Search

Consistent with prior literature, we find that average relative effective spreads are higher for venues that pay for order flow (PFOF) than for venues utilizing the maker-taker (MT) model. This relation becomes more nuanced when liquidity fees are incorporated into liquidity cost measures. For the majority of options, PFOF venues offer lower average liquidity costs net of taker fees. Net liquidity costs for the high-priced options, however, are lower for MT venues. Overall, our results suggest that the inclusion of fees and rebates can rationalize the routing of most, but not all, marketable orders to PFOF venues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In November 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission implemented the final provision of Rule 15c3-5 curbing unfiltered market access. The provision mandated that brokers verify their clients' order flow for compliance with credit and capital thresholds before routing to market centers. We find that the new checks introduce latency to order flow and force some latency-sensitive strategies out of the market. As a result, liquidity providers are better able to revise their quotes in response to new information, adverse selection declines, and liquidity improves. Consistent with the notion that the market for liquidity provision is competitive, our results show that the benefit of lower adverse selection is transferred entirely to liquidity demanders in the form of lower trading costs. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern markets are characterized by speed differentials, with some traders being fractions of a second faster than others. Theoretical models suggest that such differentials may have both positive and negative effects on liquidity and gains from trade. We examine these effects by studying a series of exogenous weather episodes that temporarily remove the speed advantages of the fastest traders by disrupting their microwave networks. The disruptions are associated with lower adverse selection and lower trading costs. In additional analysis, we show that the long‐term removal of speed differentials results in similar effects and also increases gains from trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine trading activity around insider transactions on the Toronto Stock Exchange and find evidence that some traders mimic insider positions. Our unique data set allows us to establish a direct connection between insiders, their brokerages, and the brokerages' other clients. The findings are consistent with the possibility that some brokerages tip their clients about insider trades. Insiders in our sample have good timing; returns are usually positive (negative) after insider purchases (sales). Insiders' good timing translates to the mimicking transactions, which appear to be profitable net of trading costs. Evidence consistent with tipping is observed mainly for smaller independent brokerages. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study episodes of significant intraday downward price pressures in individual stocks and find that price declines during such episodes are driven mainly by liquidity demanding nonshort volume. Although short sellers during these price pressure episodes are also active and somewhat exacerbate the magnitude of price declines, their influence on prices is secondary to that of nonshort sellers. As such, our findings are inconsistent with the recently reignited allegations of systematic trading abuses caused solely by short sellers and might shed light on the debate regarding the need to reinstitute short selling restrictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The finance literature documents a significant post-decimalization decline in intermarket quote competitiveness. We show that this result is due primarily to the decline in 100-share NBBO-matching quotes posted by NASDAQ. After decimalization, such quotes decline by more than 90%. At that time, the intermarket trading system (ITS) regards 100-share quotes as meaningless; these quotes are exempt from the trade-through rule and are generally ignored by ITS participants. We therefore argue that the major decline in quote competitiveness observed by previous research is largely nominal, and that decimalization had a much lesser impact on quote competitiveness than previously believed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Blume and Goldstein (J Finance 52:221-244, ) suggest that quote competition between trading venues may diminish following tick size reductions. We test this suggestion by studying the competitive landscape in the NYSE-listed stocks before and after decimalization. We find that NBBO (National Best Bid and Offer) participation by non-NYSE venues declines following decimalization consistent with the prediction. At the same time, the importance of quote competitiveness in attracting order flow increases. In addition, although not as active in determining and maintaining the best quotes under decimals, non-NYSE venues become more active in price discovery. Finally, decimalization leads to lower trading costs and to smaller differences in trading costs across trading venues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]