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The European Union (EU) is currently experiencing significant geopolitical shifts and is concerned that its dependence on externally produced or foreign-owned technologies risks its strategic autonomy, with implications for its security and economy. In response, it has placed sovereignty at the forefront of its agenda and at the centre of its relations with the world. Academic literature has so far paid limited attention to understanding the interactions between geopolitics, perceptions of technological dependence, and the impact on policy governance in cybersecurity. Bearing this gap in mind, the article asks how the EU's discourse of sovereignty and reducing external dependencies is shaping its approach to cybersecurity. Applying regulatory mercantilism and policy analysis to three case-studies—focusing on control of semiconductors, data server location, and cybersecurity certification— the article finds that the EU's depiction of its cybersecurity as impacted by dependence on externally manufactured products resulted in the merging of security and economic rationales. This has translated into efforts for greater control, either through promoting production within the European physical space through security-influenced industrial policies or—when this is not possible—by exerting regulatory influence beyond Europe's borders. Where globalization is believed to have failed, regulatory mercantilism becomes more likely as a policy approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its Joint Communication on Hybrid Threats, the EU has publicly recognized the risks to its security posed by non-traditional means aimed at undermining its legitimacy. The propagation of disinformation including misleading political advertising serves as a key example of how the Commission's perception of the EU's vulnerability to hybrid threats in times of geopolitical instability is shaping its regulatory policies. This article uses the framework of regulatory mercantilism, which argues that in conditions of perceived vulnerability, a state-like actor will reassert regulatory control based on a security logic in areas previously characterized by self-regulatory regimes. This article considers the Commission's 2019–2024 priorities, and how the spheres of technology, security, and democracy policies are intersecting as a response to hybrid threats. As a result, online platform governance in the EU is being substantially restructured with a move from systems of self-regulation to co-regulation backed by sanction as a means of combating hybrid threats online. The Commission's "taking back control" from platforms in the context of a digital sovereignty agenda serves as an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy, which sees the Commission seek to promote regulatory strength in response to perceived vulnerability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the evolution of the European Union's cybersecurity policy, highlighting its transition from reactive measures to a comprehensive strategy focused on resilience, cooperation, and technological advancement. The EU's cybersecurity policy has undergone three distinct phases: genesis, institutionalization, and regulatory, with a focus on regulatory mercantilism to gain control of cybersecurity governance. The article also explores the EU's efforts to export its cybersecurity norms internationally through cyber-diplomacy initiatives. Overall, the EU's cybersecurity policy is seen as a central pillar of its initiatives to provide leadership in a world perceived as presenting complex threats to its stability and security. [Extracted from the article]

The use of the Internet for the purposes of radicalisation is well understood. The use of social media platforms to spread messages of hate and intolerance has become mainstreamed, both as a means of communication and a focus of academic attention. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the complications in addressing these radicalisation efforts where the means of communication is through Internet memes, in which humour and coded language are used as means of radicalising an audience. While existing legal frameworks provide for online platforms to tackle this problem through a combination of assuring immunity from liability for taking action when content is brought to a platforms attention, as well as engaging in voluntary proactive measures, this paper explores the difficulty of addressing content that is more borderline in nature and where arguments concerning humour and freedom of expression may be raised by those spreading these messages in a system providing for significant discretion on the part of online platforms. Considering developments under the Digital Services Act, and an increased focusing on the algorithmic control of content, this article will argue that even these new measures may find the countering of radicalising content conveyed through humour quite difficult. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article considers the role of ideas in shaping law and policy processes, serving to facilitate certain actions or approaches while curtailing others. Using the development of the EU's governance approach to online service providers and platforms, this Article demonstrates how ordoliberalism as a set of beliefs regarding the regulation of market activity through law have shaped the understanding of appropriate measures for combating hybrid threats such as disinformation. Highlighting the origins of the E-Commerce Directive and the influence of ordoliberalism in the application of a regulated self-regulation model, the Article explores how ordoliberal philosophical ideas have influenced programme and policy level ideas concerning EU cyberspace governance as it relates to online platform activities. Even where there has been discursive change regarding the role of online platforms in contributing to an environment of insecurity, there has nevertheless been ideational continuity in the approach to their regulation, dictating the legal response in the Digital Services Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, we have been able to observe the emergence and mainstreaming of an EU discourse on digital sovereignty, which highlights the importance of gaining back control of EU digital infrastructure and technological production, based on the EU's perceived loss of economic competitiveness, limited capacity to innovate, high degree of dependence on foreign digital infrastructures and service providers and, related to all these factors, difficulty in providing EU citizens with a high level of cybersecurity. Bearing in mind that a considerable percentage of these infrastructures and service providers are under private sector control, the present article asks how this sovereignty discourse conceptualises the role of the private sector in EU cybersecurity. Drawing from a Regulatory Capitalism theoretical model, this article proposes that the EU has instead entered a Regulatory Mercantilist phase where it seeks to reassert its control over cyberspace, impose digital borders, accumulate data wealth and reduce its dependence on external private sector actors whose values may not reflect those of the EU order. A new approach to cybersecurity is emerging, in which the non-EU private sector can be perceived as much of a threat as foreign powers, and from whom digital sovereignty must be secured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses how populism and political uncertainty are impacting on one of the main current trends in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, namely the privatisation of JHA. Through an exploration of a cybersecurity policy case study, the article proposes to understand how the privatisation of internal security, which has resulted in private actors shaping JHA policies and regulation, is currently being disrupted. Through the use of the theoretical lenses of Regulatory Capitalism, the article argues that this change is directly related to a reduction in trust relations between the State and certain private sector actors, which occurs when priorities in addressing populism and political uncertainty are perceived to diverge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the extent to which Covid-19 has impacted the trajectory of EU Cybersecurity Policy. The Covid-19 crisis has led to an unprecedent reliance on digital solutions, ranging from teleworking to virus-tracking systems, resulting in the proliferation of Covid-19 related cybercrime, critical information infrastructure attacks and dissemination of pandemic disinformation. Although the virus has been repeatedly portrayed as life altering and as having considerably increased the cybersecurity risks faced by States, businesses and citizens, the proposed solutions, however, have accelerated existing trends in the field rather than resulting in significant institutional change. In particular, there has been a reinforcement of the role as a coordinating actor, of the introduction of further coherence between sub-areas and instruments, and of the positioning of public-private partnerships at the heart of the policy. However, where the role of social media platforms in facilitating the spread of disinformation is concerned, a changing trust relationship has resulted in a discursive shift in which these platforms require greater oversight, a belief reinforced by the spread of Covid-19 disinformation. The article proposes, through the lenses of historical and discursive institutionalism, that the EU's response to Covid-19 in the field of cybersecurity can only be understood in light of these pre-existing trends, which are the result of an economic and security path dependence that emerged in the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article demonstrates the role and importance of EU agencies in the EU's regulatory environment, and considers the consequences of an absence of cooperation through agencies for internal security. It does so by exploring the case study of the anti-counterfeiting activities of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), and what happens when a state no longer benefits from membership of an EU agency. The effective protection of consumers from counterfeit goods is dependent upon identifying best practices, sharing information on counterfeiting trends, and coordinating responses, activities undertaken through EU agencies. This article demonstrates that the ability of states to effectively counter the sale of counterfeit goods is dependent upon the existence of EU agencies due to the need for transnational cooperation. In the absence of EU agencies, states are likely to suffer diminished operational expertise and a lack of in-depth knowledge concerning counterfeiting trends. It concludes that the EU agencies form an essential part of EU security governance, with states not party to these cooperative endeavours rendered vulnerable and unable to combat at a national level what is ultimately a global problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of the EU's policies regarding the combatting of counterfeiting and in particular the establishment of the European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy (later renamed the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights). This paper will demonstrate how ‘hard’ legal regimes for the management of online sales of counterfeit items have been significantly limited by the lack of effective data on the scale of the phenomenon, as well as the reluctance of Internet platforms to tackle online infringements. Through the empowerment of the Observatory and its transferal to the European agency the European Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) however, the EU has managed to establish its position as a cyber-security actor able to tackle online infringements of intellectual property rights. Through research into and identification of best practices concerning the quantification of counterfeit sales, information collection and sharing, and in facilitating coordination and cooperation between networks of private and public sector actors, the Observatory has taken on a key role in establishing online networks for proactively countering the sale and distribution of counterfeit products online. In this way, the Commission's facilitation of a network governance model has led to the development of a more effective means of combatting the threat posed by physical goods that are distributed via digital means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens when a breakdown in relations results in mutually possessed objectives becoming harder to achieve? This article explores the consequences of the UK's withdrawal from the EU for intellectual property (IP) law and policy. Compared with other fields such as Economic and Monetary Union and the development of the EU's 'social chapter', the UK has been a supportive and proactive player in internal market integration, particularly pertaining to IP protection. As a result of 'Brexit', the EU may find that the impetus for further harmonization and integration in this field is lost, such as with the EU unitary patent. However, the consequences for the UK are likely to be more severe - a loss of influence, both over laws that govern it and in exporting IP norms internationally, as well as a loss of access to certain protections, agencies and market sectors that are within the UK's economic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protection of cyberspace has become one of the highest security priorities of governments worldwide. The EU is not an exception in this context, given its rapidly developing cyber security policy. Since the 1990s, we could observe the creation of three broad areas of policy interest: cyber-crime, critical information infrastructures and cyber-defence. One of the main trends transversal to these areas is the importance that the private sector has come to assume within them. In particular in the area of critical information infrastructure protection, the private sector is seen as a key stakeholder, given that it currently operates most infrastructures in this area. As a result of this operative capacity, the private sector has come to be understood as the expert in network and information systems security, whose knowledge is crucial for the regulation of the field. Adopting a Regulatory Capitalism framework, complemented by insights from Network Governance, we can identify the shifting role of the private sector in this field from one of a victim in need of protection in the first phase, to a commercial actor bearing responsibility for ensuring network resilience in the second, to an active policy shaper in the third, participating in the regulation of NIS by providing technical expertise. By drawing insights from the above-mentioned frameworks, we can better understand how private actors are involved in shaping regulatory responses, as well as why they have been incorporated into these regulatory networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the different philosophical approaches of the European Union (EU) and the U.S. to the concept of geographical indicators (GIs) and its application to foods in 2016. It explores how GI protection has been afforded a key role in the agricultural policies of EU, especially as they relate to external market relations with their respective consumer bases and with other states.

The purpose of this article is to examine the issue of 'lobbying' in the EU legislative process, using an interdisciplinary analysis of the development of copyright laws as a way of explaining why and how some lobbyists are more successful than others in having their preferences taken into account in legislation. As this article will demonstrate, the keys to successful lobbying in this field are information exchange, the ability to frame issues at an early stage in the legislative process (agenda setting) and the political salience of an issue. By assessing not only where legislative initiatives in copyright reform have been successful, such as the passing of the Information Society, Enforcement and Term Extension Directives, but also where legislative initiatives fail, as in the case of ACTA, it will be demonstrated that legislative success is not a simple case of 'big business getting what it wants', but of varying levels of political salience. Where the salience of an issue is low and voters consider that issue comparatively unimportant to other issues, industry representatives are able to effectively frame legislative outcomes. Where salience is high, and an issue important to voters, this ability is substantially reduced. By approaching copyright law development in this way, it is possible to reconceptualise the role of lobbying in the EU legislative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright, as currently understood, is justified by the belief that the protection it grants to creators incentivizes the continued creation of works deemed culturally beneficial to society. However, its use can be less altruistic, as a means of suppressing embarrassing or controversial information. The ability to disseminate sensitive material quickly through the Internet concerns both state and non-state actors, and there are indications that, through the use of private intermediaries, copyright can be used to suppress speech. This article seeks to explain how the current neoliberal system of governance blurs the line between public and private actors, creating a diffused and decentralized system of copyright enforcement that allows for the suppression of speech in a way that avoids discussion of censorship. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This editorial provides an overview of the themes of network governance and content regulation that are expanded upon in the subsequent articles, identifying key issues and concerns that are prevalent in the literature in this field. In particular, this text considers governance not as an Internet-specific phenomenon, but as a global phenomenon, identifying and discussing literature pertaining to governance both online and offline, and providing examples of theories that seek to explain these forms of governance. Focusing on the interaction between public and private actors in content regulation, this editorial highlights that content regulation is a complex and contested issue that cannot be separated from its social and cultural contexts, and provides an overview of the articles contained. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of IDP: Revista de Internet, Derecho y Politica is the property of Universitat Oberta de Catalunya and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article evaluates the way in which copyright infringement has been gradually shifting from an area of civil liability to one of criminal penalty. Traditionally, consideration of copyright issues has been undertaken from a predominantly legal and/or economic perspectives. Whereas traditional legal analysis can explain what legal changes are occurring, and what impact these changes may have, they may not effectively explain 'how' these changes have come to occur. The authors propose an alternative inter-disciplinary approach, combining legal analysis with critical security studies, which may help to explain in greater detail how policies in this field have developed. In particular, through applied securitisation theory, this article intends to demonstrate the appropriation of this field by a security discourse, and its consequences for societal and legal developments. In order to explore how the securitisation framework may be a valid approach to a subject such as copyright law and to determine the extent to which copyright law may be said to have been securitised, this article will begin by explaining the origins and main features of securitisation theory, and its applicability to legal study. The authors will then attempt to apply this framework to the development of a criminal law approach to copyright infringement, by focusing on the security escalation it has undergone, developing from an economic issue into one of international security. The analysis of this evolution will be mainly characterised by the securitisation moves taking place at national, European and international levels. Finally, a general reflection will be carried out on whether the securitisation of copyright has indeed been successful and on what the consequences of such a success could be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]