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The Mediterranean Basin is often considered to be a uniform entity ecologically and culturally. However, any examination at the local level reveals one of the most diverse ecologically, politically and culturally areas in the world. The Mediterranean islands are just such examples of this diversification and complexity. The islands are truly microcosms of the larger entity of which they are part, and are in addition laboratories of biological and cultural processes in evolution. In geological time natural forces set the scene, but since the early Holocene onwards, another force majeure that of an intensifying human presence, has influenced geological, biological and climatic forces to shape the landscapes in evidence today. These natural and cultural forces operate at different temporal and spatial scales. However, disentangling the roles of the various components is almost impossible, as demonstrated by the Mediterranean Island landscapes examined in this volume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The greatest asset of the Mediterranean Islands is landscape. In its broadest definition, landscape comprises physical resources, being natural, semi-natural and human, as well as cultural resources expressed in local perceptions and identity, traditional management practices, socio-economic and political systems. Mediterranean Island landscapes encapsulate a character of place that is quintessentially Mediterranean. They are microcosms of the basin's geomorphological, biological and cultural diversity, and equally a reflection of the historical coexistence of people and environment, as well as a reflection of insularity. The broad, integrative understanding of landscape underpins the essence of a strategy based on both conservation and management. Accordingly, a landscape strategy acknowledges the twofold character of Mediterranean Island landscapes as (a) the context for evaluating environmental, ecological and cultural resources and (b) the framework for ensuring a sustainable future. Equally, landscape strategies become a roadmap to evaluate concerns, to recognise resource limitation and aspirations, to develop a future vision, to articulate objectives, and to propose the principles and framework for an equitable and sustainable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Balearic Islands comprise 151 islands and islets (counting all of those of more than 100 m in maximum length) with a total area of 5,061.3 km2 and a coastline length of 1,238.9 km. The four inhabited islands, Mallorca, Minorca, Ibiza and Formentera, represent more than 99% of the total surface area. Ibiza and Formentera are close lying neighbours, and form the Pityusic sub-archipelago. The ancient Greeks called Mallorca and Minorca the Gymnasiae or the Balyares Islands, and Ibiza and Formentera the Pityusic Islands; later, the Romans referred to these four main islands and their outlining islets as the Balearics. Currently the name of Balearics is applied to the entire archipelago, and the name Pityusic to Ibiza and Formentera. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Maltese Islands are a group of small, relatively low islands situated in the central Mediterranean some 96 km south of Sicily and 290 km north of the coast of Libya. Their total land area is c.316 km2. This island group consists of three inhabited islands: Malta (246.5 km2), Gozo (65.8 km2) and Comino (2.9 km2) together with a number of small, uninhabited islets each less than 10 ha. Collectively, the islands have a coastline of 189.6 km. Amongst the Mediterranean Islands, the Maltese archipelago has received least attention, possibly because it is so close to Sicily and the Italian mainland, and because it has a limited habitat diversity. There are no mountains on any of the Maltese Islands and therefore none of the climatic, edaphic or biotic phenomena associated with such landforms. However, the biogeography of the Maltese Islands is interesting, not least as a case study of how the present day biota has been assembled and has changed as a result of climatic and edaphic changes, and particularly as a consequence of human-induced perturbations to the local environment. The islands also support a number of endemic forms which are of intrinsic scientific interest for the light they throw on the phylogeny and biogeography of their group, and for the wider evolutionary processes they reflect. Such forms are also important culturally since they are unique to the Maltese archipelago and therefore form a valuable part of local, regional and global natural heritage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crete at 8,400 km2 is the fifth largest island in the Mediterranean. It is much longer than its width, which nowhere exceeds 60 km. It has 15 mountain ranges, three of them more than 2,000 m high. Like other islands in this book, Crete once had a great independent civilisation, the Minoan in the Bronze Age (2900-1150 BC); although related to neighbouring islands it is distinct from mainland Greece, Anatolia, or Egypt. From the late Bronze Age onwards Crete became subsumed into the Greek world, though it retained some distinctiveness: it had its own gods who were different from those on Mount Olympus in mainland Greece. The next most conspicuous period in Cretan archaeology is the early Byzantine (AD 300-600), in which it differed less from other provinces of the Empire. In the Middle Ages, Crete was an imperial province of Venice (AD 1200-1650), and developed a hybrid of Byzantine and Venetian culture, different from other Venetian islands, though related to that of Kythera. In Ancient Greek times (700-100 BC) Crete was a collection of independent ‘city-states'; since then it has been part of the Roman, Byzantine, Arab, again Byzantine, Venetian, and Turkish empires, and since 1913 part of the Greek state. Crete has often not been self-sufficient but at times it has exported olive oil, cereals, wine and cheese. For centuries it had a mixed economy. Most individual households grew cereals, legumes, vines and olives, kept sheep and goats (mainly for cheese) and often a donkey, cow and pig. Wine and oil were cash crops. Over the last three centuries oil production has gradually increased and now dominates the agricultural economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corsica is the fourth largest Mediterranean Island; it is c.183 km north-south, and 83 km east-west and covers 8,682 km2. It is situated in the western part of the Mediterranean Sea (6°12-7°13 East, 41°9-43° North), at about 90 km west of continental Italy, 14 km north of Sardinia, and 170 km south-east of continental France, its metropolitan attachment. While being part of an initial geological structure which included southern France and Sardinia for millennia, it became isolated at the end of the Miocene era. Corsica is distinct insofar as it is the most northern, the wettest and the most mountainous Mediterranean Island with many peaks over 2,000 m. Most of the island is composed of granite, with a rough cliff and peak topography on its west coast. In its north-east, schists predominate giving a smoother topography (1,767 m maximum at San Pedrone). These two major units are subdivided by a corridor creating not only distinct geological/morphological but also cultural units. Still, today, the north-east part is differentiated from the south-east into two administrative substructures (called ‘départements'), namely Haute-Corse (Capital City: Bastia) and Corse-du-Sud (Capital City: Ajaccio) (Fig. 10.1). The former is more agricultural and community based, while the latter is less modified by human activity. A peculiar Quaternary deposition plain covers the east side of the island along the coast and, in the west side, the lower plains of the rivers such as Figarella, Liamone and Gravona are situated.The varied topography gives rise to several different microclimates and vegetation communities depending on altitude, from typical Mediterranean on the coast to alpine above 1,500 m. Summers are usually hot and dry and last from May till October. Winters can be cold and there is generally snow on the highest peaks until June, but by then the ambient temperature on the coast is in the mid-20s °C and the July-September average is 27 °C. The annual average is 12 °C. Annual precipitation varies from 600 mm on the coast to 2,000 mm on the highest peaks and occurs mainly in spring and autumn, with recurrent heavy storm events; up to 400 mm can fall within 24 h, leading to destructive flash-flooding events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sicily is the largest (25,708 km2) island in the Mediterranean with 1,039 km of coast and is surrounded by satellite islands of the archipelagos of Aeolian, Egadi and Pelagie. The coasts of Sicily have diverse characteristics depending on which sea they face. In the north there are high and ragged cliffs with gulfs and small pebble beaches, in the west and the south the coasts are flat with sand dune systems. In the eastern part of the island the coast can be divided in two different parts: above Catania it is similar to the northern coast while to the south it is low lying with gulfs and small bays. The history of the island is also linked to that of its active volcanoes such as Etna and Stromboli (part of the Aeolian islands). In the past eruptions and earthquakes and fairly recently immigration had their toll on the island's population which is currently c.5 million inhabitants. This makes Sicily the most populated island in the Mediterranean and the fourth more populated region in Italy with an increase in population of 1.7 per thousand inhabitants due to more births and fewer deaths and recent immigration. The population density of the region is 189 inhabitants per km2 compared to average 192 for Italy, although there are notable variations between the coastal zones and the hinterland. For example, the area of Enna the only non-coastal province of Sicily has a density of 69 inhabitants per km2 compared to 292 for Catania (Regione Sicilia 2002). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cyprus, the third largest Mediterranean Island in size, is situated in the north-eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, 33° east of Greenwich and 35° north of the Equator and has an area of 9,251 Km2, of which 1,733 are forested. Distance from the mainland ranges from 75 km from Turkey in the north to 150 km from Syria in the east and 380 km from Egypt in the south, while in the west the closest shores are the Greek islands of Karpathos and Rhodes at 380 km. The population of Cyprus is 755,000 of whom 643,000 are Greek Cypriots, 88,000 are Turkish Cypriots and 24,000 are foreigners residing in Cyprus. Since the Turkish invasion and occupation of over a third of the island, the demographic balance has changed dramatically as a result of Turkey's policy. There are around 115,000 illegal Turkish settlers in the occupied area, while a considerable number of Turkish Cypriots have emigrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sardinia is the second largest island in the Mediterranean after Sicily, with a surface area of 23,833 km2 inland, a total of 24,089 km2 including the minor islands. Its landscape mosaic confirms a position of transition between Africa and Europe, as Sardinia is almost the same distance from the coast of both continents, and is separated from Corsica by c.10 km of sea. The island is mainly mountainous with several isolated groups of mountains such as Limbara, Sette Fratelli and Gennargentu, the highest of all at 1,834 m, but also with hilly lands, plateaus and a few plains The long presence of humans on the island has been of vital importance in shaping the landscape. The most ancient human remains are traced back to the Lower Palaeolithic and have been found in the North, namely in Perfugas. However, the most imposing prehistoric native culture has been the Nuragic, the remains of which are still visible today everywhere on the island, and in particularly in areas with high settlement concentration such as Campeda and Planargia. Yet, culturally and politically Sardinia has been often influenced by its neighbours. In historic times Phoenicians, Carthaginians and Romans succeeded one another as the island's ‘masters'. Following the eclipse of the Roman Empire, Vandals and Byzantines held the island before it became a protectorate of Pisa, Genoa and then Spain. Finally, after a period as independent kingdom (1718-1861), Sardinia joined the unified Italy in 1861. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is meant by political landscapes? All landscapes, because they have been moulded by human action, are to some extent political. This is particularly evident in the Mediterranean Basin, a crossroad where civilisations have coalesced and often clashed. Although the larger of the Mediterranean Islands have been the home centres of great civilisations (Chapters 3 and 5) during prehistoric times, they have been unable to resist the repeated invasions of mainland-based powers that battled successively for political and commercial authority. The strategic location of the islands meant that they were ideal for defence, trade and exploitation of natural resources and therefore an attraction to outsiders. The Mediterranean Islands discussed herein have been used as temporary and/or permanent bases of world powers, a practice that continues today given that the USA and the UK still retain military bases there. For most of their histories the larger Mediterranean Islands have been in a position of political subservience to an outside power. Some remain powerless in political terms because they have little autonomy from mainland governments (Royle 2001). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘Everything about human history is rooted in the earth, which has meant that we must think about habitation' (Said 1994, p. 7). Edward W. Said might have used the above phrase within a context of analysis of the relation between geography and imperialistic power, but he managed to summarise in 18 words what others analysed in volumes: the past, the present and the future of anthropos (the Greek word for human) was, is and will be always depicted on the landscape. The landscape is a result of the interaction between humankind and nature. It is also the lived context experienced and perceived by human beings. Therefore, in essence, all landscapes are cultural. This particular perception and experience is extremely valuable in determining human attitudes towards the continuum of space and time. Consequently, the landscape gains its structure from the human activities, which are carried out within a given environment and through the landscape itself, and therefore it is as much a process as it is an entity (Zedeño 2000). The term cultural landscape has been used in a variety of ways from different disciplines and in different continents (for a review, see Jones 2003). In the Mediterranean Basin, Naveh (1990, 1998a, b) pioneered the holistic landscape paradigm (see Chapter 14) in the context of cultural landscapes. For Naveh (1995) cultural landscapes are ‘… a tangible meeting point between nature and mind'. When analysing the concept of cultural landscape further, the physical and the symbolic interconnection between culture and landscape becomes evident. First, landscape is more or less the space where people perform their everyday tasks. Second, land, the ancient Greek topos, may be considered to embody ancestral energies, spiritual forces, memories, dreams and identities. It is possible that the same location may effectively be a different place for two different persons, especially if they originate from different cultural backgrounds. Cultural landscapes, which comprise a mixture of everything that goes with a living space, are to be found everywhere in the world. Even areas of exceptional natural beauty that were until recently thought to be untouched by humans have often proved to have long been inhabited and altered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During glacial cycles the level of the Mediterranean, like other seas, fell by 120-150 m: enough to join Sicily to Italy, Corsica to Sardinia, and Mallorca to Minorca. Most of the other islands are surrounded by deep sea and would not be much affected unless by tectonic movements at the same time. In the early Holocene absolute sea level rose to approximately what it is now, creating jagged capes and drowned valleys. These have gradually adapted to the new sea level, as rivers have brought down sediment and filled in bays, forming deltas and sandy beaches. On the mainland this continued into historic times, choking ancient harbours and creating agricultural land. On islands this has not happened to the same extent, owing to the lack of big rivers and of badlands to act as abundant sources of sediment. Islands still have jagged promontories. Some have lagoons. Sardinia has the finest lagoon coasts in southern Europe; the presence of the algal concretions called stromatolites indicates that there were similar lagoons in previous interglacials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

MacArthur and Wilson's theory (1967) set out to identify and measure the variables involved in the colonisation of islands by biota and their subsequent evolution or extinction. The key biogeographical variables identified by their theory were island size and distance from the mainland. They suggested that an island's biodiversity is proportionate to the island's size (i.e. the larger the island the higher the species number) and inversely proportionate to its distance from the mainland (i.e. more remote islands tend to support less species). Equally significantly they argued that the number of species on an island is in a state of dynamic equilibrium - diversity eventually stabilises but turnover remains high as species continually colonise and go extinct. Dynamism is a defining concept when attempting to understand the biogeography of islands and, in the Mediterranean in particular, the impact of human activity over millennia has resulted in very high levels of dynamism with profound consequences for the biota. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Mediterranean Sea was once part of a much larger ocean which encircled the Earth. This was the Tethys Ocean which existed c.200 × 106 years ago and which subsequently diminished in extent due to the convergent movement of the African and Eurasian plates. By c.65 × 106 years ago Tethys had contracted to become the Mediterranean Sea. Since then there have been episodes of drying and flooding, low and high salinity, low and high sea levels, and cold and warmth, as well as volcanic activity and earthquakes. Many of these events are linked with climatic change and/or tectonic activity. This dynamism is reflected in the ecological changes within the sea itself and in its encircling landmasses as well as its many islands. The environment of the last 65 × 106 years has thus been anything but uniform or stable. A particularly turbulent period of environmental change occurred during the last 2 × 106 years, approximating to the Quaternary period. As high latitudes experienced major advances of ice sheets and glaciers interspersed with warm interglacial stages, the Mediterranean Basin experienced substantial temperature changes on a similar cyclical basis. Forests, grasslands and shrublands, with associated fauna, underwent continual reassembly as temperatures rose and fell. As the present interglacial, the Holocene, opened c.12 ×103 years ago, temperatures ameliorated and the ecosystems which characterize the present began to assemble. However, the Holocene is unique insofar as a new agent of environmental change began to transform landscapes. The population of modern humans (Homo sapiens) was expanding from ice-age refugia (Sykes 2001) and appropriating the resources of the Mediterranean Basin first as huntergatherers and later as agriculturalists. The environment and ecosystems of this region hardly had time to reassemble their interglacial characteristics before there was an onslaught by this new, cultural driver of environmental change. This onslaught continues today as agriculture, industry, tourism, pollution, urbanization, rural depopulation and introduced plants and animals exact their tolls. All of these natural and cultural factors have affected the Mediterranean Islands to some degree. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All Mediterranean Islands resemble each other; each island is different in its own way. Apart from their distinctive differences Mediterranean Islands share many characteristics with islands in general. Places of romance, excitement and adventure or just escape from the pressures of busy lifestyles, islands worldwide have always held a particular fascination for people. Those of the Mediterranean Basin have a special place in human and environmental history. Due to their position, Mediterranean Islands are among the most visited, studied and exploited. They also feature prominently in subjects such as mythology, literature, radio, television and travelling material. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of sustainable development that "humanity has the ability to make development sustainable — to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) brings together social, environmental, and economic considerations. In practice it means that societies need to look to the future and make investments now that will allow future generations to meet their needs consistent with those of present generations. Meeting the needs of future generations implies prediction — being able to foretell what will or might happen and how actions and decisions taken now result in differences in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key assumption of this book is that the fundamental global contextual change in the international order caused by the end of the Cold War in 1989 triggered a reconceptualization of security that was deeply influenced by two processes of globalization and global environmental change (GEC). The scientific security discourse also benefited from new approaches in the social sciences (e.g. constructivism, post modernism, complexity studies, learning social systems, risk society, solidarity society, altermundism, etc.). Both the contextual change and the scientific innovation did not result in a scientific revolution (Kuhn 1962). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on a workshop on Climate Change and Security1 this chapter addresses the following scientific questions that are relevant for the planning of the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) until 2040: Does climate research allow the identification of highly affected regions due to specific impacts? Do other scientific disciplines offer indications for possible major regional impacts for population change, settlements, use of resources, food production, etc.? Can models and theories refer to possible implications for economic, social, and political developments? Do major interactions between the identified factors result in further findings on climate change? Can the risks involved be assessed, and what are the implications that may be concluded for global and regional security for Germany and Europe? Can the findings obtained be used for conceptual ideas for the preparation of the Strategic Future Analysis of the Study on Capabilities and Technology in the 21st Century (SFT 21) of the Bundeswehr? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In religious writings and prophecies, legends, oracles and more or less rational considerations, the desire to reckon the future and eventually to possess capabilities to influence the future course of events has always been a fundamental human need resulting from the survival imperative. History of science is the history of human efforts to learn from the past and to test whether that knowledge could help in creating plausible expectations towards the future. This approach is especially important in any action-oriented social science — economics, management and particularly, due to the stakes involved, in any security-oriented considerations. In all international or internal considerations on security and in the ‘securitization' approach two elements are crucial — prediction of threats (risk, dangers, disturbances) and designing of actions necessary to respond to those threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This book focuses on the reconceptualization of security in the 21stcentury that has gradually evolved since the end of the East-West conflict (1989-1991) and that has been significantly influenced by processes of globalization and global environmental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the conditions of, and possibilities for, global security in the 21st century? Have we learnt anything from the late 20th century peace and security studies? In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, two main lessons suggest themselves.2 The first lesson is liberal democracies do not fight each other (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993a; MacMillan 2004). Perhaps the liberal democratic zone of peace could be further expanded? Perhaps democratization of states will eventually lead to planetary peace? On the other hand, the second lesson seems to be that security is not solely about the objective absence of threats of political violence and war, but also involves politics of securitization and desecuritization (WÆver 1989a, 1995, 1996a). Actors can bring about securitization by presenting something as an existential threat and by dramatizing an issue as being an absolute priority.3 By revealing the politics of security, the post-structuralist theory of securitization stresses the responsibility of actors for their speeches and actions. The moral seems to be that it is only by resisting the temptations of securitization that the political conditions for a security community can be created and maintained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN Security Council had to set up a peace enforcement mission in Haiti to prevent a civil war, which might spill over into neighbouring countries. The death toll is rising daily in Mexico and Central America due to cross-border fighting between rival gangs or maras. To establish the rule of law, the Brazilian government decided to send troops into Rio de Janeiro to stem a tide of violence associated with drug trafficking, which is using the weapons of war. In Colombia, the authorities announced that they were going to implement the ‘Patriot Plan' to reclaim territories where the state lost jurisdiction decades ago from guerrilla forces. These decision-triggered fears in neighbouring countries, especially Ecuador, that conflict would spread across the border. Amid the sociopolitical polarization in Venezuela, the government arrested nearly a hundred Colombian paramilitaries accused of subverting national order. In Bolivia, against a backdrop of instability, the armed forces withdrew to barracks in protest against a military trial being transferred to a civil court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although security1 — as a basic concept — is frequently considered in the study and analysis of policy decisions, its essential meaning ought to be more widely disagreed than agreed on.2 Commonly considered a basic concept in policy and academic debates, security is in stark reality a quantity that is not basic at any register. By couching emerging "non-traditional" concepts such as ‘environmental security' and ‘human security' solely on their relationship to potential or real threats, most often within a topology of power — and by using language that is inadequate to the often nuanced and almost always complex dynamics of such emerging identities — makes such concepts hostage to ‘traditional' state-centred, national security paradigms. Most often such decision-makers only conceive of security concepts in power-dominant, state-centric mindset. The consequence has been that human and environmental issues tend to be ignored, relative to national security, even when it is clear that some of the issues we ignore today will contribute to the national security issues we will face tomorrow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War, Pacific security issues were focused on the external security concerns of the larger nations that border the Pacific Ocean rather than on the small island states and territories themselves. The island populations have been characterized more often as passive victims of external international relations1 than as the main actors in securing their region. There is, however, a growing literature focusing on security issues within the Pacific states and territories themselves.2 This literature addresses regional concerns from political, economic, environmental, health, and social to military and law and order issues (Henderson 2005: 9; Lawson 2003: 7). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Cold War era, security issues in East Asia were relatively straightforward as a result of the East-West confrontation. However, with the end of bipolarity, security issues in the East Asian region have become more diverse and complex.1 Political order in East Asia is not just a matter of China, Japan, and Korea. Their bilateral relations with the United States, and Washington's East Asian policies exercise a strong, if not predominant influence in the region (Howe 2005: 761-792). Russia continues to be an important player in the region. Thus, the geopolitical and strategic situation of East Asia is unique and, for instance, quite different from Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1989, two scholars from the People's Republic of China (PRC) described China as: "a regional power with global strategic significance and political influence" (Hao/Huan 1989: xxix). A contention in this article is that the PRC should now be understood as a global power in its own right, at least in economic terms, marking an extremely significant power-shift. However, this statement does not mean that China is a military threat to the U.S.; on the contrary, it is still very far behind the U.S. in military expenditure, technology, and power-projection. Our second argument is that Chinese leaders have publicly committed to making this power-transition a peaceful one. Such commitments may be a smokescreen for an underlying orientation towards violent conflict, but we argue that the PRC leadership would much prefer to maintain regional and global peace. We also suggest that there are significant challenges to China's security aims of transiting to a global power status while preserving peace. First, relations between the PRC, Taiwan, and Japan remain tense in the early years of the millennium, a triangular relationship that is a major flashpoint and one that could embroil the U.S. Second, China's economic expansion has led to environmental damage at home and competition for resources internationally. All the above issues should be understood within the context of Beijing's non-negotiable commitment to a ‘One China' policy, discussed below. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional security in Southern Africa has been of enormous significance since the onset of the modern state on the African continent in general and the subregion in particular. In Southern African, with the geographical boundaries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the overall challenges facing Africa will to a significant extent apply to SADC. With the demise of the Cold War and in 1994 the onset of a more democratic regime in South Africa, regional politics and development are no longer largely dependent on the ideological divide of the East or the West but rather a function of more nuanced dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international security system is structured along ideological as well as regional and zonal foundations whose authority resides in institutions supported by states, as defined in the 1945 United Nations Charter. In this global structure, states constitute the first layer of responsibility, followed by regions. In regions there is a recognized centre whose mandate seeks to harmonize and give political direction to sub-regional and state security organizations. In Africa, attention towards creating a continental security structure have been spurred after the failure of the 1993 peacekeeping mission in Somalia with the hasty withdrawal of Western forces from the continent. However, since the 1990's Africa has hosted about 50,000 United Nations peacekeeping troops and, given the cost and frequent renewals of mandates, retaining this force on the continent was not only unsustainable but subject to external decisions if not interests. Thus, assured future African security lies in the creation of capacity from within the continent, amongst the sub-regions and nation states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The security problematique in South Asia is undergoing a metamorphosis. Old paradigms are yielding way to new conceptualizations. The fundamental questions of who is being secured? — state or people — from what threats? — external powers, forces of globalization, sub-national actors or the oppressive authority of the state itself — and, through what means? yield radically different answers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From an institutional perspective, the major post-Cold War development for European security is the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in its own right. This was prompted by the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, which allowed for the development of autonomous European policies, distinct from the US, and by the confrontation with Europe's own grave limitations when forced to deal with the civil war in former Yugoslavia. Starting with the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, the EU has set an increasingly clear, ambitious and, arguably, distinctive security agenda. This culminated in the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council 2003). The first ever strategic document guiding the full range of EU external policies, it unambiguously sets forth the global vocation of the EU, including in the field of security (Bailes 2005). The ESS outlines a holistic approach, integrating security and the other dimensions of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Africa is the continent that harbours the largest share of the world's conflicts and wars. West Africa is the sub-region with the greatest share of these problems. Since the beginning of the 1990's conflicts and violence have resulted in the death, injury, and mutilation of several hundred, and the displacement of millions of people across the sub-region. The death and injury tolls have made West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) synonymous with insecurity, violence, and destruction rather than cooperation and development as designed in the core objectives of ECOWAS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent exhaustive review of the historical evolution of the concept of security and the emergence of the concept of human security (HS) concluded: "After ten years of debates in the social sciences the conceptual debate on human security remains inconclusive and the human security definition depends on the approach, preferences, and agenda of the respective author" (Brauch 2005a: 24). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘No development without security' is proving more and more to be a development-policy paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in the field of development policy. The discernible distance between development and military actors and their tasks of the past, has in recent years rapidly diminished. This applies to Germany, but also to most other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (Tschirgi 2004, 2006; Griffin 2003). Thus far, however, too little reflection and discussion has been devoted to its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the Cold War and the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks had profound effects on international relations. Despite the interpretation of 9/11 by some as manifestation of the growing importance of globalization at the expense of regionalization and that the following unilateral American actions have been detrimental to regional efforts, in practice there is an expansion in regionalization, particularly in the security field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NATO is developing closer security partnerships with countries in the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. This marks a shift in Alliance priorities towards greater involvement in these strategically important regions of the world whose security and stability is closely linked to Euro-Atlantic security. The current drive towards increasing dialogue and cooperation with countries in these regions builds on two key decisions taken at NATO's summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004 (see document 61.1). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2004, the Cabinet of the Federal Government of Germany approved the Action Plan Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (Bundesregierung 2004)2. The basis for crisis prevention,3 conflict resolution4 and peacebuilding5 is a broad security concept that embraces political, economic, ecological, and social stability6. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) integration can be characterized with reference to a number of interrelated phenomena, none of which is peculiar to the EU but all of which are defined by its unusual structure and policy-making framework. ‘Securitization' describes the way in which security concerns have been privileged in policy-making, often to the detriment of competing social, economic and foreign policy goals. ‘Europeanization' describes the progressive treatment of JHA issues at a European level. ‘Externalization' is the process of the blurring of distinctions between policy areas which might formerly have been classified as almost exclusively ‘internal' or 'external' to the state. A fourth trend concerns the way in which democracy and human rights have been both subverted and promoted in efforts to safeguard the EU's security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inclusion of' security' as a major policy vector for development is a relatively recent phenomenon even though security concerns were fundamental to the European integration project in the 1970's and 1980's, and, indeed, to the very foundation of the European communities. What, however, ‘security' means is of deep significance to the direction of European policy and its influence on the international environment in which it is applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hardly any other topic of international security can be approached from so many angles as the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been a central player of European and Euro-Atlantic relations since 1949. It will continue to retain its importance for many years to come. One could qualify this statement and draw the preliminary conclusion: NATO will exist amidst debates as long as it lasts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1950's, European integration and security have become two sides of the same coin. From its very beginning, the West European integration process has been a structurally designed peace project. After two world wars, and following the logic of (neo)functional integration concepts (Mitrany 1943; Haas 1958,1964), the aim was to eliminate the chance of further wars between West European states. Thus, the process of supranational integration was intended to transform the anarchic structure of the West European state system into a "working peace system" (Mitrany 1943). As a consequence, a security community has emerged in Western Europe that has durably excluded force as a means of conflict resolution (Adler/Barnett 1998; Deutsch/Burrel/Kann/Lee/Lichterman/ Lindgren/Loewenheim/Van Wagenen 1957). In this sense, the process of West European integration has been a process of "desecuritization" characterized by a "progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favour of other issues" (WÆver 1998a: 69). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new dynamics in global security in recent years have had a significant impact on European security (Duke 2000; Missiroli 2002a; Van Ham/Medvedev 2002; Carlsnaes/Sjursen/White 2004). New and broader transnational threats, such as terrorism, together with the creation of new tools to meet these, have created a fundamentally new security landscape (Kirchner 2003). At the same time the European Union has established a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) including military and civil crisis management capacities, internal safety and emergency preparedness measures, rapid alert systems, a solidarity clause for the protection against terrorism,and a security strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is significant to note that the concept of security used by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), since the mid-1990's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has from the inception of the process in the 1970's been a broad one. The security concept has undergone transformations along with the political changes and realities in the CSCE/OSCE region, but these have been by far more subtle than in other organizations. One major change over time has been that the concept has been turned into an operational approach following the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The chapter addresses the key elements of the European Security Strategy (Council of the EU 2003) and its follow-up implementation, including its impact on the crucial area of capability development. It is not a rigorous and exhaustive coverage of official decisions, but rather an illustrative description of the innovative approach the European Union (EU) has taken on security and defence in the early 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the principal organ under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Since 1945 the UNSC has taken up inter-state items in fulfilment of its mandated task. During the cold war only the UNSC rarely turned to matters focusing on the well-being of individuals rather than on political communities. Between 1945 and 1990 this practice was fully in line with the predominant orientation of international politics as practised by the principal foes and their allies. Since 1990 multilateralism experienced a sea change. The increase in internal conflicts resulted in a shift in the agendas of global and regional organs, primarily of the UNSC, but also of the UN General Assembly (UNGA).1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decades, the concept of' security' has evolved significantly in academic and policy discourse Traditionally, discussion of national, international, and collective security focused primarily on military threats to the integrity of states. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has broadened to include non-military threats to states as well as nonmilitary and military threats to groups and individuals. The latter came to be known as ‘human security', a concept with little analytic precision but nevertheless discernible impact on advocacy and policy formulation (see chapter by Dedring in this volume). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Secretary-General Kofi Annan has made it a key objective to reform the United Nations (UN) from a "culture of reaction to a culture of prevention" (Annan 1997). Annan's reform-initiative is based upon the idea that there is an inherent relationship between development and security, and that investment in development efforts is the most effective way for the UN to fulfil its goal, as stated in the Charter, of "saving coming generations from the scourge of war" (Annan 2001). The question of the prospects for conflict prevention and on the more general relationship between development and security currently receives intense scholarly and political attention.1 Indeed, an international consensus has emerged on an inherent relationship between development and security, as has been mentioned in the final document of the 2005 World Summit in September 2005, which states that "we recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing" (UN 2005).2 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security dynamics have some shared features irrespective of their referent object or ‘sector', and ‘different kinds of security' often interact so that one actor's fear for military security triggers countermeasures that make another state worried about its economic security, which in turn triggers countermeasures that let a security dilemma loose operating across ‘kinds' of security. For these two reasons, it is useful to study economic security, military security, political security, environmental security and other forms together, side by side. But there are also significant differences between, for instance security against military threats and against migration (when viewed as a threat), or between economic security and environmental security. This makes it useful to look systematically at the security of what might be called ‘sectors' (economic, military, etc) and draw out the particularities regarding what are the main objects defended, who typically acts in this sector, and not least, what dynamics of security and insecurity are characteristic of this sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The basic logic of the environmental security discourse is that humankind is living beyond the carrying capacity of the earth's local, regional, and global ecosystems. Essence is how to evaluate environmental stress in relation to political stability: is this a matter of ordinary politics or a matter of exceptional politics, i.e. security politics? The debate is dominated by an intriguing paradox: in order to preserve the political-economic and social-cultural structures of local, national, and world societies it is necessary to change them fundamentally, given their un-sustainability. The warning reads that either the structures are changed voluntarily and in a controlled manner, or structural change will be enforced violently and randomly by environmental crises. Much of the debate boils down to the question ‘who is to pay a price today to avoid that others have to pay a higher price tomorrow?' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The absence of political security as a key concept in social science encyclopaedias makes a (re)conceptualization of the term not easy. 2 Although the concept is widely used in the rhetoric of decision-makers or in compilations of a variety of subjects on security problems, political security is not an unequivocal label.3 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The perception of security dangers — of multiple threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks (Brauch 2005a, 2007) — and thus the security concerns of nation states and their people has significantly changed in many but not all parts of the world with the end of the East-West conflict. The security concept has widened, deepened and sectorialized, and the classic linkage between ‘peace and security' — both in the Covenant (1919) and in the UN Charter (1945) — has turned to a conceptual quartet of peace, security, development, and environment (chap. 1 and 3 by Brauch, chap. 4 by WÆver; chap. 10 by Oswald, chap 35 by Bothe). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]