Search

How do different types of external intervention affect the likelihood of a negotiated settlement in civil conflicts? Drawing on the negotiation literature, which shows that the nature of the parties' "best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)" influences the bargaining process between them, we argue different types of intervention affect governments' and rebel groups' BATNAs in different ways. This, in turn, affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. To test this argument, we address the fact that interventions are nonrandom, and that characteristics of civil conflicts that lead to different types of intervention also influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We therefore use a two-stage statistical model. The first stage predicts the likelihood of different types of intervention, and drawing on those results, the second stage analyzes the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The results provide insights into how different types of intervention affect civil conflict outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When will states receive concessions in multilateral negotiations? And on which issues are those concessions likely to be received? I highlight two factors that influence the likelihood a state will receive concessions on an issue in multilateral negotiations: (1) the degree to which the issues linked together in the negotiation are "differently valued" by the negotiating states, and (2) the costliness of states' "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" on each individual issue. The former creates the opportunity for an exchange of concessions; the latter creates the incentive for that exchange to occur. It is the interaction of having more differently valued issues on the table and having a more costly best alternative to a negotiated agreement on an issue that makes a state more likely to receive concessions on that issue. This argument stands in contrast to the standard negotiation literature, which has shown that having a more beneficial best alternative to a negotiated agreement will yield greater concessions. I argue that these contradictory assertions exist because there are two types of best alternatives to a negotiated agreement that must be taken into account – one at the negotiation level and those at the issue-specific level. The current literature has tended to focus on the former while I focus on the latter. I test my argument on an originally constructed dataset of concessions states received in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For each issue in the Round, I coded the costliness of each state's issue-specific best alternative to a negotiated agreement and the level of concessions it received on that issue. The results provide insights into the workings of multilateral negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governing elites often ratify human rights treaties, even when their policies do not align with those treaties' obligations. This article argues that this can be explained by the fact that executives anticipate the potential challenges these treaties could raise vis-à-vis their domestic policies and enter different types of reservations when they ratify to head them off. The types of reservations they use depend on key characteristics of the executive's policies and practices, as well as its relationship with the legislative and judicial branches. Domestic actors can raise different types of challenges against the executive depending on variations in these key factors. The types of reservations executives use will therefore vary depending on the specific challenges ratification raises for them. Using an original dataset of the reservations states entered on human rights treaties registered with the United Nations, and employing an event history analysis, this study shows that the particular challenges treaties present for executives in different types of states help explain variation in how they use reservations when they ratify human rights treaties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attention international trade receives at the domestic level varies widely across countries as well as among political elites within the same country. When and why are political elites likely to dedicate attention to this issue, and what is the policy position on which they are likely to focus when doing so? We argue that political elites are more likely to focus domestic attention on international trade when their country's economy is more dependent upon trade. The balance of trade is likely to influence the degree to which trade liberalization or protectionism is the main focus of elites at the domestic level, and the complexity of their country's trade policies is likely to mediate this relationship between the trade balance and the trade-policy positions that dominate the domestic agenda. We test this argument by analyzing how political elites chose to focus on international trade in their party platforms in the lead-up to national elections across fifty-three countries from 1960 through 2014. The results show that these characteristics of countries' trade policies are related in important ways to political elites' strategic choice regarding when and how to focus domestic attention on international trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agendas shape the strategies states adopt in international bargaining and, therefore, the substantive nature of the resulting outcomes. They are also a dynamic feature of the process, as states add and subtract issues in order to shift the bargaining outcome in their favor. This article analyzes when and why states will use these different ‘issue-linkage’ strategies. Focusing on the effects of a successful agreement and the costs of failure, it highlights conditions under which states are likely to add or subtract issues from the bargaining agenda. It tests these arguments using an original dataset of the bargaining strategies states have adopted in climate-change negotiations. It concludes by highlighting the implications the argument has for understanding the outcomes of international negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Decisions in international institutions such as the European Union ( EU) are often made by consensus, even when it is not required. Tit-for-tat exchanges provide an explanation for this phenomenon, as such exchanges can help to build up support for agreements states might otherwise not have had an incentive to support. Tit-for-tat exchanges are typically analyzed as trades of support across agreements. However, we argue that the priority of negotiators to further their national and bureaucratic interests makes exchanges across micro-level issues within a single proposal for agreement more prevalent than exchanges across agreements. Using both qualitative and quantitative analyses, we show that such within-agreement, rather than cross-agreement, linkages are related to an increased likelihood of consensus across an array of different EU agreements. To understand consensus in international institutions, more broadly, it is therefore necessary to look at the substantive issues at stake within each agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? Standard answers to this question focus on the role of state power. Other scholars highlight socialization effects. I argue that in most international negotiations, the institutional bargaining structure will mitigate the effects of power and socialization, and drive state bargaining behavior. Factors highlighted by formal models of international bargaining should therefore best explain the variation in the strategies states adopt. I introduce empirical measures of these abstract concepts, and test their effects against those of power and socialization using an original dataset of state bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU). The results show that structural factors best explain variation in the EU states' bargaining strategies. I conclude by highlighting the conditions under which these effects should explain state bargaining behavior in other international negotiations, and discuss the implications of this argument for the study of international bargaining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to answer an important question in international cooperation theory: if cooperation requires successful bargaining among states, then what factors bring these states to the negotiation table in the first place? It presents a game-theoretic model of the ''prebargaining'' phase of the international cooperation problem, positing that states are more likely to enter a bargaining phase when the shadow of the future is long. This hypothesis is then tested in statistical models that explore how different shadow of the future indicators affect the probability of negotiations over territorial, river, and maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]