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Across two experiments (N=799) we demonstrate that people's use of quantitative information (e.g., base-rates) when making a judgment varies as the causal link of qualitative information (e.g., stereotypes) changes. That is, when a clear causal link for stereotypes is provided, people make judgments that are far more in line with them. When the causal link is heavily diminished, people readily incorporate non-causal base-rates into their judgments instead. We suggest that people use and integrate all of the information that is provided to them to make judgements, but heavily prioritize information that is causal in nature. Further, people are sensitive to the underlying causal structures in their environment and adapt their decision making as such. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across four studies participants (N = 818) rated the profoundness of abstract art images accompanied with varying categories of titles, including: pseudo-profound bullshit titles (e.g., The Deaf Echo), mundane titles (e.g., Canvas 8), and no titles. Randomly generated pseudo-profound bullshit titles increased the perceived profoundness of computer-generated abstract art, compared to when no titles were present (Study 1). Mundane titles did not enhance the perception of profoundness, indicating that pseudo-profound bullshit titles specifically (as opposed to titles in general) enhance the perceived profoundness of abstract art (Study 2). Furthermore, these effects generalize to artist-created abstract art (Study 3). Finally, we report a large correlation between profoundness ratings for pseudo-profound bullshit and "International Art English" statements (Study 4), a mode and style of communication commonly employed by artists to discuss their work. This correlation suggests that these two independently developed communicative modes share underlying cognitive mechanisms in their interpretations. We discuss the potential for these results to be integrated into a larger, new theoretical framework of bullshit as a low-cost strategy for gaining advantages in prestige awarding domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has demonstrated a link between illusory pattern perception and various irrational beliefs. On this basis, we hypothesized that participants who displayed greater degrees of illusory pattern perception would also be more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. We find support for this prediction across three experiments (N = 627) and four distinct measures of pattern perception. We further demonstrate that this observed relation is restricted to illusory pattern perception, with participants displaying greater endorsement of non-illusory patterns being no more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. Additionally, this relation is not a product of a general proclivity to rate all statements as profound and is not accounted for by individual differences in analytic thinking. Overall, we demonstrate that individuals with a tendency to go beyond the available data such that they uncritically endorse patterns where no patterns exist are also more likely to create and endorse false-meaning in meaningless pseudo-profound statements. These findings are discussed in the context of a proposed framework that views individuals' receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit as, in part, an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise adaptive process: that of pattern perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on the topic of duration estimation has examined the mechanisms underlying estimation of durations that are demarcated by experimental stimuli. It is not clear whether the estimation of durations that are instead defined by our own mental processes (e.g., response times) is underlain by the same mechanisms. Across five experiments, we tested whether the pattern of interference between concurrent temporal and nontemporal tasks was similar for the two types of intervals. Duration estimation of externally defined intervals slowed performance on a concurrent equation verification task, regardless of whether participants were required to report their estimate by clicking within an analogue scale or by reproducing the duration. Estimation of internally defined durations did not slow equation verification performance when an analogue scale response was required. The results suggest that estimation of internally defined durations may not depend on the effortful temporal processing that is required to estimate externally defined durations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research shows that performance on pop-out search tasks is facilitated when the target and distractors repeat across trials compared to when they switch. This phenomenon has been shown for many different types of visual stimuli. We tested whether the effect would extend beyond visual stimuli to the auditory modality. Using a temporal search task that has previously been shown to elicit priming of pop-out with visual stimuli (Yashar & Lamy, Psychological Science, 21(2), 243-251, ), we showed that priming of pop-out does occur with auditory stimuli and has characteristics similar to those of an analogous visual task. These results suggest that either the same or similar mechanisms might underlie priming of pop-out in both modalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attentional biases to threat are thought to play a central role in the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Various measures have been developed to index these biases; unfortunately, the psychometric properties of response time measures of attentional bias have not been thoroughly evaluated, and the reliability of those that have been evaluated is poor. The current study assessed the reliability and convergent validity of dot probe and emotional cueing bias scores in high-anxious and low-anxious participants in the context of a state anxiety manipulation to increase the likelihood of producing large, potentially reliable attentional biases. One hundred sixty participants completed an anxious or calm mood induction followed by dot probe and emotional cueing tasks. Reliability estimates for bias scores in the full sample were low, ranging from 0 to .44; convergent validity estimates were also poor. The anxiety induction did not substantially improve the reliability or validity of the measures. These results underscore the importance of developing new, more reliable attentional bias measures for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A divide exists in the creativity literature as to whether relatively more or less executive processing is beneficial to creative thinking. To explore this issue, we employ an individual differences perspective informed by dual-process theories (DPTs) in which it is assumed that people vary in the extent to which they rely on autonomous (Type 1) or controlled processing (Type 2). We find that those more willing and/or able to engage Type 2 processing are more likely to successfully make creative connections in tasks requiring the unification of disparate elements and the novelty of generated items, but not in some other indices of creativity, namely, cognitive flexibility and fluency. Implications for the role of executive processing in creative thinking are discussed in the context of DPTs. We situate the ability to make remote connections alongside other advanced higher order thinking capabilities that are unique to humans. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Two experiments combined a spatial cueing manipulation (valid vs. invalid spatial cues) with a stimulus repetition manipulation (repeated vs. nonrepeated) in order to assess the hypothesis that familiar items need less spatial attention than less familiar ones. The magnitude of the effect of cueing on reading aloud time for items that were repeated throughout the experiment was smaller than the magnitude of the cueing effect for items that were not repeated within the experiment. These results are consistent with the idea that familiarity within an experiment modulates the spatial attentional demands of word processing. Implications for understanding spatial attention's role in reading are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One major idea about spatial attention is that it serves to modulate crosstalk between features during reading. Two reading aloud experiments are reported in which a cue-validity manipulation was combined with manipulations that are thought to increase the likelihood of feature-level crosstalk: interletter spacing and the presence or absence of irrelevant features. Both experiments yielded an interaction between the effects of spatial cuing and each of these factors. These results are taken to support the hypothesis that when spatial attention is focused on the word, it provides protection against crosstalk among features in the context of reading aloud. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In experiments on semantic priming, participants vary substantially in the absolute magnitude of priming they produce. Are these individual differences systematic or do they arise from random processes, and does the answer carry theoretical implications? To find out, we examined split‐half and test–retest reliability of semantic priming in a series of two‐session experiments that crossed relatedness proportion (RP, at .25, .50, and .75) with stimulus–onset asynchrony (SOA, at 200, 350, and 800 ms). Low reliability would indicate little coherence of activity within semantic memory, so that the degree to which any given association influences performance is uncorrelated from one association and time of testing to the next. High reliability would indicate that each person tends to harness his or her semantic knowledge consistently, applying semantic relations among words in much the same way from one word to the next and one time of testing to the next to help task performance, resulting in systematic individual differences. What we observed was low reliability—often zero. When conditions highlighted “automatic activation” (low RP, short SOA), priming was completely uncorrelated from item to item and session to session. Both split‐half and test–retest reliability increased to significant levels under conditions that raised the probability that an activated or retrieved episode of prime experience would help with target recognition, and the probability of intentionally generating the target from the prime. Thus, task‐relevant" utility imposes a modicum of order on semantic associations that are otherwise noisy and uncoordinated. Harnessing semantic memory is like herding cats—without considerable constraint, associations tend to come and go their own ways in independent fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In experiments on semantic priming, participants vary substantially in the absolute magnitude of priming they produce. Are these individual differences systematic or do they arise from random processes, and does the answer carry theoretical implications? To find out, we examined split-half and test-retest reliability of semantic priming in a series of two-session experiments that crossed relatedness proportion (RP, at .25, .50, and .75) with stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA, at 200, 350, and 800 ms). Low reliability would indicate little coherence of activity within semantic memory, so that the degree to which any given association influences performance is uncorrelated from one association and time of testing to the next. High reliability would indicate that each person tends to harness his or her semantic knowledge consistently, applying semantic relations among words in much the same way from one word to the next and one time of testing to the next to help task performance, resulting in systematic individual differences. What we observed was low reliability--often zero. When conditions highlighted "automatic activation" (low RP, short SOA), priming was completely uncorrelated from item to item and session to session. Both split-half and test-retest reliability increased to significant levels under conditions that raised the probability that an activated or retrieved episode of prime experience would help with target recognition, and the probability of intentionally generating the target from the prime. Thus, task-relevant" utility imposes a modicum of order on semantic associations that are otherwise noisy and uncoordinated. Harnessing semantic memory is like herding cats--without considerable constraint, associations tend to come and go their own ways in independent fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The localization of a changing target character has been demonstrated to be facilitated when more features in the target character change than when fewer features change (Smilek, Eastwood, & Merikle, 2000). The purpose of the present paper is to localize the effects of the features changing manipulation with respect to central attention and early, sensory processing. In Experiment 1 we manipulated the number of features changing in the target in a change detection task, which served as Task 2 in a psychological refractory period paradigm. The results indicated that the effect of the features manipulation occurred prior to a central attentional bottleneck. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this result by including blocks of trials in which a mask was interspersed between the two search displays. The effect of the features manipulation was once again found to have a locus prior to central attention. In addition, because the relation between the effects of the features manipulation and the stimulus onset asynchrony separating Tasks 1 and 2 was not affected by the masking manipulation, the effect of the features manipulation was argued to occur after early, sensory processing. Experiment 3 supported this interpretation by showing that the masking manipulation used in Experiment 2 strongly disrupted early, sensory processing. Taken together, the results of the three experiments point to a level of representation that is postsensory, yet prior to central attention. It is argued that this "abstract" feature-level representation is important in search for a change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changes in the conscious and unconscious influences of memory over time were assessed in two experiments by using a variant of the process-dissociation procedure. In both experiments, performance on a stem-completion task was measured under both inclusion and exclusion instructions. Across the two experiments, there were four different retention intervals: 2 minutes, 2 days, 2 weeks, and 2 months. The results indicated that conscious influences decreased systematically across retention interval. In contrast, unconscious influences of memory in the absence of conscious influences increased between 2 minutes and 2 days, and then remained relatively stable from 2 days to 2 weeks to 2 months. These results stand in apparent contrast to those of McBride and Dosher (1999), which showed equal rates of forgetting for conscious and unconscious influences of memory on performance. The implications for models of the relation between conscious and unconscious influences of memory on performance are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]