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We extend the framework introduced in 'Collective Arbitrage and the Value of Cooperation' by F. Biagini, A. Doldi, J.-P. Fouque, M. Frittelli, and T. Meyer-Brandis (arXiv: 2306.11599v2, 2024) in order to analyze collective dynamic risk measures. In segmented markets, we explore the implications of cooperation on dynamic risk measurement, focusing particularly on aggregation and time consistency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we give an overview of (nonlinear) pricing-hedging duality and of its connection with the theory of entropy martingale optimal transport (EMOT), recently developed, and that of convex risk measures. Similarly to Doldi and Frittelli (Finance Stoch 27(2):255–304, 2023), we here establish a duality result between a convex optimal transport and a utility maximization problem. Differently from Doldi and Frittelli (Finance Stoch 27(2):255–304, 2023), we provide here an alternative proof that is based on a compactness assumption. Subhedging and superhedging can be obtained as applications of the duality discussed above. Furthermore, we provide a dual representation of the generalized optimized certainty equivalent associated with indirect utility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium (SORTE) was introduced in: "Systemic optimal risk transfer equilibrium", Mathematics and Financial Economics (2021), for the analysis of the equilibrium among financial institutions or in insurance-reinsurance markets. A SORTE conjugates the classical Bühlmann's notion of a risk exchange equilibrium with a capital allocation principle based on systemic expected utility optimization. In this paper we extend such a notion to the case when the value function to be optimized is multivariate in a general sense, and it is not simply given by the sum of univariate utility functions. This takes into account the fact that preferences of single agents might depend on the actions of other participants in the game. Technically, the extension of SORTE to the new setup requires developing a theory for multivariate utility functions and selecting at the same time a suitable framework for the duality theory. Conceptually, this more general framework allows us to introduce and study a Nash Equilibrium property of the optimizer. We prove existence, uniqueness, and the Nash Equilibrium property of the newly defined Multivariate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to develop a duality between a novel entropy martingale optimal transport (EMOT) problem and an associated optimisation problem. In EMOT, we follow the approach taken in the entropy optimal transport (EOT) problem developed in Liero et al. (Invent. Math. 211:969–1117, 2018), but we add the constraint, typical of martingale optimal transport (MOT) theory, that the infimum of the cost functional is taken over martingale probability measures. In the associated problem, the objective functional, related via Fenchel conjugacy to the entropic term in EMOT, is no longer linear as in (martingale) optimal transport. This leads to a novel optimisation problem which also has a clear financial interpretation as a nonlinear subhedging problem. Our theory allows us to establish a nonlinear robust pricing–hedging duality which also covers a wide range of known robust results. We also focus on Wasserstein-induced penalisations and study how the duality is affected by variations in the penalty terms, with a special focus on the convergence of EMOT to the extreme case of MOT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a novel concept of a Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium (SORTE), which is inspired by the Bühlmann's classical notion of an Equilibrium Risk Exchange. We provide sufficient general assumptions that guarantee existence, uniqueness, and Pareto optimality of such a SORTE. In both the Bühlmann and the SORTE definition, each agent is behaving rationally by maximizing his/her expected utility given a budget constraint. The two approaches differ by the budget constraints. In Bühlmann's definition the vector that assigns the budget constraint is given a priori. On the contrary, in the SORTE approach, the vector that assigns the budget constraint is endogenously determined by solving a systemic utility maximization. SORTE gives priority to the systemic aspects of the problem, in order to optimize the overall systemic performance, rather than to individual rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We describe the axiomatic approach to real-valued Systemic Risk Measures, which is a natural counterpart to the nowadays classical univariate theory initiated by Artzner et al. in the seminal paper "Coherent measures of risk", Math. Finance, (1999). In particular, we direct our attention towards Systemic Risk Measures of shortfall type with random allocations, which consider as eligible, for securing the system, those positions whose aggregated expected utility is above a given threshold. We present duality results, which allow us to motivate why this particular risk measurement regime is fair for both the single agents and the whole system at the same time. We relate Systemic Risk Measures of shortfall type to an equilibrium concept, namely a Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium, which conjugates Bühlmann's Risk Exchange Equilibrium with a capital allocation problem at an initial time. We conclude by presenting extensions to the conditional, dynamic framework. The latter is the suitable setup when additional information is available at an initial time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]