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This article aims to discuss the impact of the energy crisis exacerbated by the Russo-Ukrainian war on the general macroeconomic performance and income distribution of the Eurozone. We consider the restrictive monetary policies induced by the return of inflation, their declared and implicit objectives, and the contradictory consequences for the economic system. We analyse the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, and discuss the long-term consequences of sanctions and political strategies on the de-dollarisation of global markets.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(3), 1397-1414 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Four main categories of CJEU cases. - II.1. EMU and the euro and debt crisis in general. - II.2. Problems of multilevel decision-making. - II.3. Questions of liability and responsibility. - II.4. Issues relating to the Banking Union. - III. Concluding observations. | (Abstract) The main objective of this Article is to map and categorize the CJEU's case law relating to EMU. Although in purely quantitative terms, this is not a huge task, there are already enough relevant court rulings, up to 31 December 2020, to enable the establishment of a taxonomy distinguishing between four different categories of EMU-related case law. The first and foremost category will comprise cases dealing with the fundamentals of EMU, including clarifying the distinction between monetary policy and economic and other policies. This category includes a number of well-known cases of great political importance, such as Pringle ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, Gauweiler ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, Weiss ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, Kotnik ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 and Florescu ECLI:EU:C:2017:448. A second category relates to the nature of the EU as a system of multilevel governance and the need to determine whether the competence to act is at national or Union level or a mix of the two. Cases in point include UK v ECB (security clearing) ECLI:EU:T:2015:133, Berlusconi ECLI:EU:C:2018:1023 and Rimšēvičs ECLI:EU:C:2019:139. A third group of cases relates to issues of responsibility and liability, including questions of the liability of "abnormal" EU bodies or settings such as the Troika or the Euro Group. Fourth, especially the Banking Union has triggered cases relating to prudential supervision and other more technical issues. This analysis will be completed by some concluding remarks, including the question of the intensity of judicial control (standard of review), viewing the EMU case law in a broader context.

This article analyses the development of financial assistance in the Eurozone since 2010. It argues that reforms to instruments and bodies, notably the European Financial Stability Facility, the European Stability Mechanism, and the current Covid-19 recovery fund, are best explained by a re-occurring pattern of negotiations between potential creditors and debtors based on common Eurozone interests and national cost-benefit considerations. Building on a liberal intergovernmentalist approach, this article shows how this pattern influenced the step-by-step reform of financial assistance in the Eurozone. The threat to Eurozone stability served as a constant factor encouraging member states to expand and deepen the assistance formula. Creditors’ cost-benefit considerations were key for retaining disincentives, a limited liability for common debt, and intermediary borrowing and lending within the financing design. However, on the back of common Eurozone interests, debtors were able to push for an increase in assistance, an expansion of assistance into areas of banking sector support, and a softening of moral hazard elements in the more recent Covid-19 pandemic. Due to creditors’ continuous insistence on safeguards and limited burden-sharing, reform outcomes were repeatedly unable to resolve the difficulties at hand.

In the German parliament, the Bundestag, floor time is a scarce resource and is allocated to MPs by leaders of their respective parliamentary party groups. Previous research indicates that highly salient plenary debates tend to be dominated by party leaders and other loyal frontbenchers. Plenary speeches can therefore offer only limited insights into party unity. Any MP can give a so-called ‘explanation of vote’ (EoVs) to justify their voting decision and/or express their point of view. These written statements provide a more accurate depiction of the range of viewpoints present within legislative parties. In order to assess the effect of party control on observed party unity and parliamentary contestation, discourse network analysis has been employed in this study to compare legislative speech with EoVs in debates on the Greek crisis between 2010 and 2015. Discourse network analysis combines content analysis with an actor-centred approach, and this is the first time this method has been used to study party control and (dis)unity. Bundestag debates on the Greek crisis present an interesting case study, as the issue became increasingly controversial over time, both in the public and the legislature. While this became evident in declining voting unity and individual-level mobilisation through EoVs, the extent to which gatekeeping impedes contestation on the plenary floor needs to be assessed. In terms of representation, it is important that European Union issues not only make it to the plenary agenda but that these debates also reflect the different viewpoints of MPs.

This paper1 scrutinizes the transformation of the European economic governance. This is a framework conceived by European Union decision-makers to establish institutions and processes – coordination and harmonisation of economic policies – in order to achieve economic and social development for the European Union and its citizens. Prior to the global financial crisis, the European economic governance was incomplete, poorly coordinated and in certain macroeconomic areas insufficient. The international financial crisis and the “Euro crisis” compelled a much deeper and more comprehensive governance structure from the decision-makers of the European Union. Despite the rapid emergence of Community-level crisis management mechanisms, ad hoc responses and processes prevailed till the turning point of the “Euro crisis” in 2012. Since then, the transformation the European economic governance continued in a heavily institutionalized and coordinated form, providing a long-term vision for the European Union and the Eurozone. European economic governance has been substantially expanded, institutional arrangements cover fiscal policy, monetary policy, the supervision of the financial system, policies related to structural and competitiveness issues. Moreover, comprehensive and coordinated reform strategies were launched, based on the European Commission’s priorities. In this paper, we carry out a simple analysis to detect whether the new European economic governance has corrected the pre-crisis country-specific risks and institutional flaws.

Hailed initially as the country’s saviour for saving Italy from default, Mario Monti’s technocratic government (2011-13) ended in controversy and with its achievements questioned. Aware of this contested legacy, this article seeks to revisit Monti’s term in office and to assess his approach to the crisis that engulfed Italy and the eurozone in 2011-12. In doing so, it looks primarily at Monti’s European policy, but also briefly examines his domestic agenda. Monti’s legacy has so far drawn very limited academic interest. By filling a gap in the existing literature on contemporary European and Italian affairs, this article aims to improve our understanding of a critical phase in the recent politics and foreign policy of one the key EU member states.

Nell’evoluzione giuridica e istituzionale dell’Unione Europea un ruolo importante è stato svolto dall’ordoliberalismo. Una delle ‘battaglie’ per cui l’ordoliberalismo è conosciuto è quella sui principi della politica monetaria e dell’organizzazione istituzionale della banca centrale. Al fine di comprendere il ‘pensiero’ ordoliberale, tale tema è utile, innanzitutto, per apprezzare le basi storiche e teoriche dell’ordoliberalismo. Inoltre, tale tema è utile per illustrare la specifica influenza che l’ordoliberalismo ha svolto (indirettamente) a livello dell’Unione. La prima parte dell’articolo approfondisce il tema dell’indipendenza della banca centrale e della finalità della politica monetaria in Germania (dalla Reichsbank alla Bundesbank), La seconda parte affronta il tema dell’indipendenza della banca centrale e dell’obiettivo della politica monetaria nell’Unione Europea, indagando se e in quale modo l’ordoliberalismo abbia svolto in questo un’influenza. In the legal and institutional evolution of the European Union a particularly important role has been played by ordoliberalism. One of the ‘battles’ for which ordoliberalism is known is that of the basic principles of monetary policy and of the institutional set up of central banks. In order to better understand the ordoliberal ‘thought’, this subject can usefully be used to appreciate the historical and theoretical bases of ordoliberalism. Secondly, this subject can be useful to illustrate the influence that the ordoliberalism has played at the EU. The first part of this article aims to investigate the issue of central banks independence and the goal of monetary policy in Germany (from Reichsbank to Bundesbank). In the second part, the issue of central bank independence and the objective of monetary policy in the EU will be addressed, trying to understand if and in which way ordoliberalism has played its influence. JEL codes: B52; E52; E58; N13; N14; O52

Although European integration has become an increasingly salient and controversial topic in domestic politics, the consequences of this politicisation of the European Union for the integration process have not received adequate scholarly attention. To fill this lacuna, this article devises five hypotheses on the effects of politicisation for the integration process, which are subsequently tested against the evidence of the Euro and Schengen crises. Both crises had comparable origins, but the Euro crisis caused substantial deepening of integration, while the Schengen crisis has not engendered any meaningful reforming steps. The empirical analysis finds that politicisation assumed different forms across the two crises, which is shown to be one causal factor that explains the variation in crises outcomes. The article thereby contributes to a multifaceted understanding of the politicisation of international institutions, EU integration theory and the dynamics of the Euro and Refugee Crises.

The Italian jobs crisis consists of a high percentage of non-working labour force, matched with a high percentage of discouraged, long-term unemployed and inactive population. Not only a sharp deregulation of the job market is groundless, but even a hypothetic return to expansionary fiscal policy would be insufficient in order to solve such structural problems. Starting from the literature dealing with the “Italian decline”, this article demonstrates that the current problems of the Italian labour market are strictly connected to both (post-crisis) fiscal adjustment and pre-existing features of the industrial branch.

This article nests the explanations of the euro crisis in terms of economic, political and institutional causes within the diverging fundamentals vs. self-fulfilling expectations debate. It argues that explanations based on fundamental divergences refer to a subset of economic variables only, while those based on self-fulfilling expectations refer to political and institutional variables. However, since there is no reason not to include the latter among the fundamental variables of an economy, there is no need to refer to negative self-fulfilling expectations as an explanation for the crisis. In the paper, the role played by political and institutional variables, namely federal and monetary solidarity, is formalized in a simple model of diverging fundamentals that goes beyond the consideration of economic variables only. JEL Classification: E58, E65, F36, F45, G01

This study looks to analyse to what extent the neorealism versus neoliberalism debate contributes to understanding the complexity of the European Union's institutionalization, focusing on the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis and the asymmetries between Germany and Greece. How far can Greece be considered guilty for its situation and how far is Germany involved both in the cause and in the resolution of this crisis? To answer these questions, a brief analysis of the European Union's formation and of both countries' macroeconomic indicators and competitiveness is presented. The article also discusses the increasing institutionalization of the International System and the complex interdependence created within the European Union. It argues that increased European cooperation has deep-lying neorealist motivations and that the world financial regime's pandemic dynamics makes evident the asymmetrical interdependence between Germany and Greece. Economic disparities between the two nations are determinant factors in their respective behaviours prior to the 2008 crisis.

In many European countries, populist right-wing parties have been most noticeable representatives of Euroscepticism. In Finland, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) has been a constant promoter of organisational Euroscepticism through its leader, Timo Soini. The party broke through in Finland’s ‘big bang elections’ of 2011, when the most debated issue was the European economic crisis, which was dominated by Eurosceptic Soini. Research concerning the relationship between the media, populism and Euroscepticism usually focus on national or European Parliament elections. This study analyses the media portrayal of the Eurosceptic Finns Party during times other than elections, focusing on the Finland’s overall Euro crisis press coverage in 2010–2012. The analysis shows that the populist Finns Party has been a minor player in that coverage, which was dominated by the Euro positive political and economic elites. Differences between newspapers indicate that journalistic routines and political context direct media coverage toward particular framings, even when the media proclaims itself politically independent and neutral.

The European Central Bank is one of the most independent central banks in the world, but this independence is also highly constrained: the Maastricht Treaty established a primary mandate to pursue price stability and prohibited it from engaging in monetary financing. Using an historical institutional framework, this article analyses the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy during the euro crisis. The Maastricht Treaty’s constraints forced the ECB to act incrementally during the crisis and rely primarily on the layering of institutional changes. Nevertheless, the self-reinforcing effect identified by historical institutionalism meant that these gradual changes had important consequences over time. The unconventional monetary policies are contrasted with the more drastic institutional change instigated by the Member States, the ECB’s designation as the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The self-reinforcing effects and path dependence set by the ECB’s high degree of independence in the Maastricht Treaty, however, also constrained the EU in ensuring the accountability of the ECB, as the accountability structure is another instance of layering despite the very different nature and consequences of financial policy supervision.

The Italian jobs crisis consists of a high percentage of non-working labour force, matched with a high percentage of discouraged, long-term unemployed and inactive population. Not only a sharp deregulation of the job market is groundless, but even a hypothetic return to expansionary fiscal policy would be insufficient in order to solve such structural problems. Starting from the literature dealing with the “Italian decline”, this article demonstrates that the current problems of the Italian labour market are strictly connected to both (post-crisis) fiscal adjustment and pre-existing features of the industrial branch

The robustness of the EU’s constitutional framework – and its ability to accommodate democratic politics – is challenged as never before. The growing disconnect between formally democratic procedures and substantive choice is well illustrated by the Greek crisis. Since its first bailout in May 2010, Greece has held four general elections and a referendum. Yet, the anti-austerity preferences of the Greek electorate have not been effectively translated into policy.

The European Union has remained stable despite all its past and current challenges. This essay explores the reasons for that. We argue that the secret behind its stability lies in its system of negotiation. Against this backdrop, we analyse two recent challenges of the European Union. First, we show how domestically bound European governments were able to bring about a stable internationally negotiated solution for what became known as euro crisis. By means of game theory we boil down why the European Union remained stable even after havoc struck. Second, we analyze the dynamics behind the failed negotiations with Ukraine that have led to the current conflict. Thereby, the role of vested interest in negotiations for stability is emphasized. We prognosticate that due to the very same vested interests that led to the failure of the negotiations, Ukraine will remain united and return to stability in the mid-term. Finally, we conclude that, despite challenges like these, the European Union never experienced a crisis in terms of system theory since it never fell short to fulfil its purpose which is to allow for peaceful cooperative solutions.

This article nests the explanations of the euro crisis in terms of economic, political and institutional causes within the diverging fundamentals vs. self-fulfilling expectations debate. It argues that explanations based on fundamental divergences refer to a subset of economic variables only, while those based on self-fulfilling expectations refer to political and institutional variables. However, since there is no reason not to include the latter among the fundamental variables of an economy, there is no need to refer to negative self-fulfilling expectations as an explanation for the crisis. In the paper, the role played by political and institutional variables, namely federal and monetary solidarity, is formalized in a simple model of diverging fundamentals that goes beyond the consideration of economic variables only. JEL Classification: E58, E65, F36, F45, G01

La crisis política y económica europea se ha visto reflejada en el actual sistema de partidos con la aparición de nuevas opciones electorales que están irrumpiendo con fuerza en varios países. Desde esta perspectiva, se analiza la actualidad del sistema político y sus carencias desde el punto de vista de las nuevas tecnologías, así como la interacción con la sociedad civil europea, como los dos planteamientos fundamentales para entender la situación. La importancia creciente de la ideología y la contextualización histórica del presente movimiento nos permiten entender y analizar la posible repercusión que puede tener en el futuro inmediato de Europa.

The euro crisis points towards the limits of the post-war pro-European integration consensus in Germany, a trend that has manifested itself in both the legal and political realms. In the legal arena, the powerful German Constitutional Court (GCC) has heard complaints on several key rescue measures, including the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank’s (ECB) bond buying programme. The Court’s ruminations on these initiatives both reflect and feed German eurosceptics’ concerns. They also have implications for the Eurozone as a whole, insofar as they limit the German government’s room to manoeuvre. In the political arena, a new eurosceptic party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), contested the September 2013 federal election and the May 2014 European parliamentary election, winning a handful of seats in the latter. AfD’s emergence potentially marks a shift towards a more overtly eurosceptical political discourse in Germany. Thus, both legal and political developments have the potential to constrain the choices for the EU as a whole by reconfiguring the political and policy landscape of Germany, the Union’s reluctant hegemon.

The fundamental idea we discuss in this paper is that the failure of Europe to deal with the international crisis is due, first and foremost, to the deepening of a more specific crisis that affected the very process of European integration and developed through two main channels: one, broader, linked to the erosion of the original driving forces underpinning integration in Europe; another, more circumscribed, linked to the malfunctioning of the euro as an internal adjustment mechanism of the currency zone. To deal with these structural dimensions of the crisis, we put forward a model of a Global Europe against the model of Continental Europe that has dominated the integration process until now and in this alternative framework we discuss the potential role of Portugal and of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries.

This paper investigates whether the ‘Euro crisis’ has altered the Court of Justice’s legal reasoning in the area of the four freedoms and direct taxation. In view of the tremendous budgetary implications of the Court’s judgments in the area of direct taxation, this paper departs from the hypothesis that the financial crisis could result in the adoption of a more ‘lenient’ approach by the Court towards the Member States’ national budgets (in particular those under financial assistance). By deploying three different indicators, the interpretation and use of the general principles of EU law, the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment, and the number of references for preliminary rulings, this paper concludes that the Court has not been as affected by the financial crisis as initially suspected.

The paper analyses Germany's ascent not only as Europe's most important economic power, but also as its leader. Figures show that Germany overcame the crisis; in fact the crisis legitimized its development model. Which would be Germany's main strategic choices, confirmed by the historic evolution of the recent years? First, its option for manufacturing, which allowed Germany to turn into Europe's factory. Second, the option for reform. "Agenda 2010", initiated by Gerhard Schroeder in 2003, is a crucial moment in the country's evolution. Special attention is paid to Germany's position on the single currency. Germany's performance is that it managed to turn the euro into a kind of European Dmark. The euro now formally "obeys" German rules, agreed upon from the very beginning, and is mainly coupled to the evolution of German economy. Germany is now sitting its most important exam: the European one. Today, Germany is Europe's most powerful state, but it must become its leader, whose development model would be accepted throughout the continent. Some German economic options are strikingly similar to China's.

This paper addresses the implications of the euro crisis, which turned from „a Greek mess" to a political, institutional, economic and confidence crisis of the European Union. In our view, the EU public sphere is relevant for the current debate surrounding the crisis because it represents the setting where solidarity among EU citizens and EU states is created. Given our interest in the concept of the EU public sphere and the way the crisis of the European Union influences the debates in the public sphere, the way in which solidarity among EU citizens and EU states is imagined and enacted, we carried out a research project focused on the Romanian public sphere in the context of the crisis. The research project was carried out around a crucial event in the process of crisis resolution: the signing of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union by 25 EU member states at the beginning of March 2012. The results show that in Romania, for the moment at least, the "EU" has not fallen victim to the crisis. There is a considerable drop in public trust in the EU, but it is our assessment that the descending trend could be reversed, provided a clear vision, accompanied by strong leadership, emerges.

The French presidential elections of 2012 brought a new political approach concerning the candidates speech, because Europe became one of the main electoral themes within a national election. In full European economic crisis, the French people seem more than ever interested about the future of European construction, and in this context, the presidential candidates had to tackle this topic of interest in their election campaign. Analyzing the speeches of the first three candidates among the French voters’ preferences, it can be concluded that the future of France in the European construction, as well as the very future of the United Europe are influenced by the results of this year’s presidential elections.

Specialists believe that Europe is mired in a deep debt trap as a result of the costly measures taken to deal with the financial and economic crisis and they describe the situation as being serious, but not without hope. The majority of the specialists believe that without the euro, Europe would be in a much worse position. In the fallowing paper, our intention is: first to stress the key factors that have led Europe to the current crisis, second to present some possible scenarios that the crisis may generate in the near future and third to give some viable solutions that might improve Europe’s nowadays economical situation and help it get out of the crisis.

With his concept of governmentality, Michel Foucault delivered one of the most innovative approaches to analyze neoliberalism, which is predominant on the international stage since “Thatcherism” (1979-90) and “Reagonomics” (1981-88). Even an own discipline developed around this concept (governmentality studies), bringing fruitful theoretical merits. However, there is a huge gap. Benchmark for most researches in the governmentality studies is always the geographical and jurisdictional confined state. Thus, inter-, trans-, and supranational organizations such as the UN, IMF, EU, World Bank or INGOs are completely neglected. I try to fill that gap and to deliver starting points for further analysis of (neoliberal) governmentality on a supranational level by asking: How do neoliberal socio-economic programs of the IMF and European Commission (EC) for Greece work in a Foucauldian perspective? While conducting a theoretical discussion of the governing principles of Troika programs for Greece and using the concept of governmentality, I find that social security is reconcilable with neoliberalism, but an organization of it on a public basis is not. Public welfare is not excluded in neoliberalism; the neoliberal governmentality even insists on private, personal provision, which is based on individual responsibility of a rational acting subject. The objective is to transform social security to a private good. And the same principles are used by the Troika through their adjustment programs during the Greek crisis.

The euro crisis points towards the limits of the post-war pro-European integration consensus in Germany, a trend that has manifested itself in both the legal and political realms. In the legal arena, the powerful German Constitutional Court (GCC) has heard complaints on several key rescue measures, including the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank’s (ECB) bond buying programme. The Court’s ruminations on these initiatives both reflect and feed German eurosceptics’ concerns. They also have implications for the Eurozone as a whole, insofar as they limit the German government’s room to manoeuvre. In the political arena, a new eurosceptic party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), contested the September 2013 federal election and the May 2014 European parliamentary election, winning a handful of seats in the latter. AfD’s emergence potentially marks a shift towards a more overtly eurosceptical political discourse in Germany. Thus, both legal and political developments have the potential to constrain the choices for the EU as a whole by reconfiguring the political and policy landscape of Germany, the Union’s reluctant hegemon.

This paper aims to explore the role of labour and trade unions in the repeated shifts of crisis phenomena over the past years. It addresses the question why, confronted with the very profoundness of the crisis, they have failed to develop politically relevant and socially progressive strategies so far. The presented argument not only refers to structural power relations but in particular to the political struggles and processes in which more far-reaching ambitions have been knocked into shape. In that context, the focus is above all on economic stimulus packages, financial market regulation, and current budget consolidation. The paper will be organised as follows: It will start with some general problems of trade unions in generating sufficient power and organisational capacities against the background of the unfolding crisis within the European Union (EU). The next section empirically highlights these developments by discussing the cases of Germany, France, and Spain. The paper then concludes highlighting common challenges and chances, but also the difficulties to form new progressive European alliances.