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The anti-gender movements began in the West but have thus far been most influential and governmentally supported in Hungary, Poland and Russia. Anti-genderism has served multiple functions to entrench what proponents label as traditional values, while promoting specific class and racialised interests in the cloak of rejecting both the communist past and Western European political and social expectations. Why did anti-genderism develop and become pronounced in otherwise different post-communist countries? This article traces the origins of these movements based on news coverage and scholarly sources, arguing that anti-gender movements signal authoritarian trends and thus matter deeply for open, democratic societies. The Hungarian, Polish and Russian cases offer similar but distinct variations in the political trajectory of their respective movements, highlighting the feedback between conservative, expressively patriarchal, and populist forces and their embracing of anti-genderism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority‐friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single‐country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical right voters and parties are often characterized as conservative and traditionalist on issues of gender, sexuality, and morality. Common wisdom is that they reject the progressive sociopolitical shifts that began in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, some radical right parties, such as the Dutch Party for Freedom, maintain moderate positions on morality issues. Are radical right supporters still traditionalist? Latent class analysis applied to European Social Survey data from 10 West European countries reveals that radical right supporters belong to three ideologically distinct classes. The fastest growing group is the sexually-modern nativists, who make up about 45% by 2016. Contrary to extant literature, traditionalism no longer appears to be a major motivation for today's radical right. Instead, immigration and nationalism are now the core common concerns for radical right supporters in Western Europe. This development may be due to the Euro crisis and the migration crisis, which have increased the salience of national borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, European governments have faced persistent pressures to manage the effects of mass immigration on their societies. As a result, citizenship policies have received increasing amounts of attention from both policymakers and scholars alike. However, to date, it remains unclear how these policies regulating political membership have changed over time, and whether these policies have converged or diverged in their requirements for membership. To answer these questions, this article advances a new theoretical and empirical expansion of existing scholarship on citizenship. With data collected from national citizenship policies across 16 Western European countries from 1970 to 2017, I construct a two-dimensional framework of citizenship acquisition requirements in order to test a number of extant hypotheses regarding citizenship policy trends over the last five decades. Through an examination of aggregated country-year scores and correlation analysis, I find that concurrent trends of both convergence and divergence are occurring in Western Europe over time and that most states have largely abandoned their traditional approaches to citizenship and immigrant incorporation as they adapt more open yet more regulated strategies to address the contemporary realities of immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1929, Robin Page Arnot and James Ford, both sponsored by the Comintern, each set out on a trip to investigate what Western European communist parties had accomplished in their campaigns on colonialism and racial inequality. Both men issued stern reports suggesting more could be done; but following these investigations a proposed European colonial conference never happened. The League Against Imperialism petered out. The International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers formed, but consistently dealt with discrimination and received limited, if any, help from European communist parties. Using Executive Committee politsecretariat documents, this article argues that the Comintern quickly abandoned an emphasis on colonial work, instead focusing on domestic campaigns when contacting these parties between 1929 and 1935. Highlighting the migration of these ideas transnationally, while offering a comparative analysis of the Executive Committee of the Communist International's interventions into each party, this research serves as a starting point for further inquiry into why the Comintern elected to not press these European parties to do more. Was their inaction because the Comintern was always Eurocentrically-minded? Was it because Comintern leaders were only paying lip service to these concepts? Was it that the Comintern prioritized other matters, especially as the Great Depression and the rise of fascism brought new challenges to communism? This article sheds some light on these questions by exposing the way in which the Comintern instructed each party to focus on in their broader campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lijphart's classical consociational theory, developed between the 1960s and 1975, was based largely on the experience of four western European cases. He argued that the success of consociations depended on the preparedness and ability of elites to cooperate, and that the prospects for success were facilitated by the presence of certain historical and structural factors, including a tradition of accommodation and a "multiple balance of power". In the past forty years or so, consociations have been implemented, or attempted, in a number of places quite unlike the classical cases. This article argues that a satisfactory explanation of the performance of the new consociations requires consideration of three dimensions additional to those described in Lijphart's classical account. These are, respectively, the i) external dimension; ii) the security dimension; and iii) the self‐determination dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In both public and scholarly debates, globalisation has recently been accredited with a massive impact on the political preferences and electoral behaviour of Western citizens. Some go as far as to declare a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, driven, for example, by individuals' exposure to international competition and their degree of national as opposed to cosmopolitan identification. Extant tests of this argument have, however, relied on class and education as proxies for these processes. In contrast, this study provides a direct test of the influence of the globalisation processes on attitudes to economic distribution, the European Union and immigration as well as on vote choice across nine West European countries. The results show that variables tapping the core aspects of globalisation have relatively little impact on attitudes and vote choice; are largely unable to account for the effects of class and education; and do not seem to lead to the establishment of new divisions between winners and losers within or across classes. Rather, the winners and losers of globalisation seem to be the traditional winners and losers with respect to material positions and political influence in modern Western societies – that is, those placed higher as opposed to lower in the class and education hierarchies. In this way, the proposed cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation may seem to be rather much like old wine in new bottles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study we assess policy representation by populist radical right (PRR) parties in ten West European countries. Going beyond aggregate left-right or socio-cultural (GAL-TAN) dimensions of political conflict, we study representation on policy issues related to the PRR parties' core ideological features nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Analysing data from party expert and voter surveys, we find that the PRR parties provide largely unique policy positions that are congruent with their voters' preferences in terms of their opposition to immigration and the European Union. By contrast, the parties are less representative in terms of their value conservative and authoritarian positions on gay rights and civil liberties. The findings have relevance for our understanding of party strategy, voter behaviour, and the dimensionality of political competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper looks at how protest politics has developed in Western Europe since the 1970s and how these developments are related to changes in electoral politics. We take up arguments on the two-fold restructuration of political conflict and its different impact on protest and electoral politics. Most importantly, we highlight that the second wave of political change sweeping across Western Europe since the 1990s with increasing conflicts over immigration and European integration left different marks on protest politics as compared to electoral politics. We argue that this difference reflects the driving forces of change and their preferences for specific political arenas, as the momentum shifted from the libertarian left to the populist radical right. More specifically, the results indicate that challengers from the left and challengers from the right follow different logics when it comes to the interplay of protest and electoral mobilization. Empirically, we rely on two large-scale protest event datasets as well as on data on electoral results and campaigns from the 1970s to 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent are incumbent governments affected by the state of the economy when it comes to premature dissolution? This article investigates this research question using a data set on parties and governments for 18 West European countries for the period 1945–2013. In addition to investigating the general effect of the state of the economy on government termination, we hypothesize that macroeconomic conditions affect cabinet termination in different ways depending on the type of government that is in power. Using Cox proportional hazards models to estimate how different government types are impacted by the same changes in the economy, our results indicate that economic changes do matter, but that they mainly affect coalition governments. Our results also indicate that there is a difference between minority and majority governments when it comes to the type of termination. Minority coalition governments resolve to early elections, not replacements, presumably because a minority government does not survive defection. Majority coalition governments, in contrast, show sensitivity towards both types of terminations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the rise of populism in Western Europe over the past three decades has received a great deal of attention in the academic and popular literature, less attention has been paid to the rise of its opposite-- anti-populism. This short article examines the discursive and stylistic dimensions of the construction and maintenance of the populism/anti-populism divide in Western Europe, paying particular attention to how anti-populists seek to discredit populist leaders, parties and followers. It argues that this divide is increasingly antagonistic, with both sides of the divide putting forward extremely different conceptions of how democracy should operate in the Western European political landscape: one radical and popular, the other liberal. It closes by suggesting that what is subsumed and feared under the label of the "populist threat" to democracy in Western Europe today is less about populism than nationalism and nativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with the failure of traditional immigration controls, policymakers in the United States and Western Europe increasingly look to foreign aid to reduce migrant inflows. Some analysts expect assistance to improve living standards in source countries, thereby deterring residents from moving abroad. While this idea makes intuitive sense, research on aid and migration shows mixed results: some scholarly work supports aid-based migration policies, but other analyses suggest that aid actually enables migration by providing individuals with resources that facilitate movement across borders. We suggest that this tension in the literature reflects a failure to distinguish between different types of foreign aid. Drawing on recent work demonstrating the heterogeneous effects of various aid projects, we posit that governance aid should deter emigration by enhancing government capacity and alleviating political push factors; in contrast, economic and social aid should enable migration by increasing individuals' means and capabilities to move. We test our hypotheses on a panel of 101 developing countries spanning twenty-five years (1985–2010). We find that governance aid does reduce emigration rates from developing countries, while other types of aid appear not to affect migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the political changes, particularly the transformation of the democratic politics in Western Europe brought by the 2008 global financial crisis. Topics covered include political effects of the rise of the service economy and the decline of manufacturing, impact of the financial losses caused by the global crisis on economic performance, decline of a managed form of democratic capitalism, and emergence and success of right-wing populist parties in recent elections.

Abstract: This article explains legislative turnover in eight West European legislatures over 152 general elections in the period 1945–2015. Turnover is measured as the rate of individual membership change in unicameral or lower chambers. It is the outcome of a legislative recruitment process with a supply and a demand side. Decisions made by contenders affect supply, while decisions made by parties and voters influence demand. Such decisions are shaped by four political and institutional factors: the institutional context of political careers, or structure of political career opportunities; political party characteristics; electoral swings; and electoral systems. Ten specific hypotheses are tested within this theoretical framework. The structure of political career opportunities is the most decisive factor explaining variability in turnover rates, followed by electoral swings and political parties. Electoral systems show less substantive effects. Electoral volatility is the predictor with the most substantive effects, followed by duration of legislative term, strength of bicameralism, regional authority, gender quotas, level of legislative income and district magnitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the increasing popularity of comparative work on other-regarding preferences, the implications of different models of altruism are not always fully understood. This article analyzes different theoretical approaches to altruism and explores what empirical conclusions we should draw from them, paying particular attention to models of redistribution preferences where inequality explicitly triggers other-regarding motives for redistribution. While the main contribution of this article is to clarify the conclusions of these models, we also illustrate the importance of their distinct implications by analyzing Western European data to compare among them. We draw on individual-level data from the European Social Survey fielded between September 2002 and December 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Current comparative policy research gives no clear answer to the question of whether partisan politics in general or the partisan composition of governments in particular matter for different morality policy outputs across countries and over time. This article addresses this desideratum by employing a new encompassing dataset that captures the regulatory permissiveness in six morality policies that are homosexuality, same‐sex partnership, prostitution, pornography, abortion and euthanasia in 16 European countries over five decades from 1960 to 2010. Given the prevalent scepticism about a role for political parties for morality policies in existing research, this is a ‘hard’ test case for the ‘parties do matter’ argument. Starting from the basic theoretical assumption that different party families, if represented in national governments to varying degrees, ought to leave differing imprints on morality policy making, this research demonstrates that parties matter when accounting for the variation in morality policy outputs. This general statement needs to be qualified in three important ways. First, the nature of morality policy implies that party positions or preferences cannot be fully understood by merely focusing on one single cleavage alone. Instead, morality policy is located at the interface of different cleavages, including not only left‐right and secular‐religious dimensions, but also the conflicts between materialism and postmaterialism, green‐alternative‐libertarian and traditional‐authoritarian‐nationalist (GAL‐TAN) parties, and integration and demarcation. Second, it is argued in this article that the relevance of different cleavages for morality issues varies over time. Third, partisan effects can be found only if individual cabinets, rather than country‐years, are used as the unit of analysis in the research design. In particular, party families that tend to prioritise individual freedom over collective interests (i.e., left and liberal parties) are associated with significantly more liberal morality policies than party families that stress societal values and order (i.e., conservative/right and religious parties). While the latter are unlikely to overturn previous moves towards permissiveness, these results suggest that they might preserve the status quo at least. Curiously, no systematic effects of green parties are found, which may be because they have been represented in European governments at later periods when morality policy outputs were already quite permissive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing social pact literature claims that governing parties offer social pact proposals because they anticipate they will receive an electoral benefit from social pact agreements. Yet the available data on social pacts inform us that in a substantial minority of cases social pact proposals fail to become social pact agreements. In an effort to better determine the political calculations made by governments before they propose a social pact, this article examines the effect of implementing reform legislation unilaterally, social pact proposals, social pact proposal failures and social pact agreements on the vote share of government parties in 15 Western European countries between 1981 and 2006. It is found that social pact proposals do not have any electoral consequences for governing parties, unilateral legislation and social pact proposal failures reduce the vote share of governing parties, and social pact agreements provide an electoral benefit to parties in minority governments only. These findings suggest that governing parties propose social pacts in a good faith effort to complete a social pact agreement; and that such an agreement is not a way for these parties to gain votes, but to avoid the electoral punishment associated with enacting unpopular reforms unilaterally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Welfare chauvinism has become an important element in the agenda of the populist radical right. This article proposes a novel argument to explain variation in the strength of welfare chauvinist appeals across social policy programmes. It theorizes that the redistributive justice principles (equity, equality, and need) that underpin a social programme matter. Equality- and need-based programmes are more likely to contradict a nativist worldview in principle or practice, whereas equity-based schemes are less vulnerable to welfare chauvinistic appeals. As a consequence, welfare chauvinism should be targeted at social policies that provide universal or means-tested benefits. Insurance-based systems are more likely to be immune. This argument is tested through a qualitative content analysis of populist radical right election manifestos in four West European democracies. The results show that insurance-based systems (pensions, unemployment) are less likely to attract welfare chauvinism, whereas universal healthcare and means-tested social assistance programmes are more prone to draw nativist appeals. Universal family allowances, however, are less likely to attract welfare chauvinism than predicted by the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The return of migrants to their country of origin and the development of efficient return measures have become more prominent on the political agenda of many Western European countries. Since policymakers prefer 'voluntary' return, governmental programmes to support the return of migrants - Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes - were developed as far back as the 1970s and have played an increasingly important role in migration policy over the last three decades. At the same time, general migration policy and welfare systems have undergone profound change, including in the meanings and connotations attached to social welfare, return support and return policy. This raises questions about the implications of these broader societal and policy changes for the widely implemented AVR programmes. In this article, we discuss the interpretation and evolution of AVR programmes by analyzing how one particular European country, Belgium, has developed its AVR programme over time. We explore the evolution of the programme's content, target group and institutional positioning, which shed light on its changing goals and are closely linked to a broader shift towards a 'managerial' approach to migration policy and the welfare state. We argue that return support may become decontextualized when it adopts 'conditional entitlement' as a central principle. This leads to strong differentiation, based on personal responsibility, between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' migrants, the levelling down of the support given to returnees, and a more coercive voluntary return policy in which social support is linked to deportation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a vast theoretical literature argues that we live in populist times, the success of populism beyond its electoral dimension is rarely investigated empirically. This paper analyses the development of populism in five Western European countries (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) from the 1970s to the 2010s. First, it measures whether political parties articulate populist discourses more and more often in their election manifestos. Second, the paper tests whether the presence of populism has increased over time in newspaper articles. The results show that populism is not a new phenomenon and that there is no linear increase over the decades. Moreover, while election manifestos are significantly more populist in the 2010s than in previous decades, populism in newspaper articles remains rather stable at a low level, suggesting that the media curb rather than foster populist discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives This article evaluates the influence of the economic crisis (2009-2013) on the vote share of the radical right in Western European regions. I ask two questions: (1) Has the radical right electorally benefited from the recession that has hit Western Europe in the aftermath of the U.S. and European stock market crisis in 2008/2009? (2) Has it performed particularly well in areas that have been very hard hit by the crisis? Methods I evaluate both questions in a longitudinal and multivariate framework through pooled time series analysis. The analysis, which controls for immigration, the education level of the region, and population density, covers more than 150 regions in 17 European countries from 1990 to 2013. Results First, I find that the 2009 to 2013 economic crisis has merely triggered a very moderate increase of 1 percentage point in the aggregate average regional vote share of the radical right. Second, and with the exception of regions in Greece and France, my results also indicate that the radical right has had the strongest electoral gains in regions and countries that have been relatively spared from the gust of the crisis. Conclusion This quantitative study highlights that an economic crisis is no panacea for the success of the radical right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the responsiveness of the Parti socialiste towards specific social groups under the Hollande and Mitterrand presidencies. It thereby contributes to the discussion on the changing representativeness of social democratic parties in Western Europe. The study is based on a content analysis of the governments’ justifications for the annual budget. With this innovative approach it is possible to assess whether the responsiveness of a party persists at the governmental level. Through an inductive coding procedure, three categories of responsive justifications are discerned: inequality reduction, needs of specific social groups and general functioning of society. In line with its title, the article mainly focuses on the second category, identifying a shift from responsiveness to the low-income classes towards responsiveness to the middle classes. Furthermore, a corresponding transformation of the Parti socialiste is observed, from advocating expansive policies in the early 1980s to justifying restrictive policies today. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Written 40 years ago, Harvey Molotch’s paper ‘City as a Growth Machine’, is a milestone in urban studies. By its focus on land owners and land related interests and their collective promotion of urban growth he radically shifted the centre of gravity of studies of urban politics. This article celebrates his achievement. It then shows, first, how his insights might be deepened by a critique whose point of departure is a recognition of the capitalist nature of that politics and the role played by the accumulation strategies of property developers; and second, how our understanding of urban growth politics in the USA might be deepened by comparison with that in the countries of Western Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do political parties' shifts on sociocultural issues, which signify the withdrawal of ideological commitment and disturb their supporters, cause vote loss? We argue that the negative electoral impact of positional shifts is constrained by party supporters' opinion as well as parties' ideological strength on sociocultural issues. Using data on party positions and ideologies in Western Europe from 1990 to 2008, we find that only parties holding strong ideologies on sociocultural issues lose votes by shifting their positions on these issues. Even these parties, however, do not lose votes when their position shifts in the same direction as that of their supporters. The results indicate that niche parties are straightforwardly affected by position shifts regarding sociocultural issues; they should adopt different strategies between values they endorse and those they reject; and political parties should not be worried about vote loss from position shifts as long as they follow their supporters' opinions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic voting theory assumes that on an individual level voters react to economic indicators to hold incumbents responsible for the performance of the economy. On an aggregate level, this would imply that there is an association between economic indicators and levels of volatility since voters have to switch parties if they want to punish or reward political actors. Based on a time-series cross-section analysis of the Pedersen Index for Western European countries in the period 1950-2013, we do indeed observe an association between economic indicators and levels of volatility. This effect furthermore grows stronger over time, and it is assumed that this is rendered possible by processes of partisan dealignment. The analysis suggests that European electorates are significantly more likely to shift parties in response to economic downturn now than they were a few decades ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political systems of the 1960s-1980s in Western Europe witnessed a pas de deux of two political blocks, the moderate left and the moderate right, which both collaborate in order to achieve stability, welfare state and European integration. As most of the successful stories, this one came eventually to an end: starting with the 1990s, the centre-left and centre-right parties were not able to replicate their previous results. Moreover, due to different circumstances in the recent years they could only achieve half of the percentages they gained decades ago. The aim of this article is to evaluate the shape of the centre-right and centre-left nowadays in Europe and also to find out whether such a consensus would be possible once more. Some explanation of why party systems changed dramatically in recent years will be provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of the radical right as a strong competitor to mainstream parties has fundamentally reshaped patterns of competition in many European party systems. In this article, we systematically explore changes to the ideological landscape in Western Europe by examining whether there has been programmatic mainstreaming of radical right parties due to (a) accommodation to and (b) moderation by radical right parties. We examine positions and salience on liberal-authoritarianism and the salience of economic issues using manifesto data from 68 parties in 17 countries. Our findings provide empirical support for a rightward shift in European party systems: on liberalauthoritarianism, mainstream left and right parties have increased their emphasis and moved to the right. Yet radical right parties have generally remained niche competitors; they are increasingly extreme and more focused on liberal-authoritarianism. Our analysis has important implications for understanding party systems, party competition and citizen representation in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first and foremost task of all governments is to make decisions. Consequently, studies on governments should deal above all with their ability to produce legislation. To this respect, this article analyses the legislative productivity of 112 parliamentary governments in 12 Western European democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) from 1990 to 2013. My independent variable is an index offering an immediate picture of the decision-making potential of parliamentary governments, while the dependent variable is the 'detailed' legislative production of those governments. If we are able to differentiate between governments who decide, and governments who do not, we could answer a considerable number of interesting questions: which Western European parliamentary democracies tend to produce more (detailed) laws and which - on the contrary - are used to facing greater difficulties for achieving that goal? What are the reasons behind these opposing trends? The empirical results largely confirms that the more a parliamentary government has got decision-making potential (in terms of the proposed index), the more likely it will pass 'detailed' legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tries to explain regional level variation in the far right-wing vote across more than 160 regions in 17 Western European countries from 1990 to 2013. With the help of a panel Tobit model, I first examine the impact of nine regional-level structural indicators on the dependent variable, the percentage of the far right-wing vote. I find that the far right performs better in territorial units with a high percentage of university-educated individuals, in rural regions and in areas that have a high percentage of foreigners. Second, I use a dynamic specification in first differences to evaluate how changes in the independent variables trigger changes in the dependent variable. The results of this second specification highlight that increases in unemployment rates and in the number of college-educated citizens trigger a better performance of the far right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fall of the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe was a shattering event for the western European radical left, causing many parties to change their names and strategies. Despite prophesies pointing to the death of radical anti-capitalist politics, radical left parties (RLPs) still exist in all parts of Europe, and in many countries they have even been able to increase their influence. This paper seeks to provide a comparative mapping of the policies and policy positions of western European RLPs before and after the fall of communism. The results of the examination indicate that although leftward trends can be observed in many RLPs in the early 2010s, the general, long-time, trend shows that the radical left family – and especially democratic socialist parties – has become less radical with regards to the core left–right dimension. Moreover, the study also shows that many RLPs – and, again, especially democratic socialist parties – have become more interested in other, non-socioeconomic, issues. Despite the rise of new left issues, the radical left is, however, still distinguishable from other parties mainly through their comparatively strong emphasis on old, traditional, left issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In parliamentary democracies, political parties bargain over cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. While most of the theoretical literature predicts that only minimal winning coalitions form in equilibrium, the empirical evidence shows that minority and surplus coalitions are about as frequent. In this article, I bridge the gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence by developing a noncooperative bargaining model in which parties are both office seeking and policy pursuing. Parties bargain over cabinet portfolios, which in turn determines the government policy. Parties are farsighted, and when they coalesce with other parties, they take into account not only the expected cabinet portfolio allocation but also how this allocation would affect the government coalition policy. The model predicts in equilibrium the formation of minimal winning as well as minority and surplus coalitions as a function of a party's size, ideal policies, and relative preference for policy versus office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies on the electoral performance of niche parties have not fully taken into account the evolutionary aspect of the programmatic profiles of these parties, although the majority of these parties were analysed from when they first came into existence, as new parties. Acknowledging the variation in programmatic profiles between niche parties and over time, the article argues that the electoral effects of nicheness and programmatic concentration as programmatic features of niche parties vary over their lifecycle. When entering the electoral arena, niche parties benefit from high levels of nicheness and programmatic concentration. However, these positive effects decrease as parties grow older and face different challenges to those of their early days. The empirical analysis of green and extreme right parties in this article supports the corresponding hypotheses. Results show that the positive effects of nicheness and programmatic concentration vanish over time and indicate niche parties’ own influence on their electoral destiny. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent studies document that voters infer parties' left-right positions from governing coalition arrangements. We show that citizens extend this coalition-based heuristic to the European integration dimension and, furthermore, that citizens' coalition-based inferences on this issue conflict with alternative measures of party positions derived from election manifestos and expert placements. We also show that citizens' perceptions of party positions on Europe matter, in that they drive substantial partisan sorting in the electorate. Our findings have implications for parties' election strategies and for mass-elite policy linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parties that defend the interest of one or a few ethnic groups and/or regions are, despite their differences, recurrently grouped together into a single party family. This article systematically applies the multidimensional framework offered by Mair and Mudde in order to provide an up-to-date inventory of the universe of ethnic and regionalist parties in Western Europe and assess whether they form a family. The evidence indicates that although the ethnic and regionalist family appears to be somewhat less coherent than more established families, there are clear similarities between the proposed (core) member parties. More specifically, the common denominators that distinguish the members of the ethnic and regionalist party family are their rather similar origins, sociologies, and policy orientations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most accounts of electoral system change tend to consider it as being driven by purely partisan interests. Political parties are expected to change the electoral rules as a way to maximise gains or minimise losses. However, little work has been done on the question of why electoral reforms are so scarce in spite of these potential benefits. In this study, a wide range of both factors that may foster ('catalysts') and ones that may hinder ('barriers') the change of electoral institutions are investigated. A statistical analysis is performed of 16 West European countries from 1975 to 2005, covering 23 reforms of the proportionality of their electoral systems. It is found that procedural barriers are more effective for explaining the likelihood of electoral reforms than (most of) the catalysts. Additionally, there are indications that courts may play a more active role in triggering reform than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few studies have analysed the effect of political engagement on legislators’ responsiveness. This article focuses on opinion leaders defined as citizens who regularly discuss politics and who attempt to persuade others to change their viewpoint. It investigates whether opinion leaders are better represented compared to other voters. Taking advantage of the Swiss institution of direct democracy, the article combines roll-call votes and information from popular votes to compare the voting behaviour of legislators and citizens on exactly the same policy proposals. It thus overcomes limitations pertaining to the lack of identical information on elites’ and citizens’ preferences that is common in the literature. The findings show that opinion leaders are better represented than the rest of the electorate in those instances where both sub-groups disagree, and that issue salience does not increase responsiveness to rank-and-file voters. These findings have important implications for understanding unequal representation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It has been argued that political parties are in decline. While they used to be responsible for connecting citizens to the state by translating their preferences into policies, they have increasingly become part of the state, acting as governors instead. While this perspective emphasises parties' representative function, it is less clear what their role is in a more direct democratic context. Parties may gain support due to such context, but they may also be seen increasingly redundant in a situation where citizens can co-decide directly. Focusing on party membership, this study tests these rival expectations on a panel of 16 West European democracies over the period 1980-2008 and finds that parties tend to have higher levels of party membership in a direct democratic context. The usage of referendums, however, does not contribute to this effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State formation in the developing world can be explained as growing centralisation and institutionalisation. To understand why some states struggle with state formation, or the processes of centralisation, the model provided by Charles Tilly, in his analysis of state formation in Western Europe, is applied to Lebanon, starting at the onset of the 1975 civil war and concluding with an analysis of the post-Syrian occupation environment. With the appropriate conditions it is possible to use Tilly’s model of war making and the state to measure state formation, or the lack thereof, in the developing world. Conclusively, in the case of Lebanon, it is evident that progress towards strong state formation has been made because of processes of war that are similar to those Tilly outlines in his historical analysis of Western Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Our study investigates the assumption that citizens expect the democratic institutional system to operate in accordance with values and norms that are deeply embedded in public thinking of their country. As individual-level trust towards the institutional system is built mainly on these norms and values, our results show that differences between Eastern and Western European public thinking lead to asymmetries regarding the bases of institutional trust. Specifically, degree of income inequalities and perceived quality of welfare services seem to be more important factors in the postsocialist region in comparison with Western Europe. Furthermore, in accordance with the approach of motivated social cognition, we could also confirm that those with a higher level of conventionality motivation lean on normative ideological elements to a greater extent when they are indicating their personal level of institutional trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people say that they trust local authorities, is it simply because they have generalized trust in national government? Or is trust in local government rooted in distinctive considerations, connected to the character of local communities and the balance of power across levels of government? We explore how trust in local and national government differs across individuals and across countries in western Europe. We find that people trust local government for different reasons than those that drive trust in national government. Cross-national differences in levels of trust in government reflect the character of national institutions. While both proportional representation systems and federal systems are power-sharing designs, each has distinctive consequences for trust. When opportunities for voice in local government are high, as in decentralized systems, people report greater trust in local government. When opportunities for voice in national government are limited, as in majoritarian systems, people report lower trust for national government and higher trust in local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parliamentarians and their party groups can employ many different instruments to communicate policy statements to their electorate (debates in plenary, presentations of committee reports, oral questions, written questions, and interpellations). Therefore, the design of these instruments should be analysed in one common framework. This paper seeks to provide a first step towards this goal by mapping and explaining the centralisation of parliamentary policy statements in all western European countries with a parliamentary system. It is argued that, on a theoretical level, there are two different causes for a stronger or weaker centralisation of the instruments of parliamentary policy statements: the electoral connection and efficiency. Empirically, it is shown that there are striking differences in centralisation both within and between countries which are worth exploring further. Moreover, the results of the statistical models suggest that the electoral connection is the driving factor behind the centralisation of the instruments of parliamentary policy statements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Employing two theories of morality policy, Policy Types and the "Two Worlds" of religious/secular party systems, we describe and attempt to explain the empirical patterns for five morality policy issues (abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia, assisted reproductive technology/stem cell research, and same-sex marriage) across 24 Western democracies since World War II. What is the content of policy adoption? Are some countries consistently more permissive or restrictive on morality issues? How long do these issues stay on the political agenda? These issues have been on the agendas of all of the countries for varying time periods, with some being older in vintage (death penalty, abortion, euthanasia) than others (ART/stem cells and same-sex marriage). The general tendency has been toward greater permissiveness, but there still remains considerable policy diversity. While there has been substantial change on morality policies in Western democracies since World War II, the change is more thorough in some jurisdictions and in some regions more than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented which offers a response to articles within the issue discussing the book "Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy: Comparing Britain, France and Italy," by this article's author. An overview of the opposition to immigration of extreme right political parties (ERPs) in Western Europe, including the Italian political party Lega Nord and British political party the British National Party's (BNP's) opposition to immigrants, is provided.

Impact of Extreme Right Parties makes a welcome contribution to the growing scholarship that assesses the impacts of extreme right parties (ERPs) on inter-party competition, public opinion and public policy. Although it commendably avoids the pitfall of overestimating the political significance of ERPs, several criticisms of the book nevertheless can be raised. First, it is disquieting that its analysis of the impacts of ERPs within its chosen three countries covers less than a decade. Second, the reader may come away questioning its ultimate contribution to our understanding of the staying power of ERPs. Third, it is reasonable to ask if in investigating the impacts of ERPs on inter-party competition and public opinion the book is simply accumulating evidence for the much more important question of their impact on public policy. Finally, it is unfortunate that the possible effects of ERPs on partisan and party system dealignment are not considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical right-wing parties have been a constant force in party systems of Western Europe since the late 1980s, despite cycles of development and support. Still, measurement of their impact has proven difficult. Scholars assessing the impact of radical right-wing parties in recent years have produced mixed findings in terms of whether effects tend to be direct or indirect and more or less salient. The recent book by Carvalho engages existing literature on impact assessment examining the cases of the UK, France and Italy. His findings caution against overstatement of impacts on immigration policy, suggesting that effects are contingent on party system competition and mainstream party agency. This article considers the mixed results pointing to a lack of existing tools for measuring indirect party impacts. It contends that existing theory on party impact struggles to conceptualize empty spaces in political ideology, attributing agency to moving parties and not to others that may be pushing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]