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Research Summary: Platforms create value by connecting users to complementors offering goods or services. Complementors compete on platforms but may also benefit each other by drawing demand to the platform, which may then "spillover" from one complementor to another. This tension raises the question: When are relationships between complementors competitive versus complementary? To help address this question, I apply theory on agglomeration‐driven demand spillovers to examine when on‐platform demand spillovers created by peer product launch are larger versus smaller. Studying the Spotify platform, I find spillovers are larger, and peer album release more beneficial to an artist, when the peer stimulates greater demand expansion, platform‐mediated inter‐complementor proximity is higher, and the artist benefits more from consumer learning. Findings extend literature on on‐platform competition and inform complementor strategy. Managerial Summary: On digital platforms, complementor product launch may hurt peer performance by causing substitution or may benefit peer performance by drawing demand to the platform which may then "spillover" from the complementor to a peer. Studying the Spotify platform, I examine when such spillovers are larger versus smaller, shedding light on when peer product launch is beneficial versus detrimental for complementors competing on digital platforms. On Spotify, demand spillovers are larger, and peer album release more beneficial to an artist, when peer album release draws listeners to the platform, Spotify recommendations connect the artist to the peer, and the artist reaches new or unfamiliar listeners. The findings suggest that, on platforms featuring demand spillovers, complementors can take strategic actions to leverage spillovers and improve performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kırıkkale Law Journal (KLJ) is the property of Kirikkale Law Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Policymakers increasingly recognise the need for regulatory intervention in the digital economy to promote competition, privacy and innovation, among other policy objectives. Much policy-focused literature presents regulation as a technical puzzle to be 'solved' through identification of the appropriate intervention in a particular context, though there is persistent disagreement among experts about what remedies are preferable in different digital markets. At the same time, many external observers emphasise the sheer multiplicity of public policy objectives that regulatory interventions might fulfil, claiming that conflicts between these objectives are inevitable and thus require political rather than technocratic solutions. This article attempts to bridge the gap between these perspectives through a novel theoretical analysis of digital markets characterised by strong network effects, conceptualising different markets in terms of common underlying structural characteristics. The resulting framework helps policymakers to anticipate which remedies will safeguard competition, privacy and innovation/efficiency under what circumstances, both in well-established digital markets and with respect to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. In so doing, it also highlights limits to the technocratic governance of digital markets, identifying circumstances in which conflicts between competing public values cannot be neatly resolved through technocratic regulatory intervention alone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The advent of digital companies has brought benefits to society. Nevertheless, the digital era poses significant risks to consumers' privacy. The combination, through mergers, of enormous datasets could raise further privacy concerns. It has been much discussed whether and how consumer privacy concerns should be introduced within merger assessment. This paper approaches this issue from another perspective and reflects upon the circumstances under which the EU Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) has a role to address privacy issues. Accordingly, this paper clarifies the conditions that must be satisfied in order for privacy issues to fall within the EUMR's ambit. First, privacy should be a parameter of competition on the market and second, there must be a causal link between the merger and privacy deterioration. Following this, the paper turns to critically analyse the Commission's treatment of privacy issues in objectively selected mergers involving some of the most powerful digital companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rising concentration in digital platform markets raises the question to what extent traditional merger control is effective in these market environments. This contribution sheds a light on ways in which national competition authorities throughout the European Union and in the United Kingdom have adapted their analyses to the specific characteristics and complexities of digital markets. Through detailed case studies, I offer insights into ways in which horizontal, vertical and conglomerate theories of harm were made relevant to digital markets. At the same time, the case analysis shows areas in which competition law should further develop theories of harm in line with the insights into these market environments, particularly as regards ecosystem theories of harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the regulatory design of the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) and its significance in the evolution of EU competition law. The DMA is seen as a major step in the evolution of competition law, adopting strong regulatory structures based on experience gained from competition law enforcement in digital markets. The article outlines the roles of various actors involved in rule and policy formation, such as the Digital Markets Advisory Committee and the high-level group of digital regulators. It also discusses the enforcement of the DMA, involving the Commission, gatekeepers, national authorities, and European and national courts. The article concludes by highlighting the importance of the tri-annual review of the Act and its potential impact on competition law enforcement. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses recent policy changes and legislative developments that have expanded the jurisdiction of the European Commission and national competition authorities. These changes have created uncertainty for businesses regarding whether their transactions will need to be reviewed. The article also highlights a significant development in the assessment of conglomerate mergers, particularly in the digital sector. The European Commission recently prohibited a conglomerate merger between Booking Holdings and eTraveli, based on an ecosystem theory of harm. This departure from previous guidelines and the lack of a clear economic and legal framework for such theories of harm raises concerns about predictability and legal certainty in merger control. The article emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that addresses the challenges of digital markets while providing a just and predictable framework for businesses. [Extracted from the article]

This piece is a short essay on the first steps of the implementation of the Digital Markets Act. Our paper is divided in three sections. In the first section "Why does the DMA exist?", we come back on the genesis of the DMA and the complementing role it plays with competition law. In the second section "Challenges of Gatekeeper Designations", we look back at this first important step in the implementation of the DMA, and highlight that a key topic in the context of these designation proceedings has been the determination of the appropriate delineation of the core platform services to be designated. Finally, in the third section "Challenges of DMA compliance", we set out our high-level vision and approach for the concrete implementation of the DMA by the gatekeepers and their endeavour to comply with the various obligations and prohibitions contained in the DMA. In this regard, we highlight that our aim with the DMA is to create room for opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) are important regulations in the European Union (EU) that aim to create fair and safe digital environments. The effectiveness of these regulations depends on their enforcement. The DMA focuses on addressing the market power of large online platforms, while the DSA aims to regulate digital services more broadly. The principle of effectiveness is crucial in assessing compliance with these laws. The effective implementation and enforcement of the DMA and the DSA require the involvement of various actors, including enforcement authorities, national regulators, third parties, and the European Commission. Private enforcement mechanisms, such as representative actions, can complement public enforcement efforts. Overall, effective enforcement is essential for achieving the objectives of these regulations and ensuring a fair and safe digital environment. [Extracted from the article]

This research examines AI-driven price discrimination in digital marketplaces, comparing it to competition law. While AI can enhance efficiency and customer welfare, it can also lead to exclusion and exploitative consequences. The EU and China have implemented competition laws and regulations to address unfair price discrimination, demonstrating that a legal reaction based on competition laws is not always necessary. Competition authorities must balance various factors to effectively address AI-driven price discrimination in digital markets. It evaluates the potential for abuse of dominance and the negative impact on competition and consumers. The research uses legal research methodology to examine price discrimination laws and their evolution, comparing them with traditional forms of dominance. It also examines the economic arguments of market efficiency and fairness, consumer detriment, and regulatory action. The paper recommends increased regulation of AI pricing and improved consumer protection measures to prevent unfair market conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As firms accumulate more data, users' data-sharing decisions may polarize. Some users may share all data, whereas others may share no data, becoming "digital hermits." When users share multidimensional data about themselves with a firm, the firm learns about the correlations between different dimensions of user data. We incorporate this type of learning into a model of a data market in which a firm acquires data from users with privacy concerns. Each user can share no data, only nonsensitive data, or their full data with the firm. As the firm collects more data and becomes better at drawing inferences about a user's privacy-sensitive data from their nonsensitive data, the share of new users who share no data ("digital hermits") grows. This growth of digital hermits occurs even though the firm offers higher compensation for a user's nonsensitive data and a user's full data as its ability to draw inferences improves. At the same time, the share of new users who share their full data also grows. The model thus predicts a polarization of users' data-sharing choices away from nonsensitive data sharing to no sharing and full sharing. Our model suggests that recent privacy policies, which are focused on control of data rather than inferences, may be misplaced. History: Anthony Dukes served as the senior editor. This paper was accepted through the Marketing Science: Frontiers review process. Funding: Partial financial support was received from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [Grant 435-2023-0492]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disagreement abounds on what exactly constitutes an 'abuse' within article 102 TFEU, EU competition law's prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position. This situation is highly undesirable, given the important role this prohibition is expected to play in alleviating concerns about substantial market power and its use in important sectors, typified by actions against 'Big Tech'. This article responds to this problem by analysing and synthesising the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its evolution to establish the constituent elements of an exclusionary 'abuse'. The article corrects crucial legal misconceptions, including the putative dichotomy between violations 'by object' and 'by effect'; the assumed disparate legal tests for pricing and non-pricing conduct; and the lost distinction between the 'as efficient competitor test' and the 'as efficient competitor standard'. This critical inquiry allows one to draw concrete predictions on the future development of this challenging, yet vital, area of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction of the Digital Markets Act (the 'DMA') marked the beginning of a new regulatory framework for limiting the impact of strong platforms in digital markets. With the aim of ensuring fairness and contestability in digital markets, the new Regulation provided for a detailed administrative process, in the form of market investigations, for determining which of the digital platforms act as gatekeepers in their respective markets, whether the designated gatekeepers comply with their obligations, and to what extent new obligations must be introduced to account for new developments. This article discusses some preliminary issues related to the European Commission's administrative procedure for enforcing the new regulation. Upon summarizing the key elements of the DMA procedure, it focuses on four issues: the relationship between the DMA and competition law and problems regarding their parallel application; the obligation for recording interviews conducted for the purposes of gathering information regarding the subject matter of a market investigation; access to file limitations; and the absence of provisions regarding private enforcement and the possibility for third parties to claim damages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Hukuk Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Marmara University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Platform governance scholarship commonly derives the role of the state from its actions as a regulator of platforms: a rule-setter that sets limits and restricts their activities. This article argues that three additional state roles enable and constrain the agency of states to regulate platforms: facilitator, buyer, and producer. Using the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act as a case study, the article asks: How do different state roles in platform governance shape AI's regulatory geographies? It answers this research question by outlining two policy dilemmas between those four state roles. First, the EU's ambition to act as a facilitator of digital markets constrains its scope of interventions as a regulator of platforms. Second, the EU's deficits in acting as a producer of AI infrastructure exacerbate its dependency as a buyer of Big Tech offerings, especially cloud computing services. The article contends that dilemmas between state roles are not anomalies but defining features of state-platform relations. As generative AI systems gain sophistication, an understanding of how state roles relate to each other helps to navigate their complex governance regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I analyse the Steam platform as a configuration of several market contexts. I argue that Valve, the owner of Steam, maintains a classical retail market catering to large game publishers, while the emphasis of Valve's own game titles is in alternative market contexts based on player-driven economies. I first discuss Steam as a distinct type of platform economy due to its roots in player-driven game economies. I then introduce the notion of 'markets as fields' as my analytical framework. Based on this framework, I describe three different contexts of economic transaction: the Steam Game Store, the Steam Community Workshop and the Steam Community Market. I analyse how the approximately 46,500 game titles published on the platform are distributed across these contexts and how these games can be ranked with regard to current player numbers, and discuss Valve's position as combined platform owner, game developer and game publisher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Online retail search traffic is often concentrated at a "prominent" retailer for a product. The authors unpack the ramifications of this pattern on pricing, profit, and consumer welfare in an intrabrand setting. Prominence denotes a larger number of heterogenous-search-cost consumers starting their search at the prominent retailer than at any other retailer. These analyses show that search traffic concentration can intensify intrabrand competition, lower average prices of all retailers, and improve consumer welfare. Interestingly, the prominent retailer's incremental traffic advantage can increase or reduce its own profit; the authors denote these as the "blessing" and "curse" of prominence, respectively. The authors extend their analysis to a setting where consumers consider searching only among those retailers they are individually aware of; the prominent retailer is included in all these individual awareness sets. The effects on market average prices and welfare carry over, but only below a critical threshold level of the prominent retailer's first-search traffic advantage. Above this threshold, market average prices rise and welfare decreases, making this the region where search concentration warrants scrutiny from policy makers. The authors close with policy remedies and managerial implications of search concentration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combining historical, conceptual, and empirical approaches, this article studies one of the most fundamental, yet underexplored, questions surrounding Regulation 1/2003: What limits European Union (EU) competition law places on the adoption and application of national competition and other laws? The relationship between EU competition and national laws was supposedly settled with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. There are two exceptions to the rule in Article 3(1), under which national competition authorities and courts must apply EU competition law when applying their national competition laws, with primacy for EU provisions: Article 3(2) leaves room for 'stricter' national competition rules on unilateral conduct, and Article 3(3) for national rules pursuing a 'predominantly different objective'. The solution offered by Article 3 is not workable. Through a historical study of the political discussions preceding Article 3's adoption, a conceptual analysis of potential interpretations, and a systematic content analysis of French and German practice, this article reveals the lack of a dividing line between the notions of national competition laws and other laws. It calls for reform of Article 3 to ensure that conduct that should be governed by EU law is not assessed under national rules and standards that differ from one Member State to another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate over the goals of competition law and the standard by which to apply it have been around, more or less, ever since competition laws were first enacted. In principle, they influence every decision made by a competition enforcer or a court, whether this decision is around cartels, mergers, abuse of dominant position or even advocacy. In recent years competition authorities have been operating in an environment which is unprecedently challenging. Enforcement in digital markets and labour markets, as well as the interplay between competition and environmental policy and the green transition, shift competition enforcement to undiscovered territories. With these contemporary challenges, enforcers are far more frequently faced with the need to have a clear perception of the goal of competition law and the standard according to which to apply it to make enforcement decisions. the need for clarifying, or even redefining, the goals of competition law and the standards by which these goals are achieved, should be seriously considered by the enforcers as well as by the policy makers, who, from a democratic perspective, should be the ultimate decision makers on policy issues. The need for legal certainty presents yet another argument in the same direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the use by California's direct market farmers (DMFs) of online sales and marketing during the early onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, from March through December 2020. The pandemic caused market disruptions that accelerated the trend toward market digitalization. This paper reports quantitative findings based on 364 responses to an online survey of DMFs in California and qualitative findings from participant observation and 33 semi-structured interviews with DMFs and technical assistance providers. We found that online sales and marketing tools, such as social media and websites, were important for withstanding economic disruptions associated with the pandemic, and farmers who had an online presence were more likely to increase their sales and profitability during its early onset. However, we also found that many farmers lacked the necessary resources to access these tools and use them effectively, and that technical assistance providers experienced challenges in helping farmers with online technology use. We argue that DMFs need reliable access to the internet, as well as advice, resources, and training to access and benefit from online sales and marketing tools. These resources must be available in languages other than English (e.g., Spanish). Researchinformed programs and policies can help DMFs navigate market digitalization and strengthen their resilience to future economic disruptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Stricter competition regulation in digital markets is a growing trend in the Global North, with the Digital Markets Act in Europe being the poster child of a more interventionist approach. In this article we do not focus on the debate surrounding these European efforts (which has meritorious arguments on both sides in our view), but instead examine similar developments elsewhere in the world, namely in South Africa, India, China, and Brazil. With reference to recent enforcement activities in these countries (such as industry investigations, greater scrutiny of mergers and of individual firm conduct, and in some cases ex ante regulations targeted at specific categories of firms), we provide our views on the potential adverse consequences of seeking to replicate the European approach in instances where digital markets may be less mature. In particular, while it is generally understood that heavy-handed regulation can stifle innovation and chill competition, we argue that such risks are more acute in countries outside of Europe (and North America), which thus warrants more cautious regulation methods. This is especially the case where the policy objectives deviate from the traditional one of protecting competition rather than competitors, since such an approach runs the risk of promoting short term gains at the expense of long-term benefits, which may ultimately harm the very stakeholders that such regulation is designed to advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article discusses how the European Commission can achieve the goal of effectively implementing the Digital Markets Act. Based on legal and economic reasoning, we highlight the important role of the gatekeeper's compliance report, and discuss how to incentivize gatekeepers to write useful reports. In addition, we develop recommendations regarding the internal organization of the Commission, the prioritization of cases, and how to effectively use the concurrent enforcement powers of the Digital Markets Act and Article 102 of the TFEU. We illustrate the principles we develop using four different EU antitrust cases. Furthermore, we discuss coordination between the Commission and National Competition Authorities and the need to already develop an independent evaluation process for the Digital Markets Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the methodology of complex system analysis, the article examines the impact of digital transformation on public services in the context of the experience of the European Union. The purpose of the study is to analyze the constructive processes of transformation of the public administration system with electronic and digital technologies as a key factor in providing public services to the population and business. In the course of the study, methods of system analysis, methods of generalization, classification, system and structural-functional approaches, and others were used. The directions of the digital transformation of the public service provision system in the European Union have been determined: expanding the use of single electronic portals that ensure the establishment of direct connections on matters of public service provision; simplification of the procedure for using information technologies due to the development of mobile means of transmission and its processing; development of a general list of digital products as part of the provision of public services with the possibility of accelerated search for the required product; creation of experimental platforms and pilot areas for the implementation of digital technologies for the provision of public services. The prerequisites for the digital transformation of public services based on platforms are systematized, which is understood as the process of changing the institutional organization of markets under the influence of the spread of modular digital platforms and the application of platform technologies. These prerequisites include the growth of data quality and the specialization of interaction between participants. This makes it possible to consider platforms as centers for the provision of a wide range of digital services and to ensure the effectiveness of the platform implementation process by providing traditional goods with service properties, which are expressed in the involvement of the consumer in the production process and the accounting of his individual requests. Further research on the problems of digitization and digital transformation of socio-economic systems should cover the direction of expanding the use of digital platform services provided by the service integrator and the development of management methods for promising forms of organization of economic activity in the field of public services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Acknowledging the unbalanced power relationship between online platforms and their complementors, the economic dependence relationship and fear of retaliation may prevent complementors from fighting against economically harmful practices implemented by online dominant platforms. The economic dependence relationship and fear of retaliation are illustrated by past antitrust cases on both sides of the Atlantic. Having set the scene in which complementors might be disincentivised to take up legal actions facing anticompetitive practices, this paper takes the example of two distortions of information practices, implemented by dominant online platforms, that are harmful to both consumers and complementors: dark patterns and ranking biased by fake reviews. Under the angle of consumer empowerment (through direct complaints) and consumer-oriented enforcement (relying on competition law, the UCPD, and the Digital Services Act Package), this paper shows that consumer empowerment and consumer-oriented enforcement of distortion of information practices can produce a positive externality for complementors. Sole claims for damages have the lowest probability of producing a positive externality unless they act as a signal against an obligation non-implemented by an online platform. Injunctions and commitments have the highest probability of producing a positive externality for complementors. However, one of the constraints of this proposal may be the limited detectability of these practices by consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As digitalisation has increased and data has become more powerful, more comprehensive digital regulation has become necessary, including by national competition authorities and the European Commission. The Digital Markets Act (the DMA) is a good example of this area of regulation.1 In November 2022, the DMA came into force, introducing new regulations for core platform services which functioned as 'gatekeepers' in the digital market. By enacting the DMA, these platforms are prevented from treating businesses and consumers unfairly. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general overview of the DMA and its relationship to antitrust enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crowdfunding has reached enormous popularity among entrepreneurs, yet many struggle to fund their projects. For example, only 39.8% of all Kickstarter projects get funded. Why? Entrepreneurs need to set a predefined funding goal, which needs to be reached to get the project funded. If not reached, they do not get the money. To reach the funding goal, entrepreneurs can design reward menus from which backers can choose low-priced to high-priced rewards to support a given project. We show that simply inserting a so-called decoy option—an option in the first place that does not make sense but makes higher-priced options more attractive—can lead to significantly more backers choosing a high-priced option (up to 28% more high-priced choices). This makes it more likely for entrepreneurs to reach their predefined funding goals and thus start their designated projects. At the core of reward-based crowdfunding (RBC) is the reward menu. Carefully constructed reward menus can impact fundraising success significantly. For example, an oft-discussed approach to influencing purchasing decisions is introducing an irrelevant option into a consumer's choice set—a decoy option—making another, often more valuable, option more attractive. This phenomenon is also known as the attraction effect. Prior research, however, has found mixed evidence for its occurrence in applied settings because it has largely employed simplified attribute presentation—with only numeric attributes such as ratings—and hypothetical choices, which had no economic consequences. Hence, researchers questioned the practical significance of the attraction effect. In this paper, we examine whether the attraction effect will manifest in an applied setting such as the crowdfunding context, where product attributes are both numerical (e.g., price) and nonnumerical (e.g., content of a product), choices have economic consequences, and organizations offer several menu options to consumers. We draw upon the salience theory and propose four hypotheses, suggesting that introducing an irrelevant decoy option in choice sets, created digitally in reward menus, may lead backers to choose higher-priced options. We conducted seven online experiments and a field study on Kickstarter (in total, n = 3,998 participants), with increasing levels of similarity with RBC. We found that the attraction effect significantly shifted backers' preferences from a low-priced to a high-priced reward by 18.8% to 28.2% in different settings, highlighting the substantial potential of properly designed digital reward menus to influence funders' choices. Given that researchers have expressed skepticism about the attraction effect in applied settings, our results are particularly significant, suggesting that information systems design can influence choice behavior. This research makes targeted contributions to the literature on crowdfunding, the attraction effect, and digital design. History: Alessandro Acquisti, Senior Editor; David (Jingjun) Xu, Associate Editor. Funding: This work was supported by University of Cologne, Erasmus University, and University of Liechtenstein. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2022.1152. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Latin American Law Review is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Digital markets are regularly equated with digital capitalism. However, markets are also central features of longstanding other economic systems, such as the bush markets of Malaita, Solomon Islands, where saltwater and bush people have traded with each other for at least seven hundred years, if not longer. This article interrogates the digitization of this bush market system based on classically-conceived long-term ethnographic fieldwork that aims to develop a better empirical understanding of possibilities for diverse economic systems and markets in the digital age. We identify continuities between Solomon Islands-centric Facebook 'buy and sell' groups and bush markets and demonstrate how these continuities strengthen other economic systems and values in the country. Despite their avid use of Facebook, Solomon Islanders are able to resist the industrial-capitalism embedded in platform design and to reaffirm social networks and a broader reciprocal moral economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, there has been a tidal wave of merger filings involving large digital firms acquiring low turnover but high value start-ups. The vast majority of those transactions have flown under the radar of EU and National Competition Authorities and, among the few which have been reviewed, none has been blocked. Competition scholars wonder whether there has been a systematic bias towards under-enforcement against acquisitions of start-ups by already dominant tech firms. Some Member States are calling for a reform of the EU merger control's notification system and an adaptation of the substantive test to effectively address cases of potentially predatory acquisitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tremendous growth of digitization in recent years has raised again the question of the functionality and necessity of the original structure of copyright protection, the copyright collectives. Especially music markets have transformed to such an extent that earlier arguments in favour of the existence of copyright collectives are questionable. The transition from monopolistic and oligopolistic structures to more individual and competitive market is accelerated by the digital economy forces. Even more, the new organisation of the music market has the potential to establish a new stability. The final product of the transformation will be a simpler and shorter creator-consumer chain that will render the market more flexible and competitive, with lower prices and a greater selection. Digital service providers can efficiently collect fees from various music uses. In such world the role of current form of copyrights and copyright collectives can be considered a part of the problem rather than solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the decisions taken by the Brazilian Competition Authority, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) in two antitrust cases related the dominant food delivery platform iFood, one merger review and one investigation into exclusive dealing agreements. Through an in-depth examination of the case documents, this article uncovers the evolution in CADE's comprehension of the competition dynamics in multi-sided digital markets, while also revealing gaps and inadequacies in the authority's substantive and procedural antitrust enforcement. Based on the findings, the article draws lessons that can help strengthen the authority's approach to digital platform cases in the future. Firstly, CADE must adapt its steps of analysis and develop new theories of harms that are better tailored to the characteristics of multi-sided platforms. Secondly, CADE should conduct more rigorous merger reviews that take into account the wider impact of dominant platforms' business strategies on the ecosystem of players orbiting them. Thirdly, the article highlights the importance of the authority building its capacities and expertise to detect competition problems from an early stage, design effective remedies, and ensure these remedies are enforced effectively. These recommendations underscore the significance of continuously updating the enforcement framework and enhancing the capabilities of the competition authority to keep pace with the rapidly evolving digital economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Revista de Administración Pública is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Română de Drept al Afacerilor is the property of Wolters Kluwer Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

On 18 July 2022, the Council gave its final approval of the Digital Market Act's final text. Notwithstanding the amendments following the initial proposal published by the European Commission on 15 December 2020, the main objectives of the DMA have remained untouched and separate from the objectives pursued by competition rules. In the interim, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its preliminary rulings on the bpost and Nordzucker cases, with particularly relevant consequences concerning the application of the double jeopardy principle. The potential remedies and obligations imposed on the main digital platforms both under Articles 5 to 7 of the DMA and under competition law rules will overlap and create a risk of incoherent enforcement, especially on the side of the European Commission. Against this background, the paper strives to draw out the narrow enforcement gap left for competition authorities. In addition, the paper highlights a number of alternatives open to competition authorities when enforcing competition law rules on digital markets, namely the segmentation of its enforcement efforts depending on the type of service concerned in each case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to evaluate, if competition-like efficiencies of European-style rule of reason shall apply also in the context of the ex-ante regulation by the DMA. The rationale of such consideration lies in the concept of proportionality of the EU regulation and the assumption that EU law cannot proscribe behaviour with beneficial outcomes and effects that does not have negative consequences on the internal market outweighing the positive effects. The analysis is divided into three parts in this paper: position of the rule of law and the per se prohibition in the legal development of the EU competition law, the relationship between the DMA and competition law, including competition-based efficiencies brought in digital market cases and finally the per se prohibition included in the DMA. The analysis of the development of the case law showed that in the EU competition law the principle of per se prohibitions was never accepted and the CJEU accepted justifications outside the text of the statutory exemptions. Even though the aim of the DMA may be the introduction of a per se prohibition in order to facilitate the Commission's enforcement, it cannot be surprising if the CJ EU will, in some case in the future, follow the path of the EU-style rule of reason in the framework of the DMA as well on the basis of proportionality principle. The lesson learned from application of rule of reason in the context of agreements restricting competition or as a specific form of objective justification in the context of abuse of dominant position does not undermine effectiveness of competition law. The quasi per se concept can satisfy both: it shows that it is not probable that such a behaviour will be allowed and at the same time it dodges proportionality objections because the prohibition is not, at least theoretically, absolutely, per se. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European regulatory landscape for digital markets is undergoing a transformative change. There is an observed shift toward the protection of public values and fundamental rights, as the market mechanism and market values that traditionally led regulatory processes in digital markets seem to have fallen short. In the context of the user‐centric digital economy, a clear commitment to safeguarding citizens' interests is ever‐more salient. This article provides a comprehensive account of hypernudging—dynamically personalized user steering, which represents the next generation user influencing techniques online, with the potential to lead to multifaceted individual and collective harms. However, problematizing the phenomenon for digital policy purposes is not a straightforward task. Due to the complexity and opaqueness of its underlying mechanisms and effects, policymakers are operating under conditions of uncertainty, necessitating a shared understanding of what impact hypernudging has on users as well as crafting a shared vision of values that ought to be embedded and safeguarded in digital choice architectures. To highlight the developing European approach in relation to hypernudging, the assessment of the recent legislative initiatives—the Artificial Intelligence Act, the Digital Markets Act, and the Digital Services Act—showcases underlying learning opportunities for addressing emergent challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing dominance of a small number of 'big tech' companies, across a range of critical online markets, has led to growing calls for regulation to promote more competition, and to ensure that market power is not exploited unfairly. New regulatory regimes to this end are now under development in a variety of jurisdictions. While the new German and EU regulatory regimes are the most advanced, there are detailed proposals under discussion in the UK, US, and China, while in South Korea new regulations have been introduced in relation to the specific area of app stores. This article discusses several questions arising in this context. What problem is pro-competition digital platform regulation trying to solve? Why regulation and not competition law? What are the design challenges involved in developing such regulation? What are the risks arising from diverging regulatory approaches to these global issues and how much these risks be mitigated? And what role can trade policy play? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the digital economy, its treatment under competition, and the need for potential regulation. The aim of this article is to answer the question, of how a legal framework looks like that, on the one hand, prevents possible undesirable developments and undesirable side effects of digitization, while not unduly preventing opportunities and suppressing positive effects. The analysis requires an examination of the proper legal framework as well as the unique characteristics of the digital economy that this legal framework must take into account. As a result, in the first part of the paper, the particular features of the digital economy are worked out in the context of existing competition legislation. Based on this, the second part investigates the need for regulation. From the scientific methods, we have used the analytical and descriptive methods to analyze the current situation. By the comparative method, we introduce different views on legal regulation. The presented topic has not been thoroughly examined in the literature on the subject thus far, giving the chance to identify avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Contexto is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departamento de Derecho Economico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the Google Saga, the General Court (GC) has confirmed the Commission's decisions in Google Shopping and Google Android and dealt a severe blow to Google's strategy, which was aimed at strengthening its market power throughout its ecosystem. Although in both cases, Google was essentially favouring its own services in adjacent markets to the detriment of competitors, the Commission and the GC based their decisions on different theories of harm. In Google Shopping, the GC considered Google's conduct abusive pursuant to a novel category of abuse prohibiting self-preferencing conduct. In Google Android, instead, Google was held to have engaged in abusive forms of tying. Interestingly, in both cases Google's conduct resembles instances of constructive refusal to give access to an input, which require evidence that the input is indispensable in order to be considered abusive. However, the Commission managed to circumvent the application of the high threshold posed by the indispensability criterion. This might have the effect of inappropriately lowering the standard of proof in cases of refusal to access, paving the way for an over-enforcement of competition rules in digital markets. This article is aimed at evaluating the potential impact that the Google judgments may have on the scope of application of the indispensability requirement, and whether there is still life for the latter after the Google Saga. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many developed countries rely, to varying degrees, on competition among private health plans to obtain affordable and high-quality health insurance for their residents. Incorporating beneficiary-level competitive bidding into these healthcare systems can better align the incentives of these health plans, increase their willingness to enroll, and serve the sickest and most vulnerable patients while keeping costs manageable. We identify two digitally enabled program designs that allow private insurance plans to competitively bid to enroll individual beneficiaries. Compared with those used in existing entitlement programs, these designs always make a larger share of the beneficiary population profitable to enroll, thereby increasing willingness of the plans to enroll the most costly beneficiaries and improving access to care. On simulating the conditions of existing real-word healthcare entitlement programs, we found that these new designs actually tend to lower the tax burden in up to 83% of simulations. The research findings suggest that these new designs hold great promise in achieving the dual aim of improved access and lower costs. We believe that findings from this research can guide policymakers implement policies that will enroll more beneficiaries and cost the taxpayers less. Healthcare entitlement programs in the United States represent a large and growing financial outlay for taxpayers. In the pursuit of operational efficiencies, program administrators often contract with private managed care organizations (MCOs) to procure insurance for beneficiaries. This, however, encourages MCOs to attract the healthiest beneficiaries and avoid the sickest, a phenomenon known as risk selection. This paper investigates whether risk selection can be mitigated with a mechanism where MCOs bid to enroll each individual beneficiary. Although procurement auctions have been studied extensively in the literature, extant research has rarely discussed individual-level bidding. Digitization can contribute to the development and introduction of efficient market structures and mechanisms for matching beneficiaries with appropriate MCOs. We model demand- and supply-side aspects in a two-sided insurance marketplace to examine three mechanisms, risk adjustment, bidding, and a mix of prospective payment and bidding, with and without reserve prices. Analytical results show that traditional risk adjustment cannot optimally be used to eliminate risk selection, whereas the bidding mechanisms eliminate it entirely. Mixed bidding eliminates risk selection at a strictly lower cost than pure bidding. The proposed mixed bidding approach is a new type of mechanism with preauction offers that strictly dominates the second-price auction without requiring additional assumptions. Numerical analysis shows bidding dominates risk adjustment in 75.1% of simulated parameter sets. Compared with risk adjustment, bidding secures coordinated care for 12.1% more allocated beneficiaries while lowering program costs by 9.2% and largely preserving MCO profits. This would amount to approximately $27.2 billion in Medicaid program savings. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the proposed bidding mechanism dominates in scenarios that closely resemble real-world healthcare entitlement environments. These results show that digital markets that enable individual-level auctions are a promising approach for achieving the dual aim of financial sustainability and expanded access to care for the most vulnerable. History: This paper has been accepted by Ravi Bapna, Martin Bichler, Bob Day, and Wolfgang Ketter, Senior Editors; and Liangfei Qiu, Associate Editor, for the Information Systems Research Special Section on Market Design and Analytics. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2021.1062. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwanese Journal of Political Science is the property of NTU Press & National Taiwan University, Department of Political Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

One of the challenges before competition law today is to develop criteria for market definition in platform markets. The traditional tests for market definition do not serve to identify the boundaries of competition in multi-sided platforms due to the complexity of competitive constraints operating on each side of the platform. An important question that arises is whether platforms should be defined as one or separate markets on each side. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has generally defined platform markets from one side only. However, academic literature suggests that certain platform markets should be defined from both sides of the market. This paper argues that the CCI should use a framework of market definition that accounts for interdependencies on both sides of the platform and provides clearer guidance for when platforms may be defined from one or both sides. Applying this framework, the paper finds that the CCI did not account for certain sides of Google's search platform. This prevented the CCI from evaluating the harm to third party content providers from Google's conduct. Further, by overlooking the multisided nature of Oyo's platform in its market definition, the CCI disregarded the sources of power and competition in this market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The final version of the Digital Markets Act has now been approved. It represents a significant overhaul of the European Union’s approach to digital markets and is the first time that ex ante regulatory obligations are imposed on digital markets. A key difference which sets the DMA apart from competition law and other regulatory settings is the decision to remove economic considerations from its implementation. Instead, the DMA sets out a pre-defined list of services which are ‘core platform services’, a list of criteria to identify ‘gatekeepers’ unrelated to economic dominance and a list of obligations and prohibitions that these gatekeepers must adhere to. In this article, we discuss the pros and cons of this approach from an economic perspective. As we discuss, this decision may end up hampering the DMA’s ability to achieve its objectives: on one hand, it may prohibit behaviour that benefits consumers or does not harm them; on the other hand, by setting too narrow a list of prohibited conducts, it may fail to capture behaviour which could have the same effects as the prohibited conducts. We finally explain that the lack of proper effects and efficiency considerations may result in imperfect enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the impact of proposed regulations in the European Union (EU) on the global digital economy and efforts to advance similar regulations in the US. The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) will enter into force on 1 November 2022 and will be one of the most important pieces of legislation to regulate so-called ‘Big Tech’ platforms in any jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the US Congress is also considering legislation that would address many of the same issues as the DMA. However, it remains to be seen whether the current versions of one or more of the pending bills – or some variation thereof – will ultimately be signed into law. Until such time as new US legislation relating to the operation of digital platforms is enacted, the unilateral conduct of businesses in the US will continue to be governed by existing US antitrust law. But, with the specter of the DMA looming on the horizon, US companies are faced with the prospect of potentially needing to reimagine their business strategy in other jurisdictions to comply with a law that runs contrary to their current business operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]