Search

Abstract Background On October 29th 2009 the health authorities in the city of Trondheim, Norway were alerted about a case of Shiga toxin-positive E. coli (STEC) O145 in a child with bloody diarrhoea attending a day-care centre. Symptomatic children in this day-care centre were sampled, thereby identifying three more cases. This initiated an outbreak investigation. Methods A case was defined as a child attending the day-care centre, in whom eae- and stx1- but not stx2-positive E. coli O145:H28 was diagnosed from a faecal sample, with multilocus variable number of tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) profile identical to the index isolate. All 61 children, a staff of 14 in the day-care centre, and 74 close contacts submitted faecal samples. Staff and parents were interviewed about cases' exposure to foods and animals. Faecal samples from 31 ewes from a sheep herd to which the children were exposed were analyzed for E. coli O145. Results Sixteen cases were identified, from which nine presented diarrhoea but not haemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS). The attack rate was 0.26, and varied between age groups (0.13-0.40) and between the three day-care centre departments (0.20-0.50), and was significantly higher amongst the youngest children. Median duration of shedding was 20 days (0-71 days). Children were excluded from the day-care centre during shedding, requiring parents to take compassionate leave, estimated to be a minimum total of 406 days for all cases. Atypical enteropathogenic E. coli (aEPEC) were detected among 14 children other than cases. These isolates were genotypically different from the outbreak strain. Children in the day-care centre were exposed to faecal pollution from a sheep herd, but E. coli O145 was not detected in the sheep. Conclusions We report an outbreak of stx1- and eae-positive STEC O145:H28 infection with mild symptoms among children in a day-care centre. Extensive sampling showed occurrence of the outbreak strain as well as other STEC and aEPEC strains in the outbreak population. MLVA-typing of the STEC-isolates strongly indicates a common source of infection. The study describes epidemiological aspects and socioeconomic consequences of a non-O157 STEC outbreak, which are less commonly reported than O157 outbreaks.

Abstract Background In March 2007, the Norwegian Institute of Public Health was notified of Swedish individuals diagnosed with cryptosporidiosis after staying at a Norwegian hotel. In Norway, cryptosporidiosis is not reportable, and human infections are rarely diagnosed. Methods A questionnaire on illness and exposure history was e-mailed to seven organised groups who had visited the hotel in March. Cases were defined as persons with diarrhoea for more than two days or laboratory-confirmed cryptosporidiosis during or within two weeks of the hotel visit. The risk factor analysis was restricted to two groups with the highest attack rates (AR) and same hotel stay period. Local food safety authorities conducted environmental investigations. Results In total, 25 diarrhoeal cases (10 laboratory-confirmed) were identified among 89 respondents. Although environmental samples were negative, epidemiological data suggest an association with in-house water consumption. In one group, the AR was higher amongst consumers of water from hotel dispenser (relative risk [RR] = 3.0; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.9–9.8), tap water (RR = 2.3; CI: 0.9–5.8), and lower amongst commercial bottled water drinkers (RR = 0.6; CI: 0.4–1.0). Consumption of ice cubes was a risk-factor (RR = 7.1; CI: 1.1–45.7) in the two groups combined. Conclusion This outbreak would probably have remained undetected without the alert from Swedish health authorities, illustrating the difficulties in outbreak detection due to low health care seeking behaviour for diarrhoea and limited parasite diagnostics in Norway. Awareness of cryptosporidiosis should be raised amongst Norwegian medical personnel to improve case and outbreak detection, and possible risks related to in-house water systems should be assessed.

Abstract Background On 7 May 2007 the medical officer in Røros (population 5600) reported 15 patients with gastroenteritis. Three days later he estimated hundreds being ill. Untreated tap water from a groundwater source was suspected as the vehicle and chlorination was started 11 May. Campylobacter was isolated from patients' stool samples. We conducted an investigation to identify the source and describe the extent of the outbreak. Methods We undertook a retrospective cohort study among a random sample of customers of Røros and neighbouring Holtålen waterworks. Holtålen, which has a different water source, was used as a control city. We conducted telephone interviews to gather data on illness from all household members. One randomly selected household member was asked about detailed exposure history. The regional hospital laboratory tested patients' stools for enteropathogens. Campylobacter isolates were typed by AFLP for genetic similarity at the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. Local authorities conducted the environmental investigation. Results We identified 105 cases among 340 individuals from Røros and Holtålen (Attack Rate = 31%). Tap water consumption was the only exposure associated with illness. Among randomly selected household members from Røros, a dose-response relationship was observed in daily consumed glasses of tap water (χ2 for trend = 8.1, p = 0.004). Campylobacter with identical AFLP was isolated from 25 out of 26 submitted stool samples. No pathogens were detected in water samples. We identified several events that might have caused pressure fall and influx of contaminated water into the water distribution system. On two occasions, pressure fall was noticed and parts of the distribution system were outdated. Conclusion The investigation confirmed a waterborne outbreak of campylobacteriosis in Røros. Although no single event was identified as the cause of contamination, this outbreak illustrates the vulnerability of water distribution systems. Good quality source water alone is not enough to ensure water safety. For a better risk management, more focus should be put on the distribution system security. Waterworks personnel should monitor the pressure regularly; reduce the leakage by upgrading the distribution network and use chlorination when conducting maintenance work.