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Anomia, or difficulty naming common objects, is the most common, acquired impairment of language. Effective therapeutic interventions for anomia typically involve massed practice at high doses. This requires significant investment from patients and therapists. Aphasia researchers have increasingly looked to neurostimulation to accelerate these treatment effects, but the evidence behind this intervention is sparse and inconsistent. Here, we hypothesised that group-level neurostimulation effects might belie a more systematic structure at the individual level. We sought to test the hypothesis by attempting to predict the immediate (online), individual-level behavioural effects of anodal and sham neurostimulation in 36 chronic patients with anomia, performing naming and size judgement tasks. Using clinical, (pre-stimulation) behavioural and MRI data, as well as Partial Least Squares regression, we attempted to predict neurostimulation effects on accuracies and reaction times of both tasks. Model performance was assessed via cross-validation. Predictive performances were compared to that of a null model, which predicted the mean neurostimulation effects for all patients. Models derived from pre-stimulation data consistently outperformed the null model when predicting neurostimulation effects on both tasks’ performance. Notably, we could predict behavioural declines just as well as improvements. In conclusion, inter-patient variation in online responses to neurostimulation is, to some extent, systematic and predictable. Since declines in performance were just as predictable as improvements, the behavioural effects of neurostimulation in patients with anomia are unlikely to be driven by placebo effects. However, the online effect of the intervention appears to be as likely to interfere with task performance as to improve it.

Aphasia is an acquired disorder caused by damage, most commonly due to stroke, to brain regions involved in speech and language. While language impairment is the defining symptom of aphasia, the co-occurrence of non-language cognitive deficits and their importance in predicting rehabilitation and recovery outcomes is well documented. However, people with aphasia (PWA) are rarely tested on higher-order cognitive functions, making it difficult for studies to associate these functions with a consistent lesion correlate. Broca’s area is a particular brain region of interest that has long been implicated in speech and language production. Contrary to classic models of speech and language, cumulative evidence shows that Broca’s area and surrounding regions in the left inferior frontal cortex (LIFC) are involved in, but not specific to, speech production. In this study we aimed to explore the brain-behaviour relationships between tests of cognitive skill and language abilities in thirty-six adults with long-term speech production deficits caused by post-stroke aphasia.Our findings suggest that non-linguistic cognitive functions, namely executive functions and verbal working memory, explain more of the behavioural variance in PWA than classical language models imply. Additionally, lesions to the LIFC, including Broca’s area, were associated with non-linguistic executive (dys)function, suggesting that lesions to this area are associated with non-language-specific higher-order cognitive deficits in aphasia. Whether executive (dys)function – and its neural correlate in Broca’s area – contributes directly to PWA’s language production deficits or simply co-occurs with it, adding to communication difficulties, remains unclear. These findings support contemporary models of speech production that place language processing within the context of domain-general perception, action and conceptual knowledge. An understanding of the covariance between language and non-language deficits and their underlying neural correlates will inform better targeted aphasia treatment and outcomes.

Abstract Stroke is a leading cause of disability, and language impairments (aphasia) after stroke are both common and particularly feared. Most stroke survivors with aphasia exhibit anomia (difficulties with naming common objects), but while many therapeutic interventions for anomia have been proposed, treatment effects are typically much larger in some patients than others. Here, we asked whether that variation might be more systematic, and even predictable, than previously thought. 18 patients, each at least 6 months after left hemisphere stroke, engaged in a computerised treatment for their anomia over a 6-week period. Using only: (a) the patients’ initial accuracy when naming (to-be) trained items; (b) the hours of therapy that they devoted to the therapy; and (c) whole-brain lesion location data, derived from structural MRI; we developed Partial Least Squares regression models to predict the patients’ improvements on treated items, and tested them in cross-validation. Somewhat surprisingly, the best model included only lesion location data and the hours of therapy undertaken. In cross-validation, this model significantly out-performed the null model, in which the prediction for each patient was simply the mean treatment effect of the group. This model also made promisingly accurate predictions in absolute terms: the correlation between empirical and predicted treatment response was 0.62 (95% CI 0.27, 0.95). Our results indicate that individuals’ variation in response to anomia treatment are, at least somewhat, systematic and predictable, from the interaction between where and how much lesion damage they have suffered, and the time they devoted to the therapy.

Humans recognize both the movement (physical) goals and action (conceptual) goals of individuals with whom they are interacting. Here, we assessed whether spontaneous recognition of others' goals depends on whether the observers control their own behavior at the movement or action level. We also examined the relationship between individual differences in empathy and ASD-like traits, and the processing of other individual's movement and action goals that are known to be encoded in the "mirroring" and "mentalizing" brain networks. In order to address these questions, we used a computer-based card paradigm that made it possible to independently manipulate movement and action congruency of observed and executed actions. In separate blocks, participants were instructed to select either the right or left card (movement-control condition) or the higher or lower card (action-control condition), while we manipulated action- and movement-congruency of both actors' goals. An action-congruency effect was present in all conditions and the size of this effect was significantly correlated with self-reported empathy and ASD-like traits. In contrast, movement-congruency effects were only present in the movement-control block and were strongly dependent on action-congruency. These results illustrate that spontaneous recognition of others' behavior depends on the control scheme that is currently adopted by the observer. The findings suggest that deficits in action recognition are related to abnormal synthesis of perceived movements and prior conceptual knowledge that are associated with activations in the "mirroring" and "mentalizing" cortical networks.

Humans are faster to perform a given action following observation of that same action. Converging evidence suggests that the human mirror neuron system (MNS) plays an important role in this phenomenon. However, the specificity of the neural mechanisms governing this effect remain controversial. Specialist theories of imitation suggest that biological cues are maximally capable of eliciting imitative facilitation. Generalist models, on the other hand, posit a broader role for the MNS in linking visual stimuli with appropriate responses. In the present study, we investigated the validity of these two theoretical approaches by disrupting the left and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) during the preparation of congruent (imitative) and incongruent (complementary) actions cued by either biological (hand) or non-biological (static dot) stimuli. Delivery of TMS over IFG abolished imitative response facilitation. Critically, this effect was identical whether actions were cued by biological or non-biological stimuli. This finding argues against theories of imitation in which biological stimuli are treated preferentially and stresses the notion of the IFG as a vital center of general perception-action coupling in the human brain.