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The African continent's security landscape is constantly changing. Alongside this evolution, changes in the global order have emerged, a decline of multilateralism and an overreliance on security tools to defeat terrorism across Africa. In contrast, these challenges have allowed the African continent and its peace and security mechanisms under the African Peace and Security Architecture to respond to these insecurities through African-led Peace Support Operations (PSO)—amongst other mechanisms. These African capacities, particularly in PSO, have not always been consistently deployed as part of a multidimensional approach to dealing with insecurity. African-led PSO s have evolved and developed unique characteristics distinguishing them from traditional peacekeeping operations. However, their increased use as a sole mechanism to deal with insecurity has led to a deficiency in broader conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and peacemaking mechanisms. This has made it difficult for African-led PSO s to tackle the growing and intersecting challenges and dynamics the continent faces now and in the future. This article posits that while African-led PSO s have come to represent an increase in African agency, capability and utilisation, their increased use to deal with insecurity has led to African-led PSO s failing to deal with intersecting and growing challenges and dynamics the continent faces. Thus, the article argues that there is a need for African-led PSO s to be more agile, adaptive and comprehensive through the adoption of an Adaptive Stabilisation Approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue delves into the evolving nature of African-led Peace Support Operations and their development over the last two decades. The authors explore how states have improved their security and military capabilities to face emerging and existing threats. The papers in this issue illustrate how African-led operations have progressed and how they have been designed to stabilise states, environments, and regions. These operations have been complemented by Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and Ad-hoc Security Initiatives, which have all deployed intervention missions to tackle various challenges. The papers also note that the increasing presence of African troops in UN missions with stabilisation mandates has allowed the AU, RECs/RMs, and state military to learn through training, national rules of engagement, and civil-military relations and to contribute diverse first-hand experience in African-led Peace Support Operations and UN peacekeeping efforts. Finally, the special issue explores whether some sub-Saharan African states have employed restructuring policies by deploying forces to African-led PSOs and UN peacekeeping operations and whether this strategy has impacted the effectiveness of their forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looking back over the past seventy-five years of UN peacekeeping, the most enduring question has been: Is peacekeeping effective? Historically, most peacekeeping operations have been. However, peacekeeping is currently suffering from a significant trust deficit. One important factor that differentiates contemporary peacekeeping operations with a stabilization mandate from the historic record is the absence of a viable political or peace process. When security is not directed to serve a peace process, it produces a stabilization dilemma: the more effectively a peace operation protects and achieves stability, the less incentive there is for ruling political elites to find long-term political solutions. This dilemma generates several perverse effects, including prolonging the conflict, trapping operations in place with no exit options, increasing the resilience of armed groups, and embedding peacekeeping in the local political economy. The article identifies five factors that help prevent the stabilization dilemma and influence the effectiveness of peace operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contends that Ad-hoc Security Initiatives (ASI) have developed over the last decade in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin and represents a new form of African collective security mechanism. The G5 Sahel Force and the Multi-National Joint Task Force emerged from a context-specific need for small clusters of African states to respond collectively to a shared cross-border security threat(s). The existing African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) mechanisms were not specific and responsive enough to meet this emerging need. Despite substantial investments over the last twenty years by the African Union, Regional Economic Community/ Regional Mechanisms and international partners to establish the African Standby Force, this instrument was not agile enough to respond to the type of threats experienced in the greater Sahel region. In this article, we trace the emergence of a new type of ASI, examine how they fill an essential gap and analyse why the African Standby Force was not able to meet this need. We then consider the implications of these developments for the future of the APSA and how closer collaboration between ASIs and APSA can be developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many commentators predicted that the impact of COVID-19 on Africa, with its high levels of under-development and weak public health systems, will be particularly catastrophic. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic sectors have exposed and compounded preexisting social, political, and environmental vulnerabilities, especially in conflict-affected countries and regions, and have severely stress-tested their social cohesion and resilience. Global and local peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Africa have also been significantly disrupted. More than 1 year into the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, however, the emerging pattern is one of resilience rather than insecurity and chaos. This article assesses the disruption caused by COVID-19 to Africa's peace and security networks and considers how a complexity informed Adaptive Peacebuilding approach can assist in strengthening community resilience and stimulating self-organized adaptive capacity. The spread of the virus is still increasing steadily, and the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. The question is what can African civil society, governments and multilateral organizations do to further strengthen and support the pattern of resilience that has emerged over the first 1 year of the COVID-19 crises in Africa? The author would like to recognize the invaluable research assistance of Neyma Mahomed Ali and the contribution of ACCORD's COVID-19 Conflict and Resilience Monitor. The engagement with colleagues and contributors stimulated much of the analysis contained in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the future of UN peace operations through a complexity theory lens. In the short-term peacekeeping will have to adapt to the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall-out of the Trump presidency. In the medium-term peacekeeping will go through a phase of uncertainty and turbulence due to geopolitical power shifts in the global order. In the longer-term peacekeeping will have to adapt to a new multipolar global order characterized by coexistence, and a changing security landscape shaped by, among others, climate change, urbanization, and new technologies. Throughout these contraction, moderation, and adjustment phases, UN peacekeeping is likely to be guided by a principled adaptive approach, that allows it to adapt to the realities of the moment whilst staying true to its core form and identity. As a result, UN peacekeeping is likely to remain one of the most visible symbols of global governance and international cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Complexity theory offers a theoretical framework for analysing how social systems prevent, manage and recover from violent conflict. Insights from complexity suggest that for a peace process to become self-sustainable, resilient social institutions need to emerge from within, i.e. from the culture, history and socio-economic context of the relevant society. Peace operations are deployed to contain violence and to facilitate this process, but if they interfere too much, they will cause harm by inadvertently disrupting the very feedback loops critical for self-organization to emerge and to be sustained. To navigate this dilemma, the paper proposes employing an adaptive approach, where peace operations, together with the communities and people affected by the conflict, actively engage in an iterative process of inductive learning and adaptation. Adaptive Peace Operations is a normative and functional approach to peace operations that is aimed at navigating the complexity inherent in trying to nudge societal change processes towards sustaining peace, without causing harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the book "Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices and Politics" by Richard Caplan on how to improve the assessment of peacebuilding. It mentions number of principles of good practice that can contribute more rigour to the assessment of peacebuilding initiatives and need to measure the sustainability of peace with any certainty is because social systems are empirically complex. It also mentions need to provide feedback on effects generated by the peacebuilding initiative.

The African Union (AU) and a number of sub-regional institutions have demonstrated the will and capacity to play a leading role in maintaining peace and security on the African continent. However, despite several successes, Africa has not been able to achieve its objective of Silencing the Guns by 2020. One of the factors that hinder the effectiveness of the AU and its partners is that its conflict prevention and conflict management methodologies are outdated. They rely on a linear causal theory of change and predesigned templates that have now proven to be ineffective in Africa and elsewhere. This paper introduces a new approach - Adaptive Peacebuilding - and explores its policy, management and operational implications for the AU and its partners. The paper explains the theoretical foundation of the adaptive approach, considers its key features and then discusses its practical application. The paper concludes with recommendations for how the AU and its partners can integrate an adaptive approach in the assessment, analysis, management, coordination and evaluation of its conflict prevention and conflict management missions and related efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on significant implications of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping with increase in the economic and political influence of countries like China and India in the global system. It mentions networked peace operations, several international actors, including the World Bank and other regional development banks, multilateral donors, bilateral powers and donors, and regional organizations each play an important role alongside national and local actors.

International peacebuilding is experiencing a pragmatic turn. The era of liberal idealism is waning, and in its place new approaches to peacebuilding are emerging. This article identifies one such emerging approach, gives it a name—adaptive peacebuilding—and explores what it may be able to offer peacebuilding once it is more fully developed. It builds on the knowledge generated in the fields of complexity, resilience and local ownership, and may help inform the implementation of the emerging UN concept of sustaining peace. It is an alternative to the determined-design neo-liberal approach that has dominated peacebuilding over the past three decades. It represents an approach where peacebuilders, working closely together with the communities and people affected by conflict, actively engage in structured processes to sustain peace by using an inductive methodology of iterative learning and adaptation. The adaptive peacebuilding approach embraces uncertainty, focuses on processes rather than end-states, and invests in the resilience of local and national institutions to promote change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, I question whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? I answer the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. I then use the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, I consider the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHERCopyright of Contemporary Security Policy is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mali and Somalia have both suffered determined Islamist-inspired insurgencies, and in both African Union-led peace operations have been a central pillar in political and security stabilization efforts. Despite challenges in transferring lessons between unique situations, the AMISOM experience can ofer some useful lessons for Mali. We have identified several themes that helped to drive success for AMISOM, amongst others the determination of troop contributors and their funding partners, and actively pursuing the support of the host population. At the operational and tactical levels, we have highlighted a number of features that has contributed to more effective operations, including a high degree of adaptability, working with allied armed groups and a dogged determination to see the fight through. The next stage for both countries may be the most challenging yet as African Union and United Nations troops are called to keep a complex and fragile peace in Mali and Somalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses civilian capacity during postwar reconstruction, with a focus on the impact of changes in the United Nations' peacebuilding methodology on the supportive role of citizens during peacekeeping operations. Topics include the responsibility of civilians in providing protection through political process, the consequent increase in demand for specialized civilian capacity and expertise in postconflict societies, and the need for development of national capacity in countries emerging from conflict to support sustainable peace.

The timely deployment of suitably qualified civilian personnel is a challenge that none of the organizations that deploy peacekeepers has yet addressed. This challenge has floundered on the periphery of the peacekeeping debate for many years, but a 2010–11 UN civilian capacity review provides a unique opportunity to focus attention on the problem. This article proposes the formation of a global civilian capacity partnership that brings together the training and roster community, the UN Secretariat and a grouping of interested states, with the aim of significantly improving the UN Secretariat's ability to identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel in a reasonable time, and without adverse side effects for the local community or the mission mandate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

UN peacekeeping missions suffer from cumbersome recruitment processes, high vacancy rates and a shortage of civilian staff. This article explores the bottlenecks hampering the recruitment and deployment of trained personnel, especially civilians. Paradoxically, an increased number of trained personnel has not translated into higher deployment rates. Individual factors and structural bottlenecks together accounted for half of the non-deployments. Of the latter, the informal nature of the UN's recruitment system and the central role played by personal contacts stands out. The article makes the case for an improved link between the recruitment architecture of the UN and its training programmes, and a significant overhaul of the UN recruitment architecture per se. Unless the UN and international training programmes address this paradox, the risk of training in vain will remain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is an assumption that we can enhance peacebuilding by improving the tools that we use for assessments, planning and evaluation. However, the focus on tools creates the impression that peacebuilding challenges are technical. Improving tools is not meaningless, but our preoccupation with tools has a negative effect when it becomes a front for avoiding dealing with the deeper inherent contradictions in peacebuilding. There are limits to our knowledge and our ability to engineer specific outcomes in complex systems. There are unrealistically high expectations of coherence, unity of purpose and cooperation among peacebuilding actors. Peacebuilding agents are interconnected, but that does not imply that they have the same objectives, mandates, principles and values. Interconnected problems call for interconnected responses, not for one coherent response. Coherence should not be about negotiating a common position, and then promoting it regardless of changing dynamics. Coherence should be about continuously managing competing interests and interdependencies. The interaction between dissention, competition for resources, and the tension between different approaches and policy choices is not only normal but necessary to ensure the optimal functioning of the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores why international actors assign such high importance to coherence. It argues that the assumptions on which the principle of coherence is based are flawed, and that the empirical and theoretical evidence indicates that there is much less room for coherence than generally acknowledged in the policy debate. It recommends that the international community should lower its expectations and adopt more realistic polices. The current approach tends to put pressure on all partners to adopt a maximal approach to coherence, regardless of their relations to each other and the operational context. Coherence should not be understood as an effort aimed equally at all, nor should all partners be expected to achieve the same level of unity of effort. Coherence should rather be understood as a scale of relationships, and the most appropriate and realistic level of coherence that can be achieved will depend on the exact constellation of organizations in an interdependent relationship in that specific operational context. This article offers a typology of the range of likely relationships, as well as an explanation of the circumstances that may determine the level of coherence that can be realistically expected to develop, depending on the context and the nature of the relationships among the partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the role of the special representative of the Secretary- General (SRSG) in the context of UN integrated missions. The article argues that the primary leadership function of the SRSG is to facilitate a process that generates and maintains strategic direction and operational coherence across the political, governance, development, economic, and security dimensions of a peacebuilding process. The power and influence of the SRSG does not reside in the resources that he or she can directly bring to bear on a specific situation, but in the ability to muster and align the resources of a large number of agencies, donors, and countries to support the peacebuilding effort in a given context. This type of leadership role implies that persons with skills, experience, and a personality suited to multistakeholder mediation and negotiations are more likely to be successful SRSGs than someone who is used to top-down, autocratic, military, private sector, or direct-control type leadership styles. This perspective on the role of the SRSG has important implications for the way in which people are chosen and prepared for these positions, as well as for the ways in which support can be provided for this role, both at the United Nations and in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the African peace building policy approaches and practices of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), regional economic communities (REC) and other international organizations. The UN has established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) as part of its peace building policy. The AU has included the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy framework in its peace and security architecture. Peace building frameworks at the national level are more effective as peace building measures.

The scale of contemporary United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peace operations in Africa represent a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in UN and African peace operations. A macro-pattern has developed where most European and American peace and stability operations are deployed in NATO or European Union (EU) operations in Europe and the Middle-East, whilst most UN peace operations troops are contributed by the developing world and deployed in Africa. However, there is a new willingness in Europe to consider deploying some of its peacekeepers to Africa in EU or UN peace operations. From a UN and African perspective, the USA and Europe have a major political and financial influence on, and stake in, the future of peace operations in Africa. The AU and regional entities like ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations over the last decade. The AU has deployed its first three peace operations, AMIB in Burundi, AMIS in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia. However, the single most important factor when considering the future of peace operations in Africa is how they are financed, as that determines the size, scope and duration of the missions, and therefore has a direct bearing on their impact. The lack of clear and predictable financial arrangements is now the most important factor hindering the further expansion of African peacekeeping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]