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Although the liability of foreignness has been shown to present real economic barriers for foreign firms in various contexts around the globe, scholars continue to debate what drives this liability in different market contexts: lack of information due to institutional distance, lack of social embeddedness, discrimination, or something else. In this study, we propose a new theory, that in corporate lobbying within the nonmarket strategy context, the liability of foreignness is driven in no small part by a values-based ideological conflict stemming from the divide between democracy and autocracy. Private-sector firms from autocratic countries face costs of illegitimacy in Washington, D.C., and professional corporate lobbyists charge such firms a fee premium, in effect, to pay for legitimacy. We conduct an empirical study of the lobbying fees charged by professional corporate lobbyists in Washington, D.C., to their domestic and foreign firm clients, and the results strongly support the predictions of our theory. We also show that the liability of foreignness in this context endures for foreign firms from autocratic countries over the 15-year length of our sample period. Offering a new theoretical perspective as well as new empirical findings regarding the liability of foreignness, our study has practical implications for managers of foreign firms and may also generalize to other market contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: Lobbying allows firms to influence the government to potentially limit firms' costs during product recall crises. However, such lobbying can elicit scrutiny from the media if the lobbying gives the impression that firms wish to save costs at the expense of safety, thereby appearing hypocritical. We theorize that when faced with negative media coverage of product recalls or recall‐related lobbying, firms strategically eschew lobbying to limit further media scrutiny and its associated negative consequences. We test our hypotheses using the US auto industry's lobbying from 2008 to 2022. We provide further depth to our examination of strategic eschewal through 15 supplemental interviews of lobbyists about how the media influences firms' lobbying decisions. Managerial Summary: Companies may resort to lobbying in efforts to reduce costs related to product recall crises, but such controversial lobbying may also tarnish their image. When confronted with negative media coverage of product recalls, or recall‐related lobbying, companies are more likely to strategically refrain from lobbying to minimize additional, unwanted media spotlight and its associated negative repercussions. Managers should be mindful that even if lobbying may help limit the costs of recalls, it could also cause potential reputational harm. Thus, it is vitally important that managers pay attention to the reputational cues from the media, which can help them determine when lobbying may be problematic and allow them to preemptively refrain from such lobbying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cities increasingly address climate change, e.g. by pledging city-level emission reduction targets. This is puzzling for the provision of a global public good: what are city governments' reasons for doing so, and do pledges actually translate into emission reductions? Empirical studies have found a set of common factors which relate to these questions, but also mixed evidence. What is still pending is a theoretical framework to explain those findings and gaps. This paper thus develops a theoretical public choice model. It features economies of scale and distinguishes urban reduction targets from actual emission reductions. The model is able to explain the presence of targets and public good provision, yet only under specified conditions. It is also able to support some stylized facts from the empirical literature, e.g. on the effect of city size, and resolves some mixed evidence as special cases. Larger cities chose more ambitious targets if marginal net benefits of mitigation rise with city size—if they set targets at all. Whether target setting is more likely for larger cities depends on the city type. Two types are obtained. The first type reduces more emissions than a free-riding city. Those cities are more likely to set a target when they are larger. However, they miss the self-chosen target. Cities of the second type reach their target, but mitigate less than a free-riding city. A third type does not exist. With its special cases, the model can thus guide further empirical and theoretical work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cities have little formalized access to the European Union (EU) system, yet research indicates that cities are forming more direct relations with actors outside national borders, including EU institutions. Based on 23 interviews on the EU activities of Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm, this article investigates whether the Scandinavian capital cities engage in lobbying towards the EU, their choice of lobby channel and the justification for this choice. The article finds that lobbying the EU is important for all three cities, but that they value different channels. The article has three contributions: First, to contribute to the latest broadening of the application of the multilevel governance perspective by studying the role of cities in EU lobbying; second, to add to the literature on EU lobbying by studying the role of networks and associations for cities lobbying the EU; and third, the article argues that extra‐state channels are especially important for cities in non‐EU countries, the so‐called, "third country actors." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU's social dimension has been strengthened since the mid-2010s. Recent research has shown how Commission entrepreneurship in meta-governance such as the European Pillar of Social Rights and the European Semester turned existing regulation in a more 'social' direction or led to new regulation strengthening Social Europe. This article asks whether the Commission also stands out as the most important actor in initiatives focused exclusively on working conditions and if the European social partners also in these are secondary reactive actors. Focusing on a recent case where the social partners had a treaty-based right to bargain—the Working Conditions Directive—the article confirms the Commission's dominance and the reactivity of the social partners. The choice not to bargain reduces the social partners to lobbyists attempting to influence other key actors. However, the case also shows the limits to Commission entrepreneurship in that EU member states and the European Parliament were able to influence the outcome in important ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence scholars routinely portray intelligence oversight as a means of restraining intelligence activities, particularly covert operations. The consensus overlooks situations where oversight can instead channel popular passions. This paper documents how Reagan era activists recruited legislators to the Afghan resistance cause. Their legislative-civic alliance demanded the CIA launch more aggressive operations in Afghanistan, sidelining established oversight committees. The resulting covert action campaign risked Soviet escalation, eliminated plausible deniability, and gave advanced U.S. technology to potential terrorists. This episode highlights how well-organized lobbyists may affect the intelligence agenda and challenges assumptions that wider engagement in oversight will always restrain intelligence agencies' overreach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization decision, Republican-controlled legislatures across the U.S. initiated draconian abortion restrictions. In order to appeal to anti-abortion policymakers, advocates across the country have strategically separated "maternal and child health" (MCH) issues, such as increased insurance coverage for midwifery and doula care, from issues often labeled as "reproductive rights," such as access to sex education, birth control, and abortion. Advocates point out this strategic separation has likely contributed overall to the downfall of abortion rights. In this paper, we analyze legislative discourse to understand the legislative challenges advocates face, the strategic separations and allyships they employ, and the implications for other states and reproductive health more broadly. We find that legislators legitimate the same scientific evidence in some contexts while not in others in order to hold onto rhetorical purity within the abortion debate. In their attempts to parse the ideal abortion seeker, conservative legislators create legal ambiguities with serious consequences for healthcare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of public opinion shows that reelection‐motivated politicians systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like, and report alternative empirical findings. These unelected elites hold similarly inaccurate perceptions about public opinion, though not in a single ideological direction. We find this elite population exhibits egocentrism bias, rather than partisan confirmation bias, as their perceptions about others' opinions systematically correspond to their own policy preferences. Thus, we document a remarkably consistent false consensus effect among unelected political elites, which holds across subsamples by party, occupation, professional relevance of party affiliation, and trust in party‐aligned information sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

WIPO-GRTKF specifies, for the first time, how traditional resources embodied by traditional knowledge, genetic resources, and folklore can be defined, and what the relationship between original rights, and rights arising from the transformation and utilisation of traditional resources can be understood. Committed to promoting innovation, shared benefits and balanced interests, WIPO tries to achieve a balance between preventing users from violating holders' original rights through the acquisition of patent, trademark and copyright, and incentivizing all stakeholders to transform traditional resources to improve the greater good. The document triggers a new round of disputes among interest groups over how to share rights arising from the transformation and utilisation of traditional resources. Using an evolutionary game model to simulate how holders and users transform traditional resources, and share rights, we find that when the two sides choose to cooperate to apply for transformation and give consent to use, their benefits are maximised and strategies stabilised. We suggest that in the transforming process, holders' rights and users' interests be given equal emphasis, and an autonomous and open mode combining statutory licensing, and justified utilisation of original rights be employed. We advocate for a hybrid legislative arrangement that integrates the incentive of IPRs as private rights, and the safeguard of public rights. In the dual subject system, both users and holders enjoy multiple rights in the process of protecting and transforming traditional resources. The Chinese approach to transforming traditional resources and sharing their rights will contribute to sustainable development of traditional resource industry across the globe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (Gatekeeping Hypothesis). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive's exclusive sphere (Legislative Activity Hypothesis). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6479 lobbying audiences and over 2300 bills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lobbyists often target legislators who are aligned with them rather than opponents. The choice of whom to lobby affects both what information becomes available to legislators and how much influence special interest groups exert on policies. However, the conditions under which aligned legislators are targeted are not well understood. We investigate how the pressure to conclude policies quickly affects the strategic decision of whom to lobby. We derive conditions on the cost of delaying policies and on the distribution of legislators' preferences for lobbyists to prefer targeting allies. We show that the use of allied intermediaries has important implications for the duration of policymaking and the quality of policies. Counterintuitively, an increase in time pressure can increase the duration of policymaking and a longer duration does not always lead to better informed policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocacy intelligence is a critical organizational resource fostering long‐term survival and policy success. Policy‐active interest groups such as non‐profits, business associations and labor unions, seek to maintain their competitive advantage among peers and therefore have incentives to remain secretive about the details of their lobbying strategies and membership mobilization. We empirically evaluate this argument based on knowledge sharing interactions in 12 focus group interviews with approximately 50 representatives of interest groups in the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark. Our research design manipulates the composition of the focus groups to vary the level of competition for political influence and membership among the participants. Strikingly, we find no evidence that either type of competition hampers knowledge sharing. Instead, our novel data point to three fruitful alternative explanations: the importance of socialization, mentorship and personalities of interest group leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely thought that lobbyists exert influence over legislators' policy positions and, as a result, over policy outcomes. One mechanism of influence is the provision of policy expertise. Yet, there is little credible empirical evidence that lobbyists' expertise influences legislative outcomes. Across four experiments fielded with three lobbyists in two state legislatures that examine two public measures of legislators' positions, we find no evidence that lobbyists' expertise influences legislators' policy positions. We do find, in contrast, that the same policy expertise treatment is influential when provided by a legislative staffer. We conclude that policy information can influence legislators' positions, but that legislators are cautious when that information is provided by lobbyists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal der Juristischen Zeitgeschichte is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We argue that the everyday language distinction drawn between power and influence is meaningful and significant. There is good reason to believe that much corporate lobbying activity which is currently described under the heading of business power is better understood as attempts to secure negotiated agreements based on exerting influence rather than power and that the latter is usually used only when attempts to use influence have failed. We develop an analytical distinction between influence, understood as successful efforts at persuasion, and power using Keith Dowding's work on power. Drawing upon findings from interviews with corporate professionals operating at the coalface of business and government interaction in Australia, we show that lobbyists generally seek "quiet" behind-the-scenes accommodations with governments via attempts to exert influence rather than power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is broad consensus that lobbyists with government experience are valuable to those who employ them, principally because they possess contacts in government and unique insights into the policy process. Yet the near exclusive focus on government experience as the defining feature of lobbyist careers, means the literature has neglected analysis of the mix of different (and important) experiences that actual lobbyists likely accumulate during their careers. We address these gaps through analysis of the career sequences of over 600 lobbyists operating across contract and in‐house roles in Australia. Using the tools of sequence and cluster analysis, we identify four broad types of careers among lobbyists. While half of all lobbyists have had roles with some direct political experience, we find that distinctions between types of lobbying careers are differentiated by experience in other fields such as journalism, public relations, associations and corporate life. Moreover, our multivariate analysis shows that different career types are more strongly associated with in‐house versus contract lobbying roles. We conclude that scholars should move beyond a focus on 'revolving doors' to more directly analyse the range of experiences that lobbyists leverage in their professional lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study delves into the complexities surrounding the determination, interpretation, and application of maqāsid al-sharī'a within modern Islamic economics and finance. By conducting an extensive review of classical and contemporary literature, this research explores the diverse methods and criteria employed for ascertaining maqāsid. It critically examines the inherent subjectivity involved in categorizing maqāsid, shedding light on the ambiguity in delineating their boundaries. Additionally, the study scrutinizes the unintended consequences of broader utilization of maqāsid, particularly in transactions such as bay' al-'īnah, and evaluates the risks associated with prioritizing maslaha (utility) over textual evidence. The findings underscore the challenges posed by the subjective nature of maqāsid interpretation, illustrating how diverse perspectives can lead to differing conclusions. They emphasize the potential misuse of maqāsid for legitimizing practices contrary to the core principles of sharia. This research underscores the preservation of legislative intent and advocates a cautious approach to integrating maqāsid al-sharī'a into Islamic economics and finance. The objective is to strike a balance that upholds Islamic principles. It highlights the essential need for collectively establishing standards for both macro and micro maqāsid and their usage in ijtihād, promoting responsible applications within contemporary Islamic finance for informed and ethical solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the complex relationship between humans and dogs in urban settings. It raises the question of whether dogs would be able to survive and thrive without human intervention, suggesting that dogs have the capacity to adapt and live independently. The article also explores the historical and cultural factors that have influenced the way humans interact with dogs, such as the rise of pet ownership and the containment of stray dogs. It challenges the idea that dogs are simply products of human domestication and highlights the intricate and ever-changing nature of human-dog relationships. Additionally, the article examines the broader issue of how animals are treated and perceived in urban environments, focusing on the exploitation and commodification of animals. It discusses the origins of animal protection laws and the complex relationship between humane organizations and industry. The text also highlights the contributions of Henry Bergh, who founded the ASPCA and advocated for legislative protections for animals. It explores the tension between compassion and necessity in animal welfare and questions the concept of human exceptionalism throughout history. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of recognizing the agency of animals and envisioning a future that involves more collaboration with them. [Extracted from the article]

This article presents the first direct analysis of the influence of revolving-door lobbyists over the content of adopted public laws. We use earmarks to evaluate both the effects of lobbying and the possible additional effects of lobbying by individuals who formerly worked as congressional members and staff. Employing a fixed-effects panel approach, we evaluate original data describing the lobbying efforts of the more than 5000 accredited U.S. colleges and universities over a 12-year timeframe. Our analysis indicates that schools that lobby in a given year can expect to receive 54% more earmarks and 24% more earmarked funds relative to other schools and other years. Further, there is an additional significant effect of revolving-door lobbying that is greatest at lower levels of lobbying expenditures. Our results contribute to the emerging literature on comparative lobbying and speak to concerns about the possible corrupting influence of revolving-door lobbying over public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British Broadcasting Corporation's impact on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation coincides with the arrival of Major Gladstone Murray to take on the position of General Manager, lobbyists for a system like the BBC, and the series of Special Committees on Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commissions in the 1930s. Gladstone Murray, a Canadian, who worked for the BBC as its Director of Publicity from 1924 to 1935, was instrumental in integrating BBC's public service model in the CBC. This connection to the BBC cemented its impact on the CBC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate a linear–quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount the utility with a non-constant rate. Our objective is to identify a consistent planning equilibrium in which the players are aware of their inconsistency and cannot commit to a lobbying policy. We analyse equilibrium behaviour in both single-player and two-player cases and compare the behaviours of the game under constant and variable discount rates. The equilibrium behaviour is provided in closed-loop form, either analytically or via numerical approximation. Our numerical analysis of the equilibrium reveals that strategic behaviour leads to more intense lobbying without resulting in overshooting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars interested in political elites and policy professionals only sporadically rely on focus group methods. In this article, we argue why this is a missed opportunity. Based on our own recent research experience, we suggest three innovations to the focus group method that should make it appealing for political scientists who study professionals active in the policy process. First, focus groups allow for the study of the interactions between political elites in ways other methods cannot. Second, the method can be used for hypothesis testing when focus groups are designed accordingly. Third, the option to conduct focus groups online has major advantages in terms of participant costs, ease of recruitment, and, potentially, research equity. We hope that our suggestions are useful for researchers wanting to build on any one—or all—of these innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To lobby legislators, it is important for interest groups to signal their ability to help legislators win elections and provide them with policy-relevant information. We explore for-profit companies' use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reports as a signaling device to promote their reputation to legislators and convey their ability to provide electoral and policymaking support, which is valuable for lobbying. To this end, we create a panel dataset by combining ESG reports issued by US companies and the same companies' lobbying and campaign contribution records from 1999 to 2017. We expect companies to issue more ESG reports, as well as reports containing more quantitative content, when they lobby. The data conform to our expectations. We also reason that lobbying may be more strongly related to ESG reporting when it is coupled with campaign contributions made by affiliated corporate political action committees, but the data do not support this expectation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the historical effects of ethnic and racial diversification among legislators on identity group mobilization and the hiring of nonwhite lobbyists. We propose that diversification among legislators encouraged identity groups to lobby, that these groups hired lobbyists who reflected their members' identities, and that all interests also hired lobbyists who reflected the identities of new legislative targets. We apply a Bayesian estimation approach to infer the identities of lobbyists who were active in the American states over several decades. We find that the election of African Americans to state legislatures encouraged black identity groups to lobby, that all identity groups, including those representing Hispanics or Latinos, generally hired lobbyists who reflected their members' identities, and that the election of Asian Americans to state legislatures encouraged interests generally to hire Asian-American lobbyists. Hispanic or Latino lobbyists gained clients in response to diversification in more Democratic legislatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lobbying firms seek access to policymaking by hiring individuals with connections to government officials and with previous experience as government employees. This paper examines a different avenue for access: the transition of a firm's lobbyists into government roles. We find firms frequently forge connections to government in this manner and their business benefits as a result. Using panel data from 2001 to 2020 of U.S. federal bureaucrats and congressional staff matched to lobbying records, we quantify the value to lobbying firms when their employees enter government service. We find lobbying firms that gain government connections through the departure of one of their lobbyists experience a 36% revenue increase, or roughly $320,000 per year. In examining what drives this increase in revenue, we find firms present connections as a premium service to existing clients and that connections to congressional offices are more valuable than those gained to executive branch agencies. These results shed light onto the business model of lobbying firms and the political economy of the lobbying industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Former legislators who lobby exacerbate the effects of financial resources on the relative political influence that various organized interests achieve. These lobbyists receive more income and achieve favorable policy outcomes more often than other lobbyists. The value of these revolving-door lobbyists, however, is contingent on the continued presence of former colleagues in legislatures. Former legislators achieve influence because of their insider connections, and membership turnover among incumbents decreases the value of this asset for interest groups. I examine the incomes and clienteles of former legislators who lobbied in the American states over seven decades. Turnover is a consistent, negative predictor of revolver value. This effect is enhanced by the presence of legislative staff support. This study is the first to examine the value of revolving-door lobbyists in the state legislatures. My findings imply that reforms that induce turnover help to level playing fields of political advocacy among interests with different levels of financial resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lobbyists are omnipresent in the policy-making process, but the value that they bring to both clients and politicians remains poorly understood. We develop a model in which a lobbyist's value derives from his ability to selectively screen which clients he brings to a politician, thereby earning the politician's trust and preferential treatment for his clients. Lobbyists face a dilemma, as their ability to screen also increases their value to special interests and the prices they can charge. A lobbyist's profit motive undermines his ability to solve this dilemma, but an interest in policy outcomes—due to either a political ideology or a personal connection—enhances it, which paradoxically increases his profits. Using a unique data set from reports mandated by the Foreign Agents Registration Act, we find that lobbyists become more selective when they are more ideologically aligned with politicians, consistent with our prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the transparency regime regulating the activities of lobbyists in the UK and the devolved administrations fails to address the core problems of political lobbying and should be replaced. This is particularly important following Brexit because the regulatory landscape will change significantly in the years to come. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 establishes a registry-based system of regulating lobbyists seeking to communicate with the government in Westminster. The Scotland (Lobbying) Act 2016 establishes a similar system, with calls for a lobbying register in Wales also growing. Analyses of existing laws reveal several flaws with those registry-based systems resulting in inadequate levels of transparency. To remedy the shortfall and to get transparency right, this article argues for two changes. First, a more robust register for professional lobbyists premised on greater transparency that is harmonised for Westminster and the devolved administrations. Secondly, the creation of a centralised public website acting as the official forum for advocacy tied to specific legislative proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public relations are fundamental in organisations to establish an adequate relationship between the company and its public, and in the field of relations with public authorities, lobbying has become a very important activity. Two types of action can be distinguished: direct lobbying and grassroots lobbying. The aim of this research is to determine the professional and academic profiles of Spanish lobbyists to determine which type of activity is most common. To achieve this, the professional profiles of 370 Spanish lobbyists were analysed on LinkedIn, and a questionnaire was sent to them to find out about their experience, academic background, and typical activities. The results indicate that Spanish lobbyists are organised around companies and consultancies specialising in political communication and communication advice. The need to formalise lobbying activity, explain its tasks, recognise the exercise of influence, and establish an official register is highlighted. Regarding academic training, new Spanish lobbyists have studied Communication with postgraduate degrees in Political Science and Sociology rather than legal studies, as previously thought. There is also a growing presence of women in this field. In addition, it was determined that 88% of Spanish lobbyists focus on direct lobbying, and only 12% focus on grassroots lobbying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Campaign donors and corporate interests have greater access to Congress, and the legislative agenda and policy outcomes reflect their preferences. How this privileged access converts into influence remains unclear because petitioner-legislator interactions are unobserved. In this article, we report the results of an original survey experiment of 436 congressional staffers. The vignette manipulates a petitioner's identity, the substance of the request, and the supporting evidence being offered. We test how likely staff are to take a meeting, to use the information being offered, and to recommend taking a position consistent with the request, as well as whether they perceive the request to be congruent with constituent preferences. Donors and lobbyists are no more likely to be granted access than constituents, but staffers are more likely to use information and to make legislative action recommendations when the information source is an ideologically aligned think tank. Subgroup analysis suggests these effects are particularly strong among ideological extremists and strong partisans. And, information offered by aligned think tanks are thought to be representative of constituent opinion. Our results reveal the partisan and ideological predispositions that motivate legislative action that is more costly than merely granting access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bewährungshilfe is the property of Forum Verlag Godesberg GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

To justify its enormous cost, the defense sector promotes China as a deadly military threat, noneother being available This is a potentially fatal error. The Biden administration should recognize China's sphere of influence and strengthen control over the national security establishment. Like all other government agencies, the national security agencies fight relentlessly to defend their programs, prerogatives and budgets. To that end, they use the world's largest public relations budget, a flotilla of supporting think tanks, associations, institutes and columnists, and an army of defense industry lobbyists. Despite having never clearly won a war since World War II (not counting the farcical invasion of Grenada) and having clearly lost at least two despite a seemingly overwhelming advantage of force (Vietnam, Afghanistan and arguably Iraq), the military nonetheless has been so spectacularly successful in its political mission that we now spend more on the military than do all other countries combined – an incredible eight hundred and sixteen billion dollars per year. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a blueprint for making the U.S. Congress great again and re-empowering the legislature. Topics discussed are disappearance of legislative victories of the Congress starting in the late 1970s with the shrinking of the size and effectiveness of the Congressional Representative and crumbling committees, as well as the rise of powerful leadership staff and lobbyists, and atrophy of the Congress driven by the Republican Revolution of 1994 and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich.

Putting 'lobbyists' and 'lobbying' on the EU law map – acknowledging that there is little interest in lobbying by EU legal research – explaining why EU lawyers and especially constitutional law scholars should be interested in lobbying – presenting a framework to study lobbyists as regulated actors under EU law – considering the merits of ethnographically-oriented socio-legal research and the 'new legal realism' as methods of studying lobbyists and lobbying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do lobbyists always advocate for the interests of the members or clients employing them, or, under competing pressures, do they sometimes take positions on bills reflecting the interests of lawmakers or other lobbyists? Do they, in fact, lobby strategically by making choices that balance competing pressures in pursuit of goals like furthering their careers? Most lobbying research assumes that interest groups and lobbyists are the same, but I argue that the interests of lobbyists may be different from those they represent, which I test with a model of strategic lobbying using data on positions lobbyists took on bills in Congress from 2006 to 2017 made available by MapLight. I find that lobbyists sometimes do take positions at odds with member interests under pressure from legislators, other lobbyists, and the president, though some groups can constrain their lobbyists. I conclude by speculating on what this means for lobbying as a form of representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As literacy leaders, we know that printed words carry great meaning and power. Today, there is a widespread belief that advocacy over government concerns or policies can be adequately achieved using social media. While a well‐timed and phrased social media post can supplement advocacy efforts, advocacy must be driven by deeds even more than words. In this article, the authors articulate the importance of face‐to‐face policy advocacy with elected officials to address any educational, health, or social policy in your locale which impacts the students, families, and communities you belong to and/or serve. Specifically, they outline the steps for advocating directly with an elected legislative official (or their staff representative) and provide numerous exemplars of documents as mentor texts to support and supplement policy advocacy efforts. Their models actualize policy advocacy for socially just practices that impact some of the most vulnerable populations, English learners, and associated funding for programs supporting these populations also known as English to Speakers of Other Languages (ELs/ESOL). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the potential for a successful private sector career induce legislators to leave office? How does this affect the representation voters receive? I show that when former US senators—who now work as lobbyists—become more successful, currently serving senators with similar characteristics are more likely to take private sector employment. I replicate all results on data from the House. A number of tests suggest that senators react to the opportunity costs of holding office. Investigating selection effects, I find that legislative specialists are attracted the most in the Senate. Preliminary evidence suggests that the least wealthy respond most strongly in the House. This suggests that the revolving door shapes the skill set of legislators and the representation voters receive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a growing body of literature examining the consequences of women's inclusion among lobbyists, our understanding of the factors that lead to women's initial emergence in the profession is limited. In this study, we propose that gender diversity among legislative targets incentivizes organized interests to hire women lobbyists, and thus helps to explain when and how women emerge as lobbyists. Using a comprehensive data set of registered lobbyist–client pairings from all American states in 1989 and 2011, we find that legislative diversity influences not only the number of lobby contracts held by women but also the number of former women legislators who become revolving-door lobbyists. This second finding further supports the argument that interests capitalize on the personal characteristics of lobbyists, specifically by hiring women to work in more diverse legislatures. Our findings have implications for women and politics, lobbying, and voice and political equality in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR) has been viewed as a reliable source of information given its near century-long work of compiling statistics and reports about race relations and the social conditions affecting different race groups in South Africa. I make the case that the IRR should not be considered a reliable source of information about race groups and their social conditions in contemporary South Africa because of how the IRR misrepresents the views of ordinary South Africans with the intention of influencing policy towards the IRR's preferred ideological positions. Rather than presenting criticism of their ideological slant, I show how their policy proposals are not supported by their survey data or their interpretation. Furthermore, I argue that their misrepresentation of South Africans' beliefs is damaging to democratic processes because what the public claims it wants from government has a significant impact on what government's mandate from its citizenry is thought to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that to address the pressing issue of climate change, the U.S., state attorneys general should set up Climate Preservation Units (CPUs) as part of their offices. It mentions that due to the lack of action by the federal government, state, and local entities are increasingly responsible for addressing the climate crisis, as the legislative, and judicial branches have failed to do so.

One way to support active mobility is by the successful articulation and diffusion of new bike-infrastructure concepts. This paper studies the journey of one such concept in the Netherlands, namely the cycle highway, which nowadays is often referred to as a 'fast cycleway'. These routes provide high-quality and spacious cycling facilities connecting (sub)urban residential sites to nodes of work and study. They are built with the aim to induce a substantive modal shift in regional commuting from car and transit to cycling. Currently, there are nearly 300 fast cycleway initiatives in the Netherlands of which 52 have already been constructed. Based on 27 interviews with planners, engineers and lobbyists, this paper traces the success of the fast cyclepath concept through the perspectives of "articulation" and "liquidity". We find that fast cycleroutes emerge as whole, coherent entities through six separate vocabularies, namely of demonstration, quality framing, policy rule and contract, planning diplomacy, financial wizardry and design negotiation. Each vocabulary gives rise to a "global form" fuelling the "currency" and performativity of the fast cycleroute concept. Different contexts also induce considerable differentiation, raising the question how far the concept may be stretched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]