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Over the last twenty years, the digital economy – driven primarily through large digital platforms that have been mostly unregulated to date – has brought enormous economic and societal benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend by making digital platforms central to the global economy and society and by highlighting further opportunities, but, importantly too, risks and threats. Digital platforms, representing the increasingly important and maturing online platform economy, are now being described as critical infrastructure and even utilities. Digital platform policy, particularly the future regulation of the large far-reaching dominant platforms, is a major focus of the European Union (EU) as part of its response to the COVID-19 crisis. The literature on platform regulation highlights two major themes that emerge concerning digital platform regulation, and that are consequently the focus of future regulation: competition and online content. This article presents research findings in these areas through a critical analysis of and reflection on emerging digital platform regulatory practices which are being progressed under the groundbreaking EU Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act package. This includes assessing implications for national implementation, regulatory enforcement, and governance. A particular emphasis is placed on the Digital Services Act where there is less literature, knowledge, and experience on how to best regulate online content. In this context, the paper provides insights into how Ireland, where many of the large platforms are established and so is their de-facto regulator, is dealing with regulatory implementation issues driven by the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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While its relationship with competition law remains under debate, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) concerns fundamental rights, public values, and the control of power in digital markets. In limiting the scope of the freedom to conduct a business, the DMA seeks to safeguard conflicting and colliding fundamental rights and public interests. For the DMA to gain recognition as a legitimate and future-proof governance framework for digital markets, it must be based on participatory democracy. Meaningful participation in procedures that could impact one's position is a fundamental element of a democratic legal system governed by the rule of law. Although the DMA permits some form of dialogue, participatory democracy is constrained in scope, a bilateral logic rather than a multi-stakeholder approach is employed, and much is left to the discretion of the enforcer. Using a law-oriented and constitutional approach, we elaborate on how participatory democracy, engagement, and deliberation can be enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Nowadays, the use of digital services is indispensable to the daily activity of businesses or end users. Digital services and online platforms contribute to the internal market by opening new business opportunities, increasing industry competitiveness, and widening consumer choice. While digital services have contributed to boosting innovation and developing new business models, a few online platforms act as gatekeepers by controlling a large digital market, likely leading to unfair practices and conditions for business users and end users. Against this background, this paper discusses the rationale and the necessity for regulating digital technology development in the digital market. It analyses the EU's approach to adapting competition policy for the digital age. This paper argues that the Digital Markets Act will undoubtedly impact business models in the digital market and regulatory framework at the national level. However, its fundamental success will depend on whether the Commission has the appropriate tools to address the development of new technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the ever-expanding digital realm, a systematized and coherent legal framework regulating data-driven competition has emerged as a paramount concern in the European Union. At the heart of this intricate puzzle lie the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) governing data protection and market contestability respectively. While the 'without prejudice' clause enshrined in the DMA seeks to harmonize their coexistence, the true extent of their compatibility and complementarity remains elusive. The juxtaposition of these two legislative pillars unveils nuanced conflicts and potential vulnerabilities at their intersection. If disregarded, these glaring blind spots might become an Achilles heel of the DMA and risk to weaken the DMA's data-related ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceived as institutions funded by the public purse and intended to exist devoid of political influence, the mandate of public service media (PSM) entities is to disseminate reliable news content and high-quality audiovisual productions to all demographic segments, inclusive of marginalized communities and audiences that are typically under-served. Over the previous ten years, the rise in prominence of global platforms in national media systems has precipitated many changes in the media sector, including unique challenges for PSM institutions guided by specific public service values. Using a holistic conceptual framework for assessing the implementation of these values, this article analyzes the impact of platformization on Europe's PSM and discusses how the Union's policy approaches affect related challenges to PSM. The analysis indicates that while the European Union (EU) has accorded a high priority to PSM within its media policy framework, the role that Brussels plays in protecting the independence and efficacy of PSM has been circumscribed, given that the onus of regulating PSM entities rests with national governments. This has engendered contrasting experiences wherein certain PSM outlets enjoy political independence and command significant public trust while others function as state-controlled propaganda vehicles, advancing the objectives and interests of governing bodies. The EU has addressed global platform power in recent attempts to safeguard its digital future, including the Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). However, these acts do not adequately address PSM's two central and often interconnected problems: funding challenges and political pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb is the property of Fachmedien Otto Schmidt KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Digital market regulations respond to technological changes and global dynamics, but also to how political actors shape markets. Focusing on the Digital Markets Act, this article explains the EU's marketcraft as the result of a struggle in the policy field between political actors promoting competing economic ideas in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical context. We show that significant discursive and policy change in digital market governance has occurred because of shifting coalitions between three constellations of actors, which we call market-correctors, market-busters, and market-directors. Tracking the ongoing campaign to challenge Big Tech and define the meaning of digital sovereignty, we argue that market-directors have ushered in potentially comprehensive policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of the EU and UK regulations for competition in digital markets, specifically the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the UK Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCCA). It highlights three key issues that are often overlooked in the literature: what actions to take, how to implement them, and what to avoid. The article explores the goals of fairness and contestability, the challenges of vertical and horizontal competition, and the potential impact on the emergence of EU/UK BigTech companies. It emphasizes the need for a new regulatory philosophy and mindset, as well as a strategic vision and policy for digital competition. The article also mentions the 'Digital Markets Research Hub', a YouTube channel that features discussions with experts in the field of digital competition law. [Extracted from the article]

The article explores the Digital Markets Act (DMA) implemented by the European Union to regulate platform services offered by Big Tech companies. It specifically focuses on the potential impact of platform integration and the emergence of "super-apps" within the EU, using Meta's WhatsApp as an example. The article examines whether the DMA is equipped to address new competitive concerns and ensure fairness in digital markets. It emphasizes the importance of swift and effective enforcement of the DMA. Additionally, the article discusses the potential impact of super-apps and FM-fueled chatbots on the consumption of digital services, highlighting concerns such as barriers to entry and favoritism towards their own services. It concludes that while the DMA can address many concerns, it should be adaptable to future changes and work alongside traditional antitrust law. [Extracted from the article]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) are important regulations in the European Union (EU) that aim to create fair and safe digital environments. The effectiveness of these regulations depends on their enforcement. The DMA focuses on addressing the market power of large online platforms, while the DSA aims to regulate digital services more broadly. The principle of effectiveness is crucial in assessing compliance with these laws. The effective implementation and enforcement of the DMA and the DSA require the involvement of various actors, including enforcement authorities, national regulators, third parties, and the European Commission. Private enforcement mechanisms, such as representative actions, can complement public enforcement efforts. Overall, effective enforcement is essential for achieving the objectives of these regulations and ensuring a fair and safe digital environment. [Extracted from the article]

The European Union (EU) Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims to increase competition and fairness in the EU digital markets by reducing entry barriers and ensuring a better distribution of value generated by digital platforms. The DMA is enforced by the European Commission, which has become a fully-fledged 'federal' regulator for the first time. The DMA is part of a broader EU regulatory framework for digital platforms, and it aims to achieve principles of a Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles, including increasing user choice and promoting fair competition and innovation. The DMA imposes obligations on the biggest digital platforms, known as gatekeepers, to increase transparency, prohibit anti-competitive practices, reduce entry barriers, and open up platforms and data. The DMA does not break up the biggest platforms but aims to create competition while preserving network and ecosystem effects. The implementation of the DMA will lead to changes in technical architecture, market dynamics, and social norms, and it presents an opportunity to regain some of the early promises of the internet. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the role of the P2B Regulation in the European Union's regulatory framework for the platform economy. While the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) have received more attention, the P2B Regulation is seen as a complement to these regulations. The P2B Regulation aims to ensure fairness and transparency in the platform economy, including smaller niche platforms. However, effective enforcement is crucial for the P2B Regulation to fulfill its role. The article suggests that public enforcement is necessary and highlights the need for coordination between the enforcement of the P2B Regulation, DMA, and DSA. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the prospects for concurrent private enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Article 102 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The DMA aims to ensure fair and contestable markets in the digital sector, and private litigation is seen as a supporting role in its enforcement. The author argues that claiming a concurrent violation of the DMA and Article 102 TFEU could provide procedural benefits for private litigants, but it may also bring about complexities. The role of the European Commission is crucial in setting the stage for private enforcement, and it is suggested that similar mechanisms enhancing private litigation should be introduced for claims based on the DMA violations alone. [Extracted from the article]

This document explores the complementarity between the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the antitrust rules in the European Union. It discusses how the European Commission and national competition authorities have the choice to enforce market conduct by designated gatekeepers either under the DMA or as an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. However, there is a risk of duplication of enforcement actions, which can lead to inefficiency or under-enforcement. The document emphasizes the importance of coordination and the ne bis in idem principle in parallel proceedings. Overall, while the DMA and antitrust rules are seen as complementary, their application and coordination will need to be tested in practice. [Extracted from the article]

The introduction of the Digital Markets Act (the 'DMA') marked the beginning of a new regulatory framework for limiting the impact of strong platforms in digital markets. With the aim of ensuring fairness and contestability in digital markets, the new Regulation provided for a detailed administrative process, in the form of market investigations, for determining which of the digital platforms act as gatekeepers in their respective markets, whether the designated gatekeepers comply with their obligations, and to what extent new obligations must be introduced to account for new developments. This article discusses some preliminary issues related to the European Commission's administrative procedure for enforcing the new regulation. Upon summarizing the key elements of the DMA procedure, it focuses on four issues: the relationship between the DMA and competition law and problems regarding their parallel application; the obligation for recording interviews conducted for the purposes of gathering information regarding the subject matter of a market investigation; access to file limitations; and the absence of provisions regarding private enforcement and the possibility for third parties to claim damages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the rules applicable to algorithmic bias taking the form of self-favouring by hybrid digital platforms in the EU. In this paper, it is argued that the recently introduced prohibition of self-favouring by digital platforms should not apply across the board in the same manner. It may be necessary to consider the nature of the underlying products or services, the business models, and the monetization strategies of digital platforms. Differences in these aspects may alter their ability and incentives to engage in self-favouring potentially leading to foreclosing rivals and harming consumers. This suggests that the approach put forward by section 19a of the German Competition Act (GWB) may be better from an error-cost perspective than that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Section 19a of the GWB grants more discretion to enforcers and allows for a broader justification of the impugned conduct. In the context of the DMA, some sort of balancing exercise seems to be possible only if the European Commission makes extensive use of the possibility to further specify the prohibition of self-favouring contained in Article 6(5) of the DMA in light of the principles of effectiveness and proportionality. Finally, the paper touches upon the potential disproportionate burden, legal fragmentation, and legal uncertainty across the EU resulting from the interplay between EU competition law, the DMA, and national laws tackling similar self-favouring practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In digital markets, antitrust law and special regulations aim to ensure that markets remain competitive despite the dominating role that digital platforms play today in everyone's life. Unlike traditional markets, market participant behavior is easily observable in these markets. We present a series of empirical investigations into the extent to which Amazon engages in practices that are typically described as self-preferencing. We discuss how the computer science tools used in this paper can be used in a regulatory environment that is based on algorithmic auditing and requires regulating digital markets at scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Actualidad Jurídica (1578-956X) is the property of Dykinson SL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Platform power poses a number of challenges for competition authorities. One concern is that big tech companies may harm competition through the acquisition of emerging companies with a high competitive potential. Such acquisitions may escape ex ante merger control if they do not reach the turnover threshold for mandatory notification. The Commission sought to bridge this enforcement gap with its Article 22 guidance and the Digital Markets Act. This paper evaluates the steps taken by the Commission to increase scrutiny of such mergers. Building on this discussion, the paper examines the AG opinion in Towercast and analyses the residual gap-closing function of Article 102 TFEU. The aim of this paper is to bring the new developments surrounding digital merger control together and assess whether they represent an adequate response to the challenges posed by the digital economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on Khan's work on Amazon by transferring her normative framework to Apple. It explores the company's anti-competitive business practices, main antitrust concerns, and the currently proposed reform measures from an innovative business ethics and law (i.e., ordoliberal) perspective. The paper argues that one of the key issues with Apple is the company's closed ecosystem combined with its role as an internet gatekeeper. The E.U.'s Digital Markets Act, which aims to open Apple's ecosystem – via data portability, interoperability, and multi-homing requirements – is a necessary step in the right direction. Yet, it is insufficient to prevent the lock-in effects of a 'walled product garden' and ensure complete device and platform neutrality. That is, additional steps must be taken to overcome Apple's dual role as a platform operator and service provider and inhibit the company from engaging in anti-competitive business conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the European Commission's approach to tackling various Apple anti-competitive strategies. It considers why the European Commission has not applied excessive pricing abuse of dominance jurisprudence to challenge Apple's high commission fees charged to app developers, instead preferring to use a variety of other approaches to restore competition to certain parts of Apple's closed ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Soochow University Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition is the property of Soochow University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The rise of digitalization has bolstered the dominance of certain enterprises that hold sway over entire ecosystems, creating significant barriers for potential competitors to penetrate. To address these concerns and foster fair competition within the internal market, the European Union has enacted a regulation aimed at ensuring accessibility and fairness in the digital sector, particularly for both business users and end users of core platform services. This regulation diverges from traditional approach by streamlining procedures to tackle potential anti-competitive practices, with specific provisions tailored for platforms identified as gatekeepers. The objective is to supplement existing competition rules and address previously overlooked scenarios, drawing insights from past competition cases and challenges. Special emphasis will be placed on analyzing specific obligations to promote a competitive and equitable digital market. These obligations reflect precedents from familiar cases and are structured on a case-by-case basis to a varying extent. However, clarification will be necessary regarding the black and grey lists to facilitate regulators and undertakings in implementing the regulation effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stricter competition regulation in digital markets is a growing trend in the Global North, with the Digital Markets Act in Europe being the poster child of a more interventionist approach. In this article we do not focus on the debate surrounding these European efforts (which has meritorious arguments on both sides in our view), but instead examine similar developments elsewhere in the world, namely in South Africa, India, China, and Brazil. With reference to recent enforcement activities in these countries (such as industry investigations, greater scrutiny of mergers and of individual firm conduct, and in some cases ex ante regulations targeted at specific categories of firms), we provide our views on the potential adverse consequences of seeking to replicate the European approach in instances where digital markets may be less mature. In particular, while it is generally understood that heavy-handed regulation can stifle innovation and chill competition, we argue that such risks are more acute in countries outside of Europe (and North America), which thus warrants more cautious regulation methods. This is especially the case where the policy objectives deviate from the traditional one of protecting competition rather than competitors, since such an approach runs the risk of promoting short term gains at the expense of long-term benefits, which may ultimately harm the very stakeholders that such regulation is designed to advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) obligations will start to apply to the designated gatekeepers starting in March 2024. Its main objectives are set out in Article 1(1) as those of ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present, to the benefit of both business and end-users. However, the definition and the interpretation the Commission will provide for both objectives are far from clear. In turn, this makes future-proofing the DMA a more difficult task for gatekeepers, regulators and third parties, insofar as its obligations are construed upon one of the two stated goals depending on the provision or on both of them more generally. The paper addresses this problem by narrowing the gap between those concepts in their relationship with their underlying economic theorems. Later on, it observes the manifestations of contestability and fairness throughout the text and the regulation’s legislative process accounting for their four distinct expressions: objectives, indicators, and the legal bases for triggering the supplementary and precautionary measures of the instrument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Markets Act is a new European Regulation which entered into force on October 2022. It will apply to "gatekeepers", namely undertakings providing core platform services, with the aim of fostering "fairness" and "contestability" in the digital sector. If these objectives appear at first sight both relevant and legitimate, this paper sheds light on the dark side of this Regulation by arguing that it will undermine the Rule of Law. Indeed, for several reasons which will be discussed, the Digital Markets Act will impede or limit the respect of principles which are deeply rooted in the legal tradition of European countries. This leads to an important question: is the cure worse than the disease? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Information Systems (IS) research has built up a considerable understanding of digital platform ecosystems, while policymakers worldwide are aiming to introduce platform regulations that seek to erode fundamental mechanisms of digital platforms. This viewpoint article provides an introduction to how platform regulation affects our current understanding of digital platform ecosystems and suggests opportunities for future research. Design/methodology/approach: A detailed analysis of the effects of the European Union (EU) Digital Markets Act (DMA) on current findings of organizational, technical and economic IS platform research. Findings: Government regulations of digital platforms such as the DMA likely affect the central mode of operation of platforms in the scope of the regulation. The authors preconceive a major impact on platform openness, governance, steering the platform supply-side, modularity, nestedness, network effects, pricing and single-/multi-homing. In addition, the authors present opportunities for future research in each of these IS platform research streams. Originality/value: Landmark regulations implemented in the past, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), caused paradigm changes that fertilized research opportunities in IS and beyond. This viewpoint article aims to nudge studies that examine the changed mode of operation of platforms following platform regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attempt to establish a common European framework for core platforms' duties and responsibilities toward other actors in the digital environment is at the core of the recent scholarly debate surrounding the Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposal. In particular, the everlasting juxtaposition between the "data power" – as emerging from recent cases (Section 2) – that dominant tech companies enjoy and the concept of consumer sovereignty (Section 3) lies at the core of the proposal's attempt to identify digital core platforms as market gatekeepers. Accordingly, this chapter critically investigates the divide between power imbalance and consumer sovereignty in light of the architecture designed by the DMA, with a specific focus on its effectiveness in identifying gatekeepers' power drivers (Section 4). After highlighting the main critical aspects of the pertinent rules, opportunities for fruitful developments are then identified through the reframing of some of the notions considered in the proposal, and namely the role of "lock-in" effects and "data accumulation" (Section 5). Lastly, this chapter suggests that the DMA advancements – while desirable – are bound to be fragmentary in the absence of a wider appraisal of the nature of data power imbalance dynamics in the modern digital markets (Section 6). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pravnik is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As digitalisation has increased and data has become more powerful, more comprehensive digital regulation has become necessary, including by national competition authorities and the European Commission. The Digital Markets Act (the DMA) is a good example of this area of regulation.1 In November 2022, the DMA came into force, introducing new regulations for core platform services which functioned as 'gatekeepers' in the digital market. By enacting the DMA, these platforms are prevented from treating businesses and consumers unfairly. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general overview of the DMA and its relationship to antitrust enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Latin American Law Review is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years, there has been a tidal wave of merger filings involving large digital firms acquiring low turnover but high value start-ups. The vast majority of those transactions have flown under the radar of EU and National Competition Authorities and, among the few which have been reviewed, none has been blocked. Competition scholars wonder whether there has been a systematic bias towards under-enforcement against acquisitions of start-ups by already dominant tech firms. Some Member States are calling for a reform of the EU merger control's notification system and an adaptation of the substantive test to effectively address cases of potentially predatory acquisitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doing Business in a World of Goliaths: Power Imbalances and Economic Dependency in Platform-to-Business Relations Digital platforms have emerged as crucial infrastructures in today's economy, facilitating digital transactions between buyers and sellers. However, propelled by network effects and other sources of market power, digital platforms are generally the stronger party in their relations with users, and this could lead them to abuse their market power through exclusionary and exploitative practices. While extensive consumer regulations shield consumers in business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions, scant protection is afforded to businesses in presumed peer-to-peer business-to-business (B2B) transactions. Although certain EU provisions, such as Article 102 TFEU, Regulation 1150/2019 and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), aim to safeguard business users in platform-to-business (P2B) contexts, their effectiveness is constrained. These regulations and provisions are often too narrow in scope, fail to consider the platform's unique features, prioritise public interests over those of individual businesses and lack effective remedies. Conversely, some Member States have adopted abuse of economic dependence regulations, potentially offering stronger protection, as such an approach provides more flexibility and emphasises contractual fairness for individual business users. The present article attempts to show that business users are in fact economically dependent on the platform, thereby suggesting that an EU level prohibition of abuse of economic dependence could more effectively address the existing gaps in protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While business users face difficulties accessing and porting data on platforms, the Digital Markets Act has been hailed as the legislative tool enabling business users access and transfer the data they have generated on platforms controlled by gatekeepers. The tool provided by the Digital Markets Act is discussed in this article and the author argue that business users should have a more elaborated right to first access the data they produce on platforms and in ecosystems, and secondly transfer such data from platform to platform, cloud to cloud, thing to thing or in-house. A right to access and transfer data could have several benefits; it benefits dissemination of data, creativity and innovation in connected markets and it promotes competition between platforms, clouds and ecosystem providers. Creativity will be enhanced because necessary data—being the raw material for new innovations—will be more broadly disbursed. It will also benefit consumers having a disbursed and disseminated data commons for the development of ideas, innovations, and the exchange of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital technology brought informational saturation to our lives. In cyberspace, private and business users need help to make valuable pieces of information stand out from the noise of excessive information. With search algorithms, recommender systems, and online advertising, digital platforms specialised in providing relief for this problem. Their technologies arrange digitalised information to make it intelligible and relevant for individuals. But the separation of information from noise did not only become a necessity to comfortably navigate the depths of the web, it also became a commodity. There is a demand for it, a supply, a price, and an exchange on markets which is enabled by private law. The examples of general search, recommender systems, and online advertising illustrate that. At the same time, their commodification can become problematic. This paper argues that in the European Union (EU), the separation of information from noise has become a contested commodity according to M. J. Radin's framework. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act purposefully limit the influence of the market price mechanism on the design and allocation of the separation technology to protect legal goods like the democratic process, innovation, and privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text discusses the Digital Markets Act (DMA), a new regulatory regime aimed at introducing more competition into digital platform markets. The DMA has been implemented quickly, with compliance reports already being published by designated gatekeepers. The first designation decisions show that companies can escape DMA obligations based on the delimitation of their "core platform services" and can appeal their gatekeeper designation, although such appeals do not suspend compliance duties. The text also explores the relationship between the DMA and competition law, noting that compliance with the DMA does not preclude competition law enforcement. The text concludes by highlighting the ongoing developments and reporting on various topics in the field. [Extracted from the article]

On 18 July 2022, the Council gave its final approval of the Digital Market Act's final text. Notwithstanding the amendments following the initial proposal published by the European Commission on 15 December 2020, the main objectives of the DMA have remained untouched and separate from the objectives pursued by competition rules. In the interim, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its preliminary rulings on the bpost and Nordzucker cases, with particularly relevant consequences concerning the application of the double jeopardy principle. The potential remedies and obligations imposed on the main digital platforms both under Articles 5 to 7 of the DMA and under competition law rules will overlap and create a risk of incoherent enforcement, especially on the side of the European Commission. Against this background, the paper strives to draw out the narrow enforcement gap left for competition authorities. In addition, the paper highlights a number of alternatives open to competition authorities when enforcing competition law rules on digital markets, namely the segmentation of its enforcement efforts depending on the type of service concerned in each case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the interactions between the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the laws and competition frameworks of Member States. Specifically, the article sets out three different interpretations on the text of articles 1 (5) and (6) of the DMA, which govern interactions between the DMA and national law and competition policy. The article identifies a narrow, broader, and broadest interpretation of the legal interests protected under the DMA. Each interpretation creates different harmonization effects. The article argues that the narrow and broader interpretations allow for significant divergence between national rules, creating the risk of regulatory fragmentation. The broadest interpretation would allow competition authorities and courts to weigh the interests protected in the DMA against national interests and create greater convergence of laws and competition policy in the Digital Single Market. The article also proposes ways forward for the implementation and enforcement of the DMA and national competition laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2022 the European Council gave final approval to new regulation of digital markets. This specifically addresses the main concerns raised by the business behaviour of operators of core services in their gatekeeping positions. The list of core services was extended during revisions. In this article, I address the question of whether the inclusion of virtual assistants into the list of core services was the right decision. Overall, this paper argues that (i) virtual assistants as gatekeepers for consumption should be listed among core services, (ii) some of the Digital Markets Act's obligations need to be adopted to fit the specifics of virtual assistants, (iii) there are two relevant dimensions of power which should be considered in competition policy and regulation analysis: market power on virtual assistants' market and the ecosystem of related markets (cross-market integration criterion), (iv) the growth of new gatekeepers should be prevented, among other means by stricter merger control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recently adopted Digital Markets Act (henceforth: DMA) addresses the behaviour of so-called gatekeepers by imposing a list of prohibitions and obligations on these platforms. Despite the potential of the initiative, it remains questionable how the DMA fits in the regulatory landscape. The DMA is – at least formally – not a competition law instrument but also differs from sector-specific regulation. This begs the question of how the DMA fits in the broader regulatory context. This paper aims to address this issue by assessing to what extent the DMA is different from "traditional" competition law and sector-specific regulation respectively. The unclarities regarding the position of the DMA in the broader regulatory context result in various difficulties, amongst others relating to the institutional set-up. The second part of this paper addresses these institutional difficulties resulting from the concurrent application of the DMA and "traditional" EU competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This is important for the complex demarcation between the DMA and national instruments such as the new Section 19a GWB, as set out in Article 1(5) and (6) DMA.[9] A closer look, however, shows that this inconsistency is already inherent in the DMA itself. Possible Private Actions With the entry into force of the 11th amendment to the GWB, infringements of Articles 5, 6 and 7 DMA are treated almost identically to infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or national competition law for private enforcement purposes. I. Introduction Germany was one of the Member States in favour of decentralised enforcement of the DMA, with significant involvement of national authorities.[2] Not surprisingly, it was also one of the first to adopt national rules to complement the DMA enforcement regime. Keywords: Digital Markets Act; gatekeeper regulation; platform regulation; enforcement EN Digital Markets Act gatekeeper regulation platform regulation enforcement 112 117 6 08/02/23 20230401 NES 230401 Finding the appropriate role for Member State authorities and courts was one of the main challenges in negotiating the Digital Markets Act (DMA). [Extracted from the article]

Polarization of the society is nowadays easier than ever due to the strong influence of social media. Opaque algorithms personalize news feed of users through massive data processing and thus creating effects that are fueling extremization of opinions. Negative effects of social media can be used by third parties to influence society to achieve their goals, however antidemocratic. Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act aim to regulate Digital Single Market through fair competition and consumer protection regulation. This regulation can have significant impact on the democratic deficit of the European Union as it has potential to eradicate analyzed negative effects of social media on the polarization of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today many companies are collecting and extracting data from different sources to help them with their strategic decision-making. Big data is the basis of data-driven economy, bringing significant competitive advantage and market power to companies who are able to harness and exploit its potential. Digital transformation of markets and economy challenges the existing structures of consumer protection, data protection and competition law. Data is a commodity as well as a strategic asset. The term Big data refers to the amount of data that cannot be processed in a short time by traditional informatics devices. Undertakings possessing a large scale of different data have a competitive advantage. Possible application of the essential facility doctrine to Big data issues has not attracted much attention in competition assessment. This paper will try to fill the gap by providing some insights into competition and data issues. Also, the question whether data can be considered under the essential facility doctrine will be analysed. Furthermore, it will be shown that essential facility criteria are applicable, although there is room for some adjustments to data markets. The last part of the paper will scrutinize the Digital Markets Act that tries to shed some light and clear some possible problematic behaviour of the so-called gatekeepers. The regulation leaves the conventional approach and shortens the process of tackling possible anti-competition concerns. It regulates only those undertakings that have significant impact on market and the possibility to become an important gateway in the future. When the status of a gatekeeper is established in accordance with all prescribed criteria, there will be no need to show that the elements of the essential facility doctrine are fulfilled. The essential facility doctrine will still be relevant to undertakings that are not designated as gatekeepers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]