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The article discusses recent archival research by Stephen Kearns, which has uncovered the lost autograph of Drosslogion, a work by medieval philosopher LeMans that served as the basis for Anselm's parody of the "ontological argument." Kearns reconstructs LeMans's argument and argues that Anselm provides a direct reply to it in his work, suggesting that Anselm rejects the possibility of conceiving a being greater than all actual things.

One of the main controversies of the Logic Schools of the 12th century centered on the question: What follows from the impossible? In this paper arguments for two diametrically opposed positions are examined. The author of the 'Avranches Text' who probably belonged to the school of the Parvipontani defended the view that from an impossible proposition everything follows ('Ex impossibili quodlibet'). In particular he developed a proof to show that by means of so-called 'disjunctive syllogism' any arbitrary proposition B can be logically derived from a pair of contradictory propositions A and Not-A. The author of the Ars Meliduna instead argued that nothing follows from an impossible proposition ('ex falso nihil sequitur'). This view is supported by various counterexamples which aimed to show that the admission of impossible premises would give rise to inconsistent conclusions. Upon closer analysis these inconsistencies do not, however, have the formal structure of a real contradiction like A and Not-A, but rather the structure of two rivalling conditionals like 'If B then A' and 'If B then Not-A'. Hence these counterexamples rather have to be considered as refutations of the basic principles of 'connexive logic'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents new results regarding six Arts Masters of the Late Middle Ages. First of all, a new search target for the lost work Logica of Thomas of Cleves is suggested: a question commentary on Peter of Spain should be searched for. Second, recent research has shown that John of Hokelem is a prolific author: further findings are added here. A third notable magister artium Parisiensis of the late 14th century is Christian of Ackoy: in addition to his known works, some new findings are discussed as possible or even probable works by him. Finally, the bibliography of an important magister artium Pragensis, Helmold of Salzwedel, as well as that of two Viennese Arts Masters, Conrad Seglauer and John Gossolt, is improved. In this way, the paper offers new insights into the manuscript tradition of late medieval philosophy and provides some corrections to the standard literature (C. H. Lohr, M. Markowski, and others). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a study of D. H. Th. Vollenhoven's type-focused historiography of philosophy and its development with respect to pre-Socratic philosophy. It uses the work of Pierre Hadot on philosophical askesis, the work of Martha Nussbaum on therapeutic argument, and recent work on the transformative character of Aquinas's Summa contra Gentiles and Summa theologiae to question some of the central assumptions of Vollenhoven's methodology. In the process, Vollenhoven's practice is compared to and contrasted with the historiographical practice of Aristotle in his Metaphysics. What emerges is a way to acknowledge the continued worth of type-focused reading and the religious intuitions that gave rise to it, but on the basis of different methodological assumptions and to different historiographical effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present endeavour aims at the clarification of the concept of the logical consequence. Initially we investigate the question: How was the concept of logical consequence discovered by the medieval philosophers? Which ancient philosophical foundations were necessary for the discovery of the logical relation of consequence and which explicit medieval contributions, such as the notion of the formality (formal validity), led to its discovery. Secondly we discuss which developments of the modern philosophy effected the turn from the medieval concept of logical consequence to its most recent conceptions, such as the semantic, syntactic, axiomatic and natural deductive approaches? Thirdly we examine which are the similarities and the differences between the logical concepts of consequence, inference, implication and entailment? Furthermore, we ask what kind of relation signifies the concept of the logical consequence? That is to say, which is the analytic definition of the consequence relation R between the premises p1, p2...pn and the conclusion c of a formally valid argument? Finally, we focus on the respective answers given through the developments in proof theory by David Hilbert and Gerhard Gentzen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Martin Heidegger devotes extensive discussion to medieval philosophers, particularly to their treatment of "Truth and Being." It mentions Heidegger's critique had an unprecedented effect on the credibility of medieval philosophy, whereby great portions of the philosophical community dismiss it altogether as an illegitimate Onto-Theology. It also mentions Heidegger's criticism of Thomas Aquinas conception of truth as adequation.

I argue that Thomas Aquinas maintains the view that (created) powers are accidental to their bearers not because powers pertain to bearers with limited essences, but because their bearers have limited actual being. Power tracks not only the essence of something but also its actual existence. Things have powers that are causally relevant when these things exist, that is, the nature of a power is determined by a thing's essence, but the actual being of the thing of that essence accounts for the limitations of this power and for the extent to which a power can have causal effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Anuario Filosófico is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, S.A. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The book of remedies Rafaʾel ha-Malʾakh appeared in Hebrew at the beginning of the twentieth century. Its author, rabbi Yehuda Yudl Rosenberg, a man shaped by traditional Judaism and Hasidism, set himself the goal of creating a practical medical guide addressed to the poorer sections of the Jewish population in Russian Poland. In his work he included a diverse body of material representing a number of often conflicting views on the human body. The aim of this article is to explore the main elements shaping the ideas contained in the guide, with particular emphasis on Rosenberg's traditionalist views, which is echoed in early-modern medical publications and in ethnographic collections from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Alongside the pathology of the four humors, the most influential medical theory until the rise of modern medicine, Rosenberg's belief in the relationship between health and the spiritual life of man will be examined through an analysis of the advice provided in Rafaʾel ha-Malʾakh. Moreover, the article draws attention to Rosenberg's dialogue with modernity and seeks to answer the question whether this handbook advocated a modern approach towards the treatment of illness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Electronic Turkish Studies is the property of Electronic Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Chinese study of medieval philosophy has undergone an extraordinary historical process, and it has made great advances in the last 40 years. This paper provides a retrospective analysis of the pioneering Chinese scholars, both traditional and modern, who have played significant roles in the establishment and development of this historical field of inquiry. It pays particular attention to the important scholars, their works, methodologies, and findings over the course of the last forty years, and it also looks to the challenges currently facing this area of study and addresses the current state of the field and its future prospects. Although Chinese scholarship on medieval philosophy has already achieved great accomplishments, compared with the level of international research in the field abroad, there is still a huge gap to be remedied and therefore, we must recognize that there are great opportunities for Chinese scholars who will undertake the study of medieval philosophy with all due seriousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little has been written about the attitudes of medieval Jewish philosophers towards the phenomenon of women prophets. Among the qualities essential for a prophet, medieval philosophers highlighted intellectual perfection as the foremost prerequisite. At the same time, these philosophers generally labeled women as intellectually deficient by definition. Consequently, the axiomatic equation of a prophet with a philosopher generated an apparently unresolvable problem in the case of women prophets. Within these constraints, medieval philosophers still had to confront the question of women prophets, as the Hebrew Bible emphatically pointed at three of its heroines--Miriam, Deborah and Huldah--as among those through whom God had chosen to speak. This article deals with the surprising treatment of the issue by central representatives of medieval Jewish thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the critique of Greek philosophy by a Muslim scholar of the middle age Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 CE). It begins with a brief introductory background of Ibn Khaldun, followed by a trace of the elements of Greek philosophy in his writings. The main purpose is to track the line of argument Ibn Khaldun used in his criticism and the basic premises he used in his attempt to position himself in his critiques. This article ends with concluding remarks on Ibn Khaldun's real attitude and how he drew a balance between rejection of certain philosophic notions and the acceptance of reasons and logics as crafts practiced in human civilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hugh of Novocastro, Landolfo Caracciolo, John Baconthorpe, and some other medieval authors argued that there are real contradictions in nature. The background of this early fourteenth-century theory was the Aristotelian question of how to determine the instant of change between p and ~p. The argument was that these are simultaneously true at the temporal instant of change if it is an instant of changing. The author's aim is to discuss the background of this view in Henry of Ghent's theory of instantaneous change from potentiality to actuality at that very instant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The famous Armenian theologian and philosopher Grigor Tatevatsi (1346-1409) in his teaching tries to compare the biblical truth of creation with the philosophical postulate regarding the eternity of the world. Principally, being a creationist thinker, he criticized the theories that made the Materia co-eternal to God, meanwhile, he proposed the following arguments regarding the eternity of the world: a) before the creation the world existed actually by influence in the providence of God as an immaterial paradigm; b) the world is eternal because it is linked to eternity; c) the God is the eternal and always actual being, therefore the world was created eternal and the eternal is the necessary being which never can become none-being; d) the will of God is unchangeable, He cannot make the created world become non-being otherwise His will would change; e) the God does not make the world become non-being not because He is unable to do so but due to the boundless goodness; f. the world is eternal because the four elements and qualities that are the basis of it, are eternal. Therefore, even though the arguments proposed by Tatevatsi are based on and contain typical ideas of Neoplatonism, one has to take into account that he speaks of the eternity of the created world rather than co-existence of world with the God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

None of the medieval Armenian thinkers left a complete piece on argumentation theory. However, argumentation problems and the practical realization of requirements of the theory of argumentation were enormous part of Armenian philosophers' works. They discussed argumentation problems mostly from object-language rather than meta-language prospective. This research focuses on the works of three mediaeval thinkers: Yeznik Koghbacy (IV-V), David Anhaght (The Invincible, V), Grigor Tatevatsi (XIV-XV). In their theoretical heritage the examination of argumentation issues and coverage can be regarded as the most significant stages of history of Armenian argumentation theories, the interpretation of which first of all aims to accomplish the following problems: 1. Present the argumentation doctrines of each chosen philosopher as a complete idea of the theory of argumentation. 2. Complete the critical analysis of the theoretical heritage of the examinee philosophers. 3. Clarify the most important stages of history of Armenian argumentation doctrines. 4. Thereby increase the possibility of including history of Armenian argumentation theories in universal history. The history of each theory can be perceived and properly appreciated from the perspective of that theory's modern level of development. Considering that fact this research reconstructs the models of syntax and semantics of the language of argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El artículo discurre sobre la filosofía medieval, con un enfoque particular en la obra del filósofo colombiano Luis Eduardo Suárez. El autor comenta sobre la importancia de comprender el lenguaje de latín en el estudio de la filosofía medieval. También se consideran los trabajos de Tomás de Aquino, incluyendo el libro "Suma teológica."

The medieval distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words is usually given as the distinction between words which have signification or meaning in isolation from other words (such as nouns, pronouns, verbs) and those which have signification only when combined with other words (such as conjunctions, quantifiers, and articles). Some words, however, are classified as both categorematic and syncategorematic. One such word is Latin infinita 'infinite'. Because infinita can be either categorematic or syncategorematic, it is possible to form sophisms (logical puzzles or paradoxes) using infinita whose solutions turn on the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic uses of infinita. As a result, medieval logicians were interested in identifying correct logical rules governing the categorematic and syncategorematic uses of the term. In this paper, we look at 13th-15th-century logical discussions of infinita used syncategorematically and categorematically. We also relate the distinction to other medieval distinctions with which it has often been conflated in modern times, and show how and where these conflations go wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El artículo discurre sobre la filosofía medieval, con un enfoque en la obra de profesor Luis Eduardo Suárez Fonseca. El autor comenta sobre "Summa theologiae" de Tomás de Aquino, el cual analiza la teología desde una perspectiva filosófica. También se considera la interrelación entre la filosofía medieval, la historia y la religión.

This paper argues that three characteristic modern positions concerning intentionality – namely, (1) that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental’; (2) that intentionality concerns a specific type of objects having intentional inexistence; and (3) that intentionality somehow defies logic – are just three ‘modern myths’ that medieval philosophers, from whom the modern notion supposedly originated, would definitely reject. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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An interview with the Canadian historian of philosophy Claude Panaccio is presented. Topics of discussion include Panaccio's work on the thought of medieval philosopher and theologian William of Ockham, medieval semantics and theory of knowledge, and the question whether Ockham and other medieval philosophers subscribed to the ideas of externalism.

The article discusses the works of late medieval philosopher Nicholas Theoderici, better known as Nicholas of Amsterdam. After providing a brief sketch of Nicholas' education and career, which culminated in his service as dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Rostock, Germany, the author surveys extant manuscripts of Nicholas' writings held at several libraries in Europe, including in Berlin, Germany, Copenhagen, Denmark, and Munich, Germany. Topics discussed include logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics.

The article discusses 11th century philosopher Gaunilo's critique of the book "Proslogion" by the philosopher Anselm, which argues in favor of the existence of God. Anselm's response in the subsequent book "Proslogion 2" is mentioned, as well as counterarguments, parody, and the structure of each philosopher's logic arguments.

This paper is mainly concerned with the reception of the theory of a starless ninth orb by Maimonides (1138--1204). Maimonides addressed this topic in two of his works: first, in the third chapter of the Laws of the Foundation of the Torah, part of his code of Jewish law, the Mishneh Torah; and, at a later date, in the Guide of the Perplexed. I begin with the approach to the ninth orb in the Laws of the Foundation of the Torah, where it is presented as a starless orb divided into twelve signs named for the twelve zodiacal constellations. My contention is that Maimonides extracted the ideas about the ninth orb from a cosmological work ascribed to Māshā'allāh, an early Abbasid astrologer, or from some later work derived from Māshā'allāh's cosmology. I also clarify the unusual features of this model as presented by Māshā'allāh and try to determine the rationale behind its inclusion in Māshā'allāh's cosmology as well as in Maimonides' Mishneh Torah. This, I maintain, has to do not only with cosmological but also and especially with astrological considerations. Then I briefly study the approach to the ninth orb in the Guide, where it is incorporated in its ''classical'' form, i.e., as the all-encompassing orb imparting the diurnal motion to all the other motions, and weigh the difference between this and the Mishneh Torah. Last, in a short postscript, I broaden the scope to show that Māshā'allāh's cosmology, particularly the ninth starless orb divided into twelve signs, was widely known in the Arabic world before Maimonides, especially among Jewish intellectuals in Muslim Spain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Boethius first identifies Philosophy in the Consolation as his medica, his "healer" or "physician." Over the course of the dialogue Philosophy exercises her medical art systematically. In the second book Philosophy first gives Boethius "gentler remedies" that are preparatory for the "sharper medicines" that she administers later. This article shows that, philosophically speaking, Philosophy's "gentler remedies" amount to persuading Boethius toward Stoicism, which functions as an anesthetic for the more invasive philosophical surgery that she performs afterwards. Seeing this, however, requires understanding how Philosophy draws out Boethius's spiritedness in the first book and how in the second book she sublimates it into an intellectual and volitional apathy toward the things of fortune, i.e., into a Stoic attitude toward that which is other. Significantly, though, the Stoicism to which Philosophy leads Boethius is of a mitigated sort, inasmuch as friendship is not included among the things of fortune to which Boethius is anesthesized, an exception that opens up Boethius to genuine wonder and, consequently, to genuine philosophizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anuario Filosófico is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, S.A. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the perspectives of medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus concerning the role of God in causality, cognition, and intentionality. The author addresses Scotus's argument against the causal account of intentionality as well as his thoughts on intellectual cognition, acts of abstractive cognition, and intuitive cognition. The familiarity of Scotus with the Aristotelian perspective on the causal account of intentionality is explored, as well as the perspectives of other medieval thinkers including Godfrey of Fontaines, Henry of Ghent, and Thomas Aquinas. Several works by Scotus are examined including "Question on the Metaphysics," "Ordinatio," and "Lectura."

The article focuses on the 13th century Spanish philosopher Ramon Llull. It discusses his approach to philosophy, religious conversion and Christian apologetics, comments on his significance for the study of the Catalan language and makes reference to several of his works including "Ars combinatoria," "Vita coaetania" and "Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem" (also known as "Ars magna"). The author also offers biographical details of his life and reflects on Llull's influence on the historical study of interreligious dialogue.

The Four ages contains a brief explicit discussion of the issue of Christian philosophy, referencing the Middle Ages and the 1930s French debates about Christian philosophy. Closer attention to the debates reveals a plurality of positions rather than unanimous agreement on Christian philosophy, indicating that the quite complex issues were not resolved. In this review article, I contest Deely's interpretation of Maritian's position, provide an exegesis of Maritain's position, argue that Deely's explicit position is identifiable as very close to Neo-Scholastic opponents of Christian philosophy during the debates, and briefly discuss Gilson's and Blondel's criticisms of such positions articulated during the 1930s debates. I also indicate that despite his opposition to Christian philosophy, Deely shares several key insights with its proponents, and I end by suggesting but not developing a few ways Deely's semiotic approach could bear additional fruit for postmodern Christian philosophy's ongoing projects of self-understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the commentary on the "Posterior Analytics" of Greek philosopher Aristotle written in the 13th century by the English scholastic philosopher Robert Grosseteste. Grosseteste's work is seen, in contrast to majority academic opinion, as successful in reconciling Aristotelian epistemology, which sees human knowledge as deriving primarily from sense perception, with the medieval (Augustinian) theory of divine illumination, the view that God intervenes directly in human cognition.

This article examines Gerald Odonis' view on the nature of place as found in his commentary on the Sentences (Sent. II, d. 2, qq. 3-5) and in an anonymous question (Utrum locus sit ultima superficies corporis ambientis immobile primum) extant in manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 4229. Both texts defend a thoroughly un-Aristotelian conception of place as three-dimensional space. Odonis not only deviates from Aristotle's definition of place as the inner surface of a surrounding body, but also from the positions of his contemporaries, including fellow Franciscans. Despite some remarkable doctrinal similarities between Odonis' view and that of Renaissance innovators like Francesco Patrizi and Bernardino Telesio, it seems unlikely that Gerald played a role in the rise of new conceptions of place in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. An edition of the anonymous Quaestio de loco is given in an appendix. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle's definitions of truth and falsity, on the one hand, and the relational and cognitive account of truth entailed from its transcendental nature, on the other hand, naturally lead later medieval philosophers towards correspondence theories of truth. Nonetheless in the later Middles Ages at least three versions of the correspondence theory (classical, internalist, and externalist) can be found. Thomas Aquinas, in particular, proposed a mixed interpretation, bringing together metaphysical and semantical considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Neoplatonism in Contemporary Christian Dionysian Polemic. It discusses the comparison between the receptions of Dionysius in relation to non-Christian philosophy during the Latin Middle Ages and the twentieth-century Christian thought. It states that the medieval philosophers including Eriugena, Thomas Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa as a rule refuse to divide religion from philosophy. Hence, it notes that the medieval philosophers see no need to set Dionysius in opposition to non-Christian philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Proclus. It mentions that Vladimir Lossky and Jean-Luc Marion celebrates Dionysius in opposition to the non-Christian Neoplatonists.

Abstract  According to a doctrine widely held by most medieval philosophers and theologians, whether in the Muslim or Christian world, there are no metaphysical distinctions in God whatsoever. As a result of the compendious theorizing that has been done on this issue, the doctrine, usually called the doctrine of divine simplicity, has been bestowed a prominent status in both Islamic and Christian philosophical theology. In Islamic philosophy some well-known philosophers, such as Ibn Sina (980–1037) and Mulla Sadra (1571–1640), developed this doctrine through a metaphysical approach. In this paper, considering the historical order, I shall first concentrate on Ibn Sina’s view. Then I shall turn to the theory of divine simplicity of Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), as the most developed and comprehensive version of the medieval theories in Christian world. Finally, I will return to Islamic philosophy and explore the more complicated and mature account of the doctrine as it was introduced by Mulla Sadra according to his own philosophical principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the closely related question about the relationship between being as being and divine being in relation to the metaphysics of medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas. It explains the argument raised by Aquinas that the purpose of metaphysics does not presuppose prior knowledge of God's existence, but its subject is being as being. It also analyzes the denial made by Aquinas that God falls under the notion of being.

Medieval classifications of knowledge ("divisiones scientiarum") were created to impose order on the ever-expanding breadth of human knowledge and to demonstrate the interconnectedness of its several parts. In the earlier Middle Ages the trivium and the quadrivium had sufficed to circumscribe the bounds of secular learning, but the eventual availability of the entire Aristotelian corpus stimulated a reevaluation of the scope of human knowledge. Classifications emanating from the School of Chartres (the "Didascalicon" of Hugh of St. Victor and the anonymous "Tractatus quidam") did not venture far beyond Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville. Dominic Gundissalinus (fl. 1144-64), a Spaniard who based parts of his elaborate analysis of music on Al-Farabi, attempted to balance theory and practice, in contradistinction to the earlier mathematical emphasis. Aristotle had rejected musica mundana, and his natural science left little room for a musica humana based on numerical proportion. Consequently, both had to be reinterpreted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The late medieval discussion of 'nobility' (= nobilitas, dignitas) defined in philosophical terms (as opposed to other social notions like 'aristocracy'), produced a large number of writings, many of which are still unedited. Nevertheless, modern philosophical historiography (developed throughout the seventeenth century and reaching its first apogee with Hegel) has neglected the conceptual debates on nobility. Perhaps having assumed it to be a dead relic of the 'pre-illuminist' past, historians and philosophers understood 'nobility' as a non-philosophical issue and so it still appears in contemporary scholarship. The first aim of this essay is to draw attention to this issue by presenting a sort of preliminary catalogue of the different types of conceptualizations of 'mobility'. By exploring the meanings and philosophical employment of the expressions 'bene nasci' and 'bene natus', this article also reveals a new aspect of the Aristotelian notion of magnanimity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A careful reading of Heloise's letters reveals both her contribution to Abelard's ethical thought and the differences between her ethical concerns and his. In her letters, Heloise focuses on the innate moral qualities of the inner person or animus. Hypocrisy—the misrepresentation of the inner person through false outer appearance, exemplified by the potentially deceitful religious habit or habitus—is a matter of great moral concern to her. When Abelard responds to Heloise's ideas, first in his letters to her and later in his Collationes and Scito te ipsum, he turns the discussion away from her original interests. He transforms her metaphor of the habitus as false appearance into a discussion of another type of habitus, the habitual process of acquiring virtue, and integrates her focus on the animus into his developing ideas about sin as intention. Examining the differences between Heloise's ethical thought and Abelard's allows us to appreciate the distinct contributions of both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medieval theories of ethics tended on the whole to regard self-perfection as the goal of human life. However there was profound disagreement, particularly in the late thirteenth century, over how exactly this was to be understood. Intellectualists such as Aquinas famously argued that human perfection lay primarily in coming to know the essence of God in the next life. Voluntarists such as the Franciscan John Peckham, by contrast, argued that ultimate perfection was to be achieved in patria through the act of loving God. The present article argues that Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent defended a different sort of voluntarism with respect to the final destiny of human beings. Rather than claiming that the goal of human life lay in the perfection of the self, they argued instead that ultimate union with God was to be achieved mystically through an act of self-transcendence, which occurred through ecstasy or quasi-deification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay develops two major arguments. First, if John Buridan's 'first argument' for the reintroduction of natural supposition is only that the "eternal truth" of a scientific proposition is preserved because subject terms in scientific propositions supposit for all the term's past, present, and future significata indifferently; then Albert of Saxony thinks it is simply ineffective. Only the 'second argument', i.e. the argument for the existence of an 'atemporal copula', adequately performs this task; but is rejected by Albert. Second, later fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's natural supposition, given in certain Notabilia from the anonymous author in, Paris, BnF, lat. 14.716, ff. 40va-41rb, are nothing but an interpolated hodge-podge of criticisms given earlier in the century against various views of Buridan's by Albert of Saxony. It is this fact that makes Albert the real source of late fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's view of natural supposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the contribution of Giles and his contemporaries during the thirteenth century, to the foundation of freedom during medieval philosophy. It states that Giles was engaged in debates over human freedom and will. Little attention and commentary were given to Giles contribution to freedom during his time.

The article focuses on the logical works and philosophy of Peter Abelard. Philosophical obscurity and unpublished works were the reasons why Peter Abelard, as well as his works, did not receive the proper recognition it deserved compared to his contemporaries. It suggests critical reading and careful commentary towards Abelard's works.

The article stresses the main lines of theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas's philosophy on the nature of the body-soul union. His writings and thought have become familiar to those acquainted with medieval philosophy, as well as to many others interested in the wide range of problems he dealt with. Aquinas believed that every human being has a soul, but a proper understanding of his concept of "soul" (anima) presupposes some familiarity with the medieval concept of anima rationalis. The soul was considered the core of the human identity and, detached from the body to which it is intrinsically united, it cannot be seen, tasted or felt by means of the senses.