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The article explores how a meeting left the three countries optimistic that a long-term solution to the conflict could be worked outing Egypt, but crucial sticking points remained as well, such as the rate of filling the reservoir located behind the dam. It mentions that Egypt for its part has sought to slow down the filling of the reservoir.

The decision of Gladstone's government to invade and occupy Egypt in 1882 remains one of the most contentious in late nineteenth-century British political and imperial history. This article examines the decision-making process in June and July 1882, revisiting Robinson and Gallagher's influential study in the light of more recent historiographical research and previously unused sources. It looks at who made the critical decisions, what their preoccupations were, and how they were able to get Cabinet approval. Hartington and Northbrook were the two key figures, who co-operated to overturn Gladstone's and Granville's policy in June 1882. Yet their co-operation was momentary and they found themselves on different sides of the argument over the participation of Indian forces and international support. Although they shared a sense of Egypt's importance to British imperial security, they each had a distinctive approach, so that the decision to occupy cannot be reduced to a conflict between Whig pragmatists and Radical idealists. The article also shows how the Alexandria riot on 11 June altered the context of decision-making by shifting the mood in the parliamentary Liberal party towards intervention. Parliament, not the press, was the crucial site of 'public opinion' in the Egyptian crisis in June and July 1882. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes regional events in the twenty-first century and identifies Turkey's relations with Arab countries, pointing out the serious deterioration that has occurred in those relations with its bordering Arab neighbors as well as Egypt and Lebanon. The article argues that Turkey's "imperatives of state," as in the case of any other state actor, determine the foreign policy trajectory and consequently its regional and international relations. Turkey has chosen to ally itself with pro-Western regional states, namely Israel and Qatar, but not others, such as Egypt. Creating rivalry and animosity with bordering states is neither conducive to Turkey's long-term relations with those states nor to its ultimate political stability. Its NATO membership exacerbates animosity that would ultimately work against Turkey's regional influence. Consequently, Turkey's imperatives of state ironically stand in the way of achieving its regional ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses foreign relations between Egypt and Italy during the interwar period of 1919 to 1939, especially after 1933 when Italy's National Fascist Party (Partito nazionale fascista, or PNF) came to power. It also discusses the Italian community living in Egypt and its relations to Italy, Egypt's efforts at decolonization, and the 1933 visit of Italy's king Vittorio Emanuele III to Alexandria, Egypt to celebrate the opening of the Italian state school Scuole Littorie Italiane, founded to expand on Italy's fascist educational goals.

Following the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, analyses of political change in Egypt have primarily focused on domestic processes and paid relatively less attention to the influence of changes in the country's foreign policy. The circular character of the recent Egyptian political transformation process enables strategic shifts to be observed and the scope of foreign policy change – and continuity – to be assessed. This article addresses the evolution and the adaptive moves made by Egyptian foreign policy towards the Arab region between 2011 and 2016, paying special attention to the relations between post-Mubarak Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have traditionally maintained a mutual interest bilateral relationship in which Egypt's economic dependence and shared security concerns – the stability of the Gulf and Middle East countries, the containment of Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Hezbollah – have led them to act pragmatically and overcome disagreements. In keeping with a framework of foreign policy analysis that distinguishes between foreign policy determinants, decision-making and behaviour, the article will first examine how the domestic political transformations witnessed since 2011 have affected Egypt's foreign policy. A more in-depth case study will then focus on the sub-regional level of analysis with the specific aim of explaining the strengthening of relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia from 2014 to 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contends that the roots of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1977 decision to seek peace with Israel, eventually leading to the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, can be found in events on or near Egypt's borders in Africa and larger Cold War politics. It therefore moves beyond the focus by many scholars on bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relations and the US-centric role in the peace process and instead examines how the breakdown in Egyptian-Libyan relations, the Ethiopian Revolution, and Soviet penetration of the African continent compelled Sadat to make peace with Israel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Egyptian-Soviet relations in the run up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It argues that Egypt and the Soviet Union stumbled into brinkmanship with little coordination and no agreement on common objectives or goals. The article demonstrates how frustration and mutual disappointment were recurring features of the interactions between the two allies during the critical weeks prior to the war. In doing so, the article exposes new aspects of how Cairo and Moscow managed their alliance and assesses what that means to our understanding of the origins of this transformative war. These conclusions challenge revisionist accounts that attribute the start of the war to Egyptian-Soviet collusion and some traditional narratives that present the Soviet Union as an enterprising risk-taker invested in regional brinkmanship. The article draws heavily on Egyptian and Arabic language sources to examine Egyptian-Soviet interactions during this key period of Middle Eastern history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

National Socialism did not end in 1945. Nazi SS-experts on armament, propaganda and secret police operated in Egypt long after this year under cover of West German and US Cold War operations. German foreign policy had traditionally taken close interest in the region. Following this tradition, diplomats, many of them with Nazi backgrounds, aspired to new economic and political goals after the Second World War by maintaining contacts with those SS experts in the country. Only when the cooperation between Germany and Egypt finally failed, did West German diplomats establish diplomatic relations with Israel in 1965. A clear separation between functionary elites of the Third Reich and the West German elites is not possible. Thus, new research should focus on the entangled and global post-war connections of National Socialist functionaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Latin American Studies is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article reviews EU’s mediation attempts in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. After presenting the main challenges and opportunities of EU mediation in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) neighborhood, EU interventions in Egypt are discussed in relation to the 25 January 2011 revolution, during the presidency of Mohammed Morsi, and after the 3 July 2013 coup d’état, focusing specifically on the choice of mediation styles and their timing. It is argued that three contextual conditions that are typical of the crises that erupt during failed democratic transitions - their fast pace, their eminently domestic nature and significant power asymmetries between the main parties involved - exacerbate the structural problems that the EU faces when intervening in countries that are not current or potential candidates for accession. The analysis of EU mediation styles during Egypt’s transition provides a critical perspective on EU’s foreign policy making after the Treaty of Lisbon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on Political Islam has not devoted ample space to the intellectual contributions of contemporary moderate Islamists. This article attempts to rectify this by examining the international relations discourse of a twentieth-century Egyptian religious scholar: Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra. Despite Abu Zahra's prominence in the Islamic world, his writings have received scant attention from academics. The article provides a close reading of his three principal works on international relations: al-ʿAlaqat al-Duwaliyya fi al-Islam, Nazhariyat al-Harb fi al-Islam and al-Wihda al-Islamiyya; as well as a fourth work with a significant bearing on the subject: al-Mujtamaʿ al-Insani fi Dhil al-Islam. It contends that Abu Zahra's international relations discourse is part of a more than a century-old tradition of theorizing on international relations that dates back to the religious reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu. Accordingly, Abu Zahra is treated here as an exemplar of what I refer to as the moderate and reformist school in contemporary Islam, in contradistinction to the radical school that is associated with salafi-jihadist figures and movements. A close analysis of Abu Zahra's international relations discourse thus provides penetrating insights on one pivotal, albeit understudied, dimension of this reformist/moderate current in contemporary Islam: its perspectives on international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of History Studies (13094688) is the property of History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Egypt and Ethiopia continue to oppose one another over the allocation of the waters of the Nile River basin, despite a succession of provisional multilateral agreements. Officials in Cairo insist that Egypt be guaranteed its “historic rights” to two-thirds of the river’s flow, while their counterparts in Addis Ababa demand an “equitable” distribution of water among all of the riparian countries. More important, Sudan’s shift in alignment from Egypt to Ethiopia has injected new tension into the dispute, and the sustained involvement of South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Eritrea heightens the likelihood that periodic crises will escalate into armed confrontations. Consequently, existing studies that offer sanguine assessments of the potential for a compromise settlement fail to address the key dynamics that drive the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Six years after protests toppled Husni Mubarak, Egypt is still struggling with the aftermath of the “Arab Spring" and the chaos it unleashed. The removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013 and Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi's ascension to the presidency is sometimes seen as returning Egypt to its pre-2011 political landscape. Egypt is continually wrestling with how to deal with the past as well as trying to cultivate stronger ties abroad. This includes strengthening work with the new U.S. administration under Trump, securing Sinai with Israel's cooperation, and walking a fine line on Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Russian influence in the region. This article, based on a research trip to Egypt and discussions and interviews with Egyptian insiders from various fields, provides an overview of the challenges facing Cairo and how its elites hope to meet them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigates the effect of the July 3rd 2013 events on Egyptian-Turkish political and economic relations. The relevant history is reviewed in the period 1996-2006. Though they witnessed ups and downs, they saw unprecedented improvement in the times of former Egyptian President Mohammad Mursi, but deteriorated upon the 2013 incidents. When Mursi was brought down, political and economic relations declined, as some trade deals were cancelled and mutual diplomatic representation waned. With regard to the future, it is concluded that there are three scenarios. The first is the persistence of the status quo. The second is further deterioration until severing the ties. The third, which is the most optimistic, is an improvement achieved through intercession by a super power or each country's acceptance of the reality and attempt to avoid future dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and mentions demonstrations against government in Cairo, Egypt. Topics discussed include president of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz AlSaud, Egypt's involvement in regional conflicts and anti-Iran sentiment in the country.

Since 2014, Chinese-Egyptian relations have emerged as one of the most important bilateral axes in the Middle East. Over that time, a new era of closer political and economic ties has begun to develop between the two countries. This study analyzes the motivation behind China's actions to formalize a comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt in light of the relative decline in U.S. influence and power in the region. Its findings show that economic interests are the primary consideration in this burgeoning relationship, but that the strategic potential of Egypt's geographic location and the size of its economic market make it a promising partner for Chinese ambitions in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reports on Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa's expression of his country's concern about Israel's failure to talk forthrightly about its nuclear weapons capacity. Cairo's renewed campaign to limit Israeli nuclear arms as part of regional arms control measures; Israel's policy regarding nuclear weapons; Effect of Egypt's campaign on its status in the Middle East peace process.

The article focuses on the various conflicts between different countries. It claims that the broken military alliance between the Soviet Union and the U.S. provided for the division of Germany and Korea into a communist-ruled and an anticommunist section. It likewise indicated serious trouble between Egypt and Israel, wherein Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser vowed to wipe off Israel in the map right after they become capable to do so. Moreover, it adds that the existent danger between major nations is alarming, thus, constructive actions have to be carried out.

Since the Muslim Brotherhood's ouster in July 3, 2013, tension has escalated between Turkey and Egypt and gained media attention as an unprecedented incident in bilateral relations. However, disagreement has characterized bilateral relations since the declaration of the Egyptian Republic and the launch of diplomatic relations with Turkey in the 1950s. By tracking the history of both countries' bilateral relations, this study contends that, according to the elitist duality thesis, Turkish -Egyptian relations were an exception to the Turkish -Arab relations, as they were not influenced by the ruling elite. It argues that regardless of the ruling elite identity, tension has disrupted the normal course of relations. By relying on extensive interviews conducted with members of the Justice and Development Party, and academicians and staff members in the Turkish ministries of economy and foreign affairs, the study analyzes the unaddressed tension in the Turkish -Egyptian relations since the 1950s until 2013 and provides policy recommendations to improve bilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Egyptian state’s policy of dispatching trained Egyptian professionals, primarily educational staff, across the Arab world rarely features in analyses of Egypt’s foreign policy under Gamal Abdel Nasser. This article relies primarily on newly declassified material from the British Foreign Office archives, unpublished reports from the Egyptian Ministry of Education, and an analysis of related articles in three main Egyptian newspapers (al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Jumhuriya) in order to provide a detailed reconstruction of regional migration’s importance for Egyptian foreign policy. It debunks the conventional wisdom that Egyptian migration became a socio-political issue only in the post-1973 era, arguing that the Nasserite regime developed a governmental policy that allowed, and encouraged, Egyptians’ political activism in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf according to state foreign policy priorities in the 1952-1967 period. By presenting a cache of archival material in analytical and critical context, this article offers concrete evidence of how migration buttressed Egypt’s regional ambitions under Gamal Abdel Nasser. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The post-intervention situation in Libya poses foreign and security policy challenges for Egypt. Egypt’s definition of the Libyan problem centres on two fundamental aspects: it is depicted as the consequence of an unfinished R2P military intervention, and perceived as part of a regional war against Islamist terrorism. All practical steps being taken by the authorities in Cairo are based on this dual framing. The implications of its positioning are, firstly, a securitised approach to foreign policy, including limited military interference and proxy support and, secondly, the emergence of a partisan position. To date, the impact of Egypt’s foreign policy line in the Libyan theatre has been limited and hence its viability risks being thrown into question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This articles analyses the campaign conducted by the Moroccan nationalist movement in Cairo after World War II aiming to enlist the Arab League in its anti-colonial struggle. Although the Maghribi activists initially celebrated several successes, they ultimately failed to obtain any diplomatic support, especially following the Egyptian revolution of 1952. Drawing on Moroccan as well as French, Spanish, and US sources, this article argues that Nasser and his colleagues refused to support the Moroccans due to irreconcilable ideological differences, thus laying the foundation for the scepticism towards the Arab world that characterised Morocco's foreign policy during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the continuing dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile River. It examines the Egyptian policy before and after the leadership of Presidents Mosni Mubarak and Muhammad Morsi. The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981 which reduced the level of bilateral hostility with Ethiopia is noted. The engagement of Mubarak with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi during his presidency is also explored.

Egypt maintained a policy of antagonism at arm’s length toward Ethiopia throughout Husni Mubarak’s presidency. This pattern changed immediately following Mubarak’s ouster. The burst of rapprochement and diplomatic activism that took shape in the spring of 2011 signaled a fundamental shift in the content and form of Egyptian policy vis-à-vis Ethiopia, which was reflected in President Muhammad Mursi’s reluctance to respond belligerently to Ethiopian initiatives 2 years later that threatened to diminish the northward flow of the Nile. Cairo’s evident restraint during the Mursi era cannot be explained by a change in the strategic circumstances that confronted Egyptian policy-makers. A more promising explanation can be found in a reformulation of desecuritization theory, which highlights the internal dynamics whereby potentially dangerous aspects of a country’s external environment get transformed into matters of routine political contestation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]