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The article discusses the evolution of the common law fiqh in Singapore during the period from 1957 to 2013. Topics covered include the implications of the common law fiqh for the Muslim community, the establishment of the domesticated fiqh with the 1957 Muslims Ordinance, the move from domesticated to created fiqh with the 1966 Administration of Muslim Law Act and the issues of accommodation and assimilation in relation to High Court decisions relevant to fiqh.

A clarification to the article on Hertogh litigation that was published in the 14(3), article 8 issue is presented.

Sixty years on, the Hertogh litigation (1950-51) continues to resonate in the Malay-Muslim world. The person on whom the courts focussed was a 13 year-old girl, 'Maria' in her Dutch-Christian persona and 'Nadra' in her Muslim reincarnation. The Singapore Court at the time was bound by wholly inappropriate law to decide which of her two religious identities was the correct one for determining custody and validity of marriage. There was, in fact, no 'right' answer and Maria/Nadra suffered the consequences. This essay describes the litigation, the result of which (apart from personal tragedies) was a complete loss of trust by Singapore Muslims in the post-war colonial legal system. The issue of trust is of vital importance and has recently re-appeared in Malaysian syariah. The issue there is exactly the same -- what law determines the legal identity of women and children whose religious identity is uncertain as, for example, in circumstances of apostasy and conversion. The Malaysian answers are inconsistent and in the view of many (both Muslim and non-Muslim) are bidding fair to allow, or even encourage, distrust of the law and the courts. The subject itself, the personal status of women and children, is always crucial in Muslim societies, as is the question of who decides the appropriate law and determines its effects for daily life. In this respect the Hertogh litigation lives on and we ignore its historical lessons at our peril. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Singapore is a secular state with a Muslim minority (about 15 per cent, mostly ethnic Malay). However, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), which governs personal status, does not define 'Muslim'. This falls to the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS, Singapore Islamic Religious Council) acting in its judicial function. In 1997 it decided that the Ahmadiyya were not Muslim, thus judicially confirming the widely held Sunni opinion that the Ahmadiyya are a deviant sect. In doing so, MUIS drew authority from (a) British-Indian precedent, (b) contemporary Pakistan precedent and (c) theology on the finality of revelations to the Prophet Muhammad (the Seal of the Prophets). Each source was used selectively but there is an especially heavy reliance on Pakistan precedent. This source is not binding in Singapore, because the Pakistan constitutional and positive laws expressing Islam have no parallel in Singapore. The MUIS decision is thus highly questionable at best; in the strict view it is an unjustifiable application of a foreign precedent and, therefore, wrong. The British-Indian precedent says that the Ahmadiyya are Muslim. The theology can be made to read as neutral or negative depending on one's purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]