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Classical statistical analysis of data can be complemented or replaced with data analysis based on machine learning. However, in certain disciplines, such as education research, studies are frequently limited to small datasets, which raises several questions regarding biases and coincidentally positive results. In this study, we present a refined approach for evaluating the performance of a binary classification based on machine learning for small datasets. The approach includes a non-parametric permutation test as a method to quantify the probability of the results generalising to new data. Furthermore, we found that a repeated nested cross-validation is almost free of biases and yields reliable results that are only slightly dependent on chance. Considering the advantages of several evaluation metrics, we suggest a combination of more than one metric to train and evaluate machine learning classifiers. In the specific case that both classes are equally important, the Matthews correlation coefficient exhibits the lowest bias and chance for coincidentally good results. The results indicate that it is essential to avoid several biases when analysing small datasets using machine learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the integration of large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, into physics education. LLMs are artificial intelligence methods that can generate human-like text and have the potential to enhance personalized learning and provide immediate formative feedback to students. However, there are concerns about the accuracy and reliability of the feedback provided by LLMs. The article presents an application called LEAP (Learning with AI about Physics) that allows students to interact with ChatGPT for physics problem solving, with predetermined prompts to ensure focused and relevant feedback. The article emphasizes the need for careful integration of LLMs into teaching practices and highlights the potential benefits and challenges of using LLMs in physics education. [Extracted from the article]

Technology helps to solve problems, but it may also lead to unintended consequences. For example, biofuels may help to overcome the disadvantages of fossil fuels, but their production might compete with food production leading to higher food prices and hunger. Therefore, in recent decades, the societal impact of technology has come to the center of attention. To deal with potential ethical issues related to technology, many scholars have emphasized the importance of addressing values already during the design phase of new technology. Values are understood as beliefs about what is good or desirable, like human autonomy, safety, sustainability, or privacy. Researchers in ethics and philosophy of technology have developed a variety of approaches, like value-sensitive design (VSD) and responsible research and innovation, to help engineers embed values in technological design (e.g.,). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many researchers from robotics, machine ethics, and adjacent fields seem to assume that norms represent good behavior that social robots should learn to benefit their users and society. We would like to complicate this view and present seven key troubles with norm-compliant robots: (1) norm biases, (2) paternalism (3) tyrannies of the majority, (4) pluralistic ignorance, (5) paths of least resistance, (6) outdated norms, and (7) technologically-induced norm change. Because discussions of why norm-compliant robots can be problematic are noticeably absent from the robot and machine ethics literature, this paper fills an important research gap. We argue that it is critical for researchers to take these issues into account if they wish to make norm-compliant robots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has documented robust associations between greater disgust sensitivity and (1) concerns about disease, and (2) political conservatism. However, the COVID-19 disease pandemic raised challenging questions about these associations. In particular, why have conservatives—despite their greater disgust sensitivity—exhibited less concern about the pandemic? Here, we investigate this "conservatism-disgust paradox" and address several outstanding theoretical questions regarding the interrelations among disgust sensitivity, ideology, and pandemic response. In four studies (N = 1,764), we identify several methodological and conceptual factors—in particular, an overreliance on self-report measures—that may have inflated the apparent associations among these constructs. Using non-self-report measures, we find evidence that disgust sensitivity may be a less potent predictor of disease avoidance than is typically assumed, and that ideological differences in disgust sensitivity may be amplified by self-report measures. These findings suggest that the true pattern of interrelations among these factors may be less "paradoxical" than is typically believed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social media technologies (SMTs) are routinely identified as a strong and pervasive threat to digital well-being (DWB). Extended screen time sessions, chronic distractions via notifications, and fragmented workflows have all been blamed on how these technologies ruthlessly undermine our ability to exercise quintessential human faculties. One reason SMTs can do this is because they powerfully affect our emotions. Nevertheless, (1) how social media technology affects our emotional life and (2) how these emotions relate to our digital well-being remain unexplored. Remedying this is important because ethical insights into (1) and (2) open the possibility of designing for social media technologies in ways that actively reinforce our digital well-being. In this article, we examine the way social media technologies facilitate online emotions because of emotional affordances. This has important implications for evaluating the ethical implications of today’s social media platforms, as well as for how we design future ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technology should be aligned with our values. We make the case that attempts to align emerging technologies with our values should reflect critically on these values. Critical thinking seems like a natural starting point for the critical assessment of our values. However, extant conceptualizations of critical thinking carve out no space for the critical scrutiny of values. We will argue that we need critical thinking that focuses on values instead of taking them as unexamined starting points. In order to play a crucial role in helping to align values and technology, critical thinking needs to be modified and refocused on values. Here, we outline what value-centred critical thinking could look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People share their emotions on social media and evidence suggests that in times of crisis people are especially motivated to post emotional content. The current Coronavirus pandemic is such a crisis. The online sharing of emotional content during the Coronavirus crisis may contribute to societal value change. Emotion sharing via social media could lead to emotional contagion which in turn could facilitate an emotional climate in a society. In turn, the emotional climate of a society can influence society's value structure. The emotions that spread in the current Coronavirus crisis are predominantly negative, which could result in a negative emotional climate. Based on the dynamic relations of values to each other and the way that emotions relate to values, a negative emotional climate can contribute to societal value change towards values related to security preservation and threat avoidance. As a consequence, a negative emotional climate and the shift in values could lead to a change in political attitudes that has implications for rights, freedom, privacy and moral progress. Considering the impact of social media in terms of emotional contagion and a longer-lasting value change is an important perspective in thinking about the ethical long-term impact of social media technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research conducted on Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) has grown considerably during the last decades. With the help of BCIs, users can (re)gain a wide range of functions. Our aim in this paper is to analyze the impact of BCIs on autonomy. To this end, we introduce three abilities that most accounts of autonomy take to be essential: (1) the ability to use information and knowledge to produce reasons; (2) the ability to ensure that intended actions are effectively realized (control); and (3) the ability to enact intentions within concrete relationships and contexts. We then consider the impact of BCI technology on each of these abilities. Although on first glance, BCIs solely enhance self-determination because they restore or improve abilities, we will show that there are other positive, but also negative impacts on user autonomy, which require further philosophical and ethical discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical issues concerning brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) have already received a considerable amount of attention. However, one particular form of BCI has not received the attention that it deserves: Affective BCIs that allow for the detection and stimulation of affective states. This paper brings the ethical issues of affective BCIs in sharper focus. The paper briefly reviews recent applications of affective BCIs and considers ethical issues that arise from these applications. Ethical issues that affective BCIs share with other neurotechnologies are presented and ethical concerns that are specific to affective BCIs are identified and discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Connecting human minds to various technological devices and applications through brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) affords intriguingly novel ways for humans to engage and interact with the world. Not only do BCIs play an important role in restorative medicine, they are also increasingly used outside of medical or therapeutic contexts (e.g., gaming or mental state monitoring). A striking peculiarity of BCI technology is that the kind of actions it enables seems to differ from paradigmatic human actions, because, effects in the world are brought about by devices such as robotic arms, prosthesis, or other machines, and their execution runs through a computer directed by brain signals. In contrast to usual forms of action, the sequence does not need to involve bodily or muscle movements at all. A motionless body, the epitome of inaction, might be acting. How do theories of action relate to such BCI-mediated forms of changing the world? We wish to explore this question through the lenses of three perspectives on agency: subjective experience of agency, philosophical action theory, and legal concepts of action. Our analysis pursues three aims: First, we shall discuss whether and which BCI-mediated events qualify as actions, according to the main concepts of action in philosophy and law. Secondly, en passant, we wish to highlight the ten most interesting novelties or peculiarities of BCI-mediated movements. Thirdly, we seek to explore whether these novel forms of movement may have consequences for concepts of agency. More concretely, we think that convincing assessments of BCI-movements require more fine-grained accounts of agency and a distinction between various forms of control during movements. In addition, we show that the disembodied nature of BCI-mediated events causes troubles for the standard legal account of actions as bodily movements. In an exchange with views from philosophy, we wish to propose that the law ought to reform its concept of action to include some, but not all, BCI-mediated events and sketch some of the wider implications this may have, especially for the venerable legal idea of the right to freedom of thought. In this regard, BCIs are an example of the way in which technological access to yet largely sealed-off domains of the person may necessitate adjusting normative boundaries between the personal and the social sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we discuss the importance of emotions for ethical reflection on technological developments, as well as the role that art can play in this. We review literature that argues that emotions can and should play an important role in the assessment and acceptance of technological risk and in designing morally responsible technologies. We then investigate how technologically engaged art can contribute to critical, emotional-moral reflection on technological risks. The role of art that engages with technology is unexplored territory and gives rise to many fascinating philosophical questions that have not yet been sufficiently addressed in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can scientific evidence prompt us to revise philosophical theories or folk theoretical accounts of phenomena of the mind? We will argue that it can—but only under the condition that they make a so-called ‘ontological commitment’ to something that is actually subject to empirical inquiry. In other words, scientific evidence pertaining to neuroanatomical structure or causal processes only has a refuting effect if philosophical theories and folk notions subscribe to either account. We will illustrate the importance of ‘ontological commitment’ with the ‘neuroanatomical approach’ to amusement as proposed in a recent paper by Palencik (Dialogue 46(3):419-434, 2007). We will show that the scientific evidence presented in said neuroanatomical approach has no bearing on the conceptual issues, in that the philosophical theories and folk distinction that are criticized do not subscribe to any account of the underlying neuroanatomical structure or causal processes. Our suggestions in this paper are not limited to philosophical accounts of humor but apply to the relationship of philosophy, common sense and science in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We value a sense of humor in people, and amusement is something that we enjoy. So why not enhance and train your ability to be amused? In this paper, I investigate whether our ability to be amused can be trained. I adopt the idea that training a capacity requires improving control. If we cannot improve the control of a capacity, then we cannot train that capacity. I show that we cannot improve the control of our capacity of amusement because of the cognitive process underlying amusement. Hence, you cannot train your funny bone! [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that machines can create works of art. My argument is based on an analysis of the so-called creative machines and focuses on technical functions and intentions. If my proposal is correct, then creative machines are technical artifacts with the proper function to bring about works of art. My account is based on sensible conceptual connections between makers, technical artifacts, intentions, and the creation of art. One upshot of the account presented here is that we do not need a new conceptual framework or dubious assumptions about artistic agency on part of machines in order to arrive at the conclusion that creative machines make art. I will conclude the paper with some remarks regarding the artistic value of items produced by creative machines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There seems to be no connection between philosophy of humor and the philosophy of technology. In this paper, I want to make the case that there is. I will pursue a twofold goal in this paper: First, I will take an account from one of the seminal figures in the philosophy of humor, Henri Bergson, and bring out its merits for a philosophy of technology. Bergson has never been fully appreciated as a philosopher of technology. I will fill this gap and show that Bergson's account of the comic contains some interesting insights about our relation to technology. Second, I will show that humor and the comic open up a new perspective on technology that may facilitate new ways of thinking about our technological culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In number 35 of Think, James Spiegel presents reasons for why flatulence is funny. In this article I will address five issues that I find problematic in his account: (1)His claim that laughter always results from a pleasant psychological shift is false.(2)His argumentative move from what makes paradigm cases funny to what makes flatulence funny is unwarranted.(3)His notion of a psychological shift is not specific enough and lacks explanatory power.(4)The claim that funniness of flatulence involves superiority is doubtful.(5)His talk about ‘nervous energy’ is questionable and has implausible implications. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper, I will focus on the extension theories of technology. I will identify four influential positions that have been put forward: (1) technology as an extension of the human organism, (2) technology as an extension of the lived body and the senses, (3) technology as an extension of our intentions and desires, and (4) technology as an extension of our faculties and capabilities. I will describe and critically assess these positions one by one and highlight their advantages and their shortcomings and limitations. Along the way, I will explicate some of the differences and similarities between the various approaches. I conclude the paper with some suggestions for future research directions that will be beneficial for advancing theory building and that will drive forward the philosophical refinement of extension theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distillation of four 'gravitational centers' of discourse on the ethically relevant issues regarding robots constitutes the elements of the taxonomy developed in this paper. In this paper I take the birds-eye perspective, looking on the ongoing discussions and picking out clusters: (1) Robots as mere means to achieve a specific goal; (2) the robot as an addressee/recipient of ethical behavior; (3) the robot as a moral agent; (4) the robot as an ethical impact-factor. A fifth dimension is then introduced: The 'meta-perspective' invites ethicists and researchers in robotics to be sensitive to how their discipline and thinking is influenced. One the one hand, this taxonomy helps roboticists to navigate through the ethical discourse, on the other hand it creates a common ground for the needed dialogue between professional ethicists and people with hands on experience in robotics. The paper concludes with implications for future collaborations between ethicists and researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doping of carbon nanoparticles with impurity atoms is central to their application. However, doping has proven elusive for very small carbon nanoparticles because of their limited availability and a lack of fundamental understanding of impurity stability in such nanostructures. Here, we show that isolated diamond nanoparticles as small as 1.6 nm, comprising only ∼400 carbon atoms, are capable of housing stable photoluminescent colour centres, namely the silicon vacancy (SiV). Surprisingly, fluorescence from SiVs is stable over time, and few or only single colour centres are found per nanocrystal. We also observe size-dependent SiV emission supported by quantum-chemical simulation of SiV energy levels in small nanodiamonds. Our work opens the way to investigating the physics and chemistry of molecular-sized cubic carbon clusters and promises the application of ultrasmall non-perturbative fluorescent nanoparticles as markers in microscopy and sensing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Magnetic field fluctuations arising from fundamental spins are ubiquitous in nanoscale biology, and are a rich source of information about the processes that generate them. However, the ability to detect the few spins involved without averaging over large ensembles has remained elusive. Here, we demonstrate the detection of gadolinium spin labels in an artificial cell membrane under ambient conditions using a single-spin nanodiamond sensor. Changes in the spin relaxation time of the sensor located in the lipid bilayer were optically detected and found to be sensitive to nearindividual (4 ± 2) proximal gadolinium atomic labels. The detection of such small numbers of spins in a model biological setting, with projected detection times of 1 s [corresponding to a sensitivity of ∼5 Gd spins per Hz1/2], opens a pathway for in situ nanoscale detection of dynamical processes in biology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The uptake and intracellular trafficking of sphingolipids, which self-associate into plasma membrane microdomains, is associated with many pathological conditions, including viral and toxin infection, lipid storage disease, and neurodegenerative disease. However, the means available to label the trafficking pathways of sphingolipids in live cells are extremely limited. In order to address this problem, we have developed an exogenous, non-toxic probe consisting of a 25-amino acid sphingolipid binding domain, the SBD, derived from the amyloid peptide Aβ, and conjugated by a neutral linker with an organic fluorophore. The current work presents the characterization of the sphingolipid binding and live cell trafficking of this novel probe, the SBD peptide. SBD was the name given to a motif originally recognized by Fantini et al [1] in a number of glycolipid-associated proteins, and was proposed to interact with sphingolipids in membrane microdomains. Methodology/Principal Findings: In accordance with Fantini's model, optimal SBD binding to membranes depends on the presence of sphingolipids and cholesterol. In synthetic membrane binding assays, SBD interacts preferentially with raft-like lipid mixtures containing sphingomyelin, cholesterol, and complex gangliosides in a pH-dependent manner, but is less glycolipid-specific than Cholera toxin B (CtxB). Using quantitative time-course colocalization in live cells, we show that the uptake and intracellular trafficking route of SBD is unlike that of either the non-raft marker Transferrin or the raft markers CtxB and Flotillin2-GFP. However, SBD traverses an endolysosomal route that partially intersects with raft-associated pathways, with a major portion being diverted at a late time point to rab11-positive recycling endosomes. Trafficking of SBD to acidified compartments is strongly disrupted by cholesterol perturbations, consistent with the regulation of sphingolipid trafficking by cholesterol. Conclusions/Significance: The current work presents the characterization and trafficking behavior of a novel sphingolipid-binding fluorescent probe, the SBD peptide. We show that SBD binding to membranes is dependent on the presence of cholesterol, sphingomyelin, and complex glycolipids. In addition, SBD targeting through the endolysosomal pathway in neurons is highly sensitive to cholesterol perturbations, making it a potentially useful tool for the analysis of sphingolipid trafficking in disease models that involve changes in cholesterol metabolism and storage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]