Search

Swept-sines provide a tool for fast and high-resolution measurement of evoked otoacoustic emissions. During the measurement, a response to swept-sine(s) is recorded by a probe placed in the ear canal. Otoacoustic emissions can then be extracted by various techniques, e.g., Fourier analysis, the heterodyne method, and the least-square-fitting (LSF) technique. This paper employs a technique originally proposed with exponential swept-sines, which allows for direct emission extraction from the measured intermodulation impulse response. It is shown here that the technique can be used to extract distortion-product otoacoustic emissions (DPOAEs) evoked with two simultaneous swept-sines. For proper extraction of the DPOAE phase, the technique employs previously proposed adjusted formulas for exponential swept-sines generating so-called synchronized swept-sines (SSSs). Here, the SSS technique is verified using responses derived from a numerical solution of a cochlear model and responses measured in human subjects. Although computationally much less demanding, the technique yields comparable results to those obtained by the LSF technique, which has been shown in the literature to be the most noise-robust among the emission extraction methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ideology, propaganda, and political discourse of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have continued to function as key elements of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Maoist period since 1978. In the first term of the Xi Jinping leadership (2012-2017), the CPC, for instance, elaborated on its guiding ideological concepts, devised inventive ideational framings of phenomena usually perceived as tangible (such as the “New Normal”), engaged in complex intellectual debates on crucial topics (such as “eco-civilization”), intensified and diversified its argumentation patterns and discursive strategies, and consolidated ideational governance over some citizens’ individual values, beliefs, and loyalties. Furthermore, it is often no longer possible to differentiate between the CPC’s internal and external propaganda, as seemingly exclusively domestic ideational and discursive issues increasingly correlate with international phenomena. However, the trends in the Xi era do not present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cum-innovation of previous Maoist and post-Maoist uses of ideology, propaganda, and political discourse, primarily aiming at strengthening one-party rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central role of ideology has been one of the key features of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. One of the places where the phenomenon can be observed is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, a vast, important, and rich borderland area inhabited by some 10 million Turkic Muslim Uyghurs. Since 1949, the central government has managed to win only a limited degree of Uyghur support for its policies, leaving the region riven with protest and violence. The central government has therefore sought to devise and implement policies so as to simultaneously address multiple aspects of Xinjiang’s reality, including ideational affairs. This paper examines the party-state’s ideational governance, i.e. efforts to define and regulate Uyghur values, beliefs, and loyalties so that they are instrumental in maintaining the political stability of the PRC. Firstly, the novel approach to Xinjiang policy adopted by the Xi leadership during its first functional term (2012-2017) is examined, namely its concern with Xinjiang’s growing geopolitical significance and with the security dimension of the Xinjiang problem. Two main focuses of Xinjiang governance are introduced, particularly the advancement of centripetal inter-ethnic relations (officially called “ethnic unity”) and the eradication of religious or cultural practices deemed as potentially subversive (“de-extremization”). Secondly, the ideology relating to Xinjiang is examined within the framework of the CPC’s national-level ideology. Thirdly, new legislation, by which the authorities seek to legitimate Xinjiang policies, is considered. Fourthly, several grassroots “ethnic unity” and “de-extremization” activities are reviewed as examples of the party-state’s efforts to use the Uyghur religion and other intangible domains as ideational apparatuses to inculcate desirable political values. The conclusions reached in this article raise the broader question as to whether the party-state’s resolve to strengthening its ideational governance over the Uyghurs will bring about a change in the security situation in Xinjiang. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explains the intellectual history and ideology of the Turkic insurgency and the East Turkestan Republic in Kashgar in 1933–34. Texts in periodicals from the period suggest that the insurgency was defined by its intellectual elites more as a nationalist enterprise than as a religious one. The insurgency's ideologists established important national attributes of the East Turkestani nation, particularly its national name, homeland, symbology, and history, and they also articulated East Turkestani national interests, particularly political independence, representative government, and modernization. Regardless of the arguably low degree of social penetration of the ideas of the elites among common society and the small extent to which policy was actually implemented, the intertwining of East Turkestani national identity and interests with political self-government and modernization was an ideological concept that had a profound impact on all subsequent administrations in Xinjiang. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]