Search

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides that children require 'special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection' (Preamble). In recent years various attempts have been made by Scottish lawmakers to safeguard and promote children's rights across a range of legal fields. However, the field of delict (termed "tort law" in many jurisdictions) has been excluded from the process of mainstreaming children's rights in domestic law. Most of the contemporary litigation in the field is about liability for negligence (i.e., unintentional wrongdoing). In negligence proceedings, children are typically victims seeking redress from adults through the judicial system following childhood injury. Using Scotland as a case study, this article examines legal reasoning in what are termed "childhood negligence proceedings". Drawing on the jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and wider literature, the article raises concerns about both the substance and established practices of the law. In particular, an absence of judicial engagement with children and research about childhood development is observed. Consideration is given as to what might be the nature of the obligations imposed upon states in this field of law by Articles 1 (age), 2 (non-discrimination), 3 (best interests), 6 (life, survival and development) and 12 (voice) of the CRC. Two overarching questions persist: first, can findings of negligence or contributory negligence against children ever be justified? And secondly, if so, what should be the model for imposing childhood liability? As Scotland fully incorporates the CRC in domestic law, the article concludes by framing a series of questions directed towards creating new knowledge and developing new understanding capable of transforming the child's position in delict/tort law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Angle Health Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The distinction between the criminal fault elements of recklessness and negligence is one of Anglo-American criminal law's key distinctions. It is a distinction with practical significance, as many serious crimes require at least recklessness and cannot be committed negligently. The distinction is standardly marked by awareness. Recklessness requires awareness that one's conduct carries a risk of harm. Negligence only requires that one ought to have been aware that one's conduct carried such a risk, even if one was in fact unaware of this. But should the recklessness/negligence distinction be marked by awareness of risk, or by something else? Does a defendant's awareness of risk really have the normative significance to mark such a distinction? In this paper, I answer these questions by discussing a challenge to this 'standard account' of the recklessness/negligence distinction raised by the work of Antony Duff, who defends an alternative, non-awareness-based model of the recklessness/negligence distinction. I will argue that, although Duff's alternative model fails, seeing how it goes wrong helps us see how awareness genuinely does have the right kind of normative significance to mark the distinction between recklessness and negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit recently made a decision in the case of McCluskey El v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case, stating that the appellant was adequately informed of the contract's terms and that the pandemic did not justify tolling the statute of limitations. The court emphasized the importance of reasonable communication and the rarity of granting an equitable tolling remedy in maritime tort actions. This decision provides clarity and guidance for future cases involving equitable tolling. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the definition of misfeasance within the framework of tort and criminal liability. Topics covered include the scope of the breach of duty of public officials, the difference between misfeasance and criminal negligence, and an analysis of case law in misfeasance in the development of the common-law offence, and gross negligence with a focus on manslaughter.

We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as 'gullible' or 'biased', and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Specifically, I argue that that a popular account of responsibility for belief, which grounds it in belief's reasons-responsiveness, faces a problem analogous to one faced by H.L.A. Hart's influential capacity-based account of culpability. This points towards a more promising account of responsibility of belief, though, if we draw on accounts of negligence that improve on Hart's. Broadly speaking, the account of negligence that improves on Hart's account grounds culpability in a (lack of) concern for others' interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a (lack of) concern for the truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the article "Improving Jurors' Evaluations of Auditors in Negligence Cases," by Kathryn Kadous. The article examined the effect of bias on jurors' decisions on negligence cases involving auditors. Kadous' article also proposed a theoretical framework for the possible influence of knowledge of a negative outcome on the evaluative judgments of jurors in an auditor negligence trial. The author expresses his concerns about the article's theoretical background, experimental design, and analysis of results.

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The modified version of art. 121-3 of the French Criminal Code introduces a hierarchy of the nonintentional forms of guilt according to seriousness. From the perspective of the French legislator, this hierarchy would be the following: deliberate negligence (art. 121-3 para. 2), simple negligence - carelessness, imprudence - (art. 121-3 para. 3) and breaking a duty of care or protection (art. 121-3 para. 4). In the Italian Criminal Code only the conscious negligence is defined, whereas the simple negligence is not defined, but merely exemplified. Thus, article 43 para. 1 states that "There is an offence committed with negligence whenever the result, even though foreseen, is not desired by the agent and occurs because of carelessness, imprudence, lack of skill, or failure to observe laws, regulations, orders or instructions". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the unwittingness of negligence, personal responsibility for negligent conduct is puzzling. After all, how is it that one is responsible for what one did not intend to do or was unaware that one was doing? How, therefore, is one's agency involved with one's negligence so as to ground one's responsibility for it? Negligence is an unwitting failure in agency to meet a standard requiring conduct that falls within one's competency. Accordingly, negligent conduct involves agency in that negligence is a manifestation of agency failure. Now, nobody's perfect. Human agency is innately fallible, and a measure of agency failure is, therefore, unavoidable. The more one's negligence manifests failure in one's agency as an individual, the more one is responsible for it. In contrast, the more one's negligence involves the shortcomings innate to all human agency the less responsible one becomes, because one's agency as an individual is less and less involved in one's failure. Determinative of the measure of individual and of human failings mixed into an instance of negligent phi -ing is the background quality of one's agency at meeting one's competency at phi -ing. That is, how able one is at delivering on what one is able to competently do. The more able, the less one's occasional instances of negligence involve manifestations of failures of one's agency as an individual—nobody's perfect—and are more manifestations of one's agency's innate human fallibility, making one less and less responsible for one's negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although in German and in Spanish legal systems there are no express provisions with regard to the criminal negligence (culpa), this has not hindered the legal doctrine and jurisprudence to thoroughly analyse this form of guilt. This made it possible to qualify as intentional offences some deeds which in our legal system are considered to be committed with conscious negligence (involving foresight). The difficulty to distinguish between indirect intention (dolus eventualis) and conscious negligence (luxuria) has nonetheless determined Spanish courts to ask the legislator to provide a clear definition of indirect intention, which could be an additional argument with respect to the weaknesses entailed by such a legal approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 in Great Britain, intended to abolish gross negligence manslaughter. Topics discussed include the issues with identification doctrine in criminal liability for corporate manslaughter before this act; the case law for corporate manslaughter; and the fine that can be imposed on corporations in cases on negligence manslaughter.

The article discusses the effects of gross criminal negligence on professional tribunals. Topics discussed include information on the gross negligence manslaughter; need of professional standards and conduct in medical practice; and the death of the victim due to the breach of duty and the patient safety culture.

Copyright of Court Case Times is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, I advance a culpability-based justification for command responsibility. Command responsibility has attracted powerful, principled criticisms, particularly that its controversial 'should have known' fault standard may breach the culpability principle. Scholars are right to raise such questions, as a negligence-based mode of accessory liability seems to chafe against our analytical constructs. However, I argue, in three steps, that the intuition of justice underlying the doctrine is sound. An upshot of this analysis is that the 'should have known' standard in the ICC Statute, rather than being shunned, should be embraced. While Tribunal jurisprudence shied away from criminal negligence due to culpability concerns, I argue that the 'should have known' standard actually maps better onto personal culpability than the rival formulations developed by the Tribunals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legal status, scope, and policy implications of the waiver of tort doctrine have been a prominent, controversial, and unresolved feature of many recent class action proceedings in Canada, especially in products liability cases, where plaintiffs have sought to claim disgorgement of profits or revenues as an alternative to proof of damage or injury. The doctrine in recent years has been invoked frequently by plaintiffs in negligence class actions, though its legal status in such a context remains uncertain, as it has not been judicially decided. The article assesses the waiver of tort doctrine from an economic perspective. It argues that decoupling remedies from actual damages in negligence cases generally, or in products liability cases in particular, is not well founded from an economic perspective. Theory and evidence suggests that the deterrence and insurance aspects of negligence law are best achieved by linking remedies to losses actually suffered. In many contexts, disgorgement of gains from activities entailing negligent conduct may induce socially wasteful forms of over-deterrence. Economic analysis does not support the waiver of tort doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Law & Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Societe (Cambridge University Press) is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

'Attempted negligence' is a category of criminal offense that many jurists and philosophers have law have deemed conceptually incoherent. In his Attempts: In the Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, Gideon Yaffe challenges this dismissal, anchoring his argument in cases of what he calls 'mental self-management' in which agents plan to bring about that they perform unintentional actions at a later time. He plausibly argues that mental self-management-type attempted negligence is possible. However, his account raises the question whether such attempts can be successful: whether, in other words, attempts to perform unintentional actions at a later time could issue in actions that are, indeed, unintentional. Intuitively, at least, it would seem that we should answer in the affirmative. However, that answer poses problems for a plausible and widely-held account of intentional action. Al Mele, responding to Yaffe's account, has pointed out this problem without, I think, providing a satisfactory resolution. I propose another way of vindicating the possibility of successful attempted negligence with small, if significant, revision to the standard view of intentional action. In these cases, I argue, agents fail to act intentionally because they render themselves, through their acts of self-management, unaware that they are successfully executing their intentions. Moreover, I argue that these agents' intentions to bring about that they perform unintentional actions do not commit them to acting intentionally because of the nature of intentions to bring about actions. I offer an account of the intention to bring about that one A's and defend it against some objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One proposed way of preserving the link between criminal negligence and blameworthiness is to define criminal negligence in moral terms. On this view, a person can be held criminally responsible for a negligent act if her negligence reflects a deficit of moral concern. Some theorists are convinced that this definition restores the link between negligence and blameworthiness, while others insist that criminal negligence remains suspect. This article contributes to the discussion by applying the work of ethicist Nomy Arpaly to criminal negligence. Although not interested in legal issues herself, Arpaly has a well-developed theory of moral agency that explains moral concern in terms of responsiveness to moral reasons. Introducing her work to the ongoing scholarly debate will be helpful for two reasons. First, while a definition of negligence in terms of moral concern is recognized as one proposed solution to the negligence–blameworthiness problem, authors promoting it have yet to give a systematic account of moral concern and its relation to blame. Borrowing Arpaly's account will help clarify the idea of moral concern so that both proponents and critics of a concern approach to negligence can have a better-defined debate. Second, her theory of blameworthiness is especially suited to defending the blameworthiness of negligent actions, because it does not have recourse to a special quality of choice or self-control that must be active to render conduct blameworthy. To make this second advantage clear, the article argues that reliance on choice or self-control problematizes blameworthiness for negligence. Those who wish to defend blameworthiness for negligent acts should base their work on an account of moral agency that does not rely on either choice or self-control to explain when an action is blameworthy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers information on the history, drawbacks and legal reforms to prosecution of manslaughter by criminal negligence of physicians in various jurisdictions in Australia. It discusses the case of Jayant Patel, the Director of Surgery at Bundaberg Base Hospital, Queensland, which reflects prosecutorial failure of the criminal justice system of Australia to address the fraud charges associated with deaths.

The dental profession holds a special level of trust with the patients; the profession makes a commitment to patient that they will adhere to high ethical standard of conduct. In recent times the dental profession is under attack by litigation cases by disgruntled patients who are not satisfied by the treatment. The dissatisfaction can be resolved between patients and doctors but sometimes patient turn to courts to get the matter solved. A litigation case against a dentist causes loss of reputation, loss of income, harassment, mental agony and embarrassment in the society. Hence, to protect oneself from such type of suffering the dentist should have an idea about the rules and regulation guiding their profession, the law and litigation pertaining to their practice and standard protocols to follow to avoid the malpractice cases. The data gathered for this review article was from manual and internet search of records. The following review article provides basic information on ethical principles, dental negligence and related liabilities, case reports and how to make dental treatment more qualitative and accountable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical profession differentiates itself from other professions, where apart from the knowledge and skill, touch of humanity is also required. Since the inclusion of medical profession under the ambit of Consumer Protection Act there has been a spurt in the number of cases against the doctors. Bolam's test is applied to assess medical negligence of doctor. Cases against the doctors can be brought in a civil or criminal court, and accordingly the negligence may be civil or criminal negligence. In deciding criminal negligence against doctors criminal intent need to be proved. The Medical Law and Ethical Code for medical professional in India are prescribed by Indian Medical Council, under the section 20-A of Indian Medical Council Act of 1956 and Amendment Act No. 24 of 1964. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the changes in the Singapore law on occupiers' liability with the recent Court of Appeal decision in Toh Siew Kee v. Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd. It discusses the two changes in the law including no longer a distinction between invitees and licensees and occupiers' liability under the tort of negligence. It discusses the High Court's decision in which the Justice Woo Bih Li dismissed all the claims related to See Toh (C.A.).

James Badenoch QC asks whether it is right that members of the medical profession should be subject to litigation when things go wrong. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In standard models on negligence rules, due care levels can be used for fine-tuning the care levels of potential injurers, and there are good arguments why care levels should vary among different fields. We extend the analysis of the impact of due care on care actually chosen to situations where damages depend on sales prices. This is the case for many contractual relationships, but also for damages on capital markets which are usually calculated as the difference between share prices paid and share prices after the adverse information becomes public. In a model with errors in court, we show that tighter negligence standards may even reduce care levels chosen by potential injurers under reasonable circumstances. Due to this counter-intuitive effect, negligence standards can hardly be applied for fine-tuning the care levels of potential injurers when damages depend on prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: This paper is a critical evaluation of the compensation system for personal injury tort in Nigeria. The present compensation system under the law of tort leaves many victims of personal injury uncompensated in Nigeria. This stems from many factors, including the fact that traditional tort theory of no liability without fault has continued to be the principal basis for liability. This is in spite of the heavy criticisms of the tort regime as an ineffective mode of compensation. Through an analytical assessment of selected core heads of claims in tort, the paper reveals the inadequacy in the foundations of tort law and its regulation of claims for personal injury in Nigeria. Implications: It finds that fault as the primary foundation of tort law in Nigeria creates a large volume of uncompensated plaintiffs, who, without an efficient alternative social security to fall upon, have to personally bear their losses. In the light of this, the paper uses examples from other jurisdictions to recommend that tort law in Nigeria is in need of more legislative intervention. Value: The paper recommends that the provision of a sustainable compensation system for personal injury is imperative for social justice in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: This paper is a critical evaluation of the compensation system for personal injury tort in Nigeria. The present compensation system under the law of tort leaves many victims of personal injury uncompensated in Nigeria. This stems from many factors, including the fact that traditional tort theory of no liability without fault has continued to be the principal basis for liability. This is in spite of the heavy criticisms of the tort regime as an ineffective mode of compensation. Through an analytical assessment of selected core heads of claims in tort, the paper reveals the inadequacy in the foundations of tort law and its regulation of claims for personal injury in Nigeria. Implications: It finds that fault as the primary foundation of tort law in Nigeria creates a large volume of uncompensated plaintiffs, who, without an efficient alternative social security to fall upon, have to personally bear their losses. In the light of this, the paper uses examples from other jurisdictions to recommend that tort law in Nigeria is in need of more legislative intervention. Value: The paper recommends that the provision of a sustainable compensation system for personal injury is imperative for social justice in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views on the number of cases related to corporate manslaughter. The author, on going through a study of corporate manslaughter cases, found that there was a strong prima facie case for prosecuting about 40 cases of corporate manslaughter a year. The author insists the main obstacles to prosecution include a lack of resources and political will to prosecute, as well as a lack of training and legal understanding of how the law applied to corporate defendants.

Copyright of JURA - Juristische Ausbildung is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Author-supplied Abstracts.)

The author examines the impact of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which came into effect in April 2008. He analyzes the decision of the Manchester Crown Court in R v Lion Steel Equipment Ltd., which indicates worrying clues about the manner in which courts will approach the imposition of fines. The author also discusses other court cases which covered the issue of level of fines.

Copyright of Turkish Journal of Police Studies / Polis Bilimleri Dergisi is the property of Turkish National Police Academy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In chapter 6 of Attempts, Gideon Yaffe defends the thesis that it is 'possible to attempt crimes of negligence' (, p. 173). I am persuaded that he is right about this, provided that 'attempt crimes of negligence' is read as (potentially misleading) shorthand for 'attempt to bring it about that we commit crimes of negligence.' But I find certain parts of his defense unpersuasive. My discussion of those parts of his argument motivates the following thesis: Not only can one attempt to bring it about that one commits a crime of negligence, but the attempt can be successful as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Qualifying the automobile as a dangerous instrument is linked to the ‘responsibilization’ and the criminalization of individual negligent drivers in the United States. One case—State v. Fitzgerald (1978)—is selected to illustrate this particular process. The use of the dangerous instrument argument lowers the threshold of criminal liability from gross to ordinary negligence and offers judicial ground to increase the degree of culpability for negligent homicide. My argument is twofold. First, I claim that the criminalization of negligent driving points to a process whereby the motor vehicle and the negligent driver co-constitute one another. Second, I contend that criminalizing negligent driving is related to the emergence of a specific class of risks: circumstantial risks. I conclude by pushing for a Tardian turn in criminology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government intrusion into the homes of the working-classes gained momentum through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. One hitherto unexamined piece of legislation that sought to regulate behaviour was a clause in the Children Act 1908 pertaining to the use of domestic fireguards. This transpired because of the outcry of coroners who conducted inquests into the deaths of children fatally burned in their homes, supposedly a safe refuge, a space constructed as a maternal responsibility. Coroners increasingly believed such accidents were a result of either maternal carelessness or negligence, especially those involving unguarded fires and absent mothers. Yet, limited by inadequate laws and unwilling juries, the coroner could do little but admonish the mother. However, growing Government concern over the abilities of working-class mothers and the health of the nation finally brought the issue of absent fireguards and burnt children to Parliamentary debate, culminating in a provision which appeared to have been aimed more at prevention than punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Australian court case R. v. Patel, which dealt with criminal negligence in a case of medical manslaughter. Topics include the burden of proof required to prove criminal negligence, the legal accountability placed on health care workers, and if medical manslaughter remedies are effective as a means of deterrence.

The article provides a brief description and history of the "insanity defense", which is a legal defense on which the mentally disordered may rely and is now referred to as "not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder" (NCR). It further states that recklessly exacerbating one's own mental disorder with the resulting injury or death of another should be considered criminal negligence and elaborates on the possible forms of punishment which should accompany the proposed offence.

Doug Husak suggests that sometimes an actor should be deemed reckless, and not merely negligent, with respect to the risks that she knowingly created but has forgotten at the moment of action. The validity of this conclusion, he points out, depends crucially on what it means to be aware of a risk. Husak's 'neutral prompt' and 'counterfactual actual belief' criteria are problematic, however. More persuasive is his suggestion that we understand belief, in this moral and criminal law context, as a concept whose meaning is determined by its function as a culpability standard. Husak concludes that inadvertent actors are often less culpable than knowing-but-later-forgetful actors; this is plausible, but there are also numerous counterexamples. Holly Smith focuses on negligence cases in which an agent's failure to notice a risk stems, not from a prior culpable choice, but from an objectionable attitude or set of attitudes. She is right to emphasize that genuine moral culpability does not depend on conscious choice. However, Smith also asserts that decisions that flow from an actor's objectionable attitudes are only rarely culpable, because they often do not arise from a reasonably full configuration of the actor's motives. This last requirement is, I fear, an unrealistic and unnecessarily demanding criterion of culpability. Even when many of the actor's evaluative attitudes are 'inactive' in Smith's sense, the actor might deserve blame for not bringing them to bear on his decision. Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd thoroughly explore, and find deficient, H.L.A. Hart's 'unexercised capacity' theory of negligence. They are correct that that theory requires a further judgment: an actor's inadvertence is culpable only if he had the capacity to have adverted 'if X' where X is the source of the actor's moral desert. They overstate, however, in suggesting that the capacity issue falls out of the picture once we identify that underlying desert basis. The authors also worry that if desert is grounded on an underlying vice, we lack a reliable way of ranking the different vices that might explain the actor's inadvertence; this is not a fatal objection, however, because negligence determinations are quite feasible even in the absence of clear rankings. Moore and Hurd conclude by identifying eight distinct categories in which criminal liability for negligence is justifiable. Negligence is indeed a surprisingly complex and pluralist concept. The three articles in this symposium brightly illuminate some of the most fundamental conceptual and normative issues in the debate over whether it is just to blame and punish the negligently inadvertent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause or allow-or risk causing or allowing-such harm to occur. The standard theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk; (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of these defects of character at some earlier time; (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the tortious liability of misfeasance in public office and its relationship with constitutionality in the context of Great Britain's Crown Proceedings Act 1947. It mentions the struggles between public and private litigants and courts in determining the extent to which a public authority has to be treated as any other party wherein it has been in the torts of breach of negligence and statutory duty. The notion of misfeasance in public office is a form of tort which will apply to public officials in the law enforcement sector involved in improper collusion, improper disclosure of criminal records, and refusal to stop violence.

The article focuses on the criminal negligence under clean water act (CWA) with reference to the case United States v. Edward Hanousek. Edward Hanousek discontinued the preventive measures in the pipeline construction, which led to accidental discharge of around 1000 to 5000 gallons of oil in Skagway River. It is stated that for any environmental criminal investigation, charges should be filed in such a manner that if proven guilty the perpetrator can not find a legal escape.