Search

Self-Confrontation Micro-Phenomenological Interviews (SCMPIs) aim to capture the fine-grained details of an athlete's experience, focusing on pre-reflective consciousness without resorting to post-hoc rationalizations. This specific type of self-confrontation interview was developed in the domain of work analysis in cognitive ergonomics. Despite its integration into numerous research studies in sport performance and training practices, the direct effects of the SCMPI on athletes remain underexplored. In this perspective article, we provide a brief overview of the theoretical foundations of SCMPI as well as a description of the paradox of the SCMPI situation. Throughout this paper, we highlight the unsolved questions around use of SCMPIs to improve athletes' performance by enhancing reflective thinking as well as pre-reflective awareness. Furthermore, we discuss the epistemological and practical considerations regarding the selection and use of activity traces in SCMPIs. The paper calls for further research to evaluate the SCMPI's impact on performance in elite athletes, emphasizing the need for a rational application of this method in both research and practical interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-Confrontation Micro-Phenomenological Interviews (SCMPIs) aim to capture the fine-grained details of an athlete's experience, focusing on pre-reflective consciousness without resorting to post-hoc rationalizations. This specific type of self-confrontation interview was developed in the domain of work analysis in cognitive ergonomics. Despite its integration into numerous research studies in sport performance and training practices, the direct effects of the SCMPI on athletes remain underexplored. In this perspective article, we provide a brief overview of the theoretical foundations of SCMPI as well as a description of the paradox of the SCMPI situation. Throughout this paper, we highlight the unsolved questions around use of SCMPIs to improve athletes' performance by enhancing reflective thinking as well as pre-reflective awareness. Furthermore, we discuss the epistemological and practical considerations regarding the selection and use of activity traces in SCMPIs. The paper calls for further research to evaluate the SCMPI's impact on performance in elite athletes, emphasizing the need for a rational application of this method in both research and practical interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behaviour settings are sociocultural places defined by three main ecological aspects: the affordances of material structures, typical patterns of skilful action and socially situated norms. These aspects explain the observed regularities of human behaviour associated with the material characteristics of places. However, the focus of ecological theories on how individual agents attune their actions to the pre-established order of behaviour settings neglects the agents' active role in sustaining or motivating transformations in this order. We therefore propose an alternative enactive approach to behaviour settings that accounts for the role of agents as active supporters and transformers of behaviour settings. Based on the enactive concepts of agency, normativity and dialectics, we argue that agents, as participants of behaviour settings, simultaneously respond to multiple normative dimensions (e.g. biological, sensorimotor and interactive). To sustain the order of behaviour settings, agents sometimes need to inhibit other normative responses of their bodies, which sometimes is detrimental to one or many aspects of their lives. Nonetheless, agents can collectively trigger the transformation of behaviour settings. This transformation can occur dialectically as tensions between two or more norms to which human bodies respond are resolved, even if new tensions arise and the process of changing behaviour setting continues. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to introduce a design-based research (DBR) approach developed in the field of vocational and continuing education, which is grounded in a pragmatic and phenomenologically inspired enactivist approach to activity. As a design-based methodology, our activity-centered and enactive DBR approach aims to generate knowledge related to design and to identify relevant design principles. After detailing the particularities of an activity-centered and enactive DBR approach, we focus on the results pertaining to design knowledge by identifying two broad design principles for vocational education and training, and five enactivist inspired principles for training design. A significant practical implication for researchers and practitioners in vocational and continuing education and training is that these enactivist inspired design principles provide promising pathways to enhance the connectivity between (i) work experiences, (ii) work and training practices, and (iii) learning contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ethology, and more generally in the study of animal behavior, observations are theory-laden. A review of theories of animal behavior reveals that the animal is a variable object, shaped by variable levels of causality. This approach to animal behavior, which differs radically from the way psychology studies human behavior, is a consequence of the difficulty of treating animals as subjects in ethology, where they are most often studied in the third person. However, there is a subjectivist tradition in the study of animal behavior, influenced by a phenomenological background. Our aim to promote a at first person approach has led us to propose an etho-phenomenology based on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, Francisco Varela's enaction theory and constructivist psychology. However, in order to legitimize this approach to animal behavior, we apply it here to behaviors that seem abnormal according to traditional explanatory frameworks, such as actospatiality, tail carrying in mice or expressing ambivalence displayed through color in octopuses. Furthermore, to explore issues such as human-animal communication, the etho-phenomenological perspective is combined with the notion of participatory sense-making, leading us to propose a theory of emotional hybridization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional theories of motor learning emphasize the automaticity of skillful actions. However, recent research has emphasized the role of pre-reflective self-consciousness accompanying skillful action execution. In the present paper, we present the course-of-experience framework as a means of studying elite athletes' pre-reflective self-consciousness in the unfolding activity of performance optimization. We carried out a synthetic presentation of the ontological and epistemological foundation of this framework. Then we illustrated the methodology by an in-depth analysis of two elite windsurfers' courses of experience. The analysis of global and local characteristics of the riders' courses of experience reveal (a) the meaningful activities accompanying the experience of ongoing performance optimization; (b) the multidimensionality of attentional foci and the normativity of performance self-assessment; and (c) a micro-scale phenomenological description of continuous improvement. These results highlight the fruitfulness of the course-of-experience framework to describe the experience of being absorbed in an activity of performance optimization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the phenomenon of joint attention and its relevance in understanding the modes of awareness of the presence of God. It explores the perspectives of Eleonore Stump and Andrew Pinsent, as well as the challenge raised by Donald Bungum, with the aim of reaching a better understanding of a distinct way of being 'moved by God in a divine way'. According to Stump and Pinsent, joint attention can deepen our understanding of our relationship with God, emphasizing the importance of sharing attention with Him and making better sense of the way humans may be moved in a divine way. However, Bungum challenges this view by suggesting the possibility of closeness without explicit awareness. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for a nuanced understanding of awareness and the presence of God in our spiritual lives, for our connection with God can manifest in diverse ways different from traditional accounts of explicit awareness. We suggest that a view of joint attention centered in action may be more suitable for an attempt to make sense of what 'to be moved in a divine way' amounts to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Empathy is foundational in our intersubjective interactions, connecting with others across bodily, emotional, and cognitive dimensions. Previous evidence suggests that observing individuals in painful situations elicits whole bodily responses, unveiling the interdependence of the body and empathy. Although the role of the body has been extensively described, the temporal structure of bodily responses and its association with the comprehension of subjective experiences remain unclear. Objective: Building upon the enactive approach, our study introduces and examines “bodyssence,” a neologism formed from “body” and “essence.” Our primary goal is to analyze the temporal dynamics, physiological, and phenomenological elements in synchrony with the experiences of sportspersons suffering physical accidents. Methods: Using the empirical 5E approach, a refinement of Varela’s neurophenomenological program, we integrated both objective third-person measurements (postural sway, electrodermal response, and heart rate) and firstperson descriptions (phenomenological data). Thirty-five participants watched videos of sportspersons experiencing physical accidents during extreme sports practice, as well as neutral videos, while standing on a force platform and wearing electrodermal and heart electrodes. Subsequently, micro-phenomenological interviews were conducted. Results: Bodyssence is composed of three distinct temporal dynamics. Forefeel marks the commencement phase, encapsulating the body’s pre-reflective consciousness as participants anticipate impending physical accidents involving extreme sportspersons, manifested through minimal postural movement and high heart rate. Fullfeel, capturing the zenith of empathetic engagement, is defined by profound negative emotions, and significant bodily and kinesthetic sensations, with this stage notably featuring an increase in postural movement alongside a reduction in heart rate. In the Reliefeel phase, participants report a decrease in emotional intensity, feeling a sense of relief, as their postural control starts to reach a state of equilibrium, and heart rate remaining low. Throughout these phases, the level of electrodermal activity consistently remains high. Conclusion: This study through an enactive approach elucidates the temporal attunement of bodily experience to the pain experienced by others. The integration of both first and third-person perspectives through an empirical 5E approach reveals the intricate nature of bodyssence, offering an innovative approach to understanding the dynamic nature of empathy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mindfulness is the method of studying attention and discovering exfaience; it is increasing in educational research in Western universities and demonstrates itself in publications and curricula. Therefore, applying mindfulness in the educational system can improve the methods of learning and attention. This pafa first studies modern mindfulness and its results. Then criticizes its challenes & limitations that are affected by theoretical foundations. Originally, mindfulness took a holistic position and was not confined to one aspect. Today, neuroscience, cognitive science, and clinical psychology reduced mindfulness to the psychological dimension. In comparison, it is extended in many aspects like ethical, spiritual, cultural, and social. Although mindfulness achieved brilliant results, it might act as an inner technological control tool that is normalized and internalized. In neurophenomenology, however, the Buddhist origins and ethical-spiritual features would be kept, respected, and accepted results from empirical areas. Neurophenomenology proposes enactive & embodied mindfulness awareness to preserve all mindfulness features. Mindfulness is something more and beyond recovering from mental illnesses. It follows healing in ethical conduct to reach self-transcendence and intersubjectivity relation. Thus, this pafa explains embodied mindfulness and considers its educational implications according to the neurophenomenology faspectives. Keywords: embodied mindfulness, enaction, neurophenomenology, learning exfaience, attention training, intersubjective interactions Synopsis Education is the process of mind making. So, we need a method to help us understand our educational exfaiences profoundly. Mindfulness is the method of studying exfaience. In the last decade, scientific research about mindfulness has increased. The findings could transform the fundamental realm philosophy of education and its sub-branches like curriculum, educational technology, and educational planning (Burrows, 2011; Thierry et al., 2018). Nevertheless, mindfulness and its remarkable results have not found a place in the education system in Iran yet. Generally, the mindfulness techniques in Iran have more used as a clinical or cognitive therapy especially mental issues such as anxiety, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and etc. (Kaviani et al., 2005; Pourhosein et al., 2019). Since the findings indicate that mindfulness training improve cognitive, emotional, emotional function and can make better the processes of attention, memory and learning, therefore, mindfulness approach can help resolving educational problems and give opportunity to students reflect on their pedagogical exfaiences precisely. However, there is a crucial point that has to be considered about mindfulness training and using mindfulness in education. Mindfulness originally is holistic as the human. It means mindfulness should comprise multiple psychological, social, moral, and cultural dimensions. Western researchers used to apply mindfulness in clinical, and psychological ways and its effect on neural activities or mental fasonal disorders. While this dimension is only a part of whole mindfulness. Mindfulness cannot reach its goal by considering only one aspect that modern mindfulness uses today. Thus, choosing a reductionism or holism position will determine different consequences for the education system. Firstly, the pafa presents Western and Buddhist views of mindfulness and then, proposes embodied enactive mindfulness according to the neurophenomenology faspective is rooted in Buddhism. This position makes modern Western mindfulness more fafect and fruitful. Neurophenomenology is the methodological stream that chooses different methods compared to theories like representationalism, dualism, Physicalism, and empirical realism. In this view, if cognitive science is to include human exfaience, it must have some method for exploring and knowing what human exfaience is. It is for this reason that neurophenomenology focus on the Buddhist tradition of mindfulness(Varela et al., 2017). Mindfulness in the enactive embodiment approach should not be considered as a private realm but a form of specific knowledge to shape the states and behaviors of mind-body in the environment. The term embodiment imply that the mind is not just settled inside the head, but is embodied in the whole organism embedded in its environment (Thompson, 2001). Our sensorimotor actions interact with our social-cultural context. Our mind can obtain a new faception in every moment and in contrast, erase our previous faceptions or presumptions (Shapiro & Stolz, 2019). It means the biases obtained by right and wrong learning that emerged in interaction with the environment are constantly subjected to restudy and reconstitute. Thus, the embodied reflection first needs to ignore the expired faspectives that emphasize mind-body separation. Embodied mindfulness has more responsibilities than supporting cognitive-emotional powers and individual psychological treatment. Moral, social, and spiritual education is also considered. Thompson (2017) as an outstanding neurophenomenologist believes that Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction or MBSR was meant from the beginning to be a clinical program orthogonal to common narratives of health and well-being, a laboratory for a more exfaiential and participatory medicine, a vehicle for self-education, healing, and transformation rather than a new therapy. However, it has changed its plan and now, it has little value from the faspective of healing, transformation, or liberation. Consequently, modern mindfulness has gradually separated from the holistic and comprehensive original view. Morality is an inseparable part of every mindfulness practice even morality is not mentioned formally as secular mindfulness programs are acting like that. Educators and teachers can guide students to establish a true moral foundation. Conclusion: the embodied mindfulness; the mind art for sense-making of learning exfaience Embodied mindfulness tries to modify the unwilling gap between mind-body and help the theory and practice domains in education. However, it needs some exfaience in the classroom and encourages teachers and students to reflect on their bodies. The thinking should not be apart from something isolated from their own, and the mind shouldn't be considered apart location where they only contemplate. Indeed, consciousness is created in their environment where they have intersubjective and inter-body interactions with others. The embodied education emphasizes interaction actions and enagement of students to the environment, subject matters, and contents which they all are the mind content students. The process of learning and its exfaiences would be more constant in embodied education. For example, teachers try to attract the student's attention to how the learning exfaience is built. Perhaps, narrating the story might be fascinating for learners. Describing how eyes and tongue movement, the activities of ears, hands, walking, teacher's hand movement, blackboard, tablet, digital devices, or even the object of a science lesson and the whole space of the classroom play a role in creating the student's learning exfaience. This is the simple explanation of embodied mindfulness that can amplify their consciousness, attention, and reflection. However, mindful reflection is not only about the exfaience shaping but reflection itself is a form of exfaience. The reflection can interrupt everyday habitual chain patterns. Habitual chains mean eliminating artistic, passionate, and innovative aspects of our daily lives and becoming automatic, impulsive, and robotic activities. In contrast, mindfulness is the opposite of habitual patterns. Through embodied mindfulness, students get the opportunity to reflect on their learning exfaience at the moment. In addition, since embodied mindfulness happens in the class which is a part of the large context, it is social. Students interact with others and learn how to go beyond themselves and think about their classmates as a part of themselves. This is self-transcendence the feature can take a fason beyond individuality, and care about other people such as his/herself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I focus on the concept of embeddedness as the background against which eros is a force and a power in and through interactions. To go beyond an internalist account of eros, I engage in a dialogue with some philosophical accounts of desire from an enactive perspective.This enables me to shed light on the location of the embodied tension as "in-between" lovers and "all-around" them. Crucial to this tensional account of embedded eros is the intertwining between self and others' becomings in processes of participatory sense-making. Through participatory sense-making lovers make their worlds, creating new ways of being and knowing in the ensemble. I advance some steps towards an enactive ethics of eros where, I claim, the cultivation of the space in-between and all-around lovers is the key to avoid the traps of a degenerated form of eros. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is an editorial titled "Towards an enactive approach to health: an integrative perspective which considers interdependence, agency, autonomy and participatory sensemaking in therapeutic phenomena." It discusses the limitations of the biomedical paradigm in addressing health, which tends to separate mind and body and prioritize objective indicators of disease. The enactive approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the interdependence of living organisms with their environment and the importance of sense-making in health. The editorial highlights several research articles that explore health from an enactive perspective, covering topics such as subjectivity in health assessment, the participatory nature of clinical treatment, and the role of developmental understanding in health. Overall, the studies provide evidence of how the enactive paradigm can contribute to a deeper understanding of human health. [Extracted from the article]

Contextualisation research in entrepreneurship is on the rise. Scholars generally view it positively, as contextualisation allows for a better understanding of the bigger picture, whilst also concerns are voiced. However, contextualisation may lead to an overly fragmented field and its possible disintegration. This calls for 'the emergence of sensible approaches to contextualisation that provide guidance in balancing its benefits and costs' as reported by Welter et al. (Small Business Economics 52(2):319–330, 2019) which is the challenge we address in this Special Issue. More specifically, we argue that an investigation of the construction and enactment of contexts provides a path to better understand the identified tension. The aim of this Special Issue ties in with increasing calls in the entrepreneurship literature for going beyond agent centric views towards accounts that theorise the interconnections between agency and structure. Taken together, the articles in this special issue contribute to (1) a stronger grounding for entrepreneurship theories and concepts; (2) a more balanced conceptualisation of both agency and context; (3) a shift from the 'standard model' of entrepreneurship; and (4) context sensitive entrepreneurship methodologies and approaches. We end with identifying further research avenues. Plain English Summary: Contextualisation research in entrepreneurship is on the rise. With contextualisation we aim to understand the external environmental factors impacting entrepreneurial activities. Many scholars believe it provides a better understanding of the bigger picture, whereby others highlight that contextualisation may lead to an overly fragmented field and its possible disintegration. In this Special Issue, we argue that by investigating 'doing contexts', which are the making, unmaking, and remaking of sites for entrepreneurial action, we help to tackle this challenge. Taken together, the articles of this Special Issue contribute to (1) a stronger grounding for entrepreneurship theories and concepts; (2) a more balanced conceptualisation of both agency and context; (3) a shift from the 'standard model' of entrepreneurship; and (4) context sensitive entrepreneurship methodologies and approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Signa is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Creative Arts in Education & Therapy is the property of Inspirees International B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the context of global research culture, practitioner-researchers in theatre and performance have consistently struggled to best account for the embodied and emergent qualities of their subjects. As methodologies for 'practice as research' (PaR) in theatre and performance have developed since the 1990s, artistic researchers have often continued to define themselves against scientific conceptions of thinking, knowledge, and research to highlight the specific efficacies of artistic practice. I argue that this strategy genuinely hinders researchers, and that interdisciplinary approaches that move across the sciences, humanities, and arts are the key to robust accounts of theatre and performance. By revisiting a seminal PaR performance project, Joanne 'Bob' Whalley and Lee Miller's Partly Cloudy, Chance of Rain (2002), I suggest how interdisciplinary approaches such as enaction from the cognitive sciences should be integrated into PaR methodologies to better address the complexity and richness of embodiment and emergence in theatre and performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By considering the position of education as a pharmakon, highlighting its potential positive and negative effects on societies by its technical unfolding, the article proposes to explore the political and pedagogical role that public and collective performances can have within the public sphere as political devices for promoting and enacting radical democracy. To this end, it analyzes a contemporary collaborative artistic practice, the performance 'Un Violador en Tu Camino' ('A rapist in your path') by the feminist collective LASTESIS from Chile, through two main philosophical perspectives: Bernard Stiegler (1952 - 2020), and his approach to technology, to art, and education in human societies; and Oliver Marchart, coming from his conceptualization of art and activism through the notion of conflictual aesthetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychedelics are psychoactive substances that receive renewed interest from science and society. Increasing empirical evidence shows that the effects of psychedelics are associated with alterations in biochemical processes, brain activity, and lived experience. Still, how these different levels relate remains subject to debate. The current literature presents two influential views on the relationship between the psychedelic molecule, neural events, and experience: The integration view and the pluralistic view. The main aim of this article is to contribute a promising complementary view by re-evaluating the psychedelic molecule-brain-experience relationship from an enactive perspective. We approach this aim via the following main research questions: (1) What is the causal relationship between the psychedelic drug and brain activity? (2) What is the causal relationship between brain activity and the psychedelic experience? In exploring the first research question, we apply the concept of autonomy to the psychedelic molecule-brain relationship. In exploring the second research question, we apply the concept of dynamic co-emergence to the psychedelic brain-experience relationship. Addressing these two research questions from an enactive position offers a perspective that emphasizes interdependence and circular causality on multiple levels. This enactive perspective not only supports the pluralistic view but enriches it through a principled account of how multi-layered processes come to interact. This renders the enactive view a promising contribution to questions around causality in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics with important implications for psychedelic therapy and psychedelic research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Pedagogicos (Valdivia) is the property of Estudios Pedagogicos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring data on experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one's experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the horizon of attending to experience by analogy to the "experimental arrangement" in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one's lack of epistemic access to the "original", observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., horizon of the method), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The neo-Darwinian theory of evolution and adaptation by natural selection has got us used to considering organisms' features as solutions to problems set by the environment. However, no living system faces an outside reality independent of itself: organisms and groups of organisms, by their constitution and activity, specify the content, events and properties of the world in which they live. In this perspective—the theory of enaction—, the organism does not need to be optimal but simply viable, and it appears as a fundamental actor of the becoming of its lineage at the scale of phylogeny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on the enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others' emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method. Materials and methods: Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person's painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson's bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant's own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of New Architecture is the property of New Architecture Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Freedom: An Impossible Reality (FAIR), Raymond Tallis finds room in a law-abiding universe for a uniquely human form of agency, capable of envisioning and pursuing genuinely open possibilities, thereby deflecting rather than merely inflecting the course of events, in accordance with self-owned intentions, reasons and goals. He argues that the genuinely free human pursuit of such propositional attitudes depends on our acting from a "virtual outside", at an epistemic distance from the physical world that reveals not only what is the case, but that it is the case. The enactive approach in cognitive science and philosophy of mind aims to supersede the cognitivist traditional that has long dominated the field, by reframing cognition as an agentʼs immediate, embodied engagement with its environment. In an appendix of FAIR, Tallis argues that this approach risks both eliminating propositional attitudes, and collapsing the epistemic distance between agent and world. He concludes that if enactive theorists are to distinguish between genuinely pursuing an intention and merely responding to a stimulus, their corrective to cognitivism is in need of a correction of its own. This paper argues that such a correction is already to be found within the enactive literature, and furthermore, that it bears striking similarities to Tallis own account of what makes human agency unique. It is therefore concluded that the case for freedom set out in FAIR is compatible with the enactive approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Reliance on sole reductionism, whether explanatory, methodological or ontological, is difficult to support in clinical psychiatry. Rather, psychiatry is challenged by a plurality of approaches. There exist multiple legitimate ways of understanding human functionality and disorder, i.e., different systems of representation, different tools, different methodologies and objectives. Pluralistic frameworks have been presented through which the multiplicity of approaches in psychiatry can be understood. In parallel of these frameworks, an enactive approach for psychiatry has been proposed. In this paper, we consider the relationships between the different kinds of pluralistic frameworks and this enactive approach for psychiatry. Methods: We compare the enactive approach in psychiatry with wider analytical forms of pluralism. Results: On one side, the enactive framework anchored both in cognitive sciences, theory of dynamic systems, systems biology, and phenomenology, has recently been proposed as an answer to the challenge of an integrative psychiatry. On the other side, two forms of explanatory pluralisms can be described: a non-integrative pluralism and an integrative pluralism. The first is tolerant, it examines the coexistence of different potentially incompatible or untranslatable systems in the scientific or clinical landscape. The second is integrative and proposes to bring together the different levels of understanding and systems of representations. We propose that enactivism is inherently a form of integrative pluralism, but it is at the same time a component of the general framework of explanatory pluralism, composed of a set of so-called analytical approaches. Conclusions: A significant number of mental health professionals are already accepting the variety of clinical and scientific approaches. In this way, a rigorous understanding of the theoretical positioning of psychiatric actors seems necessary to promote quality clinical practice. The study of entanglements between an analytical pluralism and a synthetic-organizational enactivist pluralism could prove fruitful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science has gathered robust evidence supporting the hypothesis that cognitive processes do not occur in an amodal format but take shape through the activation of the sensorimotor systems of the agent body, which works as simulation system upon which concepts, words, and thought are based. However, studies that have investigated the relationship between language and cognitive processes, as both embedded processes, are very rare. In this study, we investigated the hypothesis that intelligence is associated with referential competence, conceived as the ability to find words to refer to our subjective and perceptual experience, and to evoke understanding of this experience in the listener. We administered the WAIS-IV test to 32 nonclinical subjects and collected autobiographical narratives from them through the Relationship Anecdotes Paradigm Interview. The narratives were analyzed linguistically by applying computerized measures of referential competence. Intelligence scores were found to correlate with the use in narratives of words related to somatic and sensory sensations, while they were not associated with other measures of referential competence related to more abstract domains of experience or based on vivid or reflective dimensions of language style. The results support the hypothesis that sensorimotor schemas have an intrinsic role in language and cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I attempt to contribute to the developing field of “political philosophy of mind.” To render concrete the notion of “affective frame,” a social situation which pre-selects for salience and valence of environmental factors relative to a subject’s life, I conduct a case study of a deleterious socially instituted affective frame, which, during the early days of the COVID19 pandemic in the United States, produced individuated circumstances that came crashing down on “essential workers” who were forced into a double bind. We saw here an untenable and ultimately fatal situation that forced a choice between, on the one hand, increasing the risk of their failing to provide financial support for their family if they quit their job or reduced their hours, and on the other, increasing their risk of contracting the virus by continuing to work. The case study will thus be itself an affective frame that will bring to the fore for its readers a nexus of harmful social practices of contemporary American society. Form is reinforced by content here, as this particular affective frame brings forth a further emphasis on affect when we focus on workers simultaneously socialized into roles as breadwinners and as members of the caring professions. For those people, quitting work becomes even more difficult as they come to affirm their self-identity of being providers of affective labor for those in their care at work and of being the affective anchor of family life at home, the one who financially helps keep a roof over the heads of their loved ones as well as being the emotional backbone of the family. Hence the affective frame of “essential workers in Covid times” renders salient and affirmatively valenced their affectively laden self-image as caring helpers of those in need, at home and at work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organisms live not as discrete entities on which an independent environment acts, but as members of a reproductive lineage in an ongoing series of interactions between that lineage and a dynamic ecological niche. These interactions continuously shape both systems in a reciprocal manner, resulting in the emergence of reliably co-occurring configurations within and between both systems. The enactive approach to cognition describes this relationship as the structural coupling between an organism and its environment; similarly, Developmental Systems Theory emphasizes the reciprocal nature of structurally coupled systems in its analysis of organisms as developmental processes embedded within a developmental system. Through an enactive-developmental systems framing, this paper identifies the organizational features of cognizing systems in order to motivate a picture of how organism and environment co-determine and co-construct one another. I argue that organisms can be characterized as self-organizing, operationally closed, plastic systems ecologically embedded within a developmental system. In virtue of this organizational makeup, organisms actively engage in the modulation and assessment of their coupling with their environment: cognitive strategies that entail contextualized responses to variations across the web of interactions that comprises the developmental system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Internationale PME is the property of Institue de Recherche sur les PME and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Several studies have revealed the abusive behaviors directed against athletes in various sports contexts, but knowledge about the processes by which the athletes realize and accept or reject maltreatment is underdeveloped. Thus, it is difficult to establish a solid scientific basis for characterizing the mechanisms of maltreatment from the athletes' perspective regarding the forms of maltreatment they endure and the impact on their performance and wellbeing. The main goals of this paper are to show how the enactive approach (including theoretical assumptions and methodological standards) can meet these challenges, as it is well-suited to (a) describe the evolving interactions between athletes and the sports situations that lead to maltreatment (i.e., navigating in the gray area of coach-athlete relationships), (b) identify those alert landmarks that help us assess the level of risk of athlete maltreatment, and (c) provide concrete guidelines to prevent and deal with sports-related maltreatment. We illustrate our approach by a case study that examines the experience of a retired high-level boxer who faced several forms of maltreatment. Our results reveal a dynamic change in the interactions between the boxer and the maltreatment situations that led her through (a) Acceptance (i.e., future-oriented positive involvement), (b) Regulation attempt (i.e., negative feelings about weight loss, exhaustion and loneliness, questioning the compromise between performance and health, acceptance and loneliness), (c) Distancing (i.e., reopening to others) and (d) Rejection (i.e., rebellion and the decision to stand up to her coach and leave). Based on our results, we present concrete guidelines to prevent and address sports-related maltreatment, with four progressive alert landmarks that help situate the athlete in the gray area of coach-athlete relationships and suggest a "timeline" of maltreatment escalation with key warnings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study was to theorise on a composer's corporeality from the point of view of the embodied, enacted, embedded, and extended cognition paradigm, in the light of empirical data that cover the compositional process of creating one particular piece of music. The data include related manuscripts and the composer's verbal account of those manuscripts. Composition is seen as an interactive coping behaviour and an adaptive process of knowledge acquisition and production in a sonic environment. In this epistemic process, the composer begins working with various kinds of ideas: sounds, timbres, musical structures, experiences, philosophical thoughts. They explicate these intuitive or reflective embodied representations through different kinds of externalisations, such as musical gestures, narratives, visualisation, and finally, musical notation. This study substantiates the way in which embodied, extrabodily, embedded, and enactive processes constitute the cognitive acts of a composer, usually considered as almost purely mental. It shows how musical composition may not only be grounded but also depend on embodied knowledge that the score only partly conveys. In addition to helping composers and performers communicate in real life, the findings may be useful for identifying the different cognitive premises and circumstances that can result in discrepancies between the ways in which they interpret musical notation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies have shown that doping behavior emerges from contexts. Educational research would therefore be enriched by explorations of the situatedness of athletes’ activity and its dynamics of development inside sporting life courses. The principles can be summarized as (a) the connection between antidoping and athletes’ time-specific and meaningful concerns, (b) the creation of fields of possible activity that preserve athletes from doping, (c) the focus on propensities toward activities that pull athletes away from doping, and (d) the regular and timely updating of programs. Following this, the general framework for the antidoping education of elite athletes comprises four levels articulated by their distribution over the periods of athletes’ careers: (a) creating and maintaining a global antidoping culture via continuous socialization, (b) developing a sustained antidoping background via situated activities, (c) supporting punctual and specific needs with free services for all athletes, and (d) promoting tertiary prevention and post-career education. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper aims to show that genders are enacted, by providing an account of how an individual can be said to enact a gender and explaining how, consequently, genders can be fluid. On the enactive-ecological view we defend, individuals first and foremost perceive the world as fields of affordances, that is, structured sets of action possibilities. Fields of natural affordances offer action possibilities because of the natural properties of organisms and environments. Handles offer graspability to humans because of physical-structural properties of handles and the anatomical-physiological properties of humans. Although humans live in fields of bodily, action, and cultural affordances, our work focuses on cultural affordances, where action possibilities are offered to individuals because of the normative responses of individuals in that culture. Knocking on a door affords entrance because knocking provides cultured individuals on the other side of the door an affordance to which they themselves behave normatively. Usually, behaving normatively in response to cultural affordances brings about sequences of perception-action loops, which we will call "scripts": for instance, closed doors afford knocking, which affords the individual inside opening the door, which affords an interpersonal meeting, which (may) afford entrance. Although the notion of script has a strong cognitivist flavor, one of the aims of the paper to provide an ecological account of scripts, to show that what cognitivists viewed as representations (or representational structures) are in fact environmentally structured perception-action loops. On our account of gender, gendered cultures build and maintain gendered cultural affordance landscapes, that is, landscapes in which the action possibilities individuals face are normed according to a specific body type or situation; most often (assigned) biological sex. Individuals enact a given gender when they come to perceive the affordances reserved for one gender by their culture and respond in the culturally normative way, thus enacting gendered sequences of perception-action loops (i.e., gendered scripts). With the shifting landscapes of cultural affordances brought about by several recent social, technological, and epistemic developments in some cultures, the gendered landscapes of affordances offered to individuals in these cultures have become more varied and less rigid, thus increasing the variety and flexibility of scripts individuals can enact. This entails that individuals in such cultures have an increased possibility for gender fluidity, which may in part explain the increasing number of people currently identifying outside the binary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a variety of contemplative traditions, non-dual-oriented practices were developed to evoke an experiential shift into a mode of experiencing in which the cognitive structures of self-other and subject–object subside. These practices serve to de-reify the enactment of an observing witness which is usually experienced as separate from the objects of awareness. While several contemplative traditions, such as Zen, Mahāmudrā, Dzogchen, and Advaita Vedanta emphasize the importance of such a non-dual insight for the cultivation of genuine wellbeing, only very few attempts in contemplative science have turned toward the study of non-dual-oriented practices. This article starts from a recently developed theoretical cognitive science framework that models the requirements of a temporary experiential shift into a mode of experiencing free from cognitive subject–object structure. This model inspired by the enactive approach contributes theoretically grounded hypotheses for the much-needed rigorous study of non-dual practices and non-dual experiences. To do so, three steps are taken: first, common elements of non-dual-oriented practices are outlined. Second, the main ideas of enactive cognitive science are presented including a principled theoretical model of what is required for a shift to a pure non-dual experience, that is, an experiential mode that is unbound by subject–object duality. Third, this synthesized theoretical model of the requirements for the recognition of the non-dual is then compared with a specific non-dual style of meditation practice, namely, Mahāmudrā practice from Tibetan Buddhism. This third step represents a heuristic for evaluating the external coherence of the presented model. With this, the aim is to point toward a principled enactive view of non-dual meditative practice. In drawing the implications of the presented model, this article ends with an outlook toward next steps for further developing a research agenda that may fully address the concrete elements of non-dual practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two major philosophical movements have sought to fundamentally rethink the relationship between humans and their environment(s): environmental ethics and enactivism. Surprisingly, they virtually never refer to or seek inspiration from each other. The goal of this analysis is to bridge the gap. Our main purpose, then, is to address, from the enactivist angle, the conceptual backbone of environmental ethics, namely the concept of intrinsic value. We argue that intrinsic value does indeed exist, yet its "intrinsicality" does not boil down to being independent of the interests and needs of humans. Rather, it is brought forth by what we call shared enaction of an axiological domain. The latter is built upon such core posits of enactivism as autonomy, enaction, participatory sense-making as well as the most recent concept of loving as knowing proposed by Hanne De Jaegher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Activités is the property of ARPACT and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As a result of the COVID‐19 pandemic, many therapists and patients have been required to switch to online sessions in order to continue their treatments. Online psychotherapy has become increasingly popular, and although its efficacy seems to be similar to face‐to‐face encounters, its capacity to support the implicit nonverbal and embodied aspects of the therapeutic relationship has been questioned and remains understudied. Objectives: To study how embodied and intersubjective processes are modified in online psychotherapy sessions. Design: Taking the enactive concept of participatory sense‐making as a guiding thread, we designed an interpretative phenomenological analysis to examine the experiences of embodiment in online therapy. Methods: We conducted phenomenological semi‐structured interviews with patients and therapists who have recently switched from face‐to‐face encounters to online modality. Results: Adjustments in verbal and nonverbal behavior, gaze behavior, management of silences, and displacements of non‐intentional and pre‐reflective patterns onto reflective ones are reported as necessary to compensate for changes introduced in the online modality. Conclusions: From an enactive perspective, such adaptations manifest regulatory processes aimed at sustaining interactive dynamics and coordinating the primordial tension between relational and individual norms in social encounters. Practitioner points: We examine different aspects of embodiment that practitioners should take into account when switching from face‐to‐face to online encounters with their clients.Online communication systems can alter aspects of the therapeutic relationship, such as its structure, its fragility, and its significance.Video calls afford new forms of intervention such as integrating the experience of patients with their self‐image, incorporating information about their habitual environment into the process, and adopting less confrontational therapeutic styles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As youngsters in a Pakistani megacity participate in a reading group to discuss the end of time by looking at the eschatological prophecies in Islamic religious sources, they come to relate apparently trivial political actions such as wall-painting, placard-holding, and pamphlet-distributing to the question of justice. We suggest in this article that this complex phenomenon can be best understood through the concept of enaction, as ethical actions are seen to enact a context suffused with political and cosmological considerations. Accordingly, our discussion positions itself against those works in the anthropology of ethics that primarily view such ethical actions in terms of self-cultivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The enactive approach provides a perspective on human bodies in their organic, sensorimotor, social, and linguistic dimensions, but many fundamental issues still remain unaddressed. A crucial desideratum for a theory of human bodies is that it be able to account for concrete human becoming. In this article I show that enactive theory possesses resources to achieve this goal. Being an existential structure, human becoming is best approached by a series of progressive formal indications. I discuss three standpoints on human becoming as open, indeterminate, and therefore historical using the voices of Pico della Mirandola, Gordon W. Allport, and Paulo Freire. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation we move from an existential to an ontological register in looking at modes of embodied becoming. His scheme of interpretation of the relation between modes of individuation allows us to understand human becoming in terms of a tendency to neotenization. I compare this ontology with an enactive theoretical account of the dimensions of embodiment, finding several compatibilities and complementarities. Various forms of bodily unfinishedness in enaction fit the Simondonian ontology and the existential analysis, where transindividuality corresponds to participatory sense-making and Freire's joint becoming of individuals and communities correlates with the open tensions in linguistic bodies between incorporation and incarnation of linguistic acts. I test some of this ideas by considering the plausibility of artificial bodies and personal becoming from an enactive perspective, using the case of replicants in the film Blade Runner. The conclusion is that any kind of personhood, replicants included, requires living through an actual history of concrete becoming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning (and while explaining them, they often imagine computers at work). But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational knowing to the detriment of engaged, human knowing pervades societal practices and institutions, often with harmful effects on people and their relations. There are many reasons why we need a new, engaged—or even engaging—epistemology of human knowing. The enactive theory of participatory sense-making takes steps towards this, but it needs deepening. Kym Maclaren's (2002) idea of letting be invites such a deepening. Characterizing knowing as a relationship of letting be provides a nuanced way to deal with the tensions between the knower's being and the being of the known, as they meet in the process of knowing-and-being-known. This meeting of knower and known is not easy to understand. However, there is a mode of relating in which we know it well, and that is: in loving relationships. I propose to look at human knowing through the lens of loving. We then see that both knowing and loving are existential, dialectic ways in which concrete and particular beings engage with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, John Stewart contributed a book manuscript entitled " Questioning Life and Cognition: Some Foundational Issues in the Paradigm of Enaction " to the Enaction Series in Online Collaborative Publishing, edited by Olivier Gapenne and Bruno Bachimont. Along with Mattéo Mossio, I was invited by Olivier to serve as a glossator of this text. The purpose was to thereby continue our long and fruitful dialogues with John that began when we were both students. I took advantage of the opportunity to also express my gratitude to John for his participation in that formative stage of my personal academic journey. My reflections were included as an epilogue to his book. In memoriam, the epilogue is reproduced in this report unchanged. I will always be grateful to John for making the research community of enaction feel like family to me and for helping me recognize that there is a place for my diverse interests in the continued pursuit of an academic career. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Breathing Life into Biology is a brave attempt to do science while wearing its values on its sleeves. It is written under the commitment that life is intrinsically valuable, and its value has to be taken seriously in doing biology. Stewart defends a conception of life in which every living organism has a subjective point of view from which it makes sense of the world. Under this conception and the commitment that life is valuable in itself, the book presents the story of life from its origin and our history as humankind. However, the book is more successful in presenting the former than the latter. Yet Stewart's conception of enaction opens the possibility for cognitive science and his conception of what makes us human enables us to embrace the histories and the forms of life of those who have been systematically silenced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I briefly reflect on the work of John Stewart and his instrumental role in the development of enactive cognitive science, his outstanding ability to communicate across disciplines, and his research obsessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Stewart commits himself to the defence of a demanding version of enaction. Among its many original features, John's version of enaction includes a questionable form of anti-representationalism, and leaves room for the Varelian idea that intentionality is a biological property. This stance anticipates contemporary endorsements in 4E cognition of intentionality as a non-representational and non-contentful property. Once it is deprived of its representational tinsels, intentionality appears to us again as a property of object-directedness. Nevertheless, is the autopoietic model of intentionality as object-directedness coherent and convincing? And do we need intentionality when we describe the meaningful relations between organisms and their environments? The article seeks to answer to these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This article examines how spectators describe their expectations of contemporary dance by referring to action. Through discussing a qualitative audience study, the article argues that spectators always have an expectation of being affected by performances they attend. This expectation can guide their interest in attending performances of certain genres instead of other possible ones on offer. Additionally, the article points out how spectators can actively manage their expectations in order to be affected. Design/methodology/approach: The study is based on 21 in-depth interviews with spectators at a dance venue, a company and a festival in Finland. The analysis of the interviews combines thematic analysis with metaphor analysis. Employing the paradigm of enaction and the concept of affordances, this article approaches expectations as embodied and dynamic, created in interactions between artists, producers and spectators. Findings: The analysis shows that when speaking about their expectations of performances, spectators use bodily and spatial metaphors. Focusing on metaphors reveals how, for the spectators, performances afford a possibility for action that affects them. The interviewed spectators describe that contemporary dance is "not set in its ways", and therefore it keeps them "awake" and their thoughts do "not fossilize". This way, they understand contemporary dance as a genre that affords a possibility to be affected by allowing a freedom of own interpretation and surprising experiences if they desire such. Originality/value: Concentration on the metaphors of language offers a deeper understanding of the active nature of spectators' expectations. Understanding how spectators describe their expectations by referring to action that enables the shaping of their emotions and thoughts can help the development of arts marketing and audience engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The enactive approach has become an influential paradigm in cognitive science. One of its most important claims is that cognition is sense-making: to cognize is to enact a world of meaning. Thus, a world is not pregiven but enacted through sense-making. Most importantly, sense-making is not a fixed process or thing. It does not have substantial existence. Instead, it is groundless : it springs from a dynamic of relations, without substantial ground. Thereby, as all cognition is groundless, this groundlessness is considered the central underlying principle of cognition. This article takes that key concept of the enactive approach and argues that it is not only a theoretical statement. Rather, groundlessness is directly accessible in lived experience. The two guiding questions of this article concern that lived experience of groundlessness: (1) What is it to know groundlessness? (2) How can one know groundlessness? Accordingly, it elaborates (1) how this knowing of groundlessness fits into the theoretical framework of the enactive approach. Also, it describes (2) how it can be directly experienced when certain requirements are met. In an additional reflexive analysis, the context-dependency and observer-relativity of those statements themselves is highlighted. Through those steps, this article exhibits the importance of knowing groundlessness for a cognitive science discourse: this underlying groundlessness is not only the "ground" of cognition, but it also can be investigated empirically through lived experience. However, it requires a methodology that is radically different from classical cognitive science. This article ends with envisioning a future praxis of cognitive science which enables researchers to investigate not only theoretically but empirically the "foundationless foundation" of cognition: groundlessness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution examines how an expert musician teaches high pitch as an embodied practice in a digital instruction video. Musical meaning-making in this perspective calls for a naturalized phenomenology which deals with the practice of music teaching, which involves a performing body. The notion of high musical pitch in terms of an abstract embodied image schema is challenged in favor of a multidimensional body schema, conceptualized at the interface between multimodal language, i.e. in speech and gesture, and the affordances imposed on musical production by the human body and the instrument artefact. As a result, the traditional metaphorical take on upward verticality, movement and causal force in image schemata becomes a conceptual background which may lead to errors on behalf of the potential student, and needs to be further enriched by natural local corporeal dimensions: immobility, non-vertical change in the lips, mouth and air flow. Such body schemata can be used in teaching more dynamic concepts about enactive knowledge in the body in interactive contexts of knowledge transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]