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Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role and capabilities of major weapon system transferred between 1950 and 2010 in Great Britain. Topics discussed include empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set that provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits; economic motivations for arm transfers such as foreign military sales for cash, and the arms are free ; and effect of human rights on U.S. transfers.

This article examines the determinants of United States arms transfers by examining military aid separate from military sales. Separation of the two types of transfers is necessary due to the different benefits the United States receives from the transfers. Sales create direct economic benefits while aid is economically costly. The results show that some political, strategic, and economic factors have differing effects on the type of transfer and its size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We address the consequences of corruption within a state on the extent to which populations have shortened life expectancy due to political corruption. Using three variables to estimate corruption, the results support the expectation that corruption increases average disability shortened life years ( DALY). The results persist when estimating the model including measures of deaths from civil war and the number of bordering states experiencing civil war, both previously shown to have an effect on DALY, although these two variables are not statistically significant in our models. While the estimated effects of the corruption variables continue to capture much of the variation in DALY for a global group of nations, they completely fail to explain any variation in Sub-Saharan African states, probably because of the devastating effects of AIDS and malaria in that region. Finally, we discuss why this failure occurs and discuss the implications of our results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]