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Plastic pollution has emerged as a global challenge necessitating collective efforts to mitigate its adverse environmental consequences. International negotiations are currently underway to establish a global plastic treaty. Emphasizing the need for solution-orientated research, rather than focusing on further defining the problems of widespread environmental occurrence and ecological impacts, this paper extracts insights and draws key patterns that are relevant for these international negotiations. The analysis reveals that (i) environmental rather than human health concerns have been the predominant driving force behind previous regulations targeting pollutants, and (ii) the decision to ban or discontinue the use of harmful pollutants is primarily affected by the availability of viable substitutes. These two key findings are relevant to the discussions of the ongoing Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on the global plastic treaty and underscore the recognition of environmental consequences associated with plastic pollution while emphasizing the need to enhance the knowledge base of potential human health risks. Leveraging the availability of substitutes can significantly contribute to the development and implementation of effective strategies aimed at reducing plastic usage and corresponding pollution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decisions about the optimal use of coastal and marine resources must be made with high uncertainty about environmental impacts and may conflict with public perception of the risk associated with current blue growth initiatives. In a discrete choice experiment conducted in valuation workshops in five communities in Arctic Norway, we examine public preferences for various aquaculture expansion paths. Respondents prefer a smaller expansion in terms of the number of aquaculture sites compared with the planned expansion. Emphasizing scientific uncertainty regarding the negative environmental impacts of aquaculture leads to lower resistance against the planned expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a paper in this journal entitled " Fear and loathing of the deep sea: why don't people care about the deep sea? ", Jamieson et al. (2020) pose this question and answer it with many interesting perspectives from psychology, ocean literacy and philosophy. However, there is an inherent assumption in the question they ask that people do not care about the deep sea. In order to assess this assumption, we contend that the first question to ask is: do people care about the deep sea? Based on the cultural significance of the theme of the deep ocean in art and literature, the results of ocean attitudinal surveys and the work done on deep sea economic valuation in recent years, we suggest that the answer is that people do care about many different aspects of the deep sea, not only the ones that hold market value, but also non-market values. It is nonetheless argued that the welfare benefits that societies gain from the deep sea are not at the fore in political discussions or marine policy making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the contingent valuation literature emphasizes the importance of controlling for respondents' consequentiality perceptions, this literature has rarely accounted for the difference between payment and policy consequentiality. We examine the influence of a randomly assigned tax amount on consequentiality self-reports and their potential endogeneity using data from a single dichotomous choice survey about reducing marine plastic pollution in Norway. Results show that consequentiality perceptions are a function of the tax amount, with payment consequentiality decreasing and policy consequentiality increasing with higher tax amounts. We discuss the challenge of finding valid instruments to address the potential endogeneity of consequentiality perceptions. (JEL Q51) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A criticism against individual- based stated preference surveys is that people seldom make choices in social isolation. An approach used in response to this is deliberative valuation. We conduct a series of valuation workshops including a choice experiment. This involves providing respondents with information and opportunity to discuss. They made their choices individually both before and after the discussion. On average respondents stated different preferences after the discussion compared to before, and the stated preferences became more consistent after deliberation. Unexpectedly, persons stating high certainty of pre-deliberation choices changed stated preferences more after deliberation than persons stating lower certainty of choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates intended visitation behavior of tourists toward Rekawa wetland under anticipated climate change (CC) scenarios. An interview-based contingent visitation survey was conducted with 365 foreign and domestic tourists to estimate the effects of CC on future visitation. Based on two IPCC scenarios using two direct and three indirect climatic factors, we composed a CC environmental index. The results show a decline in number of trips equal to 43 per cent and 53 per cent under scenarios 1 and 2 respectively, but the difference is not significant. Foreign and domestic tourists differ significantly with regard to socio-demographic characteristics and beliefs about CC effects at Rekawa. Controlling for such differences, we demonstrate that foreign tourists are less likely than domestic tourists to reduce future visitation to Rekawa due to CC impacts. Still, the future of ecotourism at Rekawa wetland is at risk if adaptation measures are not taken to meet CC impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to governmental plans, Norway faces huge expansions in the production of farmed Atlantic salmon. However, it is municipalities that designate coastal areas to aquaculture activities and their motivation depends on net benefits at municipal level from such use. Yet, there is little empirical evidence on costs and benefits of using coastal areas to aquaculture activities. We set up a cost-benefit analysis of salmon farming as seen from a municipal perspective. On the benefit side, we count consumer and producer surplus of increased aquaculture production in the region and the region's share of the national rent in aquaculture received as transfers from the national Aquaculture Fund. Costs are the opportunity cost of the land (sea) use, measured by households' willingness to pay to avoid aquaculture expansion, using data from a choice experiment. We find that parts of the producer surplus have to contribute to the regional economy for the NPV to be positive for a region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In addition to indirect support to fisheries, marine habitats also provide non-use benefits often overlooked in most bioeconomic models.We expand a dynamic bioeconomic fisheries model where presence of natural habitats reduces fishing cost via aggregation effects and provides non-use benefits. The theoretical model is illustrated with an application to cold-water corals in Norway where two fishing methods are considered-destructive bottom trawl and non-destructive coastal gear. Non-use values of cold-water corals in Norway are estimated using a discrete choice experiment. Both the theoretical model and its empirical applications demonstrate how non-use values impact optimal fishing practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European fisheries activities are subject to a hierarchy of regulatory authorities. This raises questions regarding the implications of strategic interaction between different authority levels concerning the regulation of these activities. We apply a bio-economic objective function where fishers and regulators have environmental, economic and social preferences, and where fishers are subject to the aggregate of the regulations set by the various authorities. We analyse one situation where EU authorities set their regulation first, followed by national authorities' regulation, and one situation where the two regulators set their regulations simultaneously. Using data from a survey on preferences among fisheries stakeholders combined with data from the UK nephrops fisheries, this study shows that a hierarchy of regulators with similar preferences will yield higher unit regulations, i.e. higher taxes or higher subsidies than a situation with one regulating authority. When regulators have unequal preferences we may get a situation where one regulator induces a tax on effort, whereas the other offers a subsidy. In this situation the aggregate unit regulation becomes uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use demographic and economic indicators to analyze spatial differences and temporal trends across 18 regions surrounding the Arctic Ocean. Multifactor and cluster analysis were used on 10 indicators reflecting income, employment and demography from 1995 to 2008. The main difference is between regions with high population densities, low natural growth rate, and low unemployment (Russia, Norway and Iceland) and regions with high unemployment rate and high natural growth rate (mainly North American regions). However, once those parameters were accounted for sub-regional differences start to emerge. Variation among the regions was a result of national policies and regional differences such as access and presence of natural resources (i.e. oil, gas, mining, etc.). We found only weak temporal trends, but regions with resource extraction show some signs of higher volatility. Overall, the Arctic has experienced out-migration with only Iceland and two regions in Canada experiencing in-migration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What happens when an environmental NGO (ENGO) becomes involved in fisheries management, and its involvement is recognized by the managing authorities? The answer depends on the preferences and the measures of the ENGO. We use a bioeconomic objective function where fishers and regulator have ecological, economic, and social preferences, whereas the ENGO has only ecological preferences. Applying a Cournot model we analyze how the original regulation of the authorities is affected when an ENGO becomes involved. We use empirical data on fisheries stakeholder preferences and from the Portuguese and Spanish sardine purse seine fishery to calibrate and test the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One aspect of ecosystem-based management is to include new stakeholders. When an environmental NGO (ENGO) gets a say in the fisheries management, this will affect the authorities' optimal regulation. Combining a principal-agent model and a steady-state bioeconomic model, we show that under symmetric information the authorities will moderate their use of regulation as a response to the ENGO's increased influence. However, the aggregate of the authorities' and the ENGO's regulations will be stronger. On introducing asymmetric information, the regulation of the high-cost fishers relative to the low-cost fishers is weaker than under a single principal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some bargaining situations, agreement has implications for agents beyond the parties involved, and if so, delays in reaching an agreement or failing to reach an agreement, when this would be profitable, may imply significant welfare losses. The question raised in this paper is whether the intervention of a government, who has a positive valuation of agreement and therefore offers a subsidy, will reduce such delays and inabilities to reach agreement? Based on a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a sequential bargaining game with intervention, we show that in equilibrium intervention always reduces the ex ante equilibrium inefficiency and conditionally reduces expected delays in trade. However, for intervention in the form of a subsidy to take place, the aggregate of the seller's reservation price and the externalities must be (almost) as high as the buyer's upper valuation limit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]