level of inequality in disposable income than in other developed democracies. The United States also lags behind other rich nations in the way it provides for those at the bottom of the income distribution, and there is no evidence that the opportunities for success promised by the American Dream compensate for inequality in America. Technological and economic developments are significant causes of this growing economic inequality. The role of politics is more controversial, but government policy influences the distribution of income and education by the way it determines government benefits, taxes and the way markets function. For a number of reasons—including, most importantly, the relationship between education and income and the ability of the affluent to make large campaign donations—those who are economically well-off speak more loudly in politics. They are more likely to engage in most forms of individual political participation—not only ones that involve using cash but also ones that cost nothing except time. Moreover, when it comes to political voice through organizations, a professionalized domain dominated by hired experts in which the volume of political voice can be altered to reflect available economic resources, affluent interests are more likely to be organized and active. This essay considers the growing economic inequalities that form an important part of the backdrop for unequal political voice.

Normative theories of deliberative democracy stake claims that deliberation, if done correctly, can enhance citizens’ trust in authorities, foster a greater understanding of political issues and the element of compromise in politics, and increase the legitimacy of the political system overall. Skeptics point out that public deliberations seldom fully satisfy the communicative criteria stipulated in normative theory, raising the question: to what extent may we expect imperfect deliberations to generate the promised civic goods? This article proposes a framework for answering this question and also offers a few preliminary answers. The empirical analyses build on an opinion survey conducted in the wake of a series of public meetings that varied in the extent to which they lived up to normative standards of deliberative democracy. The meetings centered around whether to continue construction on a railway tunnel near the town of Båstad in southwestern Sweden. The findings suggest that even imperfect deliberation may have the potential to generate civic goods, though the analyses also raise doubts regarding the durability of the positive effects as well as the extent to which they will develop uniformly among participants.