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The article is devoted to selected new trends in metaethics, ethics, political philosophy, and the practice of philosophy with the use of artificial intelligence. It consists of five parts. In the first part, I analyze the meaning of the question about new trends in analytical philosophy. In the second part, I present the latest trends in metaethics. In the third part, I briefly characterize the ethics of artificial intelligence. The fourth part, devoted to political philosophy, includes a presentation of the latest publications on meritocracy. The article concludes with considerations about practicing philosophy in the age of artificial intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My first aim in this paper is to use time diagrams in the style of Brentano to analyze constructions in Brouwer's separable mathematics more precisely. I argue that constructions must involve not only pairing and projecting as basic operations guaranteed by the intuition of twoity, as sometimes assumed in the literature, but also a recalling operation. My second aim is to argue that Brouwer's views on the intuition of twoity and arithmetic lead to an ontological explosion. Redeveloping the constructions of natural numbers and systems sketched in an appendix to Brouwer's Cambridge lectures, I observe that the only plausible way he can make some elementary arithmetic in his separable mathematics is by allowing for the same canonical number to be determined by multiple separable entities, resulting in an overabundant mathematical ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Nicolas Gisin suggests that by conducting physics with intuitionistic rather than classical mathematics, rich temporality—that is, passage and tense, and specifically the future's openness—can be incorporated into physics. Physics based on classical mathematics is tenseless and deterministic, and that, so he holds, renders it incongruent with experience. According to Gisin, physics ought to represent the indeterminate nature of reality, and he proposes that intuitionistic mathematics is the key to succeeding in doing so. While I share his insistence on the reality of passage and tense and on the future being real and open, I argue that the amendment he offers does not work. I show that, its attunement to time notwithstanding, intuitionistic mathematics is as tenseless as classical mathematics and that physics is bound to remain tenseless regardless of the math it employs. There is much to learn about tensed time, but the task belongs to phenomenology and not to physics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a model of physics that blends Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics (RQM) interpretation with the language of finite information quantities (FIQs), defined by Gisin and Del Santo in the spirit of intuitionistic mathematics. We discuss deficiencies of using real numbers to model physical systems in general, and particularly under the RQM interpretation. With this motivation for an alternative mathematical language, we propose the use of FIQs to model the world under the RQM interpretation, wherein we view the propensities that make up a FIQ as quantifications of potential interaction. Under this model, the stable facts, relative facts, and shifting perspectives that make up the relational interpretation correspond to shifting digits and propensities of the FIQs. The model’s predictions agree with those of both classical and quantum physics, and it is indeterministic. We also propose explanations, with examples, for how the propensities of a FIQ are distributed, and how its digits become actualized. This is equivalent to the notion of the measurement problem, and the question of what causes wave function collapse. In short, by stepping through the “new door” opened by the language of FIQs, we attempt to describe the world under the relational interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

TT□C is a generic family of effectful, extensional type theories with a forcing interpretation parameterized by modalities. This paper identifies a subclass of TT□C theories that internally realizes continuity principles through stateful computations, such as reference cells. The principle of continuity is a seminal property that holds for a number of intuitionistic theories such as System T. Roughly speaking, it states that functions on real numbers only need approximations of these numbers to compute. Generally, continuity principles have been justified using semantical arguments, but it is known that the modulus of continuity of functions can be computed using effectful computations such as exceptions or reference cells. In this paper, the modulus of continuity of the functionals on the Baire space is directly computed using the stateful computations enabled internally in the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research in the field of sports sciences undergoes substantial turmoil and instability, stemming from both quantitative and qualitative research methods. This turbulence prompts the expansion of theoretical and empirical knowledge in the domain. Qualitative research, which can be approached through positivist or critical lenses, necessitates researchers to articulate their research philosophy and epistemological stance upfront. Notably, the methodological approach, rooted in intuitionism for analyzing social phenomena, undergoes similar shifts in sociology and sports management. This approach not only invites critique but also spawns numerous theoretical underpinnings. To counter reductionist tendencies in theoretical frameworks, the Multi Grounded Theory (MGT) emerges, aiming to harmonize intuitive and reductionist analytical methods within the framework of Hegelian thesis and antithesis. Hence, authors employing MGT move beyond the pure inductive approach in MGT by explicitly incorporating external theories. By bridging the gap between theoretical frameworks and empirical data, MGT promises to offer a holistic understanding of sports-related phenomena, empowering researchers to cause innovative theories and drive the advancement of knowledge in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, among the foundational schools of mathematics appeared 'intuitionism' by Dutchman L. E. J. Brouwer, who based arithmetic on the intuition of time and all mental constructions that could be made out of it. His pupil Arend Heyting was the first populariser of intuitionism, and he repeatedly emphasised that no philosophy was required to practise intuitionism so that such mathematics could be shared by anyone. Still, stimulated by invitations to humanistic conferences, he wrote a series of notes, preserved in the State Archives, Haarlem, about solipsism. In them, he operated a series of theoretical reflections consisting of the stripping away of the patterns that are part of our consciousness and their subsequent progressive re‐introduction, in order to understand the formation of our Self as distinct from the natural world and other humans. In 1996, following a stroke, neuroscientist Jill Bolte Taylor experienced the deprivation of certain abilities in her brain and their successive regaining. In her experience there are remarkable similarities with what Heyting had hypothesised about the formation of the self. The purpose of this article is to highlight them and point out how Heyting's theoretical construct was found to be embodied in the brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the axiomatic treatment of intuitionistic mereology introduced in Maffezioli and Varzi (Synthese, 198(S18), 4277–4302 2021) by examining the behavior of constructive notions of overlap and disjointness. We consider both (i) various ways of defining such notions in terms of other intuitionistic mereological primitives, and (ii) the possibility of treating them as mereological primitives of their own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose an indexed natural deduction system for the modal logic S5 , ideally following Wansing's previous work in the context of tableaux sequents. The system, given both in the classical and intuitionistic versions (called N 5 c and N 5 i respectively), is designed to match as much as possible the structure and properties of the standard system of natural deduction for first-order logic, exploiting the formal analogy between modalities and quantifiers. We study a (syntactical) normalization theorem for both N 5 c and N 5 i and its main consequences, the sub-formula principle and the consistency theorem. In particular, we propose an intuitionistic encoding of classical S5 (via a suitable extension of the Gödel translation for first-order classical logic). Moreover, via the BHK interpretation of intuitionistic proofs, we propose a suitable Curry–Howard isomorphism for N 5 i . By translation into the natural deduction system given by Galmiche and Salhi in [(2010b). Label-free proof systems for intuitionistic modal logic is5. In E. M. Clarke & A. Voronkov (Eds.), Logic for programming, artificial intelligence, and reasoning (pp. 255–271). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.], we prove the equivalence of N 5 i w.r.t. an Hilbert-style axiomatization of IS5 . However, when considering the sheer provability of labelled formulas, our system is comparable to the one presented by Simpson in [(1993). The proof theory and semantics of intuitionistic modal logic [PhD thesis], University of Edinburgh, UK.]. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether it is feasible to establish a translation between the corresponding derivations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In one of his meetings with members of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein discusses Hermann Weyl’s brief conversion to intuitionism and criticizes his arguments against applying the law of the excluded middle to generalizations over the natural numbers. Like Weyl, however, Wittgenstein rejects the classical model theoretic conception of generality when it comes to infinite domains. Nonetheless, he disagrees with him about the reasons for doing so. This paper provides an account of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Weyl that is based on his differing understanding of what a general statement over infinite domains consists in. This difference in their conception of generality is argued to be central to the middle Wittgenstein’s overall stance on intuitionism as well. While Weyl (and other intuitionists) reject the law of the excluded middle on grounds of constructivity, Wittgenstein argues that general statements over infinite domains do not express propositions in the first place. The origin of this position as well as its consequences for contemporary debates on generality are further assessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hegel interpreters commonly reject attempts to situate Hegel's logic in relation to modern movements. Appealing to his criticisms of the logic of Verstand or mere understanding with its fixed logical structure, Hegel's logic, it is pointed out, was a logic of Vernunft or reason—a logic more at home in the thought of Plato and Aristotle than in modern mathematical forms. Contesting this implied dichotomy, it is here argued that the ancient roots of Hegel's logic, especially as transmitted by late Neopythagorean/Neoplatonic thinkers such as Proclus, gave it many features similar to ones later found in the type of algebraic transformation of Aristotle, started first by Leibniz, reanimated by Boole in the mid-nineteenth century and then developed by others such as C. S. Peirce and Arend Heyting. In particular, the ancient mathematics upon which Hegel had drawn allowed him to anticipate an answer to the criticism that Frege would later aim at Boole, concerning his inability to unite opposed class and propositional calculi. Hegel's logic would be a hybrid, incorporating features found later in intuitionist and classical logic, but it could be so because of the way he had called upon the mathematics of the ancient Platonist tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present four different approaches to prove the soundness theorem for variants with t-truth of functional interpretations. To showcase our different methods we focus on the intuitionistic nonstandard bounded functional interpretation of the nonstandard extensional Heyting arithmetic in all finite types because a version with t-truth for this interpretation has not been given before. Also, because it is a more involved interpretation than others since it includes both nonstandard principles and majorisability. This leads us to believe that if the approaches work for this more complicated functional interpretation, then they should also work for simpler functional interpretations (and realisabilities). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brouwer’s intuitionistic program was an intriguing attempt to reform the foundations of mathematics that eventually did not prevail. The current paper offers a new perspective on the scientific community’s lack of reception to Brouwer’s intuitionism by considering it in light of Michael Friedman’s model of parallel transitions in philosophy and science, specifically focusing on Friedman’s story of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Such a juxtaposition raises onto the surface the differences between Brouwer’s and Einstein’s stories and suggests that contrary to Einstein’s story, the philosophical roots of Brouwer’s intuitionism cannot be traced to any previously established philosophical traditions. The paper concludes by showing how the intuitionistic inclinations of Hermann Weyl and Abraham Fraenkel serve as telling cases of how individuals are involved in setting in motion, adopting, and resisting framework transitions during periods of disagreement within a discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide a framework for understanding agnosticism. The framework accounts for the varieties of agnosticism while vindicating the unity of the phenomenon. This combination of unity and plurality is achieved by taking the varieties of agnosticism to be represented by several agnostic stances, all of which share a common core provided by what we call the minimal agnostic attitude. We illustrate the fruitfulness of the framework by showing how it can be applied to several philosophical debates. In particular, several philosophical positions can be aptly conceived of as instances of agnosticism whilst retaining their differences and distinguishing features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most people believe some moral propositions are true. Most people would say that they know that rape is wrong, torturing people is wrong, and so on. But despite decades of intense epistemological study, philosophers cannot even provide a rudimentary sketch of moral knowledge. In my view, the fact that we have very strong epistemic confidence in some fundamental moral propositions and the fact that it is extremely difficult for us to provide even the basics of an account of moral knowledge gives us an important clue. Both of these facts stem from the very nature of moral knowledge. In this paper I provide an intuitionist account of moral knowledge. I try to remove misunderstanding and add to our understanding of the contemporary account of self-evident moral propositions. For a theory of moral knowledge to be acceptable it must explain both the moral knowledge we have and why it is so very difficult for us to explain. My theory meets both requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Discusiones Filosóficas is the property of Universidad de Caldas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to "speak" of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The category of ethics is traditionally divided among researchers in this field in to three branches: applied ethics, normative ethics and meta-ethics. Despite the three branches, each of these branches has both an effect on the other. Medical ethics as a branch of applied ethics on the one hand is influenced by the views of ethics philosophers and on the other hand due to the importance of the medical profession requires special attention. The present article uses a descriptive and analytical method to apply the philosophy of Ṣadrīan ethics with one of the important views of medical ethics, namely Principalism. The authors of this study, by examining the relevant texts, have argued the following results that are stated briefly. Principalism is in line with Ṣadrīan moral view in that according to Mullā Ṣadrā's view of moral realism, moral concepts have an existential and external meaning, and therefore moral behavior and advice must be reflected in the world. Principalism also emphasizes the improvement of the moral performance of physicians and clinicians during medical interventions. However, the emphasis on Principalism should not lead to the molding of the clinician's mind, and according to Mullā Ṣadrā's moral Intuitionism, the moral conscience of the physician and those involved in medicine should always show their role during treatment. Based on the study of Mullā Ṣadrā 's views, it is inferred that among the four principles of medical ethics, the two principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are the first priority, and the principles of justice and respect for autonomy are considered a means of profitability and non-prejudicial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How Moore's open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. The author's purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore's argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, he does not claim to be offering Moore's own argument. Rather, the author offers a reconstruction, making use of important elements of Moore's methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the argument is played by what the author calls the real thought move. He shows that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. The author finishes by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore's viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour's moderate rationalism, and showing how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two mereological theories are presented based on a primitive apartness relation along with binary relations of mereological excess and weak excess, respectively. It is shown that both theories are acceptable from the standpoint of constructive reasoning while remaining faithful to the spirit of classical mereology. The two theories are then compared and assessed with regard to their extensional import. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important "folk" anti‐realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of "faultless disagreements": situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to reject it as incoherent. There are two significant exceptions in the contemporary literature: relativists often hold it up as something of a coup for their view that it can make straightforward sense of faultless disagreement; and the author of this paper has argued (Wright 2006) that making judicious intuitionistic revisions to classical logic can provide resources that suffice to stabilise the notion. The present paper argues that neither relativism nor intuitionism in fact provides a satisfactory account and indicates how an alethic pluralist framework enables us to do better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Hitit Theology Journal / Hitit İlahiyat Dergisi is the property of Hitit University Faculty of Divinity Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 1928 Ivan Orlov published a remarkable paper which contains the first formulation of a relevant logic. The paper remained largely unknown to English-speakers until this discovery of relevant logic was shown by Kosta Do en in 1992. By that time the material on relevant logic was well known; however, there is more of interest in Orlov's paper than this: his remarks on intuitionism, the motivation for his construction, and its wider implications. This paper explains and reflects on these matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argument: The paper explores Hermann Weyl's turn to intuitionism through a philosophical prism of normative framework transitions. It focuses on three central themes that occupied Weyl's thought: the notion of the continuum, logical existence, and the necessity of intuitionism, constructivism, and formalism to adequately address the foundational crisis of mathematics. The analysis of these themes reveals Weyl's continuous endeavor to deal with such fundamental problems and suggests a view that provides a different perspective concerning Weyl's wavering foundational positions. Building on a philosophical model of scientific framework transitions and the special role that normative indecision or ambivalence plays in the process, the paper examines Weyl's motives for considering such a radical shift in the first place. It concludes by showing that Weyl's shifting stances should be regarded as symptoms of a deep, convoluted intrapersonal process of self-deliberation induced by exposure to external criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We begin with the idea that lines of reasoning are continuous mental processes and develop a notion of continuity in proof. This requires abstracting the notion of a proof as a set of sentences ordered by provability. We can then distinguish between discrete steps of a proof and possibly continuous stages, defining indexing functions to pick these out. Proof stages can be associated with the application of continuously variable rules, connecting continuity in lines of reasoning with continuously variable reasons. Some examples of continuous proofs are provided. We conclude by presenting some fundamental facts about continuous proofs, analogous to continuous structural rules and composition. We take this to be a development on its own, as well as lending support to non-finitistic constructionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We continue the investigation of the first paper where we studied logics with various negations including empirical negation and co-negation. We established how such logics can be treated uniformly with R. Sylvan's CCω as the basis. In this paper we use this result to obtain cut-free labelled sequent calculi for the logics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To make evaluations about the morally relevant impacts of algorithms, transparency is needed. This paper lays out discussion of algorithms and transparency in an explicitly moral analysis with a special focus on the domain of justice and security. The paper provides an account of the moral import of transparency, defined itself as an instrumental value denoting a state of affairs conducive to acquisition of knowledge about some X. A normative account of transparency is outlined relying on an intuitionist framework rooted in the works of Ross and Robert Audi. It will be argued that transparency can be derived as a subsidiary (prima facie) principle from other duties including beneficence and justice and that it is groundable in the value of knowledge. Building on this foundation, the paper examines transparency and duty conflict with a special focus on algorithms in justice and security, recognising that complete transparency can be impossible where duties conflict. It is argued that as a subsidiary (prima facie) principle, transparency is overridable but ineradicable, which is to say that sufficiently justifiable reasons for secrecy or opacity can licence limiting transparency, that is, there may be occasion where full transparency is not our final duty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the relationship between M. De's empirical negation in Kripke and Beth Semantics. It turns out empirical negation, as well as co-negation, corresponds to different logics under different semantics. We then establish the relationship between logics related to these negations under unified syntax and semantics based on R. Sylvan's CCw. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their recent book Buchanan and Powell claim that there is moral progress. Their analysis focuses on increasing inclusiveness, yet they also suggest other dimensions as possible indicators-improvements in the concept of morality and refinements in moral motivation. In the following I present empirical data on changes in moral understanding that occurred during the second half of the 20th century in Germany. These changes concern an increasing delimitation of the moral realm, the rise of an ethics of responsibility, the displacement of an orientation to super ego dictates by a more ego-syntonic type of moral motivation. This research largely follows the 'cognitivist' paradigm which I start off defending against Haidt's counter proposal of moral intuitionism. Feasible explanatory factors for the changes documented are put forward-processes of secularization and changes in socialization styles-and their interpretation as indicators of moral progress is discussed. The paper ends with brief speculations concerning possible reasons for current moral regressions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I develop a view on set-theoretic ontology I call Universe-Indeterminism, according to which there is a unique but indeterminate universe of sets. I argue that Solomon Feferman's work on semi-constructive set theories can be adapted to this project, and develop a philosophical motivation for a semi-constructive set theory closely based on Feferman's but tailored to the Universe-Indeterminist's viewpoint. I also compare the emergent Universe-Indeterminist view to some more familiar views on set-theoretic ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On a bilateralist reading, sequents are interpreted as statements to the effect that, given the assertion of the antecedent it is incoherent to deny the succedent. This interpretation goes against its own ecumenical ambitions, endowing Cut with a meaning very close to that of tertium non datur and thus rendering it intuitionistically unpalatable. This paper explores a top-down route for arguing that, even intuitionistically, a prohibition to deny is as strong as a licence to assert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We may try to explain proofs as chains of valid inference, but the concept of validity needed in such an explanation cannot be the traditional one. For an inference to be legitimate in a proof it must have sufficient epistemic power, so that the proof really justifies its final conclusion. However, the epistemic concepts used to account for this power are in their turn usually explained in terms of the concept of proof. To get out of this circle we may consider an idea within intuitionism about what it is to justify the assertion of a proposition. It depends on Heyting's view of the meaning of a proposition, but does not presuppose the concept of inference or of proof as chains of inferences. I discuss this idea and what is required in order to use it for an adequate notion of valid inference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his paper "Explaining Deductive Inference" Prawitz states what he calls «a fundamental problem of logic and the philosophy of logic»: the problem of explaining «Why do certain inferences have the epistemic power to confer evidence on the conclusion when applied to premisses for which there is evidence already?». In this paper I suggest a way of articulating, and partly modifying, the intuitionistic answer to this problem in such a way as to both answer Prawitz's problem and satisfy a requirement I argue to be crucial for any epistemic theory of the meaning of the logical constants: the requirement that evidence is epistemically transparent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present an effective proof (with explicit bounds) of the Podelski and Rybalchenko Termination Theorem. The sub-recursive bounds we obtain make use of bar recursion, in the form of the product of selection functions, as this is used to interpret the Weak Ramsey Theorem for pairs. The construction can be seen as calculating a modulus of well-foundedness for a given program given moduli of well-foundedness for the disjunctively well-founded finite set of covering relations. When the input moduli are in system T , this modulus is also definable in system T by a result of Schwichtenberg on bar recursion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate in intuitionistic first-order logic various principles of preference relations alternative to the standard ones based on the transitivity and completeness of weak preference. In particular, we suggest two ways in which completeness can be formulated while remaining faithful to the spirit of constructive reasoning, and we prove that the cotransitivity of the strict preference relation is a valid intuitionistic alternative to the transitivity of weak preference. Along the way, we also show that the acyclicity axiom is not finitely axiomatizable in first-order logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I see the question what it is that makes an inference valid and thereby gives a proof its epistemic power as the most fundamental problem of general proof theory. It has been surprisingly neglected in logic and philosophy of mathematics with two exceptions: Gentzen's remarks about what justifies the rules of his system of natural deduction and proposals in the intuitionistic tradition about what a proof is. They are reviewed in the paper and I discuss to what extent they succeed in answering what a proof is. Gentzen's ideas are shown to give rise to a new notion of valid argument. At the end of the paper I summarize and briefly discuss an approach to the problem that I have proposed earlier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of sociology has long been subject to critique for alleged ideological bias and left-wing groupthink linked to its social justice mission. Critics contend that the construction of “sacred victims” by progressive intellectuals hinders their ability to objectively appraise the circumstances of such vulnerable groups. To address this criticism, we survey 479 sociologists in national universities and colleges in the U.S. regarding three sensitive controversies: urban poverty in the black community; gendered differences in occupational choices; and immigration. We find significant patterns in the data. Commitment to the field’s “moral mission,” preferred research paradigm, gender, and especially political orientation are all significant predictors of sociologists’ views. The results, we suggest, can be understood by conceptualizing the field of sociology as an “emotive community.” In doing so, we draw upon current social psychological research on moral foundations theory developed by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl claims that his phenomenological-epistemological system amounts to a “universal” form of empiricism. The present paper shows that this universal moment of Husserl’s empiricism is why his empiricism qualifies as a rationalism. What is empiricist about Husserl’s phenomenological-epistemological system is that he takes experiences to be an autonomous source of immediate justification. On top of that, Husserl takes experiences to be the ultimate source of justification. For Husserl, every justified belief ultimately depends epistemically on the subject’s experiences. These are paradigms of empiricist claims and thus Husserl seems to subscribe to empiricism. However, what is universal about Husserl’s “empiricism” is that he does not limit the concept of (justification-conferring) experiences to sensory experiences or sensory experiences plus introspective intuitions but broadens the concept of experience such that also a priori intuitions are included. Husserl insists that logical, mathematical, and phenomenological intuitions such as ~ (p ∧  ~ p), 2 + 2 = 4, and “Experiences necessarily bear the mark of intentionality” provide non-inferential justification analogous to how sensory experiences can non-inferentially justify beliefs such as “There is a table in front of me.” Importantly, Husserl makes clear that such a priori intuitions are not about our concepts but about reality. This is why Husserl’s universal empiricism is a rationalism. Husserl differs from traditional rationalism as he allows that a priori intuitions can be fallible and empirically underminable. This distinguishes Husserl’s rationalism from Descartes’ and makes him a proponent of moderate rationalism as currently championed by Laurence BonJour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Wigglesworth claims that syntactic criteria of theoretical equivalence are not appropriate for settling questions of equivalence between logical theories, since such criteria judge classical and intuitionistic logic to be equivalent; he concludes that logicians should use semantic criteria instead. However, this is an artefact of the particular syntactic criterion chosen, which is an implausible criterion of theoretical equivalence (even in the non-logical case). Correspondingly, there is nothing to suggest that a more plausible syntactic criterion should not be used to settle questions of equivalence between different logical theories; such a criterion (which may already be found in the literature) is exhibited and shown to judge classical and intuitionistic logic to be inequivalent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conception of the paper is connected with bringing forward the reflection of Leon Petrażycki on intuitive law. For this purpose I analyze the genesis and dynamics of this phenomenon on the cultural-historical level, as well as with reference to issues belonging to the scope of positive law. In addition, I broaden the research field with the range of problems touching on intuitionism, morality, and also independent ethics of Janusz Kotarbinski. The starting point of the methodological optics I assume is constituted by the multi-aspectual transformations surrounding us in the sphere of axiology. Hence, if the pedagogical aspects are taken into account, it seems to me justified to undertake some actions in order to search for the logically consistent, sensible and universal solutions, which can become an ethical guide-post for the contemporary human being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Boundary Stones of Thought (2015), Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intuitionism and nihilism, according to nihilists, have key features in common: the same semantics and the same phenomenology. Intuitionism is the object of nihilism’s attack. The central charge nihilism lodges against intuitionism is that its nonnatural moral properties are queer. Here I’ll examine what ‘queer’ might mean in relation to the doctrines nihilism uses to support this charge. My investigation reveals that nihilism’s queerness charge lacks substance and resembles a tautology served with a frown. There’s really nothing to it. After I show that, I’ll offer an explanation for why nihilism has gotten intuitionism wrong. It makes a central mistaken methodological assumption and doesn’t target any identifiable intuitionism in the last hundred or so years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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