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Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic profoundly altered socio-economic activities, human behaviors, and crime patterns. However, less is known about how the pandemic and associated restrictions affected cyber-enabled and traditional fraud. Here, we conducted a retrospective analysis using police-recorded crime data in the UK to examine the impact of COVID-19 restrictions and changes in human activity on fraud. Results indicate that following the onset of the lockdown, the number of recorded fraud cases increased by 28.5%, contrasting with traditional property crimes, which dropped by 28.1%. However, the lockdown did not have a significant impact on the long-term trend of fraud. With the lifting of restrictions, fraud gradually regressed to levels approaching those before the pandemic. By inspecting the effects of different government responses and changes in population mobility on various types of fraud, we found that more stringent restrictions were associated with larger increases in most types of cyber-enabled fraud, except for those that rely on offline activities, whereas the impact on traditional fraud was mixed and contingent upon specific opportunity structures. These findings overall align with the assumptions of routine activity theory and provide clear support for its applicability in fraud and cybercrime.

Abstract Given that armed conflict has been seriously impeding sustainable development, reducing the frequency and intensity of armed conflicts has become an explicit goal and a common theme of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Determining the factors shaping armed conflict risks in different regions could support formulating region-specific strategies to prevent armed conflicts. A machine learning approach was applied to reveal the drivers of, and especially the impact of climatic conditions on, armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia and characterizes their changes over time. The analyses show a rising impact of climatic conditions on armed conflict risk over the past decades, although the influences vary regionally. The overall percentage increases in the contribution of climatic conditions to conflict risks over the last 30 years in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia are 4.25, 4.76, and 10.65 percentage points, respectively. Furthermore, it is found that the Climatic–Social–Geographical (“C–S–G”) patterns that characterize armed conflict risks vary across the three studied regions, while each regional pattern remains relatively stable over time. These findings indicate that when devising defenses against conflicts, it is required to adapt to specific situations in each region to more effectively mitigate the risk of armed conflict and pursue Sustainability Development Goals.

The potential impacts of climate change on violent conflict are high on the agenda of scholars and policy makers. This article reviews existing literature to clarify the relationship between climate change and conflict risk, focusing on the roles of temperature and precipitation. While some debate remains, substantial evidence shows that climate change increases conflict risk under specific conditions. We examine four key pathways through which climate affects conflict: (i) economic shocks, (ii), agricultural decline, (iii) natural resources competition, and (iv) migration. Key gaps include limited long-term data, insufficient integrated studies, and the inadequate understanding of causal mechanisms, necessitating transdisciplinary research that addresses social vulnerability and underlying pathways.

The recent adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees formally recognizes not only the importance of supporting the nearly 26 million people who have sought asylum from conflict and persecution but also of easing the pressures on receiving areas and host countries. However, few countries may enforce the Compact out of concern over the economic or environmental repercussions of hosting refugees. We examine whether narratives of refugee-driven landscape change are empirically generalizable to continental Africa, which fosters 34% of all refugees. Estimates of the causal effects of the number of refugees—located in 493 camps distributed across 49 African countries—on vegetation from 2000 to 2016 are provided. Using a quasi-experimental design, we find refugees bear a small increase in vegetation condition while contributing to increased deforestation. Such a combination is mainly explained not by land clearance and massive biomass extraction but by agricultural expansion in refugee-hosting areas. A one percent increase in the number of refugees amplifies the transition from dominant forested areas to cropland by 1.4 percentage points. These findings suggest that changes in vegetation condition may ensue with the elevation of population-based constraints on food security.

Introduction Despite considerable improvements in vaccination coverage over the last decade, half of the world’s unvaccinated and undervaccinated children are located in Africa. The role of institutional trust in explaining vaccination gaps has been highlighted in several qualitative reports but so far has only been quantified in a small number of high-income countries.Methods We matched information on child vaccination status from the Demographic Health Surveys with information on institutional trust from the Afrobarometer surveys at the subnational level. A total of 166 953 children from 41 surveys administered in 22 African countries covering 216 subnational regions were used. Based on a principal component analysis, we constructed an institutional mistrust index that combined the level of mistrust in the head of state, parliament, electoral system, courts and local government. Associations between institutional mistrust and child vaccination uptake were assessed with multivariable fixed effects logistic regressions that controlled for time-invariant subnational region characteristics and various child, caregiver, household and community characteristics.Results A 1 SD increase in the institutional mistrust index was associated with a 10% (95% CI of ORs: 1.03 to 1.18) increase in the likelihood that a child had not received any of eight basic vaccines and with a 6% decrease in the likelihood a child had received all of the basic vaccines (95% CI: 0.92 to 0.97). Institutional mistrust was negatively associated with the likelihood that a child had received each of the eight basic vaccinations (p

Abstract The potential links between climate and conflict are well studied, yet disagreement about the specific mechanisms and their significance for societies persists. Here, we build on assessment of the relationship between climate and organized armed conflict to define crosscutting priorities for future directions of research. They include (1) deepening insight into climate‐conflict linkages and conditions under which they manifest, (2) ambitiously integrating research designs, (3) systematically exploring future risks and response options, responsive to ongoing decision‐making, and (4) evaluating the effectiveness of interventions to manage climate‐conflict links. The implications of this expanding scientific domain unfold in real time.