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The article discusses the regulatory design of the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) and its significance in the evolution of EU competition law. The DMA is seen as a major step in the evolution of competition law, adopting strong regulatory structures based on experience gained from competition law enforcement in digital markets. The article outlines the roles of various actors involved in rule and policy formation, such as the Digital Markets Advisory Committee and the high-level group of digital regulators. It also discusses the enforcement of the DMA, involving the Commission, gatekeepers, national authorities, and European and national courts. The article concludes by highlighting the importance of the tri-annual review of the Act and its potential impact on competition law enforcement. [Extracted from the article]

Single-issue referendums – which give voters a say on specific European Union (EU) policies or general questions of European integration – were rarely employed before the 2000s, but they have since become commonplace. Examples include Greece's 2015 referendum on negotiations with the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Hungary's 2016 referendum on the relocation of refugees between EU member states and the UK's 2016 vote to leave the EU. This article asks why we are seeing more single-issue referendums in the EU. Surveying different theoretical perspectives on the conditions under which such votes occur, it considers single-issue referendums as being driven by (1) the search for strategic advantage in a two-level game, (2) domestic effects and (3) problems of consentification. Case studies of eight single-issue referendums show that domestic effects matter but offer limited evidence of hand tying. Most single-issue referendums, it finds, were called by governments wrestling with issues that could win legal approval but not political legitimacy. This instrument of direct democracy will remain a feature of EU politics, we contend, as member states wrestle with domestic effects and the challenge of (de)legitimating EU decisions through traditional means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the findings of a comparative statistical study examining the application and trends in the deployment and utilisation of European Union (EU) law before the Scottish and Irish courts over a 10-year period from 2009–2018. The paper poses the question, how does European integration impact on the domestic legal systems of EU Member States due to the increasing volume, and significance, of cases where EU law is raised and applied within domestic legal systems? The research presented is of particular relevance in light of Brexit. It allows prescient reflection on the significant disruption and impact the United Kingdom's exit from the EU is likely to have on areas of domestic law which are highly integrated with EU law. It highlights the potential difficulties implicit in attempting to unpick over 40 years of assimilation of EU law and principles into Scots law. These research outcomes should lead to further reflection and debate on the role of EU law and its impact on judicial decision-making in the Scottish and Irish legal systems in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that EU treaties have become too difficult to amend is a recurring one. This Article explores changing national constitutional rules and norms in the consent stage of EU treaty making in twenty-eight Member States between 1950 and 2016, asking how parliaments, people, and courts came to be much more significant for consent, what the consequences of this shift are, and offering some tentative proposals as to how the challenges this raises could be addressed. EU treaty making has become more complex, but we argue that treaties should be more rather than less difficult to amend where concerns over two-level legitimacy rather than two-level games predominate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Highlights and Abstract Viewed from the theory of two-level games, the European Union ( EU) Act (2011) is a rare example of a government tying its hands in international diplomacy., The UK government could find its hands more tightly bound than anticipated under the EU Act, inter alia, due to the enhanced role of the courts in EU treaty ratification., The EU Act could convey bargaining advantages to the UK, but it could also encourage other EU member states to walk away from the negotiating table., The risks posed by tighter ratification rules are borne out by Ireland's experience of EU treaty ratification since the Supreme Court ruling Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987)., David Cameron's 'veto' of plans for a new EU treaty in December 2011 illustrates the difficulties of knowing ex ante when a referendum is required under the EU Act., The European Union (E U) Act (2011) provides for greater parliamentary oversight and the possibility of a referendum before EU treaties can be ratified. This article explores the EU Act from a two-level game perspective, seeing it as a rare example of a government tying its hands in international diplomacy. That the UK government could find its hands more tightly bound than anticipated is suggested by Ireland's turbulent experience of treaty ratification in the light of Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987), a landmark ruling by the Irish Supreme Court and an inspiration for the EU Act. This situation could, the theory of two-level games predicts, bolster the UK's bargaining position in Brussels, but it could also damage the country's credibility and encourage other member states to walk away from the negotiating table. This last point helps to shed some light on the UK's 'veto' of the Fiscal Compact in December 2011. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several aspects of legal scholarship including traditions, requirements and relevance of Irish or British or Commonwealth scholarship around the world. It states that the purpose of legal scholarship is for the advancement of legal knowledge and understanding.It further highlights the role of stakeholders in creating opportunity and expectation that the scholar will also engage with court.

Cartels today are prohibited under competition regimes around the world, although seen historically (in Europe at least) as a public good to be tolerated or even encouraged by governments. Despite the prohibition, illegal cartels are still prevalent, and there are circumstances where cartel-like conduct is allowed under competition rules. This article explores the extent to which such conduct can be both subject to one regulatory regime (competition law) while also carrying out regulatory functions, and hence can be construed as transnational private regulatory regimes (TPRERs). There are three categories of cartel-like arrangements: private contractual arrangements that fall outside the realm of competition law; self-regulatory arrangements designed to exclusively advance the interests of regulatees; and hybrid regimes where private arrangements have been co-opted as a form of regulation which operate in the shadow of competition law and are often seen as advancing competition objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a normative and a functional dimension to delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. These dimensions are explored in this paper and considered in the context of the recent modernization of European Community (EC) competition law enforcement. The principal - agent model provides insights into how and why Member States delegate extensive enforcement powers to the EC Commission and the National Competition Authorities, but as it offers primarily a functional analysis the normative issues of control, accountability and legitimacy cannot be fully encapsulated within it. Thus, an analysis of the EC competition law regime requires consideration of both dimensions using the twin-track approach of principal - agent analysis and a rule of law analysis in order to understand how public power is and should be exercised within it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various reports published within the special issue concerning the principal approach to European Studies (EU), including one by Imelda Maher on the analysis of the relatively recent enforcement decentralization on European Commission (EC) rules, one by Stijn Billet on the political science analysis of the EC's influence, and one by Dermot Hodson on political economy that takes on new modes of EU governance.

The author reports on various articles that are discussed in the issue in relation to the tension between social Europe and the relationship that exists regarding governance in the old Europe and the European Union.

The article introduces the current edition and discusses articles that will address the interface of law and governance, the developing relationship between the European courts and the national courts, and the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice.

The highly formalized Stability and Growth Pact gives ECOFIN power to impose sanctions on states that breach the Pact's budgetary targets. As the ECOFIN meeting in November 2003 showed, it has considerable but not unlimited discretion. The Commission has called for a more flexible interpretation of the Pact, the strengthening of sanctions against non-compliant member states and successfully litigated the legality of the ECOFIN decision. We argue that the predominance of soft law in EMU's fiscal framework is functionally suited to the uncertainty that surrounds economic co-ordination over the medium term. This suggests an inherent tension in the Commission's proposals: although a more flexible interpretation of the Pact gives more room for fiscal manoeuvre to states that start from healthy budgetary positions, it also makes it more difficult for ECOFIN to measure compliance. This uncertainty re-emphasizes the soft law elements of the Pact, rather than bolstering the efficacy of its sanction mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses the adequacy of the economic policy coordination system in the European Union. Reference to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP); Options for the reform of SGP; Influence of the supranational central bank and fiscal policies on monetary policy.

There is a double asymmetry in the structure of economic and monetary union (EMU). First, monetary policy is uniform while national economic policies are merely co-ordinated. The credibility of monetary policy is underwritten by an independent European Central Bank, but this is not sufficient as the objective of price stability depends on other aspects of economic policy. Thus greater coordination of national economic policies is needed to secure a credible monetary policy. This highlights the second asymmetry. The emphasis on credibility has been such that due regard has not been given to the legitimacy of the EMU policy architecture. If policy-making is to be effective, credible and legitimate, decisionmakers need to pay attention to four key legitimacy indicators: input, output, values and process. It seems inevitable that the success of the developing policy architecture and its effects, both in its monetary and economic dimension, will be judged against these broader standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central to the internationalization of competition law has been the emergence of transnational networks of competition officials and experts. These networks have operated in three main areas: coordination on enforcement,' technical assistance; and moves to develop overarching competition principles at the level of the WTO. The debate over the nature of internationalization of competition norms has fallen into three phases: early failures mainly clue to the lack of any network; politicization of competition policy within a UN context followed by the emergence of a network primarily focused on the OECD. The current phase concerns coordination and the attempt to develop a competition law regime at the WTO level. This process is spearheaded by the European Union, with the United States of America favouring bilateral agreements on enforcement and technical assistance only. The way the debate has changed over the past ten years and how the two main protagonists have modified their positions, is indicative of the influence and importance of networks which, while they may give rise to formal agreements, can operate through soft power and persuasion. What emerges from the analysis is the centrality of these networks to this important aspect of contemporary international governance. They supplement rather than replace more traditional forms of internationalism and, while they may fundamentally regard themselves as technocratic, deriving legitimacy from outputs, current pressures on international policy making require them to attend to the process aspects associated with legitimacy of democratic regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking economic co-ordination in EMU as a starting point, this article explores the development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy? Second, will it lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of governance? Identified at the Lisbon European Council, the method codified practices such as benchmarking, target-setting and peer review developed in the Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne processes. The method offers a new approach to governance of the EU as a heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process. It supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity; offers an alternative to the treaty rules on enhanced co-operation; and addresses some of the legitimacy issues inherent in the EU. In EMU, the method arose out of a specific policy framework with a common monetary policy complemented by the coordination of national economic policies. The recent recommendation issued against Ireland is the first example of the operation of the method in EMU and shows how debate can be stimulated and how different and arguably equally valid perspectives defended. The particular experience of EMU with a sound money, sound finance paradigm, a long history of project-building by key elites and the central role of the European Council suggest similar conditions are required for the effective application of the method in other policy spheres. The context within which the method has operated to date is contingent and could change either over time or between policy fields. If so, the very openness of the method may serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence between the Member States and the Union, after all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the juridification, codification and sanction of the competition law in Great Britain. Process and form of the legislation; Consultation and interpretation of the act; Regulatory system for competition; Enforcement of the competition act.

The implementation of EC law in Britain is influenced by confluence between Community and national law and policy. At the same time, the trend towards greater centralization of policy and law-making in the UK is reinforced by EC law, both through the reporting systems introduced under new approach directives and the fact that central government is ultimately responsible under EC law for implementation. The primacy of the Community-member state axis weakens the Community system of indirect rule because it ignores the important enforcement role of local government, which in turn impedes the creation of the internal market, which itself is predicated on consistent enforcement practices throughout and between member states. The article first addresses what is meant by implementation and effectiveness before turning to a British study of implementation. It discusses the issue of confluence between the two legal orders and the nature of the relationship between national and local government in the context of implementation of directives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offers an analysis of the emergence of the global system of law national legal orders in Europe. Creation of worldwide network of legal communications through globalization; Link between existing law and social processes; How existing law and social processes is likely to infract on the introduction of Community norms; Difficulties surrounding the transfer of Community norms.

In this article, the authors express their gratitude to the readers and the authors of the periodical. They discuss the process of the selection of articles that includes the process of sending the articles that meat the minimum standards to few reviewers for their comments. Information on their gratitude to the authors who write book reviews and to the peer reviewers of the journal is also presented.

The article discusses the French and Dutch referenda on proposed changes to the economic governance and the Constitution of the European Union (EU). The no votes are perceived as damaging for the Union. The outcome suggests that further change will be problematic and has to be taken with caution. The no votes imply that economic governance can be seen as fundamental to the success of any future Treaty revisions. Competition policy is an integrated field where the Commission has a large scope of power compared to other EU policy domains and to other national and international competition agencies.

The article features various issues ranging from anthropological, political to comparitive historical aspects presented in the current volume.