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Resistance to clean energy policy in the United States stems partly from public hesitancy and skepticism toward anthropogenic climate change. This article examines self-declared climate change skeptics' views of clean energy policy along a continuum of skeptical thought, spanning from epistemic denial to attribution doubt. To perform this, we use data from an online survey administered in the US Pacific Northwest and a series of pilot interviews conducted with skeptics in the same region. Results reveal that skeptics' support for clean energy policy is consistently linked with their environmental concern across the skepticism continuum. Conspiracy ideation and distrust in science lead to a reduction in support. However, the positive effect of environmental concern trumps the effects of these beliefs. Important and hopeful implications of these findings for climate change communication and policy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research indicates that far-right political groups tend to be disproportionately composed of and supported by white people. Drawing off the group identity and developmental literature, we add theoretical clarity to this relationship. We argue that a salient white racial identity motivates people to explore social contexts that affirm the value of being white. Many of these contexts (e.g., conservative media) reinforce and instill beliefs in conspiracies, perceptions of racial threat, and a legitimization of group hierarchies, which are defining features of far-right ideologies. As people develop a strong white racial identity, they should thus view far-right groups more favorably. Drawing off survey data from a national US sample of 903 white young adults, we tested a mediation model positing that the effects of a strong white racial identity with support for four far-right groups (the January 6 protesters, QAnon, the Proud Boys, and the Oath Keepers) would be mediated by enhanced levels of conspiratorial ideation, perceived racial threat, and social dominance orientation. We found that the effects of white racial identity with support for all four groups were mostly or completely accounted for by these three mediating factors. We discuss the implications of this research for the racial identity and far-right groups literatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has found that white people are more likely to be climate change skeptics. In much of this prior work, white identity is treated as a categorical label, limiting the theoretical and empirical understanding of this relationship. Drawing on survey data from a US national sample of 933 white young adults, we theorize that white identity is a developmental process where people explore the meanings of their racial identity and commit to a white identity marked by enhanced levels of social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, two social-psychological constructs consistently associated with climate change skepticism. Using regression analyses, we tested a mediation model that a strong white identity would increase climate change skepticism by enhancing one's social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation. We found partial support for our model. While a strong white identity was positively associated with social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, only social dominance orientation increased climate change skepticism. Conspiratorial ideation reduced climate change skepticism. We discuss the implications of our findings for the climate change literature as well as how our findings can inform policies that could reduce climate change skepticism among white people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses interview data with people who were once skeptical about climate change but have come to accept climate science to assess the factors that contribute to their shifts in perspectives. Our findings show two trajectories of change for skeptics, depending on the nature of their skepticism. For those who move from actively denying climate change, shifting beliefs about climate change occur via a profound need to reconcile what emerges as cognitive dissonance due to challenges to their religious identities. For skeptics who move from being unsure about climate change, moving to accept climate science happens through either encountering new information from a trusted source or personally observing the effects of climate change. This extends existing scholarship on the factors that contribute to changing minds on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature on perceptions of climate change skeptics does not include a direct examination of skeptics who are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints (LDS), likely because they make up a small percentage of the U.S. population (1.6%). However, the LDS church is one of the fastest growing religious sects in the nation and world and is acquiring more political power, especially in the western United States. Our research note presents a preliminary look at Latter‐day Saint skeptics. We find evangelical and Latter‐day Saint skeptics align on measures of religious ideation and the belief that "humans are meant to rule over the rest of nature." Yet, on measures of environmental concerns and values, Latter‐day Saint skeptics appear to be somewhere between evangelical and mainline Christian skeptics. This pilot project provides a foundation for future work regarding LDS perceptions of climate change, environmental policy, and climate communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use data from 33 in‐depth interviews conducted with residents in the rural inland Northwestern state of Idaho who self‐identify as skeptical about anthropogenic climate change, to examine the nuance within the narratives that skeptics employ to voice their skepticism. Our findings show that the arguments employed by those who are skeptical of climate change do not constitute a clear typology of skepticism or "skeptics." Rather, individuals weave together unique stories—shaped by their social locations, personal experiences, and underlying ideological beliefs—and, through combining different argument threads, explain why they believe climate change is a fictitious problem. Our findings suggest that while some skeptics may lean on religion‐based or conspiracy‐based narratives to rationalize their skepticism, others may rely on science attitudes, personal experiences, or a range of additional reasons to be skeptical of climate change. In short, climate skepticism is not uniform nor accurately typologized, but a complex tapestry of socially shaped beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Munich Re (Munich, Germany: Munich Re, 2004), 76-83. 7 A. Engels, O. Hüther, M. Schäfer, and H. Held, "Public Climate-Change Skepticism, Energy Preferences, and Political Participation", I Global I Environmental i Change i 23 (2013): 1018-27; A. McCright and R. Dunlap, "Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Change Among Conservative White Males in the United States", I Global Environmental Change i 21 (2011): 1163-72. 8 K. PHOTO (COLOR) On March 6, 2012, future President Donald Trump tweeted: "The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive." Second, we present what we call a "conspiracy gap,"[10] in which skeptics who believe that climate change is a hoax hold significantly lower levels of environmental concern and policy support as compared to skeptics who do not. [Extracted from the article]

Using interviews with residents of Idaho (a rural northwest US state) who identify as skeptical of climate change, we examine how skeptics rationalize their doubts about climate science. Skeptics tend to question the reality and human causes of climate change by (1) raising concerns about incentive structures in science that could bias climatology, (2) doubting the accuracy of data and models used by climate scientists, and (3) perceiving some practices of climate science and scientists as exclusionary. Despite these concerns, skeptics exhibit deference to scientific authority when using scientific assessments to make policy decisions, including environmental policy. Understanding skeptics' concerns about climate science and areas where they support science-based policy, will lead to better dialogue between scientists, interest groups, policy makers, and the skeptical public, potentially clarifying avenues to communicate climate information and enact climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on sources related to psychological understanding for climate change skepticism including article "Climate change skepticism and denial: an introduction"; the book "Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives"; and "Energy Research & Social Science".

This article extends prior research on right-wing ideology broadly and the ideology of the Tea Party specifically. Using data from 45 interviews with Tea Party activists and participant observation at Tea Party meetings, I map five distinct ideologies, used by subsets of the Tea Party Patriots membership: Christian Conservatism, Constitutionalism, Reformed Liberalism, Libertarianism, and Conspiracism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article explores current sociological scholarship on climate skepticism and, drawing on recent literature in social psychology and behavioral science, presents an argument for future research on the relationship between emotion, information aversion, and climate denial. We extrapolate and unite these disconnected bodies of scholarship to argue that strong emotions such as fear may drive climate change skepticism and denial among some adherents. By partnering the scholarship outlined above with advances in research on conspiracy ideation, we argue that climate change skepticism and denial is, at least in some cases, a form of an exaggerated ostrich effect, whereby adherents are so driven to avoid learning about a specific problem; they actively seek to construct an alternative, safer, narrative. Given this predisposition, attempting to challenge such skepticism with information is counterproductive. As such, this paper presents alternative possibilities for communicating research findings on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) disciplines, the percentage participation of women in engineering has shown significant gains over the past few decades. However, women are still largely absent (or exist in very small numbers) in tenured academic ranks in several engineering sub-fields. In this study we present female and male engineers' varying understandings of 'scientific success' as a potential contributor to women's retention and success in their (sub)fields. Using in-depth interviews conducted among engineering graduate students and faculty at two U.S. Northwest land-grant research universities, this study demonstrates the 'dual' nature in accounts of scientific success, where formal measures of success operate in tandem with informal measures. While both men and women attribute their success to formal and informal measures, gender-based variations tend to be more prevalent among informal measures. By examining these informal measures, this study highlights the context surrounding success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decade the U.S. public has expressed varying degrees of skepticism about certain factual claims, and of "expertise" more broadly. Ideological and partisan belief polarization seems to have elevated public anxiety about topics ranging from climate change and vaccines to immigration and healthcare policy. Furthermore, polarized narratives about scientific, medical, and political topics have encouraged "directionally motivated cognition", leading to a decline in institutional trust among some fractions of the U.S. political spectrum. Our case study of the Tea Party Patriots (TPP) (i.e. a political organization that promotes the Tea Party goals) uses data from 45 interviews, 80 hours of participant observation, and content analysis of movement literature, to examine the nature and nuance of health narratives employed by the Tea Party. Specifically, we explain a central narrative in TPP organizing that features "a villainous Left covertly seeking to harm U.S. citizens" as the root of three key TPP health care narratives: (1) Democratic health initiatives enslaving youth; (2) the political left profiting from covertly making Americans dependent on state's health care programs; and (3) the left clandestinely seeking to violate the constitution as represented by their efforts to "kill grandma". These narratives reflect the increased polarization of attitudes towards healthcare, as well as a broader distrust of the political left who, activists believe, are advancing a political agenda of social control. Ultimately, we argue that culturally driven healthcare narratives of the Tea Party have had a significant impact on right-wing public opinion and Republican politics regarding U.S. healthcare policy. Many Tea Party concerns are reflected in the Republican policy positions, including those related to the Affordable Care Act of 2010. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses data from 40 interviews and 80 hours of participant observation to examine the discursive and performative (embodied, enacted, and nonverbal) position of women in twenty-first-century militia-nativist organizations, using the case study of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps ( MCDC). The case of the MCDC demonstrates that the organization produces competing narratives for understanding the role of white and migrant women in U.S. society. White American women are constructed as victims of immigration, while white women within the organization are viewed as capable colleagues. Migrant women are produced as both parasites on American society and victims of Mexican male sexuality. As this article shows, women's demands for agency, their political drives, their ascribed race, and their intentions shape their discursive production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how Tea (Taxed Enough Already) Party activists produce and circulate stories about racial inequality, presenting four distinct frames that reflect nonconformity in the Tea Party’s racial narrative. Activists engage with four racial frames: racism denial, individual responsibility, cultural responsibility, and structural responsibility. The Tea Party unites using frame amplification to emphasize the master frame of color blindness that allows activists, regardless of the frame with which they engage, to unite under the broader notion that they are all idyllically color blind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last 20 years, industrialised Western nations have witnessed a marked increase in right-wing social movements and political parties. While the origins and agendas of these groups differ in important ways, all arose in a climate of intensifying globalisation. All arose in the context of a widespread embrace of multiculturalism and cultural diversity. And all are keenly focused on the perceived threats posed by immigration. This paper examines immigration threat narratives constructed by four of these groups: the British National Party, the One Nation Party, the Tea Party Patriots, and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps. Striking similarities in the narratives employed by these groups suggest the emergence of a transnational right-wing populist ‘playbook’. The paper further argues that even when the direct electoral impact of such groups is relatively small, they have the potential to substantially reshape broader political discourse and public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Existing survey instruments of trust in science and scientists that focus on the general public are potentially insufficient to assess climate skeptics' perspectives towards climate science. They may miss important aspects of climate science about which skeptics raise concerns, and may not accurately measure climate skeptics' distrust in climatology. We introduce a new survey instrument developed using data gathered from interviewing 33 self-identified climate change skeptics in Idaho. The survey items capture skeptics' beliefs regarding climate scientists' trustworthiness and credibility, their deference to scientific authority, and their perceptions of alienation from the climate science community. We validate our survey instrument using data from an online survey administered to 1000 residents in the U.S. Pacific Northwest who are skeptical of climate change. By employing standard survey design principles, we demonstrate how our new (dis)trust in climate science instrument performs in tandem with well-known predictors of science attitudes and pro-environmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]