Search

This paper aims to map the terrain of religion and politics in modern and contemporary Morocco. Seeing the chronological and intellectual diversity within Moroccan religious thought and politics, this paper proposes three major historical periods to facilitate approaching the topic: the pre-/ colonial, the colonial, and postcolonial times. The first pre/-colonial period is hybrid; it coincides with the rise of the first generation of the Moroccan Nahda renewal, before the colonial period, although it lived into the colonial period and played important roles in it for liberation. I mark this with the “Islamic” label, since Islam was the only common identity marker for any project of renewal in an intellectually “homogeneous” society. As to the colonial period, this Islamic identity became stronger since the colonial administration tried to weaken this identity and the social fabric and its related institutions, be they religious brotherhoods, religious endowments, or Sufi orders; at a certain moment in 1930, the colonial administration played on linguistic differences to divide and rule, and in another occasion, in 1953-1955, it tried to dethrone the nationalist Sultan and replace him with a docile one. Here, again, the “Islamic” identity marker of society and politics was further emphasized as a force of unity, thus the label of Nationalist Islam in this stage, despite the variety of currents within the nationalist movement. As to the postcolonial period, it is a phase in which the modern debates over the format of the nation state, the place of religion in politics, democracy, liberalism, socialism, and secularization become part of Moroccan thought and politics. Thus, three major labels are used to describe the variety of political Islams in society: the Ultra-Orthodox Islam, the Orthodox Islam, and Critical Islam. And since they all share Islam as an identity but interpret it differently, I borrow the term from Asef Bayat to call this period the “post-Islamist” period, since the actors with the Islamic label are multiple, and no one single trend or project manages to win to enforce its Islamist interpretation on society and political stakeholders. More importantly, this diversity of interpretations is what saves the “Islamic” from rigidity and turns it into its fluidity of pre-modern times, i.e. to the “Islamic” as a lived spirituality and moral compass, as a theocentric way of life, in a forthcoming post- Islamist society, a secular world and neoliberal economies.

This paper critically examines the socio-political dynamics affecting Muslims in Europe, focusing on the significant barriers that hinder their active participation in party politics. A central argument is that the internalized secular worldview has led to widespread political disengagement. This issue is further compounded by the first generation of Muslims in Europe, who developed and entrenched a minority mindset, along with certain ulema who promote socio-political passivity and quietism, severely limiting more complex and effective political engagement. To counter this situation, the paper emphasizes the urgent need for Muslims to move beyond status quo or reactionary approaches, such as supporting mainstream parties or resorting to political abstention, both of which only superficially address their concerns. Instead, it advocates establishing independent political entities rooted in Islamic principles that strive for more profound systemic change. Such an approach would empower Muslims to form strategic alliances, challenge the status quo, and tackle broader societal issues, ultimately advancing the interests of both their communities and European society as a whole.

In my paper, I contend that it is necessary to rely on a categorial reading of Hegel’s notions of identity and difference in order to properly understand their non-hierarchical relationship in Hegelian dialectics. Many commentators reduce their speculative nature to a merely instrumental use of the terms in analyzing Hegel’s work. In this way, identity and difference are only formally employed and thus ontologically obscured, leaving room for subsequent shortcomings and hierarchizations. I maintain throughout the paper that the best way to elucidate the hierarchical question and prevent dialectical thought from such errors is by inquiring into Hegel’s speculative configuration of onto-logical categories. If anything, Hegel replaces the primacy of identity over difference with an internal linkage that determines the structure of these notions, thus granting their immanent relatedness. For him, the relationship between categories is necessarily a movement. The constitution of identity and difference, as determinations of reflexion of essence in Hegel’s Science of Logic, proves that they are equiprimordial and co-structural, hence preventing any possible hierarchy.

This paper introduces and addresses fresh perspectives in the engagement between Hegel and his postmodern critics and detractors. The first part of the paper examines some of the central discussions on postmodernity, specifically in the works of Lyotard and Habermas, and how they, in different ways, reengage Hegel. The second part focuses on Vattimo’s deployment of the concept of the postmodern credo as a way of returning to Hegel’s own interrogation of modern belief. The paper shows that the common thread linking the modernity of Hegel with the “postmodern moment” remains belief, and in particular, belief in belief itself. The final part provides a brief introduction to all the contributions in this issue.

This paper analyses Gilles Deleuze’s political philosophy in relation to the Hegelian concept of the State. To do this, we identify three interpretations of the term “State” in Deleuze’s work: 1) as the reference point defining the three forms of socius presented in Anti-Oedipus (primitive territorial, barbarian despotic, and civilized capitalist); 2) as a defining trait of the despotic socius form; and 3) as the internalization of this form (Urstaat). Deleuze emerges as a harsh critic of the State in each of these interpretations. However, the subsequent part of the paper reveals that this critique does not advocate for societal fragmentation. By comparing Deleuze’s political philosophy with Hegel’s, we demonstrate that the forms of socius in Deleuze’s system occupy the conceptual place of the State in Hegel’s framework. Through an exploration of the role of differential calculus in the ontology of both philosophers, we establish the groundwork for a philosophical examination of the dominant social relation in the modern world (which is capitalism and not the State) and the prerequisites for a novel political socius.

By examining debates on the Anthropocene era ignited by new materialist and posthumanist scholarship, this paper aims to discern how these perspectives can reframe the human-nature nexus. It also considers how various “developmentalist” approaches might assume the role traditionally held by the concept of human nature. The first section highlights concerns raised by posthumanist and neomaterialist scholars about the marginalized status of “nature”, life, and biology within dominant constructivist viewpoints. A central argument posits that notions like “denaturalization” and biopolitics amplify societal dominance over nature, pushing social theory towards an anthropocentric and potentially biologically indeterminate stance. Contrasting this, the second section delves into modern interpretations of the planet in social theory, inspired by the emergence of the Anthropocene. This lens reveals a dynamic, co-constitutive relationship, tilting less towards the unilateral commands of “nature” and more towards understanding the evolution of human life and societal structures within Earth’s expansive temporal and spatial realms. The third section further unpacks these developmental ideas by juxtaposing the theories of Bruno Latour and Tim Ingold. The paper contends that both approaches endeavor to illuminate the complex processes underpinning the evolution of life forms, underscoring the significance of culture. In conclusion, the intricate postnatural landscape of the Anthropocene necessitates a more integrated human-nature relationship. This calls for not only discarding dehumanizing facets of human nature, but also fostering a renewed sensibility - a deeper form of humanizing that acknowledges and celebrates our shared existence with other species and entities.

In this paper, I analyze and compare Maria Kronfeldner’s and Tim Ingold’s views on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture. I show that despite the differences, their views remain close, particularly in terms of their integrative potential. The ultimate purpose of this examination is to lay the groundwork for further research on the problem of conceptual integration between sociocultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology. The paper comprises four main sections. First, I briefly explore the history of Darwinism to show how nature and culture were conceptualized within this framework. Second, I deal with Kronfeldner’s separationist stance and Ingold’s holistic perspective on the nature/ culture conceptual relationship. Third, I discuss the implications of their views on the choice of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. While I interpret Ingold as supporting methodological integration, Kronfelder argues for a version of integrative pluralism. Lastly, I provide an outlook for further discussions on conceptual integration and integrative pluralism.

This paper spells out the ways in which we need to be pluralists about “human nature”. It discusses a conceptual pluralism about the concept of “human nature”, stemming from post-essentialist ontology and the semantic complexity of the term “nature”; a descriptive pluralism about the “descriptive nature” of human beings, which is a pluralism regarding our self-understanding as human beings that stems from the long list of typical features of, and relations between, human beings; a natural kind term pluralism, which is a pluralism that concerns the choices we have in deciding how to apply the kind term “human”; and an explanatory pluralism that results from the causal complexity of life. Because of the complexity of being human, which gives rise to these pluralisms, being human is, the paper claims, a kaleidoscopic affair, and one far from concerning the life sciences only.

The paper explores the possibility of creating a positive vision of post-capitalist society and economy, a blue-print for future society with reminiscence to the existing valuable drafts such as Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto. Also, it focuses on shortcomings of that blue-print that became evident through the experiences of 20th-century real socialisms. Following Canadian Marxist Michael Lebowitz, the paper elaborates on how the vision of socialism for the 21st century should place central emphasis on the importance of changing the social relations of production. The central problem is located in the “vanguard relations of production”, the central power and hierarchical authority in the hand of the party vanguard. The paper stresses the importance of the communist party as central to the articulation of the interests of the proletarian class as a whole, a class whose central interest is the overthrow of capitalism. However, the project of overthrowing capitalism must include the recognition of the practical comprehension of the importance of the democratic protagonism. Workers cannot be subordinated as passive observers of the system change. A change in social circumstances should simultaneously mean a change in the actors themselves - the socialist protagonists.

In his theoretical efforts, Lenin made two excursions into philosophy - first in the book Materialism and Empirio-criticism and then in Philosophical Notebooks. There are obvious differences between these two works, which are reflected in the attitude towards Hegel (first rejection and then enthusiasm and acceptance of Hegel’s dialectical method), but also significant similarities. The paper points out that what links Lenin’s two books is the concept of theoretical formation. We derive the term theoretical formation from Lenin’s concept of socio-economic formation: in every society, a large number of modes of production coexist, which are overdetermined by one mode as dominant. Society is thus not a complete and rounded form, but a contradictory overdeterimned formation. The main thesis of the paper is that Lenin applies the concept of over determined formation to the reading of philosophy. Philosophical discourse is never whole but is split between two irreconcilable tendencies - materialism and idealism. Philosophical work is nothing but a struggle for the theoretical dominance of one tendency over another. This struggle between philosophical tendencies is, as Louis Althusser points out, an extension of the class struggle in theory and takes place both in the entire history of philosophy and within each individual philosophical text. The philosophical text is thus a contradictory formation of unequal and combined development.

The Arab Spring uprisings marked a watershed moment in regional politics, significantly impacting Islamist movements in terms of strategies, ideologies, and organizational structures. Accordingly, this paper examines whether these dramatic events strengthened or weakened the post-Islamist evolution of traditional political Islam movements, focusing on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (E-MB) and the Tunisian Ennahda Movement Party (EMP) as case studies. The proposed hypothesis is that the Arab Spring has variably influenced Islamists. In Egypt, it initially weakened the post-Islamist turn of the E-MB. However, owing to the 2013 coup and subsequent repression, the E-MB was politically excluded and weakened, creating a vacuum that was filled by various forms of less political or non-ideological forms of Islamic activism. The Tunisian Islamists had a different story. The Arab Spring seems to have strengthened their transition to post-Islamism. In its tenth conference, the EMP declared its exit from political Islam, adopting the new concept of Muslim Democracy. Even after the presidential takeover in July 2021, which resulted in the political exclusion of the EMP, the Work and Achievement party that defected from it maintained clear post-Islamist features.

This paper studies the development in the thought and praxis of Islamic movements that aim to revive a political system governed by Islamic law. Post-Caliphate Islamic movements - the subject of the current study - have undergone recent reforms in thought, approach, and even branding since the Arab Spring. Notwithstanding the movements’ legal and theological diversity, the author argues that they share common features of reform characterized by (a) appeal to public opinion and grassroots work; and (b) willingness to work with groups outside their movement. These reforms were shaped in tandem with and in reaction to the War on Terror, the Arab Spring, and the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. The author argues that these changes gave rise to dynamic reform in the latest generation of Islamic movements, leading to substantive revisions in their approach (manhaj) to achieving Islamic change. Despite tightening proscription and censorship, the author argues that the fruit of these reforms has been a resurgence in the form of highly efficient and creative collaboration between movements. Examples studied include collaboration between the Muslim Brothers (MB) and Hizb ut Tahrir in the West, and between former-al-Qaeda and MB affiliates in Syria. The author estimates these strategies - following a period of political failure and internal skepticism - have precipitated a resurgence that makes the future of Islamic movements highly potent, despite resulting in a dilution of each group’s identity and possible decline in membership. As a result of this trajectory, this study argues for the need to theorize contemporary Islamic movements beyond historical categories that have fossilized in Western academia, and often do not capture the dynamic, fluidity and comprehensiveness of Islamic struggle. This study utilizes a mixed methodology, including archival analysis and intellectual genealogy.

The purpose of the paper is to ascertain when non-territorial autonomy (NTA) arrangements are a morally appropriate response by states to various minority claims, given possible alternatives. As such, it is not about the relationships between minorities and majorities, but minorities and the state. The two main questions are: (1) What are the criteria of moral appropriateness? (2) When are any of the alternatives morally appropriate? Methodologically speaking, it makes sense to start from the most difficult of the alternatives to justify secession because it represents the most extreme possible claim of a minority towards a state, or even against a state. Once such a criterion or set of criteria is established, the criteria for other alternatives can only be reasonably lower, and the criteria for secession will be indicative of what these lower criteria could be.

The aim of this paper is to offer a distinct approach to the theoretical conceptualization of values and norms, as well as their relationship to one another. This approach views values as a factor that can hinder the integration of the existing order and potentially contribute to a crisis of its reproduction. The relationship between values and norms is defined as potentially asymmetrical. The concept of normative-value dissonance is derived from this asymmetry, indicating the dynamic character of relations between changes to the dominant system of social reproduction and changes to the order of values and norms. Normative-value dissonance can further be broken down into systemic normative-value dissonance, which occurs when the value and normative order are not harmonized due to changes of the system of social relations as a whole, and intrasystemic, which occurs due to changes in the dominant social order, without changes to the foundations on which it is based.

This paper argues that Hegel’s account of modernity is already an account of postmodernity, according to Fredric Jameson’s definition of the cultural logic of globalized capitalism. First, Hegel’s account of the problematic of modernity will be sought in the Phenomenology of Spirit by considering the constellation of Athens, Rome and Christianity along with Hegel’s contrast between tragedy and comedy in the “Religion” chapter, in order to present a philosophical account of a concrete problem connecting social, political and economic structures with their own self-representations. The core problematic will become instantiated in the legal figure of the “person” and the social world-structure of “empire”, associated with both Roman legality and comedy. It will be argued that Hegel’s socio-historical relevance today hinges on drawing a connection between Jameson’s periodization of Realism-Modernism-Postmodernism and Hegel’s aesthetic cultural categories of Epic-Tragedy-Comedy, and not Greece-Rome- Christianity. On this basis, the Phenomenology of Spirit stands as Hegel’s own “cognitive map”, for which comedy designates a problematic extreme of a social regime of representation commensurate with the contemporary cultural logic of late and imperial capitalism.

In his recent A Spirit of Trust, Robert Brandom interprets Hegel as proposing a conception of normativity that overcomes the shortcomings of both modernity and its critics. Brandom’s Hegel asks for a “hermeneutics of magnanimity”, in opposition to what Paul Ricoeur labelled the “hermeneutics of suspicion”. According to Brandom, “great unmaskers” of modern normativity like Nietzsche or Foucault make use of the delegitimizing force that characterizes genealogical explanation. Their suspicion is that what is thought to be normative is conditioned by contingencies that undermine that very normativity. In this paper, while raising objections against Brandom’s reading, I want to hold on to his idea that Hegelian philosophy counters those subversive postmodern genealogies. Instead of focusing, as Brandom does, on the end of the “Spirit” chapter in Hegel’s Phenomenology, I draw on Hegel’s logic of self-determination. Contrary to the “great unmaskers”, for Hegel, explanation of something through reference to some external or contingent factor is parasitic on explanation that explains something through itself.

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze has never stated his intention to write or create a work of ethics or moral philosophy, at least not in the traditional sense of the term used to describe a ‘genre’ of the discipline of philosophy. However, this paper argues that a close attention to Deleuze’s philosophical thought manifests an ethos which calls us to ponder the possibility of creating a way of being that is profoundly anarchic (without an ἀρχή [archē]), in a sense that it opposes any form of dogmatism and/or hierarchies. In other words, it opposes a notion of ‘a ground’ or origin - an ἀρχή [archē]. The examination of this an-archic ethos is manifested through Deleuze’s distinction between ethics and morality and his reading of the works of two of his main philosophical predecessors, Friedrich Nietzsche and Baruch Spinoza.

The aim of this paper is to explore whether Maria Kronfeldner’s analysis of human nature could be applied to the concept of cognitive systems and related capabilities, such as the human language faculty. Firstly, I will address the nature-nurture debate, that is, explanatory claims of nature as having a role in causing the language ability, and explanatory claims of culture as responsible for the development of human language capabilities. The nature-nurture divide generates a problem since it overlooks the interaction of nature and culture during the development of language capabilities, the problem called the developmentalist challenge. I will demonstrate different standpoints that try to answer this challenge, most famously the constructivist theory of Jean Piaget and the theory of universal grammar of Noam Chomsky. Following the insights of Kronfeldner, if we opt for an explanatory (and not classificatory or descriptive) account of the human language, we will search for the explanatory epistemic roles and their fulfilments. As Kronfeldner states, different sciences search for different differences regarding explanandum, and I hope to show that the integrative interdisciplinary framework dealing with cognitive systems is needed. The conclusion is that biolinguistics is an interdisciplinary field with a necessary unifying potential regarding explanatory account of the human language faculty.

This paper arose from a discussion of Maria Kronfeldner’s book What’s Left of Human Nature? In it, I am chiefly concerned with two things: the role that other animals are afforded in discussions about and attempts at defining “human nature”, and a critique of the concept of nature that is utilized in the book. Furthermore, I view science as storytelling practice, and scholarly narratives about “human nature” as important stories in order to pose the question of accountability of telling such stories in the Anthropocene.

This paper explores a set of narratives that the writer, educator and feminist leader Amanda Labarca published in the first quarter of the 20th century, namely the novel En tierras extrañas (1915), the short novel La lámpara maravillosa and the collection of stories Cuentos a mi señor (both 1921). We are interested in inscribing this corpus of Labarca’s work mainly in the criollismo, thought of as the Latin American and Chilean literary sensibility of the first half of the 20th century. With this, we contribute to the studies that have set out to explore one of Labarca’s most unknown areas: her literature. Specifically, it traces the spirit that runs through these texts, emphasizing the typification of discourses, characters and social contexts that allow sustaining the proposal of analyzing this prose from the point of view of criollismo. Indeed, the results show the presence of several characteristics of this trend, such as the presence of the peripheral or marginal element, the traveler as protagonist or the enhancement of local customs. It is concluded that Labarca’s lyrics dialogue with the proposals of Chilean criollismo, although they are also inspired by other aesthetic and ideological proposals of her time.

Retrospection and transformation of the phenomena of criticism and crisis in social theory in recent decades have led to the weakening and even “illegitimate” renunciation of the said doublet. The paper presents an analysis of the renewal of discourse on criticism/crisis and its effects with special consideration of the possibilities of structural criticism. We included several authors of recent analyses as well as the viewpoints that have led to reconsideration of historical and analytical dynamics of two categories, structure and conjuncture, as a form of analysis of current structural processes in terms of structural analysis and criticism. The paper comprises three parts. The first part is a reflection on the reason criticism and crisis have been subjected to different processes of derogation despite their original connection. In the second part, we show the effects of different ways that crisis has manifested itself in capitalism and explain its dispersive and “non-punctual” modalities. The third part raises the question of chances of reuniting the crisis and “immanent criticism” based on structural criticism, and we further articulate its connections with immanent criticism. Structural criticism is viewed as a connection between immanent criticism and transcendent orientation that is focused on the reconnection between crisis and criticism, the elements related to capitalism.

Originating from the fields of philosophy and history, the term historicism is often used by architectural historians. Aiming to contribute to the theoretical framework for the analysis of architectural historicism, the paper first explores the meaning of the concept in its native field of philosophy of history. The paper is aligned with the recent scholarship which interprets historicism as a worldview and deduces three historicist principles - principles of holism, individuality, and development. This paper argues that an historicist outlook marked wider creative achievements of an epoch, and that architecture of the period approximately ranging from the 1750s to the 1950s did not evade its influence. Finally, the paper illustrates the three principles in the idea of building for the age which haunted architects of the Western civilisation for almost two centuries.

This paper focuses on Kant’s moral theory and how it can guide our actions in philanthropy. Philanthropy is usually defined as a voluntary action aimed at relieving suffering and improving the quality of lives of others. It has been argued that, within the framework of Kant’s theory, it is our duty to be beneficent, sacrificing a part of our welfare for others. The duty of beneficence is a wide one. Interpreters of Kant disagree on what the wide duty of beneficence requires. While a few argue that it only requires that we provide help sometimes, others hold that the duty of beneficence should be seen as more demanding, particularly in cases of emergency when help is urgently required. We are morally obliged to promote the happiness of others, but the duty of beneficence does not tell us whose happiness and how much of our resources to give. Other than emergency cases, in fulfilling the duty of beneficence, we can prioritize the ends of those near and dear to us who concern us more. Moreover, on condition that we are not indifferent to others, it is morally permissible to prioritize our ends. Finally, the paper argues that it is not always straightforward what kind of action is required in helping someone in need, and that beneficence in Kantian terms is not limited to the philanthropic sector.

This paper deals with the problem of the subject in Bachelard’s concept of surrationalism. Focusing on the epistemological character of surrational creativity, the issue of the subject is approached through the analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in the surrational act. Comparing the character of novelty in surrealism and surrationalism, the paper introduces Bachelard’s distinction between formal and material imagination, with the latter further discussed through the prepositions “against” [contre] and “in” [dans]. Bachelard’s theory of the internal dialectic - the theory of subdivision of the subject - is analyzed through his concept of reverie. The last chapter deals with the dialectic between the apodictic and the assertoric subject, aiming to reconsider the idea of interiority and repose.

The concept of natural law is fundamental to political philosophy, ethics, and legal thought. The present article shows that as early as the ancient Greek philosophical tradition, three main ideas of natural law existed, which run in parallel through the philosophical works of many authors in the course of history. The first two approaches are based on the understanding that although equipped with reason, humans are nevertheless still essentially animals subject to biological instincts. The first approach defines natural law as the law of the strongest, which can be observed to hold among all members of the animal kingdom. The second conception presents natural law as the principle of self-preservation, inherent as an instinct in all living beings. The third approach, also developed in antiquity, shifts the focus to our rationality and develops the idea of natural law as the law of reason within us. Some Christian thinkers who consider the origin of reason in us to be divine, identify the law of reason inherent in us with God’s will. This paper gives a brief exposition of the development of these three concepts of natural law in philosophy, with emphasis on the intertwining of these three concepts, which we, however, understand as primarily and essentially independent. The paper concludes with an overview of twentieth-century authors who exclusively focus on only one of the three concepts. The aim of this article is to argue against these one-sided interpretations and to uphold the independence and distinctness of the three historical conceptions of natural law.

The basic thesis of this paper is that communication is a fundamental activity of all human practices and that identity is constructed with the help of communication. Defining identity cannot be explained and understood exclusively from the standpoint of philosophy, sociology, political science or psychology. Given that the Latin root of the word communication, communio, refers to community, we can say that communication as a science best covers the relationships that people establish within the community such as schools, families, work environment, social networks and forums. The activity of communication is the establishment of a community, i.e., sociability. To communicate means to unite something - to bring one’s actions into harmony with the community and with social life. In that sense, communication is in its essence a transition from the individual to the collective. In addition, any specific form of communication depends on the wider cultural and socio-political environment in which modern people operate. This paper aims to explore the impact of technology on individual identity, to answer questions about whether robots can have the same characteristics as personalities, and whether, and in what way, machines have an impact on people. The reason for asking such questions is the decision of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament to pass a law that will grant autonomous robots the status of “electronic personalities”.

The aim of this paper is to clarify specific aspects of the impact of the brain-machine interface on our understanding of subjectivity. The brain-machine interface is presented as a phase of cyborgization of humans. Some projects in the field of brain-machine interface are aimed at enabling consensual telepathy - communication without symbolic mediation. Consensual telepathy refers to one of potential ways of transmission of information within singularity. Therefore, consensual telepathy is an important aspect of singularity. Singularity or human-machine symbiosis shows some similarities with child-mother unity. Therefore, the psychodynamic perspective might be considered useful in thinking about human-machine symbiosis. Knowledge from developmental psychodynamic psychology combined with insights by Slavoj Žižek and Jean Baudrillard provides an additional perspective looking at human-machine symbiosis. The paper claims that if consensual telepathy becomes another way of communication, it will have the potential to annihilate subjectivity making it schizophrenic. At the same time, we look at the possibility of an escape from our inner world through the prism of addictions.

The contemporary conceptions of universal basic income (by Guy Standing), tax havens extraction (by Gabriel Zucman), and climate emergency (by Christiana Figueres) are briefly presented in the form of exposition in Massive Attack’s Eutopia EP. These conceptions address the most concerning issues of today’s world, while the concept of eutopia, proposed by Massive Attack’s Robert Del Naja and Mark Donne, represents “a place of well-being, as a practical aspiration,” a realistic utopia in which those issues are resolved. The present paper discusses the conceptions presented in Eutopia, assessing the possibility of the materialisation of eutopia. As suggested by Massive Attack, the ideas of Eutopia can be traced back to More’s Utopia, being rooted in a humanistic endeavour of improving humanity, inspiring engagement and search for a better and just society. Apart from discussing Eutopia, the paper explores Another Now, the political science-fiction novel by Yanis Varoufakis. Varoufakis’ critique of capitalism and the alternative he proposes in the novel Another Now argue along the same line as Eutopia, encouraging engagement in today’s world.

The topic of this paper is an examination of the practical dimension of contemporary philosophical culture, both in relation to the idea of wisdom in traditional philosophy and in relation to psychoanalytical practice. In the first part of the paper, we determine what philosophical culture is, primarily by emphasizing the differences between that culture and the scientific-technological culture. In the second part of the paper, we show that such a philosophical culture has fallen into a crisis. In the third part of paper, we offer a way out of that crisis, in the form of psychoanalysis, which criticizes the primacy that philosophical culture accords to consciousness, logic, diachronic and linear ways of thinking. In the fourth and last part of the paper, we present the shortcomings of this psychoanalytical model. As a solution, we offer a new model of philosophical culture, created by the synthesis of philosophy, psychoanalysis, but also other discipline of human thought, which has similarities with Nietzsche’s anticipation of Gay Science, as well as with Jasper’s idea of transcendence.

The main goal of this essay is to provide an in-depth analysis of the trajectory of the Colourful Revolution (CR) in North Macedonia as a social movement. From a more general perspective, the paper engages with the growing interest in the literature that explores the correlation between social movements and democratisation processes, especially in societies that fall into the category of hybrid regimes. The Colourful Revolution is a good example of a protest movement that has created effective regime change. It presented a complex social movement encompassing many fragmented social and political groups gathered around the idea of a common adversary. Additionally, the Colourful Revolution has one particularity: it is a social movement that has undergone a full developmental circle - formation through utilization of political opportunity frameworks, a period of activity and success and dissolution. Drawing on literature of the political process, opportunity frameworks and cycles of social movements, the paper argues that social movements such as the Colourful Revolution are not just temporary and unstable structures but are also highly dependent on the existence of a common target of the social activism in question. The removal from power of political actors that have been the reason for mobilisation of a complex and diverse network of social and political activism resulted in an absence of an adhesive factor holding together all the parts of this complex system. The absence initiated gradual discord and dissolution of different factions within the social movement (CR in this case) and reveals its true nature - temporary, ideologically diverse, conflictual, and even undemocratic in some respects.

In this paper, I analyse Martha Nussbaum’s view of how we should treat non-human animals, which she links to her capabilities approach. This approach offers a conception of justice or, as Nussbaum puts it, a collection of fundamental rights that specify some of the necessary elements for a just society. In addition to justice for human beings, this approach includes animal rights. The basis for the discussion consists of two elements that justify the claim that every animal deserves to live a life that is characteristic of a member of its species. The first element is dignity, and the second is sympathetic imagination. The intention of Nussbaum’s approach is to represent an improvement on the social contract tradition (in particular, in the Rawlsian version), by offering a more encompassing theory of justice. In her view, the capabilities approach, contrary to the theories of social contract, has principled resources that allow it to include, among else, non-human-animals in the domain of justice. However, the contribution of my paper consists in showing the problems I observe in Nussbaum’s theory. These problems are related to the insufficient definition of basic concepts and to the fact that in Nussbaum’s theory, non-human animals remain, across various situations, only a means of serving human needs. The consequence is that non-human animals are not included in the domain of justice which, after all, is Nussbaum’s fundamental ambition.

Protests among citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are becoming more frequent. Most often, their aim is to decry the dysfunctionality and opacity of the government, which are the result of the ethno-political structure created by the Dayton Agreement, but also a trend towards democratic regression and autocracy. A number of authors have tackled the “JMBG” protests of 2013 and the Plenums that emerged from the February 2014 protests, from their particular disciplines. The focus of this paper is the social movement “Justice for Dženan,” organized by the Memić family upon the tragic death of Dženan Memić in Sarajevo in February 2016. An in-depth study was conducted with key actors of the movement, as well as those who follow or in some way support the protests. Particular emphasis in the research was paid to the pragmatic symbiosis of the social movement and one political party. We argue that it is possible to identify a pragmatic symbiosis as a novel form (democratic innovation) of socio-political cooperation that can impede rising autocratization. Through the quest for accountability, social movements are introducing new strategic practices of mobilization and a novel type of alliance-building with external factors (new political parties as well as other social movements). The goal of the paper is to explore how the social movement “Justice for Dženan” interacts with political parties and approach the political sphere in BiH. Also, the idea is to examine the possibilities and functionality of this kind of cooperation with the framework of contentious politics.

The current coronavirus pandemic (SARS-CoV-2) has presented many scientific disciplines, including philosophy, with various theoretical and practical challenges. In this paper, we deal with three philosophical issues related to the pandemic and specific approaches to them. The first part of the article is dedicated to the analysis of the term “expert,” whose significance was highlighted at the outbreak of the pandemic. By examining Plato’s ancient and Goldman’s modern understanding of this concept, we will try to emphasize the importance of expert opinion in crisis circumstances. In the second part of the paper, we will deal with the issue of public mistrust of scientific authorities as well as the problem of the flourishing of so-called conspiracy theories. Goldenberg’s and Cassam’s approach to this topic will help us see where the source of these problems might lie and what potentially harmful consequences they can produce. In the third part of the text, we list some of the main moral dilemmas we have faced since the beginning of the pandemic. Special attention is paid to Kant’s moral philosophy in which we find advice on how an individual should act in times of crisis.

In this paper, I examine the view that, surprisingly, the more citizens deliberate about politics, the less likely they are to participate in the realm of the political, and vice versa. In the first part of the paper, I approach the problem from the perspective of the paradox of voting, the claim that voting itself is instrumentally irrational because of the very low probability that a single vote will make any difference at the elections. In the second part of the paper, I argue that rather than analyzing voting instrumentally, it is better to view it as part of the civic commitments that constitute what it means to be a citizen in a democratic society. The act of voting is not primarily an individual’s attempt to decisively influence any particular outcome, but an affirmation of the key practice that upholds the democratic society in which citizens play a part. This reveals a meta-paradox of voting. Namely, to not vote is to exhibit a type of behavior that implies acceptance of democracy simultaneously with rejecting its defining component. Because of that, I will claim, not voting is itself irrational. In light of that conclusion, in the third part of the paper, I explore the extant divide between deliberation and participation by referring back to the analysis of civic commitments. Whereas participation without deliberating reveals ideological bias, deliberation without participation expresses a lack of understanding of what it means to be a citizen. The way to connect them is to engage in a process of attaining reflective equilibrium between the two, starting from the practice of deliberation that would be fully informed by the awareness of our democratic commitments and disconnected from ideologically motivated participation.

In my view, making the case for a specific interpretation of Critical Theory is problematic.1 Although the term has a prestigious origin stemming from Horkheimer’s 1937 paper, Traditional and Critical Theory,2 given during his term as Director of the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University and generating the enthusiasm of its members, the term and the movement associated would be defined and radically redefined not only by subsequent generations but by its very author. One of the merits of the book under discussion is that even before the first chapter an ‘Interlude’ is presented entitled Arguing for Classical Critical Theory signifying to the reader that Horkheimer got it right when he defined the subject and that it is possible to return to that particular definition after 83 years. This paper challenges Professor Sørensen’s claims for the restoration of classical Critical Theory on three levels: the scientific, the historical and the political level.

This paper presents three interconnected examinations of Asger Sørensen’s arguments in Capitalism, Alienation and Critique, which thematize Sørensen’s overarching understanding of the relationship between theory and practice: his general methodological perspective on critical theory, its distinctive epistemology and its anchoring in the empirical world. The paper authors each try to push Sørensen on these crucial points by considering how Sørensen’s variant of critical theory actually operates, scrutinizing in more detail the particular relationship between the ‘experience of injustice’, which for Sørensen constitutes the empirical foothold for critical theory, and the theoretical diagnosis of social reality which the critical theorist should formulate against the backdrop of this experience.

The author finds the possibility of overcoming the current liberal-capitalist system in a different conception of time, which requires a different attitude towards both the past and the future. The paper begins with an analysis of the Benjamin’s critique of Marx, followed by analysis of Derrida’s critique of Benjamin and finally Derrida’s critique of Marx. Benjamin points out the problem of teleological understanding of time, the understanding that the meaning of events comes only from the future, which is present in Marx, and which prevents us from escaping the “circle” of violence. Although he relies on Benjamin’s conception of time, the author seeks to transcend the understanding of law as something separate from justice, and law as violence. Therefore, the paper turns to Derrida and his understanding of the law, eventually providing new possibilities for understanding and constituting the left, social theory, but also critical thinking today.

Maximus the Confessor’s Ambiguum 41 contains some rather atypical observations concerning the distinction of sexes in the human person. There is a certain ambiguity as to whether the distinction of the sexes was intended by God and is ‘by nature’ (as found in Genesis and asserted by most Church Fathers) or a product of the Fall. Namely, Christ is described three times as “shaking out of nature the distinctive characteristics of male and female”, “driving out of nature the difference and division of male and female” and “removing the difference between male and female”. Different readings of those passages engender important implications that can be drawn out from the Confessor’s thought, both eschatological implications and otherwise. The subject has been picked up by Cameron Partridge, Doru Costache and Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska, among others, but is by no means settled, as they draw quite different conclusions. The noteworthy and far-reaching implications of Maximus’ theological stance and problems are not the object of this paper. In a 2017 paper I attempted to demonstrate what Maximus exactly says in these peculiar and oft-commented passages through a close reading, in order to avoid a two-edged Maximian misunderstanding: to either draw overly radical implications from those passages, projecting decidedly non-Maximian visions on the historical Maximus, or none at all, as if those passages represented standard Patristic positions. Here, I am revisiting this argument, given that the interest in what the Confessor has to say on the subject seems to be increasing.

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics.

Until a decade ago, a comprehensive contestation of the so-called “transitional” paradigm was largely missing in the post-socialist era. This reality changed in the last ten years, especially in the region of former Yugoslavia. Some social movements in this region have started questioning the very essence of the economic and social misconceptions of the post-socialist condition. This paper first provides an elaboration of the very conceptual edifice of the ruling paradigm (hence the object of the critique of the three social movements in question), as well as a theoretical and methodological framework. It goes on to map out the epistemic discursive content of the respective social movements in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, thereby assessing the conceptual content of their critique of the post-socialist transitional paradigm. Finally, given the similarities between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the paper seeks to explain variations in the critique by how the structural and contextual features impact the perspective from which it is constructed.

This paper offers an alternative theoretical consideration of ethnic identification in psychology. Mainstream social psychological theories are largely positivist and individualistic. New possibilities of theoretical understanding open up as the relational and symbolic nature of ethnicity enters psychological inquiry. This paper takes culture and self as two conceptual domains of social identification, following a meta-theoretical position of cultural psychology. The central focus is the cultural development of the person in social context of a given culture, specifically their ethnic identification, to which end, it looks at several processual aspects. First, ethnic culture is approached as a guiding principle and practice in everyday understanding and experience of one’s own ethnicity. Second, ethnic identification is considered a social and personal act of meaning making, which happens in a given social context, through practical activity and the discursive positioning of a person. Third, since rather than considered a conscious aspect of belonging, ethnicity is assumed and taken for granted, ruptures are considered as destabilizing events that create an opportunity for ethnic meaning reinterpretation and developmental transition. In the meaning making process, symbolic resources are conceived of as primary self-configuring tools, which are also culture-configuring. Ethnic meaning making is theorized as a central social-psychological process through which ethnic culture and a person as an ethnic subject emerge in historical perspective. Finally, the uniqueness of a singular person in the shared ethnic culture is conceptualized based on symbolic distancing from the immediate social context, through the model of knitting personal and socio-historical semiotic threads.

This paper looks at Thomas Szanto’s theory of hatred that suggests that hatred has an indeterminate affective focus and that it derives its intensity from the commitment to the attitude itself. Contrary to Szanto’s theses, this paper claims that the hated properties are not necessarily fuzzy. On the contrary, in many cases we can clearly reconstruct the quasi-rational genesis of hatred, by relying on the deep structures behind the social dynamics (as demonstrated by the example of anti-Semitism). Furthermore, the paper states that even though in certain cases hatred is a truly empty of content, these cases are marginal in comparison to other, more important forms of hatred.

This paper extends Alan John Simmons’s conceptual distinction between Lockean (or consent) and Kantian (or justificatory) conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons’s main criticism.

The paper compares Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological approach with the one developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The aim of the paper is to identify the complementarities and incongruences of these approaches. The main similarity consists in the intention to “dialectically” overcome/bridge the gap between “objectivism” and “subjectivism” in social theory. Another parallel includes a negative attitude towards the relativistic tendencies of postmodernism. These authors share the thematization of: the body as a locus of social influences, the centrality of language in social life, the social functions of knowledge, and the importance of power in social relations. Differences in theorizing are attributed to the different intellectual, theoretical, and socio-cultural contexts in which these scientists operated. The divergences of these theoretical approaches become evident when one examines the different meaning and significance attached to the concepts of individuation, structure, action, habitus and habitualization, structure of relevance and relation of common-sense and scientific knowledge. Finally, there is a visible difference in political views: Bourdieu was a critic “from the left,” while Berger and Luckmann were self-proclaimed liberal conservatives.

This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies - namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick’s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose’s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses’ contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick’s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called “abominable conjunction”. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose’s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick’s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black’s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals.

In his masterpiece The Star of Redemption, Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) shows as the notion of totality is a constant and central reference in the history of philosophy from Ionia to Jena. This paper aims to explain a different meaning of the concept of totality, reconsidering some aspects of the question starting from the philosophical reflection of Franz Rosenzweig and his opposition to the Hegelian thought. In particular, according to Rosenzweig, the concept of totality is the essential background in which one could rethink the concept of community. For this reason, the second part of this paper is focused on the implications of a different concept of totality embodied by Judaism.

This paper focuses on the current international refugee crisis and the ways in which it is leading to sharp symbolic and physical violence through the process of “othering.” Based on Hannah Arendt’s discussion of statelessness and the question of the right to have rights, and Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of Homo Sacer, as well as drawing on other key authors such as Judith Butler, we argue that conditions of extreme human vulnerability and dangers of totalitarianism are being radically worsened by the ethnicized and racialized denial of the other, that is, of human rights. Rather than advocating an abstract cosmopolitanism, however, without strong purchase in contemporary social life, the paper concludes by noting the need to place oneself in a position of discomfort, in order to confront the tension between particularistic attachments and universalist aspirations, between the multiplicity of laws and the ideal of a rational order common to all polities, between belief in the unity of humankind and the healthy antagonisms and tensions generated by human diversity.

The paper deals with Aristotle’s concept of corruption. First, it reconstructs Aristotle’s debate with the pre-Socratics and then it focuses on the candidates for entity that can perish: form, matter, and substance. The text argues against the widely accepted thesis according to which substance is a corruptio simpliciter without further ado. The paper intensely relies upon ancient and medieval commentators of Aristotle. Finally, special attention is devoted to the dimension of time and the problem of actuality.

Karl Renner’s theory of national autonomy has not been sufficiently taken into account by scholars due to difficulties in its reception and puzzling content. Neither liberal nor communitarian, his original theory combines individual rights with collective rights, territorial autonomy with personal autonomy, classical federalism with establishment of nations as constituent parts of the state. This paper will introduce the reader to Renner’s main concepts. It will start by presenting Renner’s ideas on the nation, the multinational state, the role of the majority principle, and the need for nations’ legal recognition by and within the state. Then, Renner’s core notion of national autonomy and its organisation through the personality principle will be discussed. Further, the paper deals with Renner’s concept of the representation of national interests at the federal or supranational levels. Lastly, it sums up the discussion and draws conclusions regarding Renner’s theory of autonomy in general.

The paper distinguishes two accounts of legal normativity. One-source accounts claim there is only one source for legal normativity, which is ultimately linguistic. Two-source accounts claim legal normativity is both linguistic and non-linguistic. Two-source accounts claim we need to go beyond language and beyond propositions taken as linguistic entities, while they are one-source accounts’ main conceptual tool. Both accounts construct propositions as linguistic. There is, nevertheless, a documented analytic tradition starting with G.E. Moore that constructs propositions as non-linguistic entities. Today, the problem of the unity of proposition and structured propositions are highly debated in metaphysics. How does such debates fit into the one-source vs. two-source picture of legal normativity? Why has analytic legal philosophy failed to consider such an option concerning propositions (arguably calling descriptive sentences about norms “normative propositions” did not help)? This paper thus (I) reconstructs the argumentative dynamics between one-source and two-source accounts; (II) presents the less considered philosophical view of propositions as non-linguistic entities and (III) discusses how to include or dismiss such a philosophical view in the one-source/two-source debate on legal normativity.