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We provide a rationale for the mixed relationship between product market competition and unionized wage, and more importantly, for a generally unexplained empirical evidence of a positive relationship between product market competition and unionized wage. We show that a higher product market competition decreases (increases) unionized wage if the external scale economies are weak (strong). However, a higher product market competition may decrease or increase the unionized wage if the external scale economies are moderate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors investigate the impact of exchange rate movements on wage determination in unionized labor markets. Using a simple model of international oligopoly, the authors show that organized labor has a rational incentive to accept lower wages in the face of a currency appreciation. They examine this proposition empirically using a matched worker-firm data set for Portugal and, though the impact varies considerably with worker characteristics, find results consistent with the predictions of the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the impact of privatization on wage formation in unionized labour markets. Using longitudinal worker-firm data for Portugal spanning the period 1991–2007, we find that privatization significantly increases the actual paid wage and show that this effect occurs via two different channels. First, privatization tends to increase the wage floor negotiated via collective bargaining. Second, privately owned firms tend to pay larger mark-ups on the union wage floor. These effects are heterogeneous across bargaining regimes and worker groups, with pay rises occurring only under more decentralized bargaining settings, and accruing predominantly to newcomers to the firm and highly educated workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that if the product market is not very much concentrated, open shop union, where the union density is less than one, may not be a justification for a positive relationship between product market competition and unionized wage, irrespective of the union density, bargaining power of the union and the union's preference for wage and employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do individual top managers matter for wages and wage policies? Are there general differences in 'style' among managers with respect to worker compensation? To shed light on these questions, we exploit a large panel dataset from Portugal that allows us to match workers, firms, and managers, and follow the movements of the latter across different firms over time. While accounting for the effect of worker and firm heterogeneity, we estimate the role of top manager fixed effects in determining wages and wage policies. The estimates suggest that (i) top managers have a significant influence on wages and wage policies; (ii) there exists different managerial 'styles'; and (iii) managers' (observable) attributes matter for worker compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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