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This article explores India's response to the Ukraine crisis and its decision not to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It examines various factors that contribute to India's reluctance, such as its fear of pushing Russia closer to China, its reliance on Russia for weaponry, a sense of nostalgia from the Cold War era, and economic benefits from maintaining silence. The article concludes that India is unlikely to change its stance on Russia in the near future, which could impact its alignment with the United States. It also discusses India's longstanding partnership with Russia and how it influences India's foreign policy decisions, particularly in relation to Russia's actions in Ukraine. The article suggests that India's ties to Russia may hinder its ability to develop a closer relationship with the United States, potentially allowing China and Russia to gain influence in the region. [Extracted from the article]

Research on terrorism disagrees on whether terrorist activity is at its highest in collapsed states, which are more hospitable to such activities, or whether terrorism increases in more capable states. We revisit this discussion by theorizing an interactive relationship: terrorists prefer to operate in politically-hospitable states, but their attack frequency within these states increases with greater technological capacity, which allows them to expand their military, recruitment, and financing operations. We analyze 27,018 terrorist incidents using regression and causal inference models, conduct a case study, and find robust support for this interactive logic. Our conclusions outline implications for policy and academic work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

17 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Pakistan, "Joint Statement from the 9 SP th sp U.S.-Pakistan TIFA Council Ministerial", February 23, 2023, https://pk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-from-the-9th-u-s-pakistan-tifa-council-ministerial/; U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Pakistan, "Joint Statement on U.S.-Pakistan Climate and Environment Working Group", March 16, 2023, https://pk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-u-s-pakistan-climate-and-environment-working-group/. Reprising a close strategic relationship with Pakistan could significantly damage US interests The United States could be pursuing its strategic rapprochement with Pakistan in the hope of improving joint US-Pakistan counterterrorism capabilities. The India Factor in US-Pakistan Renewal The United States' rapprochement with Pakistan will likely undermine US strategic cooperation with India. [Extracted from the article]

India and Russia have enjoyed a strong relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union, partially as a legacy of the Indo-Soviet partnership during the Cold War. But how will this invasion impact future relations between New Delhi and Moscow? We argue that the war will likely harm this relationship over the long term, although some scenarios might minimize this harm. Western sanctions and Russian material losses in the war will make it difficult for Russia to fulfill Indian arms orders, especially if the sanctions regime remains in place for several years, forcing India to turn to other sources of weapons, including the United States. Its increasing isolation from Europe could also force Russia to move even closer to India's rival China, making India less secure. There may be opportunities to improve energy ties between India and Russia, but Western sanctions and geographic barriers will limit any energy gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This was exemplified in the visit of the ISI-D's current director, Faiz Hameed, to Kabul, hard on the heels of the Taliban seizure of the capital.[5] More recently, Pakistani decisionmakers at the highest levels of government have sought to put the best possible gloss on the Taliban government. To that end, they have forcefully argued that to avert a humanitarian crisis in the country, the world needs to engage with the Taliban regime.[6] However, Pakistan has held off on recognizing the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, arguing that a regional consensus is first needed before such recognition can be granted. This goal has remained a constant in Pakistan's strategic vision, even after its overt acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 and the subsequent forging of a viable nuclear deterrent.[3] Pakistani governments have had two major goals in Afghanistan The 1996 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan represented a realization of both of these goals in one fell swoop. In the wake of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover, three major regional states - Pakistan, India, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) - all have significant and overlapping stakes in the future of Afghanistan. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on India's response to COVID-19 pandemic and blame must be squarely attributed to three critical choices made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi complicated by three fundamental structural conditions in India. It mentions overburdened public health infrastructure, the post-independence Indian state has had a remarkable record of containing pandemics. It also mentions three critical choices by Modi's government such as delayed international flight ban, a drastic and poorly planned national lockdown, and a shortage of medical equipment and testing.

The article discusses the transformation of India under the leadership of Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It explored the policy initiatives proposed such as the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), the secular principles of the government led by Modi compared to previous administrations, and the presidential order which revoked the special status of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In May 2019, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi won a second five-year term with a parliamentary majority unprecedented in recent decades (303 of 545 total seats). Under his leadership, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has for all practical purposes abandoned any pretense of upholding India's constitutional commitment to the values of secularism, political pluralism, and intellectual freedom. The BJP's antisecular, majoritarian vision threatens liberal democracy in India on three levels: societal, ideological, and institutional. If the party implements this vision, India will probably remain an electoral democracy, but its claim to be a liberal democracy—a country of freewheeling debate and discussion, robust check-and-balance institutions, and solid safeguards for rights and freedoms—will become a thing of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The region's nuclear vortex also extends beyond India and Pakistan to include the People's Republic of China (PRC), which has been involved in an enduring geopolitical rivalry with India since the early 1950s. The Sino-Indian nuclear dyad, however, is quite asymmetric; the PRC is primarily concerned with the perceived nuclear threat from the United States, while India views the PRC's own nuclear-weapons capabilities with considerable alarm. For its own part, the PRC refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of India's nuclear-weapons program, making it difficult for India to broach the subject with the PRC. [Extracted from the article]

Focuses on the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir in India. Details of the shooting of Hindu inhabitants in a mountain village by the Indian Army; History of the dispute between India and Pakistan; Efforts of New Delhi, India to address Kashmiri grievances through state-level elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

The article focuses on resounding victory of the Indian political party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in nineteenth general election in May 2019 despite rising unemployment, sluggish economic growth, widespread rural distress, and unpopular policy measures such as demonetization. Topics discussed include BJP passed an ordinance and introduced a citizenship bill that sought to exclude Muslims immigrating from other South Asian states from obtaining Indian citizenship, foreign and security policy of Indian government and government authorized a retaliatory air strike to avenge them.

The article looks at the economic and political events in Sri Lanka after the civil war, which began in 1983 and ended in May 2009. Topics covered include the firing of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe by President Maithripala Sirisena in 2018, the 19th Amendment to the Constitution approved by Parliament in April 2015, and the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka according to the country's Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission.

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan remains at the core of one of the most intractable conflicts in modern history. This article provides a plausibility probe into the dynamics of this South Asian rivalry that is conceptually based on the dynamic understanding of "frozen conflicts" introduced in this special issue of Asia Europe Journal. We lay out the key features of the conflict vis-à-vis the redefined notion of frozen conflicts, situating the rivalry in the broader category of unresolved protracted conflicts with a looming threat of violence renewal. In turn, we examine the three transformational dynamics as they operate in this particular case: peaceful thawing, violent thawing, and conflict withering. We conclude that despite the ongoing developments within the conflict dynamics, the possibility of conflict transformation through any of the suggested pathways remains unlikely in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did the Punjab bear the brunt of the mass violence and the migration that accompanied the partition of India? This paper makes the case for analytical eclecticism by showing that the following three explanations - centred respectively on democratisation, nationalism, and ideas; the commitment problem; and the security dilemma - account for the violence/migration in the different stages in the run-up to the partition of India. Instead of arguing that 'everything mattered', this paper elucidates the complex causality at work by demonstrating how these factors interacted with one another during the different stages leading to India's partition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This forum comes from a 2016 panel at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. The forum participants offered mid-term assessments of the foreign policy of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This forum considers whether Modi heralded in a new era in Indian foreign policy, or whether Modi's policies just repackaged older policies. The authors in this forum answer these questions by focusing on a range of issues from the role of religion to economic issues, to the relations between India and major foreign partners. The authors conclude that while Modi has undeniably put a personal stamp on foreign policy, substantive changes have been minimal. The first significant change lies in the centralization of foreign policy decision-making in the Prime Minister's Office. Second, while religious diplomacy played an important role, the version of Hinduism that Modi has adopted in foreign affairs is more inclusive than the one on display in domestic politics. Third, India's foreign economic policy has adopted a distinct nationalist tone. Fourth, Modi has signaled a "neighborhood first" focus in foreign policy. Finally, despite attempts at imparting his personal stamp, India's foreign policy towards major partners and in most issue areas remains substantively similar to those of the previous administrations.   Resumen: Este debate surgió a partir de un panel de la reunión anual de la Asociación de Estudios Internacionales realizada en 2016. Los participantes presentaron sus evaluaciones intermedias de la política exterior de Narendra Modi, primer ministro de India. El debate analiza si Modi instauró una nueva era en la política exterior india o si, por el contrario, simplemente les dio un lavado de cara a las políticas anteriores. Para responder estas preguntas, los autores del debate se centran en varias cuestiones: desde el papel que juega la religión y los problemas económicos hasta las relaciones entre India y sus principales aliados extranjeros. Los autores concluyen que si bien Modi puso su impronta personal en la política exterior, los cambios representativos han sido mínimos. El primer cambio significativo reside en la centralización de la toma de decisiones sobre temas de política exterior en la oficina del primer ministro. En segundo lugar, aunque la diplomacia religiosa tuvo un papel importante, la versión del hinduismo que adoptó Modi en la política exterior es más inclusiva que la que se muestra en las políticas nacionales. En tercer lugar, la política económica exterior de India ha incorporado un tono nacionalista distintivo. En cuarto lugar, Modi pone el foco en los países vecinos en lo que respecta a la política exterior. Por último, a pesar de los esfuerzos por darle su propia impronta, la política exterior de India sobre las principales áreas problemáticas y en lo que respecta a los aliados más importantes, no ha experimentado cambios relevantes en comparación con las administraciones anteriores.   Extrait: Le présent forum a comme origine un panel constitué en 2016 lors de l'assemblée annuelle de l'International Studies Association. Les participants du forum ont proposé des évaluations à mi-mandat de Narendra Modi, ministre indien des Affaires étrangères. La question est de savoir si M. Modi s'est fait le héraut d'une nouvelle ère dans la politique étrangère de l'Inde ou s'il n'a fait que présenter d'anciennes politiques sous un nouveau jour. Les auteurs de ce forum abordent la question en réfléchissant à diverses problématiques, du rôle de la religion aux problèmes économiques en passant par les relations entre l'Inde et ses partenaires étrangers principaux. Les auteurs concluent que si Modi a indéniablement imprimé sa marque sur la politique étrangère du pays, les changements de fond sont restés mineurs. Le premier changement d'importance est le recentrage du processus de prise de décisions en politique étrangère sur le portefeuille du Premier Ministre. Le deuxième changement, opéré dans un contexte où la diplomatie religieuse joue un rôle important, est l'adoption d'une version de l'hindouisme plus solidaire en politique étrangère que celle qui est affichée en politique intérieure. Le troisième est l'apport d'une touche nettement nationaliste à la politique économique étrangère. Le quatrième est l'annonce par Modi d'une politique étrangère axée en priorité sur les « pays limitrophes ». Enfin, et en dépit des tentatives de Modi d'imprimer sa marque personnelle, la politique étrangère de l'Inde envers ses partenaires principaux et dans la plupart des domaines reste en substance similaire à celle des administrations précédentes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political liberalism in India is now under assault. The current right-of-center government, dominated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), appears intent on transforming India's pluralistic, open, and secular state into an ethnic and illiberal democracy. To that end it has sought to place ideologues in key governmental institutions, attempted to curtail academic freedoms at a leading university, and made efforts to curb an otherwise feisty mass media. A weak political opposition, which had in any case failed to demonstrate much mettle when in government prior to the BJP's 2014 electoral victory, now appears utterly incapable of stemming this illiberal tide. As a consequence, India's future as a liberal democracy appears to be at some risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the reasons behind India's testing of a nuclear device in Rajasthan in 1974 despite the nation's opposition to the development of nuclear weaponery. About three percent of the nation's needs is provided by its nuclear energy program. Since 1974, nuclear explosions for peaceful purpose have not been made by the nation. Indian strategic thinking had been affected by the 1962 border war with China. After the 1971 war with Pakistan, the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement made India to take a strategic position enhanced by the possession of a nuclear weapon.

The article focuses on the bitter relations of China and India due to tension in border region of Doklam and multiple disputes, continuing disagreements and the threat of the use of force. It mentions dramatic innovations in weapons technology and qualitative advancements in the strategic capabilities of both India and China and both countries possess arsenals of long range ballistic missiles that can deliver conventional or nuclear payloads across thousands of miles in a matter of minutes. It also mentions China has problem with India due to signing of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with the U.S.

The Sri Lankan Civil War erupted in 1983 and dragged on until 2009. The origins of the conflict can be traced to Sri Lanka's colonial era and subsequent postcolonial policies that had significantly constrained the social and economic rights of the minority Tamil population. Convinced that political avenues for redressing extant grievances were unlikely to yield any meaningful results, a segment of the Tamil community turned to violence precipitating the civil war. A number of domestic, regional, and international efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict all proved to be futile. A military strategy, which involved extraordinary brutality on the part of the Sri Lankan armed forces, brought it to a close. However, few policy initiatives have been undertaken in its wake to address the underlying grievances of the Tamil citizenry that had contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two new series of iron meso-tris( para-X-phenyl)corrole (T pXPC) complexes, Fe[T pXPC]Ph and Fe[T pXPC]Tol, in which X=CF3, H, Me, and OMe, and Tol= p-methylphenyl ( p-tolyl), have been synthesized, allowing a multitechnique electronic-structural comparison with the corresponding FeCl, FeNO, and Fe2( μ-O) T pXPC derivatives. Optical spectroscopy revealed that the Soret maxima of the FePh and FeTol series are insensitive to the phenyl para substituent, consistent with the presumed innocence of the corrole ligand in these compounds. Accordingly, we may be increasingly confident in the ability of the substituent effect criterion to serve as a probe of corrole noninnocence. Furthermore, four complexes-Fe[TPC]Cl, Fe[TPC](NO), {Fe[TPC]}2O, and Fe[TPC]Ph-were selected for a detailed XANES investigation of the question of ligand noninnocence. The intensity-weighted average energy (IWAE) positions were found to exhibit rather modest variations (0.8 eV over the series of corroles). The integrated Fe-K pre-edge intensities, on the other hand, vary considerably, with a 2.5 fold increase for Fe[TPC]Ph relative to Fe[TPC]Cl and Fe[TPC](NO). Given the approximately C4 v local symmetry of the Fe in all the complexes, the large increase in intensity for Fe[TPC]Ph may be attributed to a higher number of 3d holes, consistent with an expected FeIV-like description, in contrast to Fe[TPC]Cl and Fe[TPC](NO), in which the Fe is thought to be FeIII-like. These results afford strong validation of XANES as a probe of ligand noninnocence in metallocorroles. Electrochemical redox potentials, on the other hand, were found not to afford a simple probe of ligand noninnocence in Fe corroles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the security state in democratic India, which mention about Armed Forces Special Powers Act, colonial legacy, practice of Prevention of Terrorism Act and creation, and the role of national human rights commission.

Foreign policy belief systems have received much attention. Yet nearly all work examines attitudes in western democracies, chiefly the United States. The current security environment requires that we ask whether the foreign policy views of individuals in other nations--particularly regional powers--are similar in structure to those found in the US case. This article does so for the Indian case. Drawing on studies of US opinion, we develop a set of claims and test them on an original data set on Indian elites. We make four contributions. First, we show that Wittkopf's framework applies to the Indian case. Second, we demonstrate how this framework can be made more generally applicable by revising its emphases on different types of internationalism and on rethinking the meaning of isolationist preferences. Third, we place the Indian case in comparative perspective. And last, we model the dimensions of Indian attitudes as a function of domestic ideology. Results of our analyses provide insights into the structure of foreign policy belief systems outside the Global North. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author contends that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has not fundamentally changed the orientation of India's foreign policy despite his heightened emphasis on foreign affairs. Topics covered include his lack of input on the subject of nonalignment, how the governments of former prime ministers such as Jawaharlal Nehru insistence on nonalignment's viability in the world order, and Modi's policies towards neighboring countries such as Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Also mentioned are India's trade and investment with Southeast Asian countries, changes Modi has instituted in Indian-U.S. relations, and factors contributing to an increase in defense cooperation.

India, though a working democracy, has adopted an ambivalent stance toward the genesis and evolution of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect. This article traces India’s views toward the earlier principle of humanitarian intervention, outlines its reactions toward the advent of the norm, and discusses India’s positions on the attempts to apply it to recent international crises. It then argues that India’s cautious support for the principle stems in part from concerns about its potential abuse in the hands of the great powers, post-colonial concerns about the diminution of the norm of state sovereignty, and finally, its own domestic vulnerabilities in the protection of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For well over 20 years, μ-oxo-diiron corroles, first reported by Vogel and co-workers in the form of μ-oxo-bis[(octaethylcorrolato)iron] (Mössbauer δ 0.02 mm s−1, Δ EQ 2.35 mm s−1), have been thought of as comprising a pair antiferromagnetically coupled low-spin FeIV centers. The remarkable stability of these complexes, which can be handled at room temperature and crystallographically analyzed, present a sharp contrast to the fleeting nature of enzymatic, iron(IV)-oxo intermediates. An array of experimental and theoretical methods have now shown that the iron centers in these complexes are not FeIV but intermediate-spin FeIII coupled to a corrole.2−. The intramolecular spin couplings in {Fe[TPC]}2(μ-O) were analyzed via DFT(B3LYP) calculations in terms of the Heisenberg-Dirac-van Vleck spin Hamiltonian H= JFe-corrole( SFe⋅ Scorrole)+ JFe-Fe′( SFe⋅ SFe′)+ JFe′-corrole( SFe′⋅ Scorrole′), which yielded JFe-corrole= JFe′-corrole′=0.355 eV (2860 cm−1) and JFe-Fe′=0.068 eV (548 cm−1). The unexpected stability of μ-oxo-diiron corroles thus appears to be attributable to charge delocalization via ligand noninnocence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the five dangerous myths about Pakistan that the country's foreign and security policy propagated for its vested interests. It states that the myths have spoiled U.S. foreign relations with Pakistan and the U.S. sought cooperation with India since 2000. It is noted that former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf stated that the country faces existential threat from India and highlighted that it is a victim of terrorism. It mentions the ties between Pakistan and terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). It also states that Pakistan has not been a reliable ally to the U.S.

The article focuses on the withdrawn of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The war has been cost the U.S. 300 million dollars a day. The U.S. forge a status of forces agreement (SOFA) and a bilateral security agreement (BSA) with Afghanistan. In the absence of the SOFA and BSA, the U.S. and NATO forces would have not remained in the country after 2014.