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In April 2005, GAO recommended that the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Kennedy Center) increase oversight of its management of federal funds, better comply with fire code, and conform to project management best practices. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the progress the Kennedy Center has made in implementing GAO's April 2005 recommendations, (2) the status of federally funded capital projects and the planned spending of federal funds for capital projects as indicated by the Kennedy Center's most recent comprehensive building plan, and (3) the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees' responsibilities for federally funded capital projects and the extent to which the board fulfills these responsibilities. To fulfill these objectives, GAO examined Kennedy Center documents, visited other arts organizations, and interviewed affected parties. The Kennedy Center has taken steps to implement GAO's oversight, fire safety, and capital project recommendations but more work remains. For example, to increase oversight of its management of federal funds, the Kennedy Center contracted with the Smithsonian Institution Office of the Inspector General for audits of federal funds used for capital projects. In addition, to better comply with fire safety code, the Kennedy Center has implemented GAO's recommendations to obtain a peer review of its fire-modeling study and manage the storage of combustible materials. As a result of the peer review, the center made changes to its fire-modeling study. Finally, to better align with project management best practices, the Kennedy Center has implemented GAO's recommendations to design and implement contract, financial, and project management policies and procedures and control cost and schedule changes in future projects. The Kennedy Center's 2005 comprehensive building plan (CBP)--or longterm renovation effort--shows that the center will not complete its capital renovations within the planned 2008 time frame and budgets. The estimated costs for the remaining CBP projects have increased from $48 million to $58 million since the 2004 CBP, and the center plans to defer most terrace-level renovations beyond 2008, the original completion date. The 2005 CBP shows that the Family Theater was completed on schedule in 2005 with limited cost growth. However, despite improved contracting practices, GAO found that the Kennedy Center did not fully comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) when it used an alternative contracting method. In addition, it increased the risk of cost overruns by authorizing Family Theater work to begin before establishing the contract's guaranteed maximum price. The Kennedy Center Board of Trustees has delegated to management most of its responsibilities for federally funded capital projects, which is a typical board action. However, GAO found that several factors limit the board's oversight of federally funded capital projects. The Kennedy Center Board of Trustees and its... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This testimony discusses progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) progress in managing the project's schedule since the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Senate Committee on Appropriations' July 14 hearing on the project; (2) our estimate of a general time frame for completing the base project's construction and the preliminary results of our assessment of the risks associated with AOC's July 2005 schedule for the base project; and (3) the project's costs and funding, including the potential impact of scheduling issues on cost. However, we will not, as originally planned, provide specific estimated completion dates because AOC's contractors revised the schedule in August to reflect recent delays, but AOC has not yet evaluated the revised schedule. AOC believes that the time added to the schedule by its contractors is unreasonable. Until AOC completes its evaluation and we assess it, any estimates of specific completion dates are, in our view, tentative and preliminary. Similarly, we will wait until the schedule is stabilized to update our November 2004 estimate of the cost to complete the project. Currently, AOC and its consultant, McDonough Bolyard Peck (MBP), are still developing their cost-to-complete estimates. In summary, although AOC and its construction contractors have continued to make progress since the Subcommittee's July 14 CVC hearing, several delays have occurred and more are expected. These delays could postpone the base project's completion significantly beyond September 15, 2006, the date targeted in AOC's July 2005 schedule. Although not yet fully reviewed and accepted by AOC, the schedule that AOC's contractors revised in August 2005 shows February 26, 2007, as the base project's completion date. According to our preliminary analysis of the project's July 2005 schedule, the base project is more likely to be completed sometime in the spring or summer of 2007 than by September 15, 2006. Unless the project's scope is changed or extraordinary actions are taken, the base project is likely to be completed later than September 15, 2006, for the reasons cited by the contractors and for other reasons, such as the optimistic durations estimated for a number of activities and the risks and uncertainties facing the project. AOC believes that the contractors added too much time to the schedule in August for activities not included in the schedule and that it can expedite the project by working concurrently rather than sequentially and by taking other actions. Additionally, we are concerned about actions that have been, or could be, proposed to accelerate work to meet the September 15, 2006, target date. The project's schedule also raises a number of management concerns, including the potential for delays caused by not allowing enough time to address potential problems or to complete critical activities. Fiscal year 2006 appropriations have provided sufficient funds to cover AOC's request for CVC construction funding as well as additional funds for some risks and uncertainties that may arise, such as costs associated with additional sequence 2 delays or unexpected conditions. Although sequence 2 delays have been occurring, the extent to which the government is responsible for their related costs is not clear at this time. Additional funding may be necessary if the government is responsible for significant delay-related costs or if significant changes are made to the project's design or scope or to address unexpected conditions. In addition, we and AOC identified some CVC construction activities that received duplicate funding. AOC has discussed this issue with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alaska currently holds 35 trillion cubic feet of proven recoverable natural gas resources, about 19 percent of total U.S. reserves. Efforts to construct a pipeline to transport this natural gas from Alaska's North Slope to the lower 48 states have been stalled since 1982. The recent increase in natural gas prices has renewed interest in completing the pipeline, a project that is estimated to cost up to $20 billion. In addition to providing access to significant natural gas reserves, some expect the project to generate thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in revenues for the federal government and the State of Alaska. This report responds to a mandate in the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Act (the Pipeline Act) that we conduct a study to determine the extent to which small business concerns have participated in the construction of oil and gas pipelines. The Pipeline Act includes a "sense of Congress" provision that the sponsors of the Alaska natural gas pipeline should maximize the participation of small business concerns in contracts and subcontracts awarded for the project. This provision, while setting out a statement of congressional opinion, does not establish a legal requirement for small business participation. We confirmed that this report would focus on small business participation in the Alaska natural gas pipeline. It describes (1) the status of the Alaska natural gas pipeline project and (2) the extent to which any regulatory or oversight structure is in place to monitor small business participation in the construction of the pipeline. Given the lengthy steps required for state and federal approval of the project, the earliest that construction can begin on the Alaska natural gas pipeline is late 2009. As of June 2005, the State of Alaska had not concluded negotiations with potential project sponsors under the Alaska Stranded Gas Development Act (Stranded Gas Act), which allows the state to negotiate fiscal terms (e.g., taxes and royalties) with project sponsors.4 In addition to being approved by the state, prospective project sponsors must, under the federal Pipeline Act, (1) conduct a study of gas consumption needs and prospective points of delivery within the State of Alaska and (2) hold an open season allowing potential customers to compete for and acquire capacity on the proposed pipeline. Also, the sponsors have been strongly encouraged to submit a prefiling request to FERC. Prefiling allows the sponsors to begin the environmental review process prior to submitting a formal application to FERC. In this way, stakeholders become involved early, issues are identified and resolved, and FERC's statutory deadline for acting on an application to construct the pipeline can be met. After completing the prefiling process, the sponsors must then submit an application to FERC for a certificate of "public convenience and necessity," authorizing construction and operation of the pipeline. Once FERC determines that the application is complete, it then has 20 months to prepare the environmental impact statement and issue a final order granting or denying the application. According to FERC officials, it could take several years to complete the above steps before actual construction of a pipeline can take place, but the beginning of the process is controlled by the project sponsor(s). No structure exists at the federal or state level to monitor small business participation in the construction of the Alaska natural gas pipeline. Although the pipeline will be privately funded, the project sponsors must apply to FERC for a certificate authorizing construction of the pipeline and to DOE if they wish to participate in $18 billion in loan guarantees authorized by the Pipeline Act. According to FERC officials, they typically do not monitor small business participation as part of the permitting process. They noted that FERC does not have expertise on small business matters and that, while FERC could gather the information, other federal agencies such as the Office of Federal Coordinator, created by the Pipeline Act, or SBA might be better situated to do so. According to DOE officials, that agency does not have a legal requirement to track small business participation as part of the loan guarantee process. In the absence of such a requirement, DOE officials stated that their agency has no plans at this time to track small business participation in the pipeline project. Finally, while the Governor of Alaska lists small business participation as one objective for the pipeline project, state officials told us that the State of Alaska does not have a structure in place to monitor or track small business participation. They noted that the state's focus has been on negotiating financial terms with potential sponsors. They also stated that the participation of Alaska businesses (both large and small) and resident hire provisions continue to be issues of discussion with the applicants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Approved in the late 1990s, the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) is the largest project on the Capitol grounds in over 140 years. Its purposes are to provide greater security for all persons working in or visiting the U.S. Capitol and to enhance the educational experience of visitors who have come to learn about Congress and the Capitol building. When completed, this three-story, underground facility, located on the east side of the Capitol, is designed to be a seamless addition to the Capitol complex that does not detract from the appearance of the Capitol or its historic landscaping. According to current plans, it will include theaters, an auditorium, exhibit space, a service tunnel for truck loading and deliveries, storage, and additional space for use by the House and Senate. This testimony discusses the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) management of the project's schedules and contracts; the project's estimated costs, including risks and uncertainties; worker safety issues; and AOC's monthly reporting to Congress on the project. This testimony also discusses recommendations that we have made in previous testimony and briefings and the actions AOC has taken in response. In summary, the CVC project is taking about 2 years longer than planned and is expected to cost between about $522 million and $559 million--significantly more than originally estimated. The majority of delays and cost increases were largely outside AOC's control, but weaknesses in AOC's schedule and contract management contributed to a portion of the delays and cost overruns. Of the project's estimated cost increase, about $147 million is due to scope changes, such as the addition of the House and Senate expansion spaces; about $45 million to other factors also outside or largely outside AOC's control, such as higher than expected bid prices on the sequence 2 contract; and about $58 million to factors more within AOC's control, such as delays. Also, our analysis of CVC worker safety data showed that the injury and illness rate for 2003 was about 50 percent higher for CVC than for comparable construction sites and that the rate for 2004 was about 30 percent higher than the rate for 2003. Finally, a number of AOC's monthly reports to Congress have not accurately reflected the status of the project's construction schedules and costs and have transmitted inaccurate worker safety data. This has led to certain "expectation gaps" within Congress. AOC has taken a number of actions to improve its management of the project; however, these actions have not yet fully corrected all identified problems. To help prevent further schedule delays, control cost growth, and enhance worker safety, AOC urgently needs to give priority attention to managing the project's construction schedules and contracts, including those contract provisions that address worker safety. These actions are imperative if further cost growth, schedule delays, and worker safety problems are to be avoided. AOC also needs to see that it reports accurate information to Congress on the project. Furthermore, decisions by Congress will have to be made regarding the additional funding needed to complete construction and address any risks and uncertainties that arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since fiscal year 1995, the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Kennedy Center) has received nearly $203 million in federal funds to complete capital projects and intends to request an additional $43 million in appropriations through fiscal year 2008. The Kennedy Center's Comprehensive Building Plan identifies these capital projects as necessary to renovate the center and meet or exceed relevant life safety and disabled access regulations. GAO was asked to examine (1) the progress the center has made in completing key capital projects within estimated costs, and how it communicated this progress; (2) the current status of the center regarding fire and life safety and disabled access requirements; and (3) what best practices could help the center improve planning and management of capital projects. Although the Kennedy Center has achieved its goal of renovating the Opera House, Concert Hall, and plaza-level public spaces, each of these projects exceeded budget estimates, some by substantial amounts. Project cost growth resulted from modifications made during the renovation process, due, in part, to the Kennedy Center's lack of knowledge of the building's site conditions. Modifications led to overtime charges paid to meet tight construction schedules. Also, the center may have paid higher costs than necessary by negotiating contract modification values after work was completed. A lack of comprehensive policies and procedures limited the Kennedy Center's ability to adequately safeguard federal funds. Furthermore, our review of communication documents showed that Kennedy Center management did not always timely or accurately convey project cost growth and delays to its Board of Trustees or Congress. The Kennedy Center has complied with disabled access requirements in renovated areas. However, GAO identified three areas where the center does not appear to meet fire safety code requirements: (1) the center has not taken steps to ensure that exit paths through the Grand Foyer, Hall of Nations, and Hall of States provide adequate protection from fire; (2) doors in critical areas do not provide adequate protection from fire; and (3) the Millennium Stages have exit deficiencies and lack sprinkler and smoke evacuation systems required by code. In addition, it does not appear that the center clearly informed the board or Congress of its decision not to install sprinklers or other fire suppression systems in the plaza-level public spaces. Given the ongoing project management issues GAO has identified, the Kennedy Center could benefit from considering best practices for project management. In February 2004, GAO identified components of a best practices framework that include (1) conducting comprehensive planning, (2) assessing risks, (3) comprehensively managing project finances, (4) establishing accountability for and oversight of federal resources, and (5) incorporating stakeholders' interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since fiscal year 1995, the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Kennedy Center) has received nearly $203 million in federal funds to complete capital projects and intends to request an additional $43 million in appropriations through fiscal year 2008. The Kennedy Center's Comprehensive Building Plan identifies these capital projects as necessary to renovate the Center and to meet or exceed relevant life safety and disabled access regulations. GAO was asked to examine (1) the progress the Center has made in completing key capital projects within estimated costs and the information it has communicated about this progress to key stakeholders; and (2) the status of the Center's plans to address fire life safety and disabled access requirements. The Kennedy Center has achieved its goal of renovating the Opera House, Concert Hall, and plaza-level public spaces, and installed a building wide fire alarm system, but each of these projects exceeded its budget estimates, sometimes by substantial amounts. Project cost growth resulted from modifications made during the renovation process, due, in part, to the Kennedy Center's lack of knowledge of the building's site conditions. Unexpected site conditions and related challenges make renovation projects, like those undertaken by the Kennedy Center, difficult to complete. Modifications led to overtime charges paid to meet tight construction schedules. Also, the Center may have paid higher costs than necessary by negotiating the value of contract modifications after work was completed. The Kennedy Center lacks comprehensive policies and procedures related to capital improvements that could impact its ability to safeguard federal funds. Furthermore, our review of communication documents showed that Kennedy Center management did not always provide timely or accurate information on project cost growth and delays to its Board of Trustees or Congress. The Kennedy Center has worked to address fire life safety deficiencies, and improvements are ongoing, but after requesting and obtaining funds from Congress the Kennedy Center decided against its plan to meet fire safety code requirements by installing sprinklers and smoke evacuation systems in the Grand Foyer, the Hall of States, and the Hall of Nations. Furthermore, the Kennedy Center did not have its decisions independently reviewed nor did it clearly inform its Board or Congress that it was not spending the funds as planned. Two additional areas of concern are (1) doors in critical areas do not provide adequate protection from fire, and (2) the Millennium Stages have exit deficiencies and lack sprinkler and smoke evacuation systems required by code. The Kennedy Center has complied with disabled access requirements in renovated areas of the Center. Refer to our April 2005 report, GAO-05-334, for our recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To prevent pollutants from entering storm water runoff, the Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Storm Water Program requires controls for construction activities that disturb land. Phase I of this program requires permitting for construction activities that disturb 5 acres or more, while Phase II requires permitting for activities disturbing between 1 and 5 acres. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) extended the Phase II compliance date for discharges associated with oil and gas construction activities until March 2005 to analyze the impact of Phase II on the oil and gas industry. GAO was asked to provide information about oil and gas construction activities--such as well drilling and pipeline construction--affected by Phase I and likely to be affected by Phase II, as well as Phase II's financial and environmental implications. A small fraction of total oil and gas construction activities have been permitted under Phase I of EPA's storm water program. Phase I storm water permit data for three of the six largest oil and gas producing states--Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas--showed that 433 construction activities were permitted under Phase I over the most recent 12 months for which data were available. About 70 percent, 304 of the 433, were oil and gas pipeline activities, most of which were much larger than the 5 acre criterion under Phase I. About 17 percent, 72 of the 433, were drilling activities. In comparison, these three states reported drilling an average of about 10,000 wells for each of the past 3 years. Industry must decide whether to seek permit coverage, and it has sought to have its drilling activities permitted on few occasions because it has determined that most drilling activity involves distinct projects that disturb less than 5 acres each. In states we reviewed, there were few reported compliance problems associated with oil and gas construction activities. While it appears that most oil and gas construction activities may have to be permitted under Phase II, the actual number of activities that could be affected is uncertain, and the financial and environmental implications are difficult to quantify. The oil and gas construction activities affected by the rule may lead to increased financial costs for the oil and gas industry and federal agencies implementing the rule. Many of the potential costs stem from meeting permit requirements to review the impact of construction activities on endangered species, although this impact would be site specific and difficult to quantify. Potentially offsetting these costs, the rule may lead to additional environmental protections that are difficult to quantify, such as decreased levels of sediment in water and benefits for endangered species and their habitat. After delaying implementation of this rule for oil and gas construction activities for 2 years to study the impact of Phase II, EPA is analyzing the impact but, as yet, has not quantified the number of activities affected or the potential financial and environmental implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa, the State Department embarked on a multibillion-dollar, multiyear program to build new, secure facilities on compounds at posts around the world. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 generally requires that all U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), colocate offices within the newly constructed compounds. This report discusses how State is incorporating office space for USAID into the construction of new embassy compounds and the cost and security implications of its approach. State has built new embassy compounds in separate stages--scheduling construction of the USAID annex after work has begun (or in many cases after work has been completed) on the rest of the compound. State and USAID attributed this practice to a lack of full simultaneous funding for construction at nine locations through fiscal year 2004. Concurrent construction of USAID annexes could help decrease overall costs to the government and help achieve security goals. Concurrent construction would eliminate the second expensive mobilization of contractor staff and equipment and added supervision, security, and procurement support expenses that result from nonconcurrent construction. State has estimated that if nine future USAID annexes scheduled for nonconcurrent construction are built concurrently, it could save taxpayers $35 million. Extrapolating from data provided by State, GAO estimated a total cost savings of around $68 million to $78 million if all 18 future USAID projects are built concurrently. GAO also found that designing additional space for USAID within the main office building, or chancery, may cost less than erecting a separate annex, depending on a number of factors, including the size and configuration of the planned buildings. In addition to cost considerations, concurrent construction could help State and USAID comply with the colocation requirement and decrease the security risks associated with staff remaining outside of the embassy compound. For example, USAID staff who remain in a temporary USAID facility after other U.S. government personnel move into a new embassy compound may be more vulnerable to terrorist attack because the temporary facility does not meet security standards for new buildings and may be perceived to be a "softer" target relative to the new, more secure embassy compound. State's current plans call for continued nonconcurrent construction through fiscal year 2009. State acknowledged that there are substantial advantages to concurrent construction and has indicated that it may revise its building schedule to allow for more concurrent construction if a new cost-sharing proposal to fund new embassies by allocating construction costs among all agencies having an overseas presence is implemented in fiscal year 2005. However, even if cost sharing is not implemented, there are still opportunities for building some USAID facilities concurrently with the overall construction of the embassy compound if State, with congressional consent, revised its plan and rescheduled some projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in March 2002, was designed to consolidate U.S. installations, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension associated with the U.S. presence in South Korea. The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to review the LPP. GAO adjusted its review to also address the effect of ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other infrastructure needs. In this report, GAO assessed (1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the implications on the LPP and other construction projects of proposals to change basing in South Korea, and (3) implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea. Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all U.S. military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea. Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential relocation of U.S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about 37 percent of the $5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U.S. military installations in South Korea over the next 10 years. Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul--areas where there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence--has recently been put on hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul. GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the implementation of the LPP and future U.S. military construction projects throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources, including funding realized through land sales from property returned by the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear. Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military construction to reposition U.S. forces and basing in South Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO has been providing ongoing assistance to the Capitol Preservation Commission and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees in their monitoring and oversight of the Capitol Visitor Center construction project. Given the current decisions facing the Congress, this testimony covers (1) management of the project, (2) the estimated cost for the project, (3) the status of the project's schedule, and (4) actions that Congress and the AOC should consider taking to address funding gaps and other current project issues and risks. Recognizing the need for a new facility to provide greater security for all persons working in or visiting the United States Capitol and to enhance the educational experience of visitors who have come to learn about Congress and the Capitol building, Congress authorized the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) to build a new Capitol Visitor Center. The three-story, underground facility, located on the East side of the Capitol, is designed to be a seamless addition to the Capitol complex when completed without detracting from the appearance of the Capitol or its historic landscaping. Earlier this spring, GAO and the AOC determined that the estimated budget amount of $303.5 million for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) "base project" was no longer current. Based on GAO's recommendation, the AOC hired a contractor to help analyze and update the cost estimate for completion of the base project. GAO's review of the contractor's "base cost" estimate analysis identified $7 million in adjustments, therefore increasing the contractor's $344.3 million estimate to $351.3 million. GAO also conducted a supplemental analysis to identify potential future costs due to additional risks and uncertainties not included in the updated estimates. The result of this supplemental analysis disclosed that these risks and uncertainties could raise the estimated cost to between $380 million and $395 million. These potential additional costs do not need to be added to the base project budget now; however, a number of actions need to be taken to mitigate known risks. The AOC's May 2003 status report indicates the project is on schedule for substantial completion of the plaza deck in January 2005, substantial completion of the CVC in September 2005, and final completion and opening to the public in December 2005. However, the project is currently experiencing delays and until the AOC compiles a fully integrated schedule, there will not be adequate information to determine whether the estimated completion dates are likely to be met. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to address airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can affect the entire U.S. economy, but runway projects are often controversial and time-consuming. GAO was asked to examine how much time airports spend completing runways, what challenges airports and other stakeholders experience during this process, and what airports and other stakeholders have done to address challenges related to runway projects. GAO analyzed the results of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway projects and visited 5 airports in order to interview numerous runway project stakeholders. The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO's characterization of the challenges associated with building runways and some of the initiatives taken to address these challenges. They did express some concerns related to GAO's analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in developing runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional FAA efforts to improve the runway process. We believe that our approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time taken to build runways; however, we clarified our discussion about the length of time. We also added information regarding initiatives undertaken by FAA. The amount of time airports spend planning and building their runways can vary because of numerous factors. In light of this variation, for the 32 runway projects we analyzed, we used median rather than average time. The median time was about 10 years for runways that had been completed and was estimated to be about 14 years for those not completed. Most airports and stakeholders we visited and surveyed said they faced a variety of challenges that had delayed their runway projects. While the level of challenges that airports faced varied in part depending on the proximity of the airport to a major city and the amount of community opposition to the runway, some common themes emerged, including challenges related to the following: reaching stakeholder agreement on purpose and need for the runway; completing the environmental review process; reaching agreement on noise mitigation and other issues; and designing and constructing the runway. Although there may be no single solution to the challenges involved in developing runways, the federal government and airport authorities have undertaken a number of initiatives in this area. Recently, the President issued an Executive Order that is directed at streamlining the environmental review of transportation infrastructure projects, including runways. In addition, two federal legislative initiatives designed to streamline the runway process were considered in the 107th Congress. In addition, FAA has undertaken a number of initiatives directed at streamlining parts of the process. Airports have also undertaken initiatives in this area, including involving stakeholders such as community groups early in the process, and reaching early agreement on how best to mitigate noise and other runway impacts. These initiatives may be a step in the right direction, but it is too early to assess their impact on the runway process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]