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Similarity and categorization are fundamental processes in human cognition that help complex organisms make sense of the cacophony of information in their environment. These processes are critical for tasks such as recognizing objects, making decisions, and forming memories. In this review, we provide an overview of the current state of knowledge on similarity and psychological spaces, discussing the theories, methods, and empirical findings that have been generated over the years. Although the concept of similarity has important limitations, it plays a key role in cognitive modeling. The review surfaces three key themes. First, similarity and mental representations are merely two sides of the same coin, existing as a similarity-representation duality that defines a psychological space. Second, both the brain's mental representations and the study of mental representations are made possible by exploiting second-order isomorphism. Third, similarity analysis has near-universal applicability across all levels of cognition, providing a common research language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether supervised or unsupervised, human and machine learning is usually characterized as event-based. However, learning may also proceed by systems alignment in which mappings are inferred between entire systems, such as visual and linguistic systems. Systems alignment is possible because items that share similar visual contexts, such as a car and a truck, will also tend to share similar linguistic contexts. Because of the mirrored similarity relationships across systems, the visual and linguistic systems can be aligned at some later time absent either input. In a series of simulation studies, we considered whether children's early concepts support systems alignment. We found that children's early concepts are close to optimal for inferring novel concepts through systems alignment, enabling agents to correctly infer more than 85% of visual-word mappings absent supervision. One possible explanation for why children's early concepts support systems alignment is that they are distinguished structurally by their dense semantic neighborhoods. Artificial agents using these structural features to select concepts proved highly effective, both in environments mirroring children's conceptual world and those that exclude the concepts that children commonly acquire. For children, systems alignment and event-based learning likely complement one another. Likewise, artificial systems can benefit from incorporating these developmental principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can words shape meaning? Shared labels highlight commonalities between concepts whereas contrasting labels make differences apparent. To address such findings, we propose a deep learning account that spans perception to decision (i.e. labelling). The model takes photographs as input, transforms them to semantic representations through computations that parallel the ventral visual stream, and finally determines the appropriate linguistic label. The underlying theory is that minimising error on two prediction tasks (predicting the meaning and label of a stimulus) requires a compromise in the network's semantic representations. Thus, differences in label use, whether across languages or levels of expertise, manifest in differences in the semantic representations that support label discrimination. We confirm these predictions in simulations involving fine-grained and coarse-grained labels. We hope these and allied efforts which model perception, semantics, and labelling at scale will advance developmental and neurocomputational accounts of concept and language learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Machine learning (ML) approaches are a crucial component of modern data analysis in many fields, including epidemiology and medicine. Nonlinear ML methods often achieve accurate predictions, for instance, in personalized medicine, as they are capable of modeling complex relationships between features and the target. Problematically, ML models and their predictions can be biased by confounding information present in the features. To remove this spurious signal, researchers often employ featurewise linear confound regression (CR). While this is considered a standard approach for dealing with confounding, possible pitfalls of using CR in ML pipelines are not fully understood. Results We provide new evidence that, contrary to general expectations, linear confound regression can increase the risk of confounding when combined with nonlinear ML approaches. Using a simple framework that uses the target as a confound, we show that information leaked via CR can increase null or moderate effects to near-perfect prediction. By shuffling the features, we provide evidence that this increase is indeed due to confound-leakage and not due to revealing of information. We then demonstrate the danger of confound-leakage in a real-world clinical application where the accuracy of predicting attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder is overestimated using speech-derived features when using depression as a confound. Conclusions Mishandling or even amplifying confounding effects when building ML models due to confound-leakage, as shown, can lead to untrustworthy, biased, and unfair predictions. Our expose of the confound-leakage pitfall and provided guidelines for dealing with it can help create more robust and trustworthy ML models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, researchers have debated whether mental representations are symbolic or grounded in sensory inputs and motor programs. Certainly, aspects of mental representations are grounded. However, does the brain also contain abstract concept representations that mediate between perception and action in a flexible manner not tied to the details of sensory inputs and motor programs? Such conceptual pointers would be useful when concepts remain constant despite changes in appearance and associated actions. We evaluated whether human participants acquire such representations using fMRI. Participants completed a probabilistic concept learning task in which sensory, motor, and category variables were not perfectly coupled or entirely independent, making it possible to observe evidence for abstract representations or purely grounded representations. To assess how the learned concept structure is represented in the brain, we examined brain regions implicated in flexible cognition (e.g., pFC and parietal cortex) that are most likely to encode an abstract representation removed from sensory–motor details. We also examined sensory–motor regions that might encode grounded sensory–motor-based representations tuned for categorization. Using a cognitive model to estimate participants' category rule and multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data, we found the left pFC and human middle temporal visual area (MT)/V5 coded for category in the absence of information coding for stimulus or response. Because category was based on the stimulus, finding an abstract representation of category was not inevitable. Our results suggest that certain brain areas support categorization behavior by constructing concept representations in a format akin to a symbol that differs from stimulus–motor codes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notions of mechanism, emergence, reduction and explanation are all tied to levels of analysis. I cover the relationship between lower and higher levels, suggest a level of mechanism approach for neuroscience in which the components of a mechanism can themselves be further decomposed and argue that scientists' goals are best realized by focusing on pragmatic concerns rather than on metaphysical claims about what is 'real'. Inexplicably, neuroscientists are enchanted by both reduction and emergence. A fascination with reduction is misplaced given that theory is neither sufficiently developed nor formal to allow it, whereas metaphysical claims of emergence bring physicalism into question. Moreover, neuroscience's existence as a discipline is owed to higher-level concepts that prove useful in practice. Claims of biological plausibility are shown to be incoherent from a level of mechanism view and more generally are vacuous. Instead, the relevant findings to address should be specified so that model selection procedures can adjudicate between competing accounts. Model selection can help reduce theoretical confusions and direct empirical investigations. Although measures themselves, such as behaviour, blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) and single-unit recordings, are not levels of analysis, like levels, no measure is fundamental and understanding how measures relate can hasten scientific progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Categorization is a fundamental cognitive function that organizes our experiences into meaningful "chunks." This category knowledge can then be generalized to novel stimuli and situations. Multiple clinical populations, including people with Parkinson's disease, amnesia, autism, ADHD and schizophrenia, have impairments in the acquisition and use of categories. Although rodent research is well suited for examining the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive functions, many rodent cognitive tasks have limited translational value. To bridge this gap, we use touchscreens to permit greater flexibility in stimulus presentation and task design, track key dependent measures, and minimize experimenter involvement. Touchscreens offer a valuable tool for creating rodent cognitive tasks that are directly comparable to tasks used with humans. Touchscreen tasks are also readily used with cutting‐edge neuroscientific methods that are difficult to do in humans such as optogenetics, chemogenetics, neurophysiology and calcium imaging (using miniscopes). In this review, we show advantages of touchscreen‐based tasks for studying category learning in rats. We also address multiple factors for consideration when designing category learning tasks, including the limitations of the rodent visual system, experimental design, and analysis strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prefrontal cortex (PFC) is thought to support the ability to focus on goal-relevant information by filtering out irrelevant information, a process akin to dimensionality reduction. Here, we test this dimensionality reduction hypothesis by relating a data-driven approach to characterizing the complexity of neural representation with a theoretically-supported computational model of learning. We find evidence of goal-directed dimensionality reduction within human ventromedial PFC during learning. Importantly, by using computational predictions of each participant's attentional strategies during learning, we find that that the degree of neural compression predicts an individual's ability to selectively attend to concept-specific information. These findings suggest a domain-general mechanism of learning through compression in ventromedial PFC. Efficient learning is akin to goal-directed dimensionality reduction, in which relevant information is highlighted and irrelevant input is ignored. Here, the authors show that ventromedial prefrontal cortex uniquely supports such learning by compressing neural codes to represent goal-specific information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One view is that conceptual knowledge is organized using the circuitry in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) that supports spatial processing and navigation. In contrast, we find that a domain-general learning algorithm explains key findings in both spatial and conceptual domains. When the clustering model is applied to spatial navigation tasks, so-called place and grid cell-like representations emerge because of the relatively uniform distribution of possible inputs in these tasks. The same mechanism applied to conceptual tasks, where the overall space can be higher-dimensional and sampling sparser, leading to representations more aligned with human conceptual knowledge. Although the types of memory supported by the MTL are superficially dissimilar, the information processing steps appear shared. Our account suggests that the MTL uses a general-purpose algorithm to learn and organize context-relevant information in a useful format, rather than relying on navigation-specific neural circuitry. Spatial maps in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) have been proposed to map abstract conceptual knowledge. Rather than grounding abstract knowledge in a spatial map, the authors propose a general-purpose clustering algorithm that explains how both spatial (including place and grid cells) and higher-dimensional conceptual representations arise during learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Making good decisions requires people to appropriately explore their available options and generalize what they have learned. While computational models can explain exploratory behavior in constrained laboratory tasks, it is unclear to what extent these models generalize to real-world choice problems. We investigate the factors guiding exploratory behavior in a dataset consisting of 195,333 customers placing 1,613,967 orders from a large online food delivery service. We find important hallmarks of adaptive exploration and generalization, which we analyze using computational models. In particular, customers seem to engage in uncertainty-directed exploration and use feature-based generalization to guide their exploration. Our results provide evidence that people use sophisticated strategies to explore complex, real-world environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development and application of concepts is a critical component of cognition. Although concepts can be formed on the basis of simple perceptual or semantic features, conceptual representations can also capitalize on similarities across feature relationships. By representing these types of higher-order relationships, concepts can simplify the learning problem and facilitate decisions. Despite this, little is known about the neural mechanisms that support the construction and deployment of these kinds of higher-order concepts during learning. To address this question, we combined a carefully designed associative learning task with computational model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Participants were scanned as they learned and made decisions about sixteen pairs of cues and associated outcomes. Associations were structured such that individual cues shared feature relationships, operationalized as shared patterns of cue pair-outcome associations. In order to capture the large number of possible conceptual representational structures that participants might employ and to evaluate how conceptual representations are used during learning, we leveraged a well-specified Bayesian computational model of category learning []. Behavioral and model-based results revealed that participants who displayed a tendency to link experiences in memory benefitted from faster learning rates, suggesting that the use of the conceptual structure in the task facilitated decisions about cue pair-outcome associations. Model-based fMRI analyses revealed that trial-by-trial integration of cue information into higher-order conceptual representations was supported by an anterior temporal (AT) network of regions previously implicated in representing complex conjunctions of features and meaning-based information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How much we like something, whether it be a bottle of wine or a new film, is affected by the opinions of others. However, the social information that we receive can be contradictory and vary in its reliability. Here, we tested whether the brain incorporates these statistics when judging value and confidence. Participants provided value judgments about consumer goods in the presence of online reviews. We found that participants updated their initial value and confidence judgments in a Bayesian fashion, taking into account both the uncertainty of their initial beliefs and the reliability of the social information. Activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of belief update. Analogous to how lower-level perceptual information is integrated, we found that the human brain integrates social information according to its reliability when judging value and confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite advances in understanding the brain structures involved in the expression of stereotypes and prejudice, little is known about the brain structures involved in their acquisition. Here, we combined fMRI, a task involving learning the valence of different social groups, and modeling of the learning process involved in the development of biases in thinking about social groups that support prejudice. Participants read descriptions of valenced behaviors performed by members of novel social groups, with majority groups being more frequently encountered during learning than minority groups. A model-based fMRI analysis revealed that the anterior temporal lobe tracked the trial-by-trial changes in the valence associated with each group encountered in the task. Descriptions of behavior by group members that deviated from the group average (i.e., prediction errors) were associated with activity in the left lateral PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and lateral anterior temporal cortex. Minority social groups were associated with slower acquisition rates and more activity in the ventral striatum and ACC/dorsomedial PFC compared with majority groups. These findings provide new insights into the brain regions that (a) support the acquisition of prejudice and (b) detect situations in which an individual's behavior deviates from the prejudicial attitude held toward their group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concepts organize the relationship among individual stimuli or events by highlighting shared features. Often, new goals require updating conceptual knowledge to reflect relationships based on different goal-relevant features. Here, our aim is to determine how hippocampal (HPC) object representations are organized and updated to reflect changing conceptual knowledge. Participants learned two classification tasks in which successful learning required attention to different stimulus features, thus providing a means to index how representations of individual stimuli are reorganized according to changing task goals. We used a computational learning model to capture how people attended to goal-relevant features and organized object representations based on those features during learning. Using representational similarity analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging data, we demonstrate that neural representations in left anterior HPC correspond with model predictions of concept organization. Moreover, we show that during early learning, when concept updating is most consequential, HPC is functionally coupled with prefrontal regions. Based on these findings, we propose that when task goals change, object representations in HPC can be organized in new ways, resulting in updated concepts that highlight the features most critical to the new goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People are optimistic about their prospects relative to others. However, existing studies can be difficult to interpret because outcomes are not zero-sum. For example, one person avoiding cancer does not necessitate that another person develops cancer. Ideally, optimism bias would be evaluated within a closed formal system to establish with certainty the extent of the bias and the associated environmental factors, such that optimism bias is demonstrated when a population is internally inconsistent. Accordingly, we asked NFL fans to predict how many games teams they liked and disliked would win in the 2015 season. Fans, like ESPN reporters assigned to cover a team, were overly optimistic about their team’s prospects. The opposite pattern was found for teams that fans disliked. Optimism may flourish because year-to-year team results are marked by auto-correlation and regression to the group mean (i.e., good teams stay good, but bad teams improve). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People in a changing environment must decide between exploiting options they currently favor and exploring alternative options that provide additional information about the state of the environment. For example, drivers must decide between purchasing gas at their currently favored station (i.e., exploit) or risk a fruitless trip to another station to evaluate whether the price has been lowered since the last visit. Previous laboratory studies on exploratory choice have found that people choose strategically and explore alternative options when it is more likely that the relative value of competing options has changed. Our study extends this work by considering how global trends (which affect all options equally) influence exploratory choice. For example, during an economic crisis, global gas prices may increase or decrease at all stations, yet consumers should still explore strategically to find the best option. Our research question is whether people can maintain effective exploration strategies in the presence of global trends that are irrelevant in that they do not affect the relative value of choice options. We find that people explore effectively irrespective of global trends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every scientist chooses a preferred level of analysis and this choice shapes the research program, even determining what counts as evidence. This contribution revisits Marr's (1982) three levels of analysis (implementation, algorithmic, and computational) and evaluates the prospect of making progress at each individual level. After reviewing limitations of theorizing within a level, two strategies for integration across levels are considered. One is top-down in that it attempts to build a bridge from the computational to algorithmic level. Limitations of this approach include insufficient theoretical constraint at the computation level to provide a foundation for integration, and that people are suboptimal for reasons other than capacity limitations. Instead, an inside-out approach is forwarded in which all three levels of analysis are integrated via the algorithmic level. This approach maximally leverages mutual data constraints at all levels. For example, algorithmic models can be used to interpret brain imaging data, and brain imaging data can be used to select among competing models. Examples of this approach to integration are provided. This merging of levels raises questions about the relevance of Marr's tripartite view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physiological arousal, a marker of emotional response, has been demonstrated to accompany human decision making under uncertainty. Anticipatory emotions have been portrayed as basic and rapid evaluations of chosen actions. Instead, could these arousal signals stem from a 'cognitive' assessment of value that utilizes the full environment structure, as opposed to merely signaling a coarse, reflexive assessment of the possible consequences of choices? Combining an exploration-exploitation task, computational modeling, and skin conductance measurements, we find that physiological arousal manifests a reflective assessment of the benefit of the chosen action, mirroring observed behavior. Consistent with the level of computational sophistication evident in these signals, a follow-up experiment demonstrates that anticipatory arousal is modulated by current environment volatility, in accordance with the predictions of our computational account. Finally, we examine the cognitive costs of the exploratory choice behavior these arousal signals accompany by manipulating concurrent cognitive demand. Taken together, these results demonstrate that the arousal that accompanies choice under uncertainty arises from a more reflective and 'cognitive' assessment of the chosen action's consequences than has been revealed previously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Idealizing training examples improve people's ability to classify mammograms. [•] Idealized training succeeds by reducing the saliency of ambiguous cases. [•] Idealized training is most effective when training and test cases share similarities. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on related to neuroscience methodologies including neuroscientific-based theories of human learning, the eye-fixation data to reading outcomes and online learning.

Familiarity, or memory strength, is a central construct in models of cognition. In previous categorization and long-term memory research, correlations have been found between psychological measures of memory strength and activation in the medial temporal lobes (MTLs), which suggests a common neural locus for memory strength. However, activation alone is insufficient for determining whether the same mechanisms underlie neural function across domains. Guided by mathematical models of categorization and long-term memory, we develop a theory and a method to test whether memory strength arises from the global similarity among neural representations. Inhumansubjects, we find significant correlations between global similarity among activation patterns in theMTLsand both subsequent memory confidence in a recognition memory task and model-based measures of memory strength in a category learning task. Our work bridges formal cognitive theories and neuroscientific models by illustrating that the same global similarity computations underlie processing in multiple cognitive domains. Moreover, by establishing a link between neural similarity and psychological memory strength, our findings suggest that there may be an isomorphism between psychological and neural representational spaces that can be exploited to test cognitive theories at both the neural and behavioral levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As otherwise healthy adults age, their performance on cognitive tests tends to decline. This change is traditionally taken as evidence that cognitive processing is subject to significant declines in healthy aging. We examine this claim, showing current theories over-estimate the evidence in support of it, and demonstrating that when properly evaluated, the empirical record often indicates that the opposite is true. To explain the disparity between the evidence and current theories, we show how the models of learning assumed in aging research are incapable of capturing even the most basic of empirical facts of 'associative' learning, and lend themselves to spurious discoveries of 'cognitive decline.' Once a more accurate model of learning is introduced, we demonstrate that far from declining, the accuracy of older adults lexical processing appears to improve continuously across the lifespan. We further identify other measures on which performance does not decline with age, and show how these different patterns of performance fit within an overall framework of learning. Finally, we consider the implications of our demonstrations of continuous and consistent learning performance throughout adulthood for our understanding of the changes in underlying brain morphology that occur during the course of cognitive development across the lifespan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Training in action video games can increase the speed of perceptual processing. However, it is unknown whether video-game training can lead to broad-based changes in higher-level competencies such as cognitive flexibility, a core and neurally distributed component of cognition. To determine whether video gaming can enhance cognitive flexibility and, if so, why these changes occur, the current study compares two versions of a real-time strategy (RTS) game. Using a meta-analytic Bayes factor approach, we found that the gaming condition that emphasized maintenance and rapid switching between multiple information and action sources led to a large increase in cognitive flexibility as measured by a wide array of non-video gaming tasks. Theoretically, the results suggest that the distributed brain networks supporting cognitive flexibility can be tuned by engrossing video game experience that stresses maintenance and rapid manipulation of multiple information sources. Practically, these results suggest avenues for increasing cognitive function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We evaluate two competing accounts of the relationship between beauty and category structure. According to the similarity-based view, beauty arises from category structure such that central items are favored due to their increased fluency. In contrast, the theory-based view holds that people's theories of beauty shape their perceptions of categories. In the present study, subjects learned to categorize abstract paintings into meaningfully labeled categories and rated the paintings' beauty, value, and typicality. Inconsistent with the similarity-based view, beauty ratings were highly correlated across conditions despite differences in fluency and assigned category structure. Consistent with the theory-based view, beautiful paintings were treated as central members for categories expected to contain beautiful paintings (e.g., art museum pieces), but not in others (e.g., student show pieces). These results suggest that the beauty of complex, real-world stimuli is not determined by fluency within category structure but, instead, interacts with people's prior knowledge to structure categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some decisions, such as predicting the winnecategorization I cognitive modeling uncertainty I diffusion modeling r of a baseball game, are challenging in part because outcomes are probabilistic. When making such decisions, one view is that humans stochastically and selectively retrieve a small set of relevant memories that provides evidence for competing options. We show that optimal performance at test is impossible when retrieving information in this fashion, no matter how extensive training is, because limited retrieval introduces noise into the decision process that cannot be overcome. One implication is that people should be more accurate in predicting future events when trained on idealized rather than on the actual distributions of items. In other words, we predict the best way to convey information to people is to present it in a distorted, idealized form. Idealization of training distributions is predicted to reduce the harmful noise induced by immutable bottlenecks in people's memory retrieval processes. In contrast, machine learning systems that selectively weight (i.e., retrieve) all training examples at test should not benefit from idealization. These conjectures are strongly supported by several studies and supporting analyses. Unlike machine systems, people's test performance on a target distribution is higher when they are trained on an idealized version of the distribution rather than on the actual target distribution. Optimal machine classifiers modified to selectively and stochastically sample from memory match the pattern of human performance. These results suggest firm limits on human rationality and have broad implications for how to train humans tasked with important classification decisions, such as radiologists, baggage screeners, intelligence analysts, and gamblers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human beings are a largely untapped source of in-the-loop knowledge and guidance for computational learning agents, including robots. To effectively design agents that leverage available human expertise, we need to understand how people naturally teach. In this paper, we describe two experiments that ask how differing conditions affect a human teacher's feedback frequency and the computational agent's learned performance. The first experiment considers the impact of a self-perceived teaching role in contrast to believing one is merely critiquing a recording. The second considers whether a human trainer will give more frequent feedback if the agent acts less greedily (i.e., choosing actions believed to be worse) when the trainer's recent feedback frequency decreases. From the results of these experiments, we draw three main conclusions that inform the design of agents. More broadly, these two studies stand as early examples of a nascent technique of using agents as highly specifiable social entities in experiments on human behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mathematical developments in probabilistic inference have led to optimism over the prospects for Bayesian models of cognition. Our target article calls for better differentiation of these technical developments from theoretical contributions. It distinguishes between Bayesian Fundamentalism, which is theoretically limited because of its neglect of psychological mechanism, and Bayesian Enlightenment, which integrates rational and mechanistic considerations and is thus better positioned to advance psychological theory. The commentaries almost uniformly agree that mechanistic grounding is critical to the success of the Bayesian program. Some commentaries raise additional challenges, which we address here. Other commentaries claim that all Bayesian models are mechanistically grounded, while at the same time holding that they should be evaluated only on a computational level. We argue this contradictory stance makes it difficult to evaluate a model's scientific contribution, and that the psychological commitments of Bayesian models need to be made more explicit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology – namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology – that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What mechanisms underlie children's language production? Structural priming-the repetition of sentence structure across utterances-is an important measure of the developing production system. We propose its mechanism in children is the same as may underlie analogical reasoning: structure-mapping. Under this view, structural priming is the result of making an analogy between utterances, such that children map semantic and syntactic structure from previous to future utterances. Because the ability to map relationally complex structures develops with age, younger children are less successful than older children at mapping both semantic and syntactic relations. Consistent with this account, 4-year-old children showed priming only of semantic relations when surface similarity across utterances was limited, whereas 5-year-olds showed priming of both semantic and syntactic structure regardless of shared surface similarity. The priming of semantic structure without syntactic structure is uniquely predicted by the structure-mapping account because others have interpreted structural priming as a reflection of developing syntactic knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We evaluate two broad classes of cognitive mechanisms that might support the learning of sequential patterns. According to the first, learning is based on the gradual accumulation of direct associations between events based on simple conditioning principles. The other view describes learning as the process of inducing the transformational structure that defines the material. Each of these learning mechanisms predicts differences in the rate of acquisition for differently organized sequences. Across a set of empirical studies, we compare the predictions of each class of model with the behavior of human subjects. We find that learning mechanisms based on transformations of an internal state, such as recurrent network architectures (e.g., Elman, 1990), have difficulty accounting for the pattern of human results relative to a simpler (but more limited) learning mechanism based on learning direct associations. Our results suggest new constraints on the cognitive mechanisms supporting sequential learning behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on dynamic decision-making tasks, in which the payoffs associated with each choice vary with participants' recent choice history, shows that humans have difficulty making long-term optimal choices in the presence of attractive immediate rewards. However, a number of recent studies have shown that simple cues providing information about the underlying state of the task environment may facilitate optimal responding. In this study, we examined the mechanism by which this state knowledge influences choice behavior. We examined the possibility that participants use state information in conjunction with changing payoffs to extrapolate payoffs in future states. We found support for this hypothesis in an experiment in which generalizations based on this state information worked to the benefit or detriment of task performance, depending on the task's payoff structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Category learning theorists tacitly assume that stimuli are encoded by a single pathway. Motivated by theories of object recognition, we evaluated a dual-pathway account of stimulus encoding. The part-based pathway establishes mappings between sensory input and symbols that encode discrete stimulus features, whereas the image-based pathway applies holistic templates to sensory input. Our experiments used rule-plus-exception structures, in which one exception item in each category violates a salient regularity and must be distinguished from other items. In Experiment 1, we found discrete representations to be crucial for recognition of exceptions following brief training. Experiments 2 and 3 involved multisession training regimens designed to encourage either part- or image-based encoding. We found that both pathways are able to support exception encoding, but have unique characteristics. We speculate that one advantage of the part-based pathway is the ability to generalize across domains, whereas the image-based pathway provides faster and more effortless recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two basic approaches to explaining the nature of the mind are the rational and the mechanistic approaches. Rational analyses attempt to characterize the environment and the behavioral outcomes that humans seek to optimize, whereas mechanistic models attempt to simulate human behavior using processes and representations analogous to those used by humans. We compared these approaches with regard to their accounts of how humans learn the variability of categories. The mechanistic model departs in subtle ways from rational principles. In particular, the mechanistic model incrementally updates its estimates of category means and variances through error-driven learning, based on discrepancies between new category members and the current representation of each category. The model yields a prediction, which we verify, regarding the effects of order manipulations that the rational approach does not anticipate. Although both rational and mechanistic models can successfully post-dict known findings, we suggest that psychological advances are driven primarily by consideration of process and representation and that rational accounts trail these breakthroughs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the number of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) lines increases, so does the need for systematic evaluation of each line's characteristics and potential. Comparisons between lines are complicated by variations in culture conditions, feeders, spontaneous differentiation, and the absence of standardized assays. These difficulties, combined with the inability of most labs to maintain more than a few lines simultaneously, compel the development of reference standards to which hESC lines can be compared. The use of a stable cell line as a reference standard offers many advantages. A line with a relatively unchanging hESC-like gene and protein expression pattern could be a positive control for developing assays. It can be used as a reference for genomics or proteomics studies, especially for normalizing results obtained in separate laboratories. Such a cell line should be widely available without intellectual property restraints, easily cultured without feeders, and resistant to spontaneous changes in phenotype. We propose that the embryonal carcinoma (EC) line 2102Ep meets these requirements. We compared the protein, gene, and microRNA expression of this cell line with those of hESC lines and alternative reference lines such as the EC line NTERA-2 and the karyotypically abnormal hESC line BG01V. The overall expression profiles of all these lines were similar, with exceptions reflecting the germ cell origins of EC. On the basis of global gene and microRNA expression, 2102Ep is somewhat less similar to hESC than the alternatives; however, 2102Ep expresses more hESC-associated microRNAs than NTERA-2 does, and fewer markers of differentiated fates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This exploratory study applies and extends a new model of media attendance to examine factors that determine current levels of sharing files through peer-to-peer networks among college students, and to predict downloaders’ intentions to discontinue the behavior in the future. In a multiple regression analysis, downloading activity was found to be positively related to deficient self-regulation and the expected social outcomes of downloading behavior. Downloading activity was lessened by dissatisfaction with poor quality downloads. Those who are willing to discontinue downloading are motivated by fear of punishment, but skilled and habitual downloaders were unlikely to discontinue. Normative beliefs also affected downloading. The perception that downloading was morally unacceptable was positively related to intentions to discontinue downloading, while beliefs that the behavior was morally acceptable were positively related to current downloading activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Computational models of infant categorization often fail to elaborate the transitional mechanisms that allow infants to achieve adult performance. In this article, we apply a successful connectionist model of adult category learning to developmental data. The Supervised and Unsupervised Stratified Adaptive Incremental Network (SUSTAIN) model is able to account for the emergence of infants' sensitivity to correlated attributes (e.g., has wings and can fly), SUSTAIN offers 2 complimentary explanations of the developmental trend. One explanation centers on memory storage limitations, whereas the other focuses on limitations in perceptual systems. Both explanations parallel published findings concerning the cognitive and sensory limitations of infants. SUSTAIN'S simulations suggest that conceptual development follows a continuous and smooth trajectory despite qualitative changes in behavior and that the mechanisms that underlie infant and adult categorization might not differ significantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to make informative comparisons is central to human cognition. Comparison involves aligning two representations and placing their elements into correspondence. Detecting correspondences is a necessary component of analogical inference, recognition, categorization, schema formation, and similarity judgment. Connectionist Analogy Builder (CAB) determines correspondences through a simple iterative computation that matches elements in one representation with elements playing compatible roles in the other representation while simultaneously enforcing structural constraints. CAB shows promise as a process model of comparison as its performance can be related to human performance (e.g., solution trajectory, error patterns, time-on-task). Furthermore, CAB’s bounded working memory allows it to account for the inherent capacity limitations of human processing. CAB’s strengths are its parsimony, transparency of operations, and ability to generate performance predictions. In this paper, CAB is evaluated against benchmark phenomena from the analogy literature. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

SUSTAIN (Supervised and Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incremental Network) is a network model of human category learning. SUSTAIN initially assumes a simple category structure. If simple solutions prove inadequate and SUSTAIN is confronted with a surprising event (e.g. it is told that a bat is a mammal instead of a bird), SUSTAIN recruits an additional cluster to represent the surprising event. Newly recruited clusters are available to explain future events and can themselves evolve into prototypes/attractors/rules. SUSTAIN has expanded the scope of findings that models of human category learning can address. This paper extends SUSTAIN to account for both supervised and unsupervised learning data through a common mechanism. The modified model, uSUSTAIN (unified SUSTAIN), is successfully applied to human learning data that compares unsupervised and supervised learning performances.[SUP18] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Typically, models of category learning are verified through behavioral experiments with stimuli consisting of putatively independent dimensions such as shape, size, and color. The assumption of independence is critical in both the design of behavioral experiments and the development of models and theories of learning. Using the standard classification learning paradigm and a common stimulus set, the present work demonstrates that the assumption of independence is unwarranted. Systematic relations span stimulus dimensions and govern learning performance. For example, shape is not independent of size and color, because humans quantify size and color over shape when shape is relevant to the categorization. This quantification is reflected in natural language use (e.g., "blue triangle" as opposed to "triangle and blue"). In this example, color and size are predicates and shape is the argument. Across four experiments, the difficulty of mastering a classification rule can be predicted by the number of predicates that must be unbound in order to free rule-relevant stimulus dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]