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Copyright of Ankara Review of European Studies (ARES) / Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi (AAÇD) is the property of Ankara University European Union Research Centre and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the number of multi-facetted crises on the rise, with an international governance system deteriorating, how is the EU performing in putting its acts together to respond to these challenging times? In building up its foreign policy over the last two decades, the European Union has gone a long way from seeking 'coherence' between Members States to an 'integrated approach to conflicts and crises' embedded into the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Whilst still at an infant stage, the 'integrated approach' has led to institutional changes within the European External Action Service (EEAS), in particular the creation of a dedicated Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate. Its aims for a given crisis are promoting a comprehensive political and strategic plan shared by theEUand its Member States, acting in a unified manner and leading to synchronized actions. To be successful, including in the Union's neighbourhood, the integrated approach will need to be based on strong, clear and common EU foreign affairs objectives aiming at securing sustainable peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates the military operation of the European Union in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008-09. Despite a promising conceptual approach and close cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the operation created significant political problems between member states. It led to a split - France arguing that it carried too much of the burden and Germany and the United Kingdom sensing that they were sponsoring a pet project. When the UN failed to achieve its ambitious promises to establish a parallel presence and follow-on force, tensions arose with the UN as well. This type of operation is therefore unlikely to be repeated in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2014, the European Union (EU) launched EUFOR RCA, a military bridging operation that provided temporary support to the United Nations (UN) in achieving a safe and secure environment in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR), until March 2015. After EUFOR's mandate concluded, the union launched a follow up military advisory mission, EUMAM RCA, to improve the CAR armed forces' capacities and solidify EUFOR's achievements. However, the deployment processes of both EUFOR and EUMAM were characterized by a paradox: on the one hand, their planning processes were quick and effective; on the other hand, their force generation processes were prolonged and difficult. What explains this paradox? This article argues that, in the case of both missions, there was a mismatch between EU Member States' desire to act and their willingness to invest resources in those actions, that is, an intentions-reality gap. Due to the CAR's humanitarian emergency and France's appeal for burden-sharing, a sense of 'collective obligation' drove EU Member States to approve the deployment of EUFOR and EUMAM politically. However, since most Member States had no direct interests at stake in the CAR, they felt no equal sense of obligation to contribute to these efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy framework became operational in 2003, the Union has undertaken more than 20 crisis management operations. The drivers behind this activity remain debated. This article proposes a fresh interpretation based on governmental interests as defined by domestic political risks and opportunities. It argues that EU governments have tailored Common Security and Defence Policy action so as to satisfy domestic audiences. By way of illustration, this article examines the most ambitious Common Security and Defence Policy operation to date, the EU Force mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, as well as a deliberate non-intervention in a comparable case, in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in late 2008. By analysing the positions of the most relevant EU governments in each respective case, this article demonstrates how they corresponded to domestic political logic. Drawing on some 20 interviews with policy-makers, this article provides a theoretical account explaining the motives behind Common Security and Defence Policy decision-making rooted in original empirical evidence. The explanation for the haphazard pattern of Common Security and Defence Policy operations thus far can be found in the link between domestic politics and EU crisis management operations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyses the European Union's (EU's) largest European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military mission outside Europe to date; Eufor Tchad/RCA was a 3700-strong force involving personnel from 23 states, deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic for 12 months from March 2008. Far from this mission achieving EU 'supremacy' or projecting an 'imperial' reach, an evaluation of its objectives and achievements reveals acute limitations in the EU's ability to project power. The article analyses the context in which Eufor was conceived and deployed. It notes that the mission's weaknesses, like those of the United Nations mission to whom the EU transferred its security role in 2009, reflected its convoluted origins and objectives. Finally, the article examines whether the EU as a unitary actor has the desire or the ability to 'replace' individual European nations--in this case France--in their post-colonial military and 'humanitarian' roles in sub-Saharan Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the ways in which rapidly emerging narratives of EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management are rewriting and re-authorizing European practices of military intervention in Africa. By problematizing the underlying assumptions, this article points to the increasing significance of uncertainties about the location of contemporary political life, the location of 'crisis management', and thus to the diverse effects of a crisis management approach to African conflicts. Hence, this article problematizes and challenges a range of powerful normative claims about 'EU crisis management'. The emerging narratives are practices of knowledge and space that shape EU-Africa relations and that create new spaces of intervention, thus establishing and enabling relations of authority and control. Last, the article discusses briefly how such practices worked in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA (European Forces in Chad and the Central African Republic). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politique Africaine is the property of Karthala Editions Diffusion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Reports on developments concerning cooperation and trade in Africa, as of January 2004. European Union's decision to end consultations opened in June 2003 with the Central African Republic and partially restore cooperation with the country; Italy's cancellation of Cote d'Ivoire's commercial debt; Nigerian government's declaration of a ban on the importation of about 41 products; Move by the Rwandan government to give importers of leaded petrol two months to clear their storage facilities.