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The article critiques the book "Subversive Property: Law and the Production of Spaces of Belonging" by Sarah Keenan, and it mentions the feminist legal theory-related work of Keenan and the late American law professor Mary Joe Frug. Property rights are addressed, along with a British asylum claim involving Ugandan lesbian Prossy Kakooza. Legal decisions about inclusion and exclusion are examined, along with other refugee and immigration law cases involving lesbians in Australia and Canada.

An introduction to a constitutional protection of property is presented which includes Professor Joe Singer, problems of property, and condition of having no rules.

An essay is presented on government's forbearance of an individual's reliance on previously existing legal entitlements to a property in the U.S. Topics discussed in the essay include the U.S. Supreme Court case Fletcher v. Peck, which is related to the conveyance of land in Georgia, Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge in Massachusetts, which relates to contractual rights of a bridge, and the U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Winstar Corp.

In this essay, the author focuses on an underlying theoretical issue which she believes seriously affects our collective response to the idea of group rights in the genetic-control context. That issue is to what extent are our responses to claims of group rights hampered by our bringing to the table (consciously or unconsciously) a model which is structured to acknowledge only individual concerns? Put another way, to what extent are our objections to group rights in this context a product of our inability (or refusal) to imagine the idea of group rights, rather than the product of truly substantive concerns? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the author's comments about the article "Judicial Review, Rights, and Democracy," by Horacio Spector, published in the present issue of the journal "Law & Philosophy." The author says that in his article, Horacio Spector undertakes two tasks. First, he attempts to establish a conceptual link between moral rights and judicial review. She says that in particular, he tries to establish that moral rights justify the impartial and independent review of legislative acts that judicial review involves. Secondly, he opposes the criticism that judicial review contravenes basic democratic principles. The author examines Spector's arguments by questioning the models of judicial and legislative decision making that his article employs. She says that the products of these governmental systems are in fact far less distinguishable than assumed by Spector. She says that the claim that rights should have some setting in which they can be asserted or expressed by their holders is difficult to deny.

In the United States, payment of public tax money to religious institutions— including religious educational institutions—has traditionally been subject to rigorous restraints. Interpreting the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has long held that state-mandated financial support of religious institutions tends to corrupt both religion and government, and is a violation of conscience for those who must fund religions with which they may bitterly disagree. Recently, advocates of state aid for religious education have attacked these principles, arguing that they fail to recognise the religious tolerance that American society has achieved. This article defends the traditional restraints. It argues that Americans in fact embrace a limited form of religious diversity, one that tends to be tolerant of familiar, mainstream religious groups, but is distinctly intolerant of others. Indeed, recent polls indicate that the equal funding of all religious groups—as the Constitution's principle of equality would demand—is highly controversial and supported by few Americans. It is argued that traditional restraints on public funding of religious institutions in the USA are rooted in a fundamental truth: that religious differences in pluralistic societies are often deep, divisive, and volatile, and that the financial enmeshment of religion and government serves neither religion, government, nor the atmosphere of tolerance upon which diverse societies depend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]