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This paper investigates qualitatively the involvement of Human Resources (HR) professionals in executive remuneration governance within large UK public companies and similar organisations, considering the complex interplay of institutional, social and cognitive factors that influence executive pay decisions. Through interviews with senior HR professionals and focus groups involving mid-ranking HR professionals, the study identifies key themes, challenges and opportunities faced by HR in navigating the executive remuneration landscape. The study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the sociological and psychological dimensions of executive pay governance. The findings highlight the practical implications for HR professionals, emphasising the need for active engagement with diverse stakeholder groups, fostering a culture of openness and transparency to ensure that executive pay practices and associated processes align with organisational values and societal expectations, while underscoring the value of learning from diverse perspectives and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are ongoing debates globally regarding excessive executive compensation, the perceived weak link between pay and performance, and the widening inequality gap. The South African corporate governance code King IV's Principle 14 addresses the need for fair, responsible, and transparent remuneration. At the same time, the newly enacted Companies Amendment Act No. 16 of 2024 in South Africa emphasizes transparency in compensation, shareholder voting, and responding to shareholder feedback. This study conducts a systematic literature review of 30 articles on the transparency of executive remuneration disclosures and their determinants by analyzing Scopus-indexed articles published between 2010 and 2023, selected through specific keyword searches. The findings suggest an increasing focus on research regarding the disclosure of executive compensation, predominantly conducted in the Global North and primarily framed through agency theory. Studies exploring the factors influencing executive remuneration and the relationship between pay and performance are prevalent, with mixed results generally indicating a positive connection. Firm size emerges as a key factor in transparency, and many studies employ binary scoring to evaluate whether executive compensation disclosure is present. This paper provides valuable insights for investors, analysts, and policymakers and adds to the current understanding of executive remuneration transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executive remuneration has traditionally attracted the attention of scholars, regulators, and public opinion. In recent years, especially after epochal corporate scandals and financial crises, executive remuneration has polarized the political debate, leading to consequences for the way it was theorized, structured, and ultimately quantified within corporations. This article specifically examines the relationship between executive compensation and sustainability, with a focus on the influence of Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) metrics in the context of European companies. The article provides a qualitative analysis of the historical debate on executive remuneration and considers the different theories informing corporate law. Furthermore, it offers a qualitative and empirical analysis of how executive compensation policies of the 300 largest companies by target capitalization in Europe – listed in the FTSE EuroFirst300 – take ESG parameters into account. Lastly, this article presents some policy considerations, particularly questioning whether executive remuneration is the right incentive for ESG compliance, and emphasizing the importance of a shift in corporate culture to effectively make corporate practices more sustainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of malus and clawback provisions has increased in recent years due to the demand for tighter controls on incentive-based compensation. The alignment between executive pay and individual performance creates a culture of responsible decision-making and accountability within an organisation. This paper seeks to evaluate the current state of governance legislation on the clawback of remuneration in the South African context. A systematic literature review was conducted to provide descriptive insight on the technical and procedural approach applied to the clawback of remuneration. These findings were then compared to other countries so that similarities, differences, and areas of further research could be identified. Through detailed content analysis, it was found that the South African governance regime lags behind its international counterparts regarding remuneration clawback. Due to the absence of relevant statutory guidelines, discretion is frequently applied, leading to inconsistent treatment of clawback amongst listed companies. The use of clawback as a risk-mitigation mechanism is also relatively new in South Africa and comparative studies provide useful insight on the technicalities and administration processes applied abroad. The lessons learnt and strategies applied internationally serve as a benchmark for the development of clawback legislation in South Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the moderating effects of two specific governance structures, board independence and CEO duality, on the relationship between the pay ratio and environmental and social performance. Controlling for the endogeneity of the pay ratio and employees' performance and skills, we use a sample of companies listed on ExecuComp (S&P1500) and apply the 3SLS method to test interaction effects. We find that board independence moderates the negative relationship between the pay ratio and environmental and social performance. Furthermore, the effect of board independence on the relationship between the pay ratio and environmental and social performance decreases when the CEO is also the chair. These results suggest that independent directors moderate the negative effects of the pay ratio on firms' environmental and social performance. Finally, the concentration of power through CEO duality decreases the effectiveness of board monitoring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on cross-country panel data, the paper investigates the possible repercussions of salary gap for employee productivity and corporate financial performance. Our empirical findings corroborate the presence of a negative tail effect of wage gap on productivity and employee morale. While worsening employee turnover and productivity, and increasing the chances of workplace controversies, high salary gap is found to be associated with a more efficient cost structure and higher profitability. Our evidence suggests that extreme salary gap may be curbed by targeted internal policies favoring internal promotion and career development, unionization, employee and managerial training. The composition of the board's remuneration committee appears to play but a minor role in shaping the scale of salary gap. The results of the study are in line with equity aversion theory and suggest that extreme wage inequality may impede firms' growth with spillover effects observable at the macro-level. Targeted policies may be necessary to counter the negative repercussions of high compensation disparities as within-firm mechanisms appear insufficient to mitigate them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a progressive shift in shareholder activism in South Africa as shareholder demands for greater levels of accountability, reasonable executive remuneration and disclosure and transparency are increasing. Frustration with increasing high-profile corporate scandals and governance failures has also caused shareholder activism to gain momentum in South Africa. This article discusses the South African legal framework relating to shareholder activism and identifies trends in shareholder activism in South Africa. While the growing increase in shareholder activism is welcomed, this article contends that South Africa still has a long way to go compared to the level of shareholder activism in the USA, the UK and Australia. Recommendations are made to enhance shareholder activism in South Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to understand whether there is alignment between executive remuneration and shareholder interests in publicly listed companies in Australia. The issue is analysed over three distinct stages of an economic cycle, and the panel fixed effects method is used to estimate the performance-remuneration models. The study finds that the long-term compoents of the remuneration package would highly incentivize CEOs and executive directors. Still, the fixed salary component exerts no such enticement for them to maximize shareholders' wealth. This new information could be useful for Australian firms as well as for firms in Asia Pacific countries due to the close relationship they share with the Australian firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a long-running cyclical public debate in the UK and Australia about the level of vice-chancellors' remuneration in publicly funded universities. Whilst governments may promise greater oversight, little appears to change. Similar trends are emerging in some other European countries. This article critically considers the determination of vice-chancellors' remuneration as a governance issue. In the context of corporatised public universities, we consider how reforms in university governance may have contributed to the shifting nature and levels of vice-chancellors' remuneration in Australia and the UK. We argue that this area requires urgent governance reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: It is common practice by companies to use pay-for-performance to motivate executives to create value, measured primarily via economic metrics. However, companies are increasingly becoming more aware of their overall effect on society and the environment. This study aimed to understand how remuneration reports have incorporated economic, environmental and social targets, within pay-for-performance bonuses. Design/methodology/approach: This study investigated how the remuneration reports by Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) listed companies have incorporated economic, environmental and social attributes in executives' bonus targets, between 2015 and 2019. Findings: The findings show that the 12 companies examined in the healthcare equipment and -services sector, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, and the food- and drug retailers sector, have increasingly disclosed economic and social aspects as part of executive remuneration targets. However, there has been little change in environmental remuneration targets, to motivate executives to focus on environmental impact. Research limitations/implications: The limitations of this study include a small sample size and qualitative data collection and -analysis, that can be subjective. Originality/value: This study contributes to the literature on remuneration incentives and identifies key events that have affected the bonus target factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the impact of corporate performance and corporate governance on executive remuneration in a Chinese market setting. Using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of 860 non-financial firms listed on Chinese Stock Exchanges over the 15 years period of 2004–2018, the study found a positive and significant association between corporate profitability and executive pay. The study further reports that ownership concentration is positively related to executive pay revealing an entrenchment effect i.e., collusion between large shareholders and top management. Consistent with managerial power and agency theory CEO duality exhibits a positive relationship with executive remuneration, while board size and board independence also reveal a positive association with executive pay, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing managerial entrenchment. Interestingly, non-state-owned enterprises report a negative relationship of board size with executive remuneration which means non-state-owned enterprises with larger board size tend to reduce executive pay because they may have better control and monitoring. Following the managerial power propositions, CEO duality weakens the performance sensitivity of executive pay, but contrary to agency theory the impact of board independence on this sensitivity is in contrast and weakens the relationship of managerial pay and performance, making the independent director's role ambiguous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to empirically investigate if board director reputation capital, interlocking board membership and executive remuneration contribute to tax avoidance of listed financial firms in Nigeria. The study employed the panel generalized method of moment. Data from 2010 to 2020 was sourced from a sample of forty (40) listed financial firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The findings obtained indicate that board director reputation capital (BODRC) and interlocking board membership (IBM) exerted a negative and significant on effective tax rate while executive remuneration was positive and significant on effective tax rate. Both leverage and firm size were positive on effective tax rate in the sampled firms. The study concludes that for firms to drive tax avoidance and align the interest of managers with those of the shareholders, board director reputation capital, interlocking board membership and executive remuneration are key factors to put into consideration towards achieving the goal of wealth maximization. This study contributes to knowledge, being the first to report on how board director reputation capital, interlocking board membership and executive remuneration drive tax avoidance of firms in Nigeria and in Sub-Saharan Africa at large. The study recommends that firms should consciously design a corporate board with strong network tie consisting of director with high reputation capital, interlocking board membership tie and with well pegged motivating executive remuneration to bolster the morale of the board echelons in order to influence them to engage in result oriented activities geared towards tax avoidance and shareholders' wealth maximization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to investigate the relationship between remuneration packages [chief executive officer (CEO) and director] and independent corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices (marketplace, environment, community, workplace and money spent on CSR) of 588 Malaysian listed firms during 2006–2017. Further, the study explored the moderating effect of board gender diversity on the remuneration-CSR nexus. Design/methodology/approach: The dynamic estimator; namely, the system generalized method of moments given by Arellano and Bover (1995) has been used on the data set to control dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity problems. Findings: Findings indicate a weak relationship between remuneration and CSR where prior CEO remuneration negatively influences marketplace activities, environment-related activities and workplace practices. However, directors' remuneration leaves no effect on socially responsible activities. Moreover, board gender diversity negatively moderates the CEO remuneration-CSR relationship and an insignificant moderating effect has been observed for directors' remuneration-CSR nexus. Practical implications: This study is particularly significant for regulatory bodies of Malaysia e.g. Securities Commission Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia, policymakers, investors and managers. For academia, this study fetches support from agency theory and overinvestment hypothesis to explain the relationships. Originality/value: This paper is novel in providing empirical evidence on the moderating effect of board gender diversity on the relationship between remuneration and independent CSR activities for the first time. Moreover, this study has sourced several theoretical and practical implications. Then, the study uses a dynamic estimator that caters to the problems of endogeneity, simultaneity and heterogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The prime objective of this study is to investigate the moderating influence of executive and independent female directors on the relationship between remuneration packages (CEO and executive director) and socially responsible practices (marketplace, environment, community, workplace and money spent on CSR) of 483 Malaysian listed firms during 2006–2017. Design/methodology/approach: The dynamic estimator, namely, system generalized method of moments (GMM) given by Blundell and Bond (1998) has been employed on the dataset to control dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity problems. Findings: Findings indicate that there is a significant relationship between remuneration patterns of CEOs and executive directors and socially responsible activities. In the same way, executive board gender diversity significantly, whereas independent board gender diversity insignificantly moderates the remuneration and CSR nexus. Practical implications: This study is particularly significant for regulatory bodies of Malaysia, e.g. Securities Commission Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia, policy makers, investors and managers. For academia, this study fetches support from agency theory, stakeholder theory and upper echelons theory and presents integrated theoretical approach to be considered for future research. Originality/value: This paper is unique in providing empirical evidence on the moderating effect of both executive and independent women directors on the relationship between remuneration patterns of CEOs and executive directors and independent CSR activities for the first time. Moreover, this study has sourced several theoretical and practical implications. And, the study employs dynamic estimator for precise and concrete results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Institutional investors in emerging markets are increasingly under pressure to integrate environmental, social and corporate governance considerations into their investment analyses and ownership practices. Old Mutual Investment Group (OMIG) is a South African-based institutional investor that has long been regarded as a pioneer in responsible investing. The purpose of this study was to examine the nature and effectiveness of OMIG's private shareholder activism endeavours over the period 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2018. Design/methodology/approach: A unique database was constructed using proprietary, point-in-time data for 69 listed companies covering 283 private engagements. Binary logistic regressions were conducted to test the hypothesised relationships. Findings: The majority of the private engagements centred on executive remuneration. This finding was not unexpected given the large and growing wage gap in South Africa. Close to two-thirds of OMIG's private deliberations were successful. Engagement success was positively associated with a targeted company's capacity to change and desire to protect its reputation. Research limitations/implications: This study only investigated the private shareholder engagement actions of a single, well-resourced institutional investor. Practical implications: The findings serve as an encouragement to other investors who are contemplating a more active approach to change unethical and unsustainable corporate policies and practices. Originality/value: This unique analysis sheds light on the determinants and success of private shareholder activism in an emerging market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From October 2013, UK law and regulations (the Reform) require periodic binding shareholders' approval of executive directors' remuneration policy, as well as enhanced disclosure in remuneration reports. These requirements supplement an ongoing requirement for an annual non-binding vote on compensation outcomes that are detailed in the remuneration report. Using a large sample of listed companies from 2010–2017 we investigate whether the Reform has affected pay levels, pay-performance sensitivity, the pay gap between the CEO and other employees, the amount of cash returned to shareholders, and dissent voting on the remuneration report. We find little evidence that the Reform has affected these variables in our sample firms. Using market-based tests we find that market participants anticipated an improvement in corporate governance for some key dates before the Reform came into force. Taken together, the paper's evidence suggests the Reform has not met its stated objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK was the first country to introduce so-called 'say on pay' regulation in 2002, by providing shareholders with an advisory vote on the Directors' Remuneration Report. That approach recognised that disclosure alone was not an adequate regulatory response to the widening gap between directors' pay and company performance nor to the broader political concern over the implications of this trend for social solidarity. A second stage in the evolution of the regime began in 2013 when shareholders were granted a binding vote on remuneration policy. In this article we present the results of the first longitudinal survey of the entire phase of 'say on pay' regulation in the UK to date. We examine the link between each stage of 'say on pay' regulation and the level and growth of directors' remuneration. We conclude by linking our empirical evidence to broader developments in shareholder engagement with listed companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Banking & Commercial Law Journal / Banka ve Ticaret Hukuk Dergisi is the property of Research Institute of Banking & Commercial Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study examines the potential mediating effects of executive remuneration on the relationship between prior-year earnings management and firm equity value. The occurrence of financial scandals in Malaysia has been associated with earnings management, which entails opportunistic manipulation of a firm's earnings by managers. Managers who are driven by opportunism, engage in earnings management through the manipulation of discretionary accruals (known as accrual-based earnings management method (AEM)) or real activities (known as real earnings management method (REM)) to attain personal wealth maximisation. This is because when executive remuneration is linked to firm performance, managers are incentivised to manage earnings to boost firm performance with the aim to maximise their performance-based remuneration. Thus, through executive remuneration, earnings management may affect firm equity value. However, empirical evidence on the mediating effects of executive remuneration on earnings management and firm equity value is generally scarce. Therefore, using 601 non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Market from 2013 to 2017, this study finds significant mediation of executive remuneration on the relationship between both earnings management methods and firm equity value in a different manner. This implies that the mediating effects of executive remuneration lies on the methods of earnings management. This paper, thus, provides insights to financial reporting and corporate governance regulators, and key management personnel of Malaysian public listed firms on the importance of executive remuneration on equity valuation of earnings management. This paper also methodologically contributes to literature by establishing mediation model within the earnings management area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We undertake an experiment to explore shareholder voting behaviour when the pay‐performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package evidencing a strong pay‐performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces the effect of the pay‐performance link on voting intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of executives' ownership, firm profitability, board size and its components, as well as some other financial factors, on executives' remuneration in the context of Malaysia. Using a sample of 2403 firmyears during 2006-2014 among listed companies in Bursa Malaysia, the findings show that firm profitability, leverage and number of non-executive directors have negative effects on executives' remuneration. Conversely, dividends, percentage of executives' directors, board size and size of firms have positive effects on executives' remuneration. There is no evidence that executives' ownership has significant effects on their remuneration. From the viewpoint of the agency theory about the effects of larger boards, firm profitability, and executive percentage on executives' remuneration, it is perceived that the weak governance exists among listed companies in the Malaysian market. The insignificant impact of executives' ownership on their remuneration is an important finding of this research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of family directors and independent directors on executive remuneration of listed family firms in Malaysia, and their involvement in remuneration committee on executive remuneration. Design/methodology/approach: Fixed effect estimation is employed to examine 1,395 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2014. Findings: Family and independent directors do not have statistically significant influence on executive remuneration. Rather, family ownership exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration. This study also reveals that the interaction of family CEOs with the family directors on remuneration committee exerts a significant positive influence on executive remuneration. Research limitations/implications: The measurement of executive remuneration excludes the share options due to the non-disclosure of this information in the annual reports. Practical implications: The findings would be useful to the policy-makers and regulators in appraising the governance measures of remuneration arrangement. Originality/value: This study premises on the Type II agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Independent directors could not mitigate the Type II agency conflict via the governance of executive remuneration. They are not the effective governance mechanism that the minority shareholders can rely on. The additional analyses provide theoretical implication that the pervasive Type II agency conflict is ameliorated when the CEOs do not have family relationships with the controlling family shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The paper aims to examine the role of human greed in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK. Design/methodology/approach: The paper reviews the past and existing regulation and corporate governance recommendations on executive remuneration. Findings: The paper demonstrates that the failure of regulatory mechanisms to curb excessive executive remuneration can be justified on the grounds of human greed. Greed is facilitated by the potential conflict of interest that exists as a result of the executives' position in the company. The position of the law has given greed the opportunity to manifest, making it quite difficult for executive remuneration to be effectively regulated. Originality/value: The paper adds to the existing debate on excessive executive remuneration by demonstrating that human greed is the basis of excessive executive remuneration on which limited literature exists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to analyze the remuneration of executives in each phase of the business life cycle. A descriptive, documentary, survey-type study was performed with a predominantly quantitative approach, using a sample of 560 observations across 112 companies. For the definition of the current life cycle phase of each company analyzed, Dickinson's (2011) methodology was chosen, which classifies the life cycle into the five phases of start-up, growth, maturity, turbulence, and decline, based simultaneously on the signs of the operating, investment, and financing cash flows. The construction of the econometric model was based on Madhani (2012), Ventura (2013), and Koh et al. (2015). The results suggest that the highest level of executive compensation was in the turbulence phase, followed by the growth, decline, and start-up phases, with the lowest level observed in the maturity phase. It was concluded that the level of remuneration paid to the executives of the companies studied herein is related to the organizational life cycle, which corroborates the contingency and agency theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executives or top management in any organization play the central role in designing firms' policies including their own remuneration, investments and capital related decisions. Due to their prime importance, executives have greater access to all important information related to organizations. If such personals have greater control over the board or organization, it alludes as managerial power. Concisely, if managerial power is high then the management may misuse such information for their personal benefits. Therefore, considering the importance of managerial power, the current study aims to investigate the effects of managerial power and executive remuneration on firm performance. In order to empirically test the proposed relationships, the current study applied PLS-SEM approach by using the data of Sugar & Allied industry of Pakistan Stock Exchange for the year 2014. The results of the current study indicated that direct effect of managerial power on firm performance did not exist, however, the empirical findings showed that managerial power had a significant effect on executive remuneration. Furthermore, managerial power also significantly influenced the firm performance through the executive remuneration or remuneration mediated the relationship between managerial power and firm performance. Therefore, the current study suggests that firm should take necessary actions to reduce the managerial power and design the pay of top management in a way that any harmful action of managers against the firm's wealth would significantly affect their own benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Shareholders and other stakeholders in South Africa are increasingly raising their concerns in public about seemingly excessive executive remuneration. Most of their criticism is rooted in the large and growing wage gap in the country. Aim: The authors investigated the nature of the entities whose executive remuneration policies and practices were publicly criticised, the types of challengers involved in this social movement, key issues raised and the impact that the challengers had on the targeted executives' remuneration. Setting: Public activism involving five South African state-owned enterprises and 38 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Methods: Executives and entities that were targeted in public were identified from three online financial newspapers published between 01 January 2010 and 31 December 2016. A total of 92 events were recorded involving 65 executives. Data on these executives' emolument and three control variables were sourced from Bloomberg. Descriptive statistics and mixed-model analysis of variance tests were employed to evaluate the quantitative secondary data. Results: In line with the extant literature, most of the targets were large, well-known companies. Individual and minority shareholders represented the largest category of challengers, followed by asset managers and trade unions. The vast majority of concerns centred on the size and composition of executives' packages and insufficient justifications provided by remuneration committees. The total pay, bonuses and other performance-based incentives decreased significantly in the year after the companies were publicly targeted. Conclusion: The findings suggest that public 'say on pay' activism can be an effective mechanism in addressing seemingly excessive executive emolument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose This study extensively aims to investigate the effects of different aspects of corporate governance (CG) mechanism, including board size, executive directors’ shareholdings, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, a family member as the CEO and/or chairperson of the board, independent directors in remuneration committee and number of board meeting, on executive directors’ remuneration in small firms listed on Bursa Malaysia (BM).Design/methodology/approach The sample of this study consists of 173 bottom-listed companies from Bursa Malaysia in Year 2010. The Year 2010 was chosen because the disclosure of remuneration committee activities and directors’ pay structure is required under the revised Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance, 2007. Furthermore, the period selected is after the global economic crisis (2008), which may have an effect on the remuneration structure in small firms. The ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the relationship between remuneration as dependent variable and other independent variables.Findings A finding from this study reveals that there is a significant positive relationship between executive ownership and executive remuneration, and between board size and executive remuneration. The results provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. This indicates that the independent directors are not truly independent to monitor and control the firm activities, including minimizing the excessive remuneration.Research limitations/implications This study examines how the corporate governance (CG) affects remuneration among 173 small firms in Malaysia based on market capitalization, for one year, 2010. Hence, the results may not be generalizable to other periods or types of the companies. This shows the possibility of the absence of some additional variables in the research model and hence a limitation to the findings of the study. Although the study is being parsimonious in the choice of relevant variables, prior literature serves the guide in the selection of the used variables. This therefore gives room for future research using the potential omitted variables. Furthermore, the study focuses on total remuneration, such as fees, salaries, bonuses and benefits in kind, which makes aggregate directors’ remuneration. However, this study did not consider the remuneration related to stock options. Finally, this study only uses secondary data; hence, it could be interesting to use other instruments to collect data like a questionnaire to add more weight to the research. This study only uses one-year data; therefore, impact of changes between years cannot be analysed.Originality/value Results of the study provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. They reduce the effectiveness of non-executive directors because most of them are appointed by a family member and not socially responsible to their stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given growing inequality in South Africa, shareholders are increasingly questioning the size and composition of executive remuneration packages. They are also demanding greater transparency on the criteria and processes used to award performance incentives. The researchers hence investigated the extent and depth to which a sample of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) disclosed details on their executive performance evaluations. Attention was furthermore given to whether these companies reported a link between their executives’ pay and performance. The criteria and time frames used to evaluate and reward executive performance were also explored. Content analysis was performed on 2 136 annual/integrated reports over the period 2002 to 2015. Semi-structured personal interviews were also conducted with six directors serving on local remuneration committees. Controlling for company size, a significant increase was noted in the number of JSE-listed companies that disclosed information on their executive performance evaluations over the research period. The depth of these disclosures, however, remains superficial. As such, shareholders are constrained in their ability to hold remuneration committees accountable. These committees are encouraged to adopt a wider range of performance criteria and re-assess their focus on short-term performance. It is also suggested that commerce educators cultivate an appreciation for long-term, sustainable value creation among graduates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To deal with potential conflicts between the triple-bottom-line expectations of investors and the performance of executives, firms can use incentives by integrating corporate social performance (CSP) targets into executive compensation. No evidence yet exists that CSP targets in executive compensation actually lead to an improvement of CSP results. Using a panel data set of 400 firms for the years 2008-2012 leading to 1846 firm-year observations, the relationships between CSP targets and CSP results and CSP improvements are analyzed. The results show that (a) the level of CSP has no effect on the use of CSP targets, (b) the use of CSP targets in general does not automatically lead to better CSP results, and (c) the use of quantitative, hard CSP targets is an effective way to improve CSP results, especially to lower CSP weaknesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações is the property of Revista de Contabilidade e Organizacoes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper we analyze the relationship between conformity to executive remuneration standards, corporate ownership, and the level and structure of CEO compensation for large European listed companies in the years 2007 and 2010. We show that controlled corporations conform to executive remuneration standards less than widely held firms. We also show that weaker compliance is associated with lower CEO pay and more cash-based incentive structures. We interpret this 'conformity gap' from the perspective of individual firms and from a societal perspective, with the aim to contribute to frame the policy questions concerning executive pay at controlled corporations. Different policy implications depend on whether the conformity gap reflects a lower need for managerial incentives, given the monitoring by controlling shareholders, or the latter's willingness to extract private benefits of control. We argue in this paper that the former hypothesis prevails, so that regulators should abstain from increasing the level of enforcement of executive remuneration standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides evidence that after several decades of fighting for equal pay for equal work, an unexplained gender pay gap remains amongst senior executives in ASX-listed firms. After controlling for a large suite of personal, occupational and firm observables, we find female senior executives receive, on average, 22.58 percent less in base salary for the period 2002-2013. When executives are awarded performance-based pay, females receive on average 16.47 percent less in cash bonus and 18.21 percent less in long-term incentives than males. The results are robust to using firm fixed effects and propensity-score matching. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results show that the mean pay gap cannot be attributed to gender differences in attributes, including job titles. Instead, the results point to differences in returns on firm-specific variables, in particular firm risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to actions taken to moderate the level of management remuneration and its structure, the present article deals with the effectiveness of such governmental regulations. The ways of regulations differ around the world, but this article focuses on three particular measurements: the so-called Say on Pay, the tax deductibility of compensation, and the limitation of remuneration components. The aim of this article is to analyse existing empirical studies which deal with the three stated actions' effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Spanish Journal of Finance & Accounting / Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This research explores the distribution of executive remuneration based on the type of industry and job family in South African state-owned enterprises. A regression analysis of secondary data collected on 222 executives was conducted. The overall results based on pairwise comparison suggest that the distribution of executive remuneration across various categories of industry was the same except between forestry—defense, forestry—telecommunications, defense—telecommunications, and energy—development funding. However, the results also indicated that there was no difference in the distribution of remuneration across various categories of job families in South African state-owned enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this study, we focus on the relation between bank governance and bank merger results under Taiwan’s special regulatory environment in 2000. Adopting governance variables (executive remuneration, managerial ownership, and board diversity), we find that managerial ownership is positively related to bank merger results and that board size is negatively correlated with bank mergers’ performance. This study supports sound governance mechanisms to prevent banks from pursuing a value-loss merger and acquisition (M&A). Our results offer the insight that internal bank governance structures have a bigger impact on the value effects from bank mergers. Thus, regulators may elevate the performance of bank M&As by enhancing corporate governance codes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing remuneration plans for CEOs still mainly focus on financial performance and do not necessarily promote sustainable value creation for their firms. By way of reaction to this, a growing number of academics and practitioners are acknowledging the need for the inclusion of sustainability targets in executive remuneration. This study examines the current status of the use of sustainability targets in executive remuneration specified by country, sector and targets. Based on a sample of 490 listed firms from 11 countries and different sectors, the use of targets related to sustainability in executive remuneration is assessed. The targets are specified by kind of target (short term and long term) and content of target (environmental, social or a combination of both). The results of this study show that (a) in 2010 on average 33% of the firms used sustainability targets in remuneration, (b) mainly the 'dirty' industries use targets, (c) the targets used are mainly short-term targets and (d) they focus on social issues. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manuscript Type Conceptual Research Questions/Issues Executive remuneration, whether as a tool for resolving agency problems or as a sign of them, has been discussed in the literature for decades. The discussion, however, has been focused on non-financial firms, and bankers' remuneration, particularly in the context of corporate governance, has been overlooked until recently. However, following the financial crisis, regulators have begun intervening into banking boards' responsibilities, including remuneration. This raises numerous questions, in particular, how far the existing non-financial literature applies to banks, and if not, why and how this impacts on appropriate corporate governance in banking, and what challenges this brings? Research Findings/Insights The paper argues that due to numerous externalities, notably the interconnectivity and systemic risk of the banking sector, a traditional approach to remuneration based on resolving the principal-agent conflict is inappropriate. Active involvement of regulators is needed to balance the short-term performance of the banking sector with the long-term needs of society. This, however, means that remuneration and corporate governance of banks is no longer an individual bank issue but is a national and probably an international phenomenon. In some cases this may require fundamental changes to the national governance structure, culture, and practices. Theoretical/Academic Implications The analysis questions the suitability of the common idea of assessing corporate governance in banks in the same way as is done for non-financial institutions. Given that several traditional non-financial board responsibilities have been partially passed over to regulators in the banking sector, a new theoretical model of corporate governance is needed for banks. The paper examines relational contracts (echoed to some extent in stewardship, stakeholder, and network theories), and argues that these cannot be expected to be successful in the banking environment. Practitioner/Policy Implications The paper highlights the importance of tying the corporate governance of banks with other regulatory measures employed to restrict risk taking. It also stresses the need for harmonization of corporate governance metrics for the banking sector at a national/international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance of banks. We start by highlighting the main differences between banks and nonfinancial firms and focus on three characteristics that make banks special: (i) regulation, (ii) the capital structure of banks, and (iii) the complexity and opacity of their business and structure. Next, we discuss the characteristics of corporate governance in banks and how they differ from the governance of nonfinancial firms. We then review the evidence on three governance mechanisms: (i) boards, (ii) ownership structures, and (iii) executive compensation. Our review suggests that some of the empirical regularities found in the literature on corporate governance of nonfinancial institutions, such as the positive (negative) association between board independence (size) and performance, do not hold for banks. Also, existing work provides no conclusive results regarding the relationship between different governance mechanisms and various measures for banks' performance. We discuss potential explanations for these mixed results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outside the United States, little is known of long-run trends in executive compensation. We fill this gap by studying BHP Billiton, a resources giant that has long been one of the largest companies on the Australian stock market. From 1887 to 2012, trends in CEO and director remuneration (relative to average earnings) follow a U-shape. This matches the pattern for US executive compensation, Australian top incomes, and (for the past two decades) average trends in executive compensation in top Australian firms. Like the United States, Australia experienced a post-war 'great compression' prior to the recent 'great divergence'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most publicised rebellion during the so-called ‘Shareholder Spring’ of 2012 was at Barclays PLC. Using multi-modal and critical discourse analysis, this paper examines how three UK television channels with different public service obligations covered this story on 27 April 2012. It finds that broadcasters’ regulatory obligations do not obviously impact content and that, for example, simple reporting routines contain judgemental phrases. Generally, the multi-dimensional nature of executive pay is simplified and the real balance between private and individual shareholders is obscured. Analysis also reveals that editing and the use of images can subtly construct discourses that may not reflect the reality of the dissent. The paper concludes that established criticisms that business journalism is indolent and that corporate discourses are privileged are not supported, but also that the coverage contributes little to promote wider understanding of executive pay debates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that remuneration consultants consider when selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking. It explores how the different factors influence the level of pay and whether the factors encourage pay-for-performance. Furthermore, it investigates whether the factors used form part of the reasons why remuneration consultants have been criticised to be correlated with high executive pay. Design/methodology/approach – This paper analysis the data obtained from interviewing remuneration consultants from prominent consultancy firms that operate in the UK and the USA. Findings – This paper demonstrates that there is no uniformity in the factors used by remuneration consultants when selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking. The paper shows that company performance is not a major factor considered justifying why executive pay is not linked to company performance. The paper further demonstrates that the factors that remuneration consultants consider in selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking justify high pay and affirm that remuneration consultants are associated with high pay. Originality/value – This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels and the weak link between pay and performance. This paper will inform companies on what to demand from remuneration consultants when hiring their services. Second, it will provide the shareholders with vital information that they need to vote on remuneration reports in the annual general meeting. Finally, it informs policy makers on the grey areas of practice that require best practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a framework for understanding growth in executive remuneration and its increasing divergence from average earnings since a 1980s turning point, drawing on studies from a range of countries but with a special focus on Australian evidence. This framework emphasises the central roles played by company size, to which power is intrinsically related; the distinct, asymmetric nature of the ‘bargaining’ relationship in executive labour markets; and institutions that reflect seven rules. A corporation’s status depends in part on its chief executive officer’s status and pay. Chief executive officers’ ability to extract rents is influenced by their social capital. Chief executive officer pay is heavily influenced by relative pay deprivation. Institutions emerge to facilitate dual-asymmetric pattern bargaining. The incentive structure of executive pay adjusts over time to minimise downside risk, justify high growth and deflect shareholder concerns. Different norms shape pay in different segments, though cross-segment references will be made to justify increases. Finally, chief executive officers’ ability to ratchet pay upwards is contested, leading to cycles of asymmetries reflecting the social, political and economic climate and balance of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of advice that the remuneration consultants offer to the companies on executive pay. It explores how the advice offered affects the level of executive remuneration. Furthermore, it investigates whether the nature of advice offered forms part of the reasons why remuneration consultants have been criticised to be correlated with high executive pay. Design/methodology/approach – This paper analysis the data obtained from interviewing remuneration consultants from prominent consultancy firms that operate in the UK and the USA. Findings – This paper demonstrates that remuneration consultants’ advice on executive remuneration is not always objective. The nature of advice depends on whether the consultants have a balance of portfolio of companies (self-interest) or whether they have the courage to stand up to confrontations from the executives (fear of executives). This study shows that the purpose of using remuneration consultants in advising on executive remuneration is defeated. Also, the practice pushes up pay levels. Research limitations/implications – The research focused on large consultancy firm operating in the UK and/or the USA. Access to the participants was very difficult due to their busy schedules. Practical implications – This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels. Social implications – This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting. Originality/value – This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels. This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting. Lastly, it informs policymakers on the grey areas of practice that requires best practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This letter is a discussion of the application of the pitch template developed by Faff (2015) to a financial accounting research topic. The pitch template focuses ideas into key areas, giving clear and concise direction in planning and structuring the research idea. In this instance, the template is used in a nonlinear manner to develop a research proposal to investigate the relation between cash bonus payments and firm financial performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing wage gap in South Africa has far-reaching socioeconomic consequences. This study investigated the nature of executive remuneration issues raised by shareholder activists in the country. An analysis of 24 510 votes cast by 17 investment managers at 347 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 2013 revealed that the vote to endorse companies' executive remuneration policies evoked the most opposition. Well-known shareholder activist, Theo Botha, also criticised companies for failing to disclose sufficient details on their remuneration policies. A disconnect between the performance of companies and their executives' pay was also noted. It is recommended that the non-binding vote on executive remuneration be revised and more investor education provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we explore the role of Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs') incentives, split between monetary (based on both bonus compensation and changes in the value of the CEO's portfolio of stocks and options) and non-monetary (career concerns, incoming/departing CEOs, and power and entrenchment), in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We base our analysis on a sample of 597 US firms over the period 2005-2009. We find that both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an effect on CSR decisions. Specifically, monetary incentives designed to align the CEO's and shareholders' interests have a negative effect on CSR and non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on CSR. The study has important implications for the design of executive remuneration (compensation) plans, as we show that there are many levers that can affect the CEO's decisions with regard to CSR. Our evidence also confirms the prominent role of the CEO in relation to CSR decisions, while also recognizing the complexity of factors affecting CSR. Finally, we propose a research design that takes into account endogeneity issues arising when examining compensation variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public perception of banks in Australia is relatively poor compared to firms in other major services sectors. This study explores a number of potential sources of negative public opinion. We find that bank profits are similar to firms in other sectors after adjustment for firm size. Average bank executive remuneration as a proportion of total staff costs are also lower than those in other sectors. Finally, Australian banks not only pay a higher average effective tax rate than their counterparts in OECD countries but are also closest to their statutory corporate tax rates. Our findings therefore suggest that poor public perception of banks is based on the flawed claims of generating excessive profits, overpaying bank executives, and underpaying taxes and is not justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – This paper aims to explore the role corporate personality has played in the battle between executive remuneration and fairness, which is linked to rewarding performance. This paper also aims to explore some of the policy measures taken by the UK Government to curb excessive remuneration especially in the banking sector. Design/methodology/approach – This paper employs an analytical approach. An analytical approach relies on the collection of new information upon which to base any conclusions. The research supports the arguments being made in the paper. Findings – The paper shows how the ruling in Salomon, over a century ago, that cemented corporate personality and limited liability in the UK, is hampering many of the measures aimed at rewarding performance and promoting fairness in relation to executive remuneration. Originality/value – Limited research has been done on executive remuneration. Since executive pay has recently hit the media agenda, this paper purports to tackle a current and ongoing issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]